In the early morning of 24 March, a Russian tank landing ship unloading in the occupied port of Berdyansk in Ukraine was destroyed by explosions and fire. Here we look at the background, the loss of this vessel and its potential implications.
Background
Prior to the Russian invasion, Berdyansk on Ukraine’s Sea of Azov coast was a significant port exporting grain, fertilizers, metals and oils. Just 50 miles from the now surrounded city of Mariupol, the port has been captured and is in use by the Russian navy for supplying the front lines. The brutal siege has been enforced by indiscriminate artillery fire on the city designed to terrorise the civilian population and weaken the resolve of the defenders. The extended overland supply lines of the Russian army have proved to be a major weakness in the war. Logistic support by sea is attractive due to the volume of goods that can be moved and the assumed invulnerability to attack compared with transport by road. About 10 Russian naval vessels have been assigned to conduct supply runs to Berdyansk from Russian-controlled ports in the region.
The information war
On 7th March Ukrainian sources claimed the first major success against the Russian Navy. It was widely reported they has sunk the large patrol boat (c1,500 tonnes) RFS Vasily Bykov by luring the vessel into a pre-prepared targeting area for a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Although theoretically possible, it would have been an unconventional approach and a considerable achievement as MLRS accuracy is limited.
The Ukrainian military may genuinely have believed the operation to be a success and many western media outlets willingly published the story. Bykov has since been comprehensively verified as unharmed and pictured in Sevastapol. The images of a burning ship assumed to be Bykov have been assessed as the Moldovan-flagged merchant vessel MV Millennial Spirit targeted by the Russian Navy on 25th Feb. The Russian Black Sea Fleet has subsequently applied some basic security measures and painted over its ship’s pennant numbers and nameplates to make identification more demanding.
On 21 March Russian state media aired the above TV report confidently showing the tank landing ship RFS Orsk unloading modern BTR-82A 8×8 wheeled armoured personnel carriers (APC). The video shows the ship with almost empty holds and the last vehicles being offloaded. When the explosion on an Alligator class vessel occurred on 24th March, because of this report it was widely assumed that the Orsk was the vessel destroyed. Orsk had sailed sometime before and the ship involved in the incident was in fact her sister ship, the RFS Saratov (see photo evidence below).
There were also spurious claims that the TV report and social media coverage provided the intelligence that prompted an attack on the port. The Ukrainian military does not need to rely on Russian or friendly media to plan its operations. There are plenty of human intelligence sources on the ground in the occupied regions, its own air assets and commercially available satellite imagery would also show activity in the port. Besides the obvious ways to gather information, Ukraine is likely being supplied with high-grade real-time intelligence by the US and NATO, derived from military satellites, airborne radar and communication intercepts.
The Saratov
The Orsk and Saratov are two of four very elderly Tapir-class landing ships (NATO reporting name – Alligator) commissioned in 1968 and still in service with the Russian Navy. They were mothballed after the collapse of the Soviet Union but reactivated, primarily for use in transporting supplies to support the Russian military offensives in Syria. They have a nominal capacity of 20 main battle tanks or 45 armoured vehicles plus around 400 troops. Shephard Defence Insight notes that the Ivan Gren class assault ships were supposed to replace the Alligator class, but the glacial pace of Russian warship construction means that only two of the newer ships are in service with two modified variants still under construction.
The Orsk is equipped with a single, ancient deck crane so a large floating crane had been brought alongside to unload the APCs. The Saratov had 3 deck cranes which can all be seen in the raised position prior to the incident, presumably in use for self-unloading of ammunition which can be broken down into lighter loads than armoured vehicles. When the explosions occurred, two Ropucha class landing ships were also alongside. RFS Novocherkassk was secured on Saratov’s port side and RFS Caesar Kunikov was ahead of her. Possibly stores were being transferred through Kunikov’s stern ramp into the hold of the Saratov using the open bow doors.
The Ropucha class are marginally less antique than the Alligators but are also Soviet-era ships built in the 1970-80s. Several landing ships have been observed poised off the shores of Odessa ready for a possible amphibious assault. The stoic defence mounted by the Ukrainians across their country would suggest a seaborne attack over beaches close to Odesa would be suicidal. The Russians have likely abandoned this idea and are now using their amphibious vessels in the Black Sea primarily as cargo ships in an attempt to relieve their chronic logistic problems.
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The RFS Orsk seen in the Bosphorus, Feb 2020 while on one of the many runs made by Black Sea amphibious ships to supply the Russian military campaign in Syria. Note she has just a single deck crane and a different configuration above the bridge to the Saratov. Photo: Yörük Işık -
RFS Saratov- note she has two deck cranes forward and one on the stern. Bosphorus, March 2016. Photo: Yörük Işık. -
This enhanced screenshot of an image showing smoke rising before the fire really took hold. This would suggest the cause was an accidental fire rather than a missile attack. The thee deck cranes are all in the raised position demonstrating this was the Saratov and not the Orsk. A Rapoucha class vessel is forward of Saratov with another just visible behind the tug on her port side. (Via @GrangerE04117) -
There are some uncanny similarities between the RFA Sir Galahad lost in the Falklands, on June 6th 1982, and the RFS Saratov. Both were commissioned in 1966 and were landing ships of similar design, displacing about 3,400 tons. Sir Galahad and her sister ship, Sir Tristram were hit as the result of poor planning which lead to logistic vessels being placed in an exposed position without air cover.
The incident
The material available on social media initially shows smoke rising from the mid or forward hull. This becomes a significant fire burning in the forward hold of the ship followed by multiple detonations as explosives cook-off. Blasts from inside the hull can be witnessed at the waterline. The draughts through the open bow doors also likely made the fire worse. The Novocherkassk and Caesar Kunikov can be seen hastily putting to sea to escape the inferno. Neither appears to have sustained major damage but there is a small fire burning on the deck amidships of one of them. Credible sources say both Ropucha class ships survived, heading for Sevastapol but with 8 killed on Kunikov and 3 killed and 3 injured on the Novocherkassk. Losses on the Saratov and ashore are unknown and unsurprisingly Russia has made no official comment on this event.
Missile strike or something else?
The Ukrainian military has not released any information about the incident so there are a few possible explanations for the cause. Some have suggested the ship was hit by a Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) but these weapons are in short supply and only have an accuracy of just under 100 meters. A video showing the start of the incident does not show a large explosion that would be consistent with a large missile strike. Russian sources claimed an SRBM attack on the port was intercepted during the previous week.
Another more plausible explanation is a drone attack using a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV. The TB2 has been used successfully by Ukraine already against many Russian ground targets, firing smart laser-guided micro munitions. Alternatively, a small special forces team could have penetrated the occupied region and launched an anti-tank missile or used a small UAV to drop a weapon on the ship. This mission would appear very challenging, high risk unlikely to be carried out in daylight.
Perhaps the less dramatic, but highly plausible explanation is an ammunition handling accident. All the ingredients for such a mishap seem to have been present. Fires, explosions and accidents have been commonplace in the Russian military-industrial complex, long before the added pressures of their “special military operation”. An old and badly maintained ship, conscripts or poorly trained personnel lacking motivation combined with hurried improvisation due to an urgent need to get ammunition to the front line may all have contributed. The Russian forces seem to lack basic logistic enablers which are routinely employed by NATO and western armies such as pallets and TEU containers. These mundane standardised packaging and transporting systems make it faster and safer when handling stores. Notably, NATO forces also benefit from being armed with predominantly insensitive munitions which contain explosives that are designed to not to react in a fire or if subject to accidental shocks.
The loss of a single elderly tank landing ship won’t significantly impact the course of the war. It will at least hamper resupply efforts to the Russian forces in south eastern Ukraine. The wreck of the Saratov lies sunk alongside the jetty at Berdyansk and the port itself may be rendered at least partially unusable. In this case, an attack from a UAV is hard to verify but is another wake-up call for naval forces regarding the threat from small and difficult to detect drones that present a risk to vessels in port without sophisticated air defence protection.
Main image: RFS Saratov Transits the Bosphorus, December 2020. Photo: Yörük Işık
Two lessons so far in this conflict:
1) Armed drones will play an outsized role in any conflict and must be taken seriously. Whether land based, or possibly ship based (watch for the Turkish Navy to deploy a ‘carrier version’ of their Bayraktar TB2 from their LPD).
2) The age of main battle tanks may be over. The US Marine Corps divesting of their MBTs may have been a wise move after all. No MBT appears safe from man-portable anti-tank weapons. Each soldier will have at least a LAW-type weapon in addition to their regular kit, with heavier weapons in each platoon.
A third lesson awaits, should there be an amphibious assault on Odessa.
IMHO, this conflict is rewriting some lessons and reinforcing others from the Falklands War.
I’m not sure the day of the tank is over just yet. The day of the not quite top tier, poorly crewed, tank operation without artillery, infantry, and attack helicopters might be over.
It takes massive balls to take on a tank with an NLAW. You’ll always be better off in something protected mounting a big weapon then not…
Two lessons from the war: the fog of war is still with us. Don’t believe first reports.
It hadn’t occured to me when discussing what hit that it might not have been an attack at all.
Lesson 3) Don’t believe anything you see on the media. Information warfare and propaganda is rife.
You’re not wrong there sir. It’s also not a new phenomenon.
Armed drones – agreed. I’m wary of an over-reliance on such things though.
Tanks – I’m not so sure.
There’s been a too and fro with armour and the tools to defeat it since armour became a thing – look at persians v spartans. In tanks:
It goes on through composite armour, ERA, dazzlers and now active protection systems versus longer range missiles, guidance systems, Tandem charge warheads & top-attack.
What it does show is something Scott says above and that we’ve known for a while: don’t use your armour without supporting elements.
What it also shows is that you can’t afford to make a modern tank (or any military asset really as we can apply the same logic to most things) & then call it “good” for the next 30 years. You have to continually improve and upgrade it to keep up with modern threats. This is something I think the Americans have got right if we look at Abrams: they’re onto to their 5th/6th(?) upgrade to the M1A2 since it’s introduction in 1992 & about their 20th since the M1 came in service in 1980.
Look at the state of it anyway.. So old it’s almost a museum piece!
But while these ships are old they still float and can do their job,especially in a neutral ASW environment.
Navies by and large are very capable at role interchange to meet specific operational requirements. Indeed the French operated light frigates for just that purpose.
The problem for the Ukrainians despite their tactical and morale-impacting attacks at HQ (I’ll take Moskva out, while a shock and morale booster – and an example of tactical thinking out of the box) Navies carry on with their assets.
Which is what the Russians are doing. They still have major hulls and SSG in the Sea and can devise means to get them into OPAREAs as and when they see fit. Remember, history shows casualties are secondary to achieving an aim for them. However it is unlikely the Ukrainians at present will sink any more prestige targets or operate against the Navy beyond what they have so far achieved.
Keeping up their drone attacks by sea and air will keep the Russians on alert though simple methods can beat the water-borne drones which may if detection and range are considered be better at underway targets, a sort of ersatz submarine force. Where they are in their element is using the small armed fast patrol boats they are getting for riverine operations. Vietnam taught us much about that and the conditions are much the same.
Excellent article, more informative than anything else that I have seen.
An ancient LST isn’t much of a loss, but we’ll take it. What I wouldn’t give for the Ukrainian s to be supplied with shore launched anti-ship missiles. The loss of a Russian frigate or a Sovernemy class would truly bloody Ivan’s nose.
The Ukrainians are developing their own anti-ship missiles anyway called Neptune. If the Russians don’t have an antidote for them before embarking on Acts of aggression, it’s bad luck on them! It certainly seems Putler believes has own propaganda.
Yes. They have there own design bureau for such things from the Soviet era
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luch_Design_Bureau
Just thinking out loud that RN Harpoon 1C are to be retired next year. Also thinking how in the last days of the 1982 Falklands conflict, the Argentines jerry rigged a MM38 Exocet to be fired from the back of a truck on shore. Think they used the generator from a WW2 search light to power it.
In the second world war, frequently infantry would not advance without tanks, and tanks would not fight without infantry support. That was the psychology if not the requirement.
I would prefer a portable anti tank device and some cover, to being locked down in a tank.
I read somewhere that if tanks have to fight tanks, it’s gone wrong. Presumably they should be doing some outflanking?
I’ve heard infantry stories from WW2 saying something like ‘when the enemy tanks started shooting at our tanks, I thanked god I was infantry and not in a tank crew.’
I’ve also heard tank crew stories from WW2 saying something like ‘when the enemy artillery started falling, I could see infantry through my periscope scrambling for cover & thought; thank god I’m in this tank.’
Combined arms 🙂
If any one is listening. Maybe we could run up some railway guns for the Eastern Front. There are quite a few tubes about still; not least the IWM 15″‘s and the USN 16″. Just need some smart shells to shoot off and frighten Putin at the siege of Sevastopol3.
Combined arms. In WW2, Panzer IV + Stuka, later Sherman + rocket armed Typhoon. Now, probably, Boxer with 105mm Cockerill turret + Apache attack helicopter.
Another lesson for us to learn here is that we need to sometimes keep our old stuff as you never know when you might need it. No RN or RFA ships should be sold or scrapped so easily and often on ill an advised basis. We nearly scrapped the Bulwark and Albion after giving away one of the Bay’s. Goodness we have loads of Dry docks doing squat all, why not use them.
This is the best write-up I have found on this incident, but it still seems very sparse. Every story in the media lists two ships fleeing the dock during the explosions, but a full-length video of the incident (https://www.outono.net/elentir/2022/03/24/the-full-video-of-the-russian-ships-attacked-by-the-ukrainians-in-berdyansk/) shows six ships fleeing, including what appears to be a third Ropucha-sized landing craft that was moored on the other side of the dock. That ship also appears to be smoking, while the fire on one of the first two doesn’t look “small” but large. Now that Russia has admitted that the captain of the Caesar Kunikov died in the incident, I’m left to wonder what happened to the third ship.