In this guest article, Captain Adrian Pierce RN(Rtd) takes an overview of developments to secure the undersea battlespace.
Control of the seas has long provided significant advantages in times of peace and has been a decisive factor in many wars. In the modern world, over 80% of international trade moves by sea, 99% of digital data travels through undersea cables, and it is estimated that in excess of $10 trillion worth of financial transactions travel through these cables daily. The oceans therefore remain vital for economic security and so heavily influence Defence thinking.
As the world confronts the realities of 21st-century warfare, maintaining superiority at sea remains crucial, particularly as the West faces a complex myriad of hybrid warfare and grey zone attacks. Over the past couple of years, a spate of sabotage attacks against undersea cables, particularly in the Baltic Sea, have exposed the vulnerability of Europe’s undersea infrastructure.
In September 2022, Nord Stream 2 was blown up. In October 2023, Hong Kong-flagged Newnew Polar Bear dragged its anchor across the gas pipeline linking Estonia and Finland. At the end of 2024, Finnish authorities seized control of the Eagle S. vessel – believed to be part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” of tankers – which was suspected of damaging the Estlink 2 power cable and four internet cables between Finland and Estonia on Christmas Day. In a distinct change of approach, these vessels were publicly named, and action was taken by relevant governments. This approach continued when in January of this year, Defence Secretary John Healey announced the Royal Navy was tracking and responding to the Russian intelligence collection ship, the Yantar, as it passed through British waters for the second time in less than three months and loitered in the vicinity of Critical Underwater Infrastructure (CUI).
The increased targeting of CUI by adversaries as a tactic of hybrid warfare intended to destabilise societies presents a major security challenge. The unpredictable nature of such sabotage makes it an attractive tactic for sowing confusion and doubt, complicating Europe’s ability to mount a unified and decisive response.
Tackling these threats therefore requires a new approach. The upcoming Undersea Defence Technology (UDT) exhibition and conference, taking place from 25th to 27th March in Oslo, arrives at a critical time. Showcasing the latest advancements in undersea technology, the event serves as a key forum for stakeholders from the international naval community to engage in constructive discussions, shaping policies and strategies to strengthen undersea maritime security.
Standing strong against common threats
Despite significant challenges, 2025 is shaping up to be a year of strengthened cooperation among allies. From a push for greater alignment between NATO’s European members to cutting-edge defence technologies showcased at both DSEI Japan (May) and DSEI UK (September), this year will see the defence and security community come together in greater numbers from across the world. Protecting our maritime borders and critical undersea infrastructure requires the same approach. Building resilience and credible deterrence against such sabotage requires collaboration between armed forces, governments, and industry.
We are seeing greater recognition of this, with the UK-led 10-nation Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), which recently activated Nordic Warden, a month-long advanced response option aimed at tracking potential threats to undersea infrastructure and monitoring Russia’s shadow fleet. This was immediately followed by the ongoing NATO initiative Baltic Sentry, led from JFC Brunssum in the Netherlands, and the announcement of TF-X Baltic, which will augment Baltic Sentry with a fleet of autonomous and uncrewed Vessels.
As nations step up to play a greater role in maritime defence, it is essential to emphasise a collective, unified, and decisive response while building resilience against such threats. Trade shows like UDT therefore serve as a valuable tool to bring together key stakeholders under one roof, allowing experts to share insights and collaborate on solutions.
Future defence technologies
As attacks against CUI look set to become a preferred tactic of hybrid warfare, the technologies and strategies designed to counter them must also evolve at pace. This will be a central topic during UDT, ensuring that the West and its allies develop the appropriate and effective technologies to build resilience against these threats.
As vulnerabilities in Europe’s CUI have been made increasingly clear, European nations have taken proactive steps to safeguard their maritime borders. Efforts have been made to increase the pace that damage to undersea cables is found and repaired. In 2024, the French Navy deployed an autonomous underwater vehicle capable of operating at depths of up to 6,000 metres below the ocean surface, while the UK announced the launch of two surveillance ships to support underwater operations, including undersea surveillance and cable protection. RFA Proteus, the first of the two ships, formally entered service in October 2023.
Yet advances in technology are not limited to the protection of CUI. Innovations in surveillance, data acquisition, architectures and automation can be seen throughout and across the underwater domain, as exemplified by the Royal Navy announcing Project CABOT. This plans to deliver remotely operated and autonomous ASW capabilities, built around the new Type 92 Sloop (an uncrewed surface vessel) and the Type 93 (a drone submarine), allowing the UK to pivot to a vision of “Digitalisation of the North Atlantic”. (More on project CABOT to come in a future article)
However, security in the maritime domain does not happen in isolation. Building robust resilience relies on multi-domain integration. Much of the tech on display during UDT will therefore showcase the integration of land, maritime, air, space, and cyber domains. This will be further explored later in the year at DSEI, where there will be a focus on greater interoperability and integration across all domains, an effort that will involve both traditional and non-traditional companies.
Thus, while our navies are undoubtedly operating in an increasingly contested maritime domain, the collaboration we are witnessing across Europe, NATO, and allies, serves as a crucial asset. Events over the past couple of months in particular have reinforced and publicised the importance of securing our maritime borders, both for national, international, and economic security. Therefore, as government delegations, industry leaders, and defence experts gather in Oslo for UDT, improving undersea defence capabilities and establishing a cohesive and decisive strategy to deter threats will be at the forefront of conversation.
UDT
Now in its 36th edition, UDT is the largest exhibition and conference dedicated to showcasing the latest in undersea defence technologies. The event brings together government agencies, industry leaders, senior military officials, and academia from across the world to discuss creative solutions – from subsea to space – to ongoing and emerging challenges.
Over the 3-day event, the most cutting-edge developments in maritime technology will be on display. Key technologies to pay attention to include unmanned underwater platforms such as autonomous and unmanned underwater vehicles (UAVs and UUVs), the latest in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems, cybersecurity solutions for subsea data cables, and surveillance and monitoring capabilities.
Thus, this year’s conference theme of ‘Innovate, Collaborate, Deliver’ exemplifies the need for joint dialogue and action in finding solutions and forming a cohesive and unified strategy to maritime threats. It also provides a venue for new and emerging tech companies to contribute fresh ideas into the discussion, and to hear the latest updates on key Underwater programmes such as the Type 212CD.
Uncrewed ships with a NA scale autonomous mission profile — going down the same rabbit hole as the lights out factory of 40 years ago.
How far away from support will they be able to operate?
How close will the bad guys come to influence the mission?
Bays with a set of toys in the welldeck would be a better place to start.
CABOT — contractor owned systems?
The MOD’s rentier vibe strikes again.
BAe’s cash is cheaper than the Treasury’s cash?
Bonanza for lawyers more like.
All very good points.
‘BAe’s cash is cheaper than the Treasury’s cash?’ Very much like PFI, treasury money is always cheaper than private.
I’m no fan of PFI.
However, could this be MoD and BAES collaborating to produce an exportable system?
Yes. In a piece on Naval News the whole performance lingo was on offer
Director ASW SDI in Navy Command’s Maritime Capability team. Commodore rtd.
Buzzword bingo turned up to 11.
Is their no fad that the MOD / Service brains trust doesn’t want to get involved in?
Beyond parody / very current — AI is included as it must given its current prominence.
Can we not just stick to pattern matching and meta data.
That is what will be on offer not Minority Report style drama.
Bonkers mental and then some.
Is there no one in the RN that can think for themselves?
Maverick containers — MI6 project or a MOD venture?
We need to start at the bottom and work our way up.
Do we monitor stray / maverick containers on the high seas?
The stuff that falls of the back of a poorly stacked containership in a storm …
Or so you would think.
Given they have 75m3 of mission space inside I think we need to give it a go.
Either that or we launch few ourselves and use a Bay to act as sheepdog.
Base point — I wonder if the stray container issue is particularly bad in the Red Sea?
It would be interesting to get your thoughts on what would be/are the rules of engagement when uncrewed vehicles are used and caught in the act of conducting sabotage of critical underwater infrastructure or sea based power generation? Similarly when not in a conflict and a crewed underwater vehicle is found in the act of doing sabotage, what would be the legal and appropriate response?
All
With respect to a “visting author” , one whom I think is writing here on NL for the first time….. …….all of this business about protection of CNI (Critical National Infrastructuture) is hardly “new stuff”
Because the RN very sucessfully used commercial cable laying ships – those propely equipped with grapples and big heavy anchors – to cut enemy communications cables in
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And so we come onto the development of new technology to deal with what is actually quite an old subject
“Type 92 Sloop (an uncrewed surface vessel) and the Type 93 (a drone submarine)”
A reality check is coming up next…..
The RN’s other uncrewed project – minehunting – is running years late and is well over its planned budget
Minehunting is far far simplier than deep underwater……………
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
The ocean is large and deep. I expect losses of these platforms will not be ‘uncommon’.
Then they must be made very cheaply and very secure.
They will neither be cheap or small.
Not a lawyer (thankfully) , but surely the response would be to approach closely and as best as possible record exactly what is going on.
You then publicise the footage and shame the offending party for their clumsiness.
Not even the Russians would carry on attaching limpet mines to pipelines with a UUV sitting there, seeing everything.
I absolutely understand the vital need for reconnaissance, surveillance and monitoring but would like to know, when and if we find a hostile craft doing something not should not be doing, and if necessary asking it politely to desist, how to we sink it?
David M
A VSS (Very Simple Solution)
= launch a NSM (or two) at the hostile / offending / enemy ship.
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
PS Sailorbouy:please don’t get the lawyers involved = because they only procrastinate: and thus look to find excuses not to do the right thing…….