This week the Defence Secretary announced a Type 23 frigate will be permanently ‘forward deployed’ in Bahrain. This presence in the Gulf region and the global reach of the fleet, is certainly an asset to Britain but is the expanding portfolio of demands on the Navy workable and sustainable?
The RN has a presence in the Gulf going back decades. At least 3 escort ships were assigned to the Armilla Patrol during the 1980s-90s but none were permanently based in there and each ship spent considerable time on passage to and from the UK. British military involvement in the region is now called operation Kipion and until late 2017, the RN maintained at least one surface escort on Kipion. (In addition to the minehunters and RFA based in Bahrain). HMS Diamond was on her way to relieve HMS Monmouth in Gulf when forced to return home in November 2017 (due to a propeller shaft defect). Other priorities have left the RN with no escort vessel available to take her place. The main image above shows HMS Iron Duke handing over Kipion duties to HMS St Albans in March 2015 but this scenario will be become rare, with a ship permanently based in Bahrain for 4-5 years.
Vessels assigned to Kipion are involved in a wide range of activity in a large area that spans the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Much of the work is maritime security, disrupting trafficking in people, narcotics and weapons. Tasking may also include in the escorting US carriers or merchant ships in the Northern Gulf, facing down the Iranian navy, equipped with shore-based anti-ship missiles, mini submarines and swarms of small gunboats. Another important responsibility is maintaining freedom of navigation in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and Straits of Hormuz, maritime choke points that are critical to the flow of energy and trade to the UK. Recent operations have involved protecting merchant ships off the coast of war-torn Yemen.
Sending ships to the Persian Gulf and/or the Pacific, a renewed commitment to NATO maritime groups and dramatically increased Russian naval activity all add to the pressure on the fleet, never mind providing escorts for the aircraft carriers. Giving a positive inaugural Sir Henry Leach lecture at RUSI this week, the Defence Secretary highlighted the global ambition for the navy “Deterrence isn’t just four nuclear boats, it’s about aircraft carriers, it is about a presence in the Pacific, a presence in the North Atlantic, a presence in the Mediterranean and in the Gulf.” Reading between the lines of his speech, Williamson is demonstrating to the Chancellor how the UK’s expanding ambitions underline his department’s need for greater funding.
Of our 17 non-mothballed escorts, 6 or 7 are typically at sea at one time, some conducting training or post refit work up with around 4 or 5 available for operational tasks at the sharp end. There are those that might argue the Government’s ego is writing cheques the fleet can’t cash. The RN’s commendable can do attitude can occasionally be counter-productive in the long run. In the period 2010-14 in particular, over-working a reduced fleet damaged morale and led to a further exodus of personnel.
For a service still struggling with significant manpower issues, extending commitments will involve another balancing act.
The First Sea Lord rightly highlighted this week, the desirability of an increased focus on the Pacific, the region is becoming the epicentre of global trade and it is advantageous to have visibility amongst our partners and potential adversaries. UK interests in the Middle East and Gulf region are similarly important. Thanks to the navy and a constant culture of adapting and maximising the output of our assets, the UK does possess a global reach that few other nations can match.
The soft power benefits of showing the White Ensign, defence diplomacy and having a ‘presence’ are not in doubt. But is it sensible to be stretched so thin that the actual assets in theatre amount to single ships and have limited military impact? In most cases, should a conflict arise, they could even be a liability, quickly overcome by the local opposition unless rapidly reinforced with significant help from the United States.
A frigate permanently based in the Gulf will certainly be welcomed by regional partners. The US Navy has been impressed by the Type 45’s capabilities and might be rather more excited if there was a powerful air defence vessel available it could entrust with escorting its aircraft carriers.
The Kipion frigate, her ships company and maintenance staff will benefit from the newly-opened naval support facility, HMS Juffair at Mina Salman in Bahrain, UK trade and diplomatic relations with several of the Gulf states continue to deepen and Exercise Saif Sareea 3 will see 4,500 UK forces personnel deployed to Oman later this year. The basing of a frigate at Juffair appears to signal a greater commitment to our partners in the Gulf but the forward-deployed frigate may find itself in demand for forays further afield, perhaps into the Pacific.

Rotation, Rotation, Rotation
In September 2006 HMS Edinburgh arrived in the Falklands and remained in the South Atlantic for more than a year. This was a rare experiment with crew rotation on a surface escort, after 6 months the crew of another Type 42, HMS Exeter were flown out to relive the original ship’s company. The idea of crew rotation is attractive because it saves on fuel costs, wear and tear on the ship and in particular, the long time the ship must spend on in transit.
The four minehunters forward-deployed to the Gulf and the hydrographic vessels and the OPVs have been successfully using variations of the crew rotation system for several years. The minehunters ship’s companies are provided by 16 crews in 2 squadrons (MCM1 crew 1 ,MCM2 crew 5 etc) and work up together on an identical sister ship in the UK before being flown out to Bahrain relive one of the crews on a six-month cycle.
Hydrographic vessels HMS Echo and Enterprise have been ‘forward deployed’ in the Mediterranean for periods of more than 2 years. They operate a 3-watch system – the total Ship’s Company is 72, with 48 personnel onboard at any one time working a cycle of around 75 days on, 30 days off. The frequent changeover of personnel works in the relaxed environment of hydrographic survey but is not suited to combat vessels where the crew must be a very sharp and cohesive unit. A similar rotation system is used for the Falkland Island patrol ship HMS Clyde which has not returned to the UK since first arriving in 2007. (Maintenance is conducted locally or in South Africa).
Despite making crew rotation a success in other parts of the fleet, and after conducting numerous studies and a few experiments, until now the RN has avoided this practice for its major warships. (Historically the RN had several separate ‘Fleets’ with ships permanently stationed across the empire in Singapore, Hong Kong, Malta etc, often with sailors away for periods of up to 2 years).
For the modern navy, there are significant drawbacks of permanently stationing a frigate in a foreign base. When the ship’s company arrives to take over a ship that is on an operational deployment and sailing into danger within a short time after arrival, they must be fully trained. This requires that they are already trained on an identical ship with the same equipment outfit. Even between ships of the same class, there are some differences and modifications that must be quickly understood. It is possible a brief, tailored ‘in-theatre’ Operational Sea Training package may be needed for the incoming crew.
Typically sailors spend at least 2 years serving on a ship and tend to become rather attached to their floating home which may have its own ethos and personality. Crews are strongly encouraged to take pride in their ship, its name, history and reputation. Although ultimately one Type 23 frigate is much like another and it’s the people that really matter, swapping whole crews around risks damage to this sense of ownership. The transits to and from the UK also give sailors the opportunity to visit a variety of other ports and time to further bond together as a crew.
The effects of basing just a single frigate in Bahrain will be felt across the whole fleet. The controversial nine-month Kipion deployments guaranteed leave periods before and after, plus a one-month support & leave period mid-deployment. With personnel numbers in a very fragile balance, this change to a 6-months pattern affect the majority of ships and sailors in the training cycle.
Likely candidates to be sent to the Gulf would be one of the Type 23s about to emerge from Life Extension refit at Devonport, HMS Kent, Richmond or Lancaster. A deciding factor in selection could between ships with a towed array sonar ‘tail’ or one of the ‘general purpose’ ships, the ASW capability may be more urgently needed in North Atlantic and European waters.
A stable RN presence in the Gulf region that fully exploits the value of HMS Juffair it to be welcomed. Unfortunately, the surface fleet lacks the numbers to deliver effectively on every promise. The Defence Secretary tacitly admitted in his speech that the Navy needs more escorts. The Type 31 programme is the most realistic hope for an increase in numbers, though the five promised are not yet even in the MoD equipment funding plan.
Related articles
- Defence Secretary’s RUSI Sea Power conference speech (Gov.UK)
- First Sea Lord speech at the RUSI Sea Power Conference (Gov.UK)
- Exercise Saif Sareea (IHS Janes)
- Risks or rewards? – the RN in the South China Sea (Save the Royal Navy)
My gut feeling is that one isn’t enough, I think you really need at least two based in the Gulf (or any other region) if you’re going to achieve anything. That way you’ve got a bit of redundancy, a bigger centre of mass to justify a local holding of stores etc., and someone to learn from with an experienced crew and a new one. But that then starts to eat into the major selling point of this idea which is that you can have a permanent Gulf commitment with 1 FF rather than 3.
I agree fully that at least one more frigate is needed in the Gulf, but the cupboard is just too bare for that. Perhaps an OPV could augment the FF to flesh things out a bit?
The problem is OPVs as currently configured have no AAW capability and I wouldn’t want to be sailing around that area without any.
While crew rotation.might be seen as an innovative move by the RN it is the default for the majority of the world’s sailors and is proven to work.
The merchant marine often works on ships that are equal/if not more complex and larger (think of some of the lpg/oil mother’s ships) and rotate with only a couple of days hand over.
The problem is that the RN has a bit of a not invented here syndrome and hasn’t adapted it’s crewing/training structure to meet modern methods. I believe the RFA uses the normal rotation system with success; without requiring UK training ships.
Perhaps it’s time the military to follows the good practice of their civilian counterparts?
I don’t think you could necessarily argue merchant marine ships are more complex, the myriad sensors and weapons systems on-board a warship don’t really compare directly with a fuel pumping and pressurisation system. The issue with training is that you want the crew to be trained as a team to deal with multiple failures while still fighting the ship, which goes beyond just having a competence in your core role.
The RN have had ships based overseas before so it’s not new, however when retention is already an issue they have to be careful not to introduce schemes that will drive people outside. Certainly the crew rotation trial they carried out on a T42 based in the Falklands wasn’t the raging success you’d have thought it would be if you’d just gone by the civilian experience.
This a a non sensical waste of time. A purely delusional attempt at posturing by an out of date and obsolete navy
haha…..listen to him. What a navy-hater traitor.
Every time a Type 45 tries to operate in the Gulf it breaks down. Let the Type 23 take the permanent station and leave the 45s to deal with the Russians.
No there’s a lot wrong with your statement sir. First of all the type 45’s have operated in the gulf without ‘breaking down’ but even then it wasn’t a fault flaw it was just an issue with the gas turbines which were brand new, so of course their would a few issues. Secondly the type 23’s would be much better suited to deal with the Russians as their surface fleet is very capable but their submarines are the bigger threat to the uk.
The Daring broke down twice in 2010 and 2012, the Dauntless lost power in 2014, the Duncan had to be towed back in 2016 and the latest was HMS Diamond with a broken propeller. Until the PIP is complete not a single T45 can be counted on in hot latitudes. The best hunter of submarines is another submarine and in order to stop the wave of Russian supersonic missiles the Aster is the only answer.
Yes they have had issues, but we understand what’s wrong with the propulsion systems and short term fixes have been put in place so that they can deploy in warmer waters. Also we will have 3 or 4 type 45’s available at a time 2 will most likely will be escorting the carries. Leaving 1 or 2 left to either be deployed eles where. We don’t have any where near enough subs to deal with the Russian threat so the extra ASW capabilities will be needed from the type 23’s/type 26’s or MPA. Aster is a great missile but the CAMM is still a good air defence missle and would be able to defend a ship from a attack
3 to 4 type 45s available at a time?Absolutely no chance ,they hide them behind the ferry port, there are quite often 5 of them there.
Maybe there is a role to add a River class OPV in the Gulf/Indian Ocean. Many of the duties will include constabulary, mine hunting and anti piracy patrols. Pity they don’t mount a 57mm gun.
Wrong.
I worked on a T45 that spent the whole deployment in the Gulf area without a single incident . No black outs or partial blackouts. The reason why? Confidence in the system and that the software mods and recouperator issues have for the most part been fixed. That particular vessel spent almost 90% of its time happily steaming around on its GTAs using its DGs only for standby back up.
As for Diamond she actually never left the Med before the stern seal (not the propeller) failed.
Supersonic missiles? We have been dealing with them since the cold war. THe AS4 Kitchen is still in service …thats nearly 60 years …a number of well worked and known countermeasures existed previously and exist now for ASMs…they are nothing new.
We have no business deploying ships to the Gulf to prop up the assorted weak, illegitimate and capricious Kings, Sultans and Emir’s of the Gulf against their own people. Politically, this is the sort of action that breeds hatred of the West in so many Muslim countries. Militarily, one frigate is militarily insignificant. Our ship would become a hostage to local political situations. We shouldn’t let imperial nostalgia rule our military strategy.
Ever lived or visited the Gulf?
I am currently sat looking out of my window at a flottila of western warships in a Gulf country. I can say I am not hated by the local guys I work with because of it .
It’s nothing to do with imperial nostalgia. It’s a trade choke point that affects European trade. Many different countries cooperate to police this area. Accepting other regimes’ right to exist is hardly imperialistic. Regardless we have to work with those countries. We can’t ignore them because they don’t live up to our present day notion of what right is.
Great idea keeping a prescence about the globe or potential hot spots…russia is also gaining ports of convenience… we must continue with the strategy.
The idea of eventually using a T31 in the Gulf depends what it ends up as. If it gets the minimum equipment (57mm, Phalanx and a Wildcat plus a whole lot depends “fit for but not with” no one will be impressed.
Even a T23 GP with Sea Ceptor will not be helping defend a US carrier. Ideally as the air / missile threat is the main one in the Gulf / North Indian Ocean you would deploy a T45. But they will be totally committed to defending the two QE class in a few years.
The question then is is it better not to do anything or do something even if it’s a bit half arsed?
Iran has the only missile threat in the Gulf. It has little in the way of an air force but it does have an asymmetric threat from small boat swarm attacks.
None of the Gulf states are going to attack a western warship so you don’t need a T45. A T23 is ideal for doing work in the Gulf and IO area. Slow speed loiter capability, Helo, gun, AAW and room for RM and sundry others…
The war in Yemen has resulted in a number of ships being attached with anti ship missiles. As these water are very important for world trade my guess is that the “Gulf” Frigate will spend significant time in this area. It would not in my opinion be reasonable for the RN to sent any warship to this area without protection. Either on board of from an area defence ship. A T23 or T45 is totally suitable a River is absolutely not. As for the T31 who knows, it depends what sort of ship it ends up as.
Might it be a better idea to station one of the new batch 2 River class OPV instead of a Frigate which would be more useful doing escort duties for our Aircraft Carrier’ s and anti submarine work in the North Atlantic.
I know the Navy is not keen on building a sixth batch 2 OPV, but the case for it is getting stronger, what you guys think?
I don’t think sending a patrol ship with no real anti air or missile defences to this area is a good idea. The minesweepers can be justified as they do an important job, but probably need protection in some areas.
The problem here is overstretching…….for one someone has admitted 2 of our 19 escorts are mothballed….. We struggle to manage commitments with all 19! It’s all very well coming up with all these deployment ideas, just give us the ships we need!!!
I have no idea why we are gearing up to fighting Iran on behalf of the Gulf Arab states. One frigate is a sacrificial lamb. How much oil money is worth the lives of our soldiers and sailors?
Do we make a net profit in selling arms to the Gulf region compared to the money we have to spend on Police and Intelligence services and programmes like Prevent to counter the inevitable blowback on our streets? What about all the impact on political tensions and community relations?
Cost-benefit wise, are we in the black or the red (literally the blood of our forces personnel or civilians in Britain) with this type of latter day Imperialism?
Bla bla bla reduce the navy bla bla bla cut back onoverseas comitments bla bla bla turn britain into a non-entity for my overlords, we’ve heard it all before from you.
A lot of good points made for and against this deployment. I think the context that is missing is the international flavour of the security missions in trade choke points like the gulf. We won’t be operating in isolation, which would make a single 23 vulnerable. It’s a big area though and it can’t be policing off the horn of Africa, containing Iran and escorting carrier battle groups.
For me the future looks like 26/45s focusing on escorting carrier strike and standing NATO groups in European waters, with OPVs, RFA, mcms and 31s stationed abroad for constabulary and defence engagement. It may require more than five 31s but if they could take containerised MCM and hydrographic functions then the MCM fleet could be phased out without replacement to help buy and crew more 31s.
In terms of deployments, a bharain, Singapore and Falklands squadron sounds about right.
Don’t ask for more ships or overseas deployments too loudly mate, Iqbal above you might have an Aneurysm if you do. XD