Here we provide an update on the complex support programme that is being undertaken to keep the Type 23 frigates in service.
The programme of life extension refits to upgrade and repair the ageing Type 23 frigates to serve beyond their 30th birthdays is almost complete. The last ship to undergo this process, HMS Sutherland is still in the Frigate Support Centre (FSC) shed at Devonport but will undock in late February and should be ready to be handed back to the RN in June.
Each frigate undergoing life extension (LIFEX) refit has a hull survey and repairs, the Sea Wolf missile system replaced with Sea Ceptor, new Artisan radar (if not already fitted) and a wide range of other upgrades and refurbishments. While delivering an important capability boost, the work has mostly taken longer than expected and the work on each vessel has often been a unique project. As each ship was stripped down and surveyed, different levels of hull corrosion, structural problems and equipment deterioration were revealed. This partly explains why the time taken for each ship has varied significantly between vessels.
| Frigate* | PGMU status | LIFEX refit start | LIFEX refit end | LIFEX duration (months) | First post-LIFEX refit start |
| HMS Westminster | N | Oct 2014 | Mar 2017 | 30 | To be decommissioned |
| HMS Argyll | N | May 2015 | Apr 2017 | 24 | May 2022 |
| HMS Montrose | N | Mar 2014 | July 2015 | 17 | Decommissioned |
| HMS Northumberland | Future? | May 2016 | Apr 2018 | 23 | Due Mar 2024 |
| HMS Kent | Future? | Oct 2016 | Oct 2018 | 25 | Due June 2024 |
| HMS Lancaster | N | May 2017 | Mar 2020 | 36 | |
| HMS Richmond | Y | Sept 2017 | Mar 2020 | 30 | |
| HMS Portland | Future? | Apr 2018 | May 2021 | 37 | First to have new S2150 Bow Mounted Sonar |
| HMS Somerset | Future? | Oct 2018 | May 2022 | 43 | Post-refit issues delayed return to service until late 2023 |
| HMS Iron Duke | N | May 2019 | Jun 2023 | 49 | |
| HMS St Albans | Y | Mid 2019 | Mar 2024 | 58 | |
| HMS Sutherland | Y | Dec 2020 | Jun 2024 | 42 |
(HMS Monmouth decommissioned in 2021 without undergoing life extension.)
The original cost estimate for each LIFEX project was around £35M (excluding the engine upgrades) but this has been exceeded in most cases. HMS Iron Duke was the most extreme example, She did not receive new engines and required 2,000 steel inserts to make her seaworthy in a package that eventually cost £103M. The official figure for HMS Somerset was £60.7M, although she continued to suffer from defects well after the refit was complete. The cost of the LIFEX for every ship has not been released into the public domain, with the MoD citing “commercial sensitivity”.
The impacts of the pandemic clearly did not help but progress was slower than expected. Against expectation, the trend has been that LIFEX projects are taking longer for the later ships. Babcock says they have never delivered a ship late back to the customer and work with the RN to coordinate handover to dovetail with the build-up of the ship’s company (Something the RN is increasingly finding harder to manage). Despite being the youngest of the frigates, HMS St Albans has endured the longest time in LIFEX. The work involved 1.2 million man-hours including some 350 structural enhancements, PGMU and the complete removal of her two electric propulsion motors for a major overhaul. Her ship staff moved onboard in November 2023 but she is not expected to be ready for sea until March.
PGMU ambition scaled back
Originally it was intended that 11 of the 13 ships would receive the Power Generation Machinery Upgrade (PGMU) but only HMS Richmond, St Albans and Sutherland will benefit from this. Essentially the upgrade involves replacing the four diesel generator sets with modern equivalents to provide much greater fuel efficiency and performance, especially in hotter climates. (More technical details here). It is unclear if some of the other frigates that have previously completed LIFEX will return to have PGMU at a later date.
The PGMU project presented considerable engineering challenges and attendant costs that were somewhat underestimated at the start. New equipment had to fit within the existing structural and compartment constraints and integrate with the ship’s legacy services and systems. The first frigate to have the PGMU, HMS Richmond went back to sea in March 2020. Her refit employed 350 Babcock staff working a total of 1 million man-hours. 8 km of new cable and 600m of new pipework and were installed. The new diesel-generator sets have to be placed into the Forward Auxiliary Machinery Room (FAMR) below decks. The Upper Auxiliary Machinery Room (UAMR) is on the main deck level and is more easily accessible via deckhead soft patches but was also completely stripped and much equipment re-sited. Richmond has now sailed for thousands of miles and the upgrade has proven to be a success.
Back for more
Following the end of the LIFEX project, ships are now returning for their next upkeep period. HMS Argyll was dry-docked in the Summer of 2022 and is part-way through the project. She was undocked in January but soon after the Daily Telegraph reported HMS Argyll would not be returned to service, essentially due to a lack of sailors with crewing Type 31 and Type 26 being prioritised. However, Babcock say the upkeep is continuing and she is now undergoing ‘post dock-dependent work’. The MoD refuses to confirm that HMS Westminster will be scrapped or comment on plans for HMS Argyll.
Having been run extremely hard since completing LIFEX in 2018, HMS Northumberland will go into the FSC dry dock for a badly needed upkeep period in March. HMS Kent will begin similar maintenance package in June. Under Lloyds certification rules now applied to most RN vessels, ships must be dry docked at least every six years and Babcock will be kept busy with a rolling programme of Type 23 frigate maintenance into the 2030s.
In future a heavier gauge steel is part of the answer for the hull on and below the waterline.
The T23 were designed to have a short life span and then be replaced, something like less than 20 years. This also factored into how their hull was built.
Good idea in theory, but with funding cuts they obviously weren’t replaced in good time.
Future Frigates are built for more like 30
Mid Life Update was common at the time but wasnt planned for say from 15 years old , which would have been 2015. And then it was done in ad hoc way
Theres no reason to suggest the ‘hulls’ of all the ships ( some exceptions) are in a bad condition
PS . Corrosion in hulls usually starts from the inside as theres various tanks bilges etc plus the structural support for the outside plating is complex welded angles.
The last time RN warships had ‘thin hulls’ was the Leanders as a weight saving design ( 23300-2500 tons standard)
Ha ha ha. Let’s see if Captain Internet knows how thick the T23 hulls were relative to the Leanders?
DK Brown from the RCNC said the Leander hull plating was ‘thin’ for weight saving , not the internet. Plus the interior corrosion proofing wasnt a bar on that for the T23
All RN escorts have had similar plating thickness, although thanks to LRNS T45 and T26 will be slightly thicker.
Context again.
It is worth pointing out that there much better modelling of the electrochemistry of weld / plate interactions etc as well as massive improvements in paints and epoxy coatings.
Then the growing understanding of how bacteria are responsible for some modes of steel corrosion.
So the way hulls degrade has changed significantly as the tin worm is slowed and controlled in different ways.
Yes. maintence is key and the anti corrosion done properly- inside and out – ( BAE again) in the first place
The story shows the the oldest ships still in service with Chile and no ‘thin hull’ problems!!
You do know Babcock look after the 23s, right? Or have they been taken over by BAES as well?
My mistake , I assumed all T23 were built by BAE . But it was Marconi Marine – later BAE- and Swan Hunter
And that could be why the hulls are wearing unevenly as there were different working practices at the two yards.
Not really – much as I’d like to agree. Yes – different working practices, but all those ships have had significant refits eight years into their lives where all tanks, bilges, wet spaces as well as the external coatings were blasted back to bare metal and represerved. That’s a long time ago now.
Those refits took place at Portsmouth, Rosyth and Devonport, so while there will be different practices at each as well, it’s hard to put a figure on it.
It’s also fair to say that time in hand in NLs table is not directly proportional to the material state of the ship. There’s very definitely a scheduling issue in Devonport – there are only so many warm bodies that can be put on the job.
Plus you can assume some Covid effects in terms of delays for the last four, possibly five.
The story is silent on whether those Chilean ships are working towards the same safety and availablity standards as the RN. NL is being a bit naughty in that regard.
Also doesn’t highlight the Chilean navy only goes out to sea 1 week in 52
Heres the exact quote from DK Brown in his book Rebuilding the Royal Navy… Type 12
“apart from from much of the thin hull plating having to be replaced due to corrosion”
Weight was a particular problem for this class and its various batches
Still not understanding context eh? “Thin hull plating” relative to what? Weight is a problem for virtually all ships of this type. What makes you think Leanders were are worse than T42, T22, T23?
show me a car the same age thats been used the same
The entire point behind the T23 was that there would be no significant MLU – as a direct result of the perceived massive cost of those given to the Leanders. That’s why they only had an 18 year design life. The idea was to have a single major refit halfway through life.
Of course that was fine in theory, but not likely to survive first contact with the Treasury……
That’s how I remember it too.
I do refits and maintenance on commercial as well as Military ships. Irrespective of the gauge of steel used steel wastes away.
Poor preservation (painting), badly maintained cathodic protection systems and dissimilar metals all help to increase wastage. It’s not unusual for a commercial vessel to need upwards of 150t of steel replacements internally and externally.
Using thicker steel won’t stop wastage just delay it slightly.
This.
This was a profoundly expensive waste of money, basically because no government wanted to sign the contract for the replacements. A serious failing on policy over a decade…As for refusing to provide the total cost due to commercial sensitivity that’s so much BS, there are no new tenders for this, it’s simply the government hiding and refusing to be accountable to the taxpayer.
Correction . The 2010 conservative government decided the existing new frigate development program wasnt required for 5 years , until before the 2015 election when the funding for ‘development’ was announced and an actual build contracts in July 2017 ( 3) and Nov 22 (5)
So 10 years after the build contracts should have been announced ( 2012) the reduced number (8) was under contract.
They vould have the hulls made aboard becuse the waste of money comes from our dockyards overcharging and overruns!!
Its called corrupt .
I had a neighbour a polish chippy who got a hob on the carriers in rosyth , was on £850 per week for a four day week .
on his 1st day he did 3 cabins . Was then pulled over by his manager and asked if he liked his job , he said yes and would try to do more but was just getting used to it and was told no , do half a cabin per day , they wanted to stretch the job as long as possible , ” its goverment money “”!!!
This is why everything costs so much !! Apauling !!
In addition i has seen stuff in scrap yards thay looked new and cane from the dockyard !!
There was nothing to stop the Labour government from firming up a contract before then..a lot of the blame was on the 2010 conservative government for delaying the contract..but it does not the Labour administration get away Scot free.
Have you seen how much delay BAE does even when a ‘final gate’ is opened for a contract to be signed …its years
If you understood what commercial lunacy MoD tries to impose in a contract – and indeed the non-MoD sign offs required afterwards, it’s no surprise BAES take their time. It really isn’t a question of MoD saying here’s a nice juicy contract, sign here please…
N-a-B
I will totally agree with your point (i.e. about the sheer lunacy of anybody wanting to sign a standard MOD contract)
Regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
“stop the Labour government from firming up a contract before then”
they didnt even have a finalised design, there was to be no repeat of the contract disaster Conservatives did 2 months before 1997 election on Astutes – it was an election gimmick, repeated again ( a lesser way) in 2015 election with the T31
Also we remember the Dreadnought DP1 contract £1.3 bill for hulls to start construction at end of 2016. Election was within 6 months in 2017
You read it here first , look for new naval ship contract in next 6 months , but before 2024 election.
Captain Internet is of course ignoring the three – yes, three – times his beloved Gordon Brown knocked back the FSC (later T26) programme. That’s 1999, 2003 and 2006.
Ships with an 18 year design life should have started entering service from 2008, meaning build contracts from ~ 2004 at latest. But evil Tories, obvs…
Why would anyone design a frigate with an 18-year lifespan. It’s not world war II anymore.
Someone being told what to do by John Nott?
He liked cheap.
A total idiot.
Supportive Bloke
Not, it has to be said, very fair on John Nott…….
He can be criticised for many many other things (OK – almost everything else); but not this one.
The one and only thing that the (now notorious) 1981 defence review did get right was that the huge costs of refitting life-expired RN escorts was a very big waste of money.
In particular, the programme to refit the old Leander’s had got completely and utterly out of control – with one or two of those refits costing as much as buying a complete new ship (and, to make it worse, they all came out of the dockyards with very-different new weapon fits..).
It certainly did not help that in those days they were Royal Dockyards: Chatham in particular was very heavily unionised and notorious for VETREB (Very Extended Tea Refreshment Breaks) .
Therefore Nott continued the entire new shipbuilding programme for escorts, and there were quite a few on the slipways; however he quickly took out of service the Rothay, Leander and County classes. (Note. which did reduce the total numbers of escorts)
He also added a number of new submarines (which later came in quite handy)
Thus the key assumption behind the design of the Type 23 was, as N-a-B has quite-correctly pointed out directly above, only one quick refit mid-life.
All in all, the situation back then in 1981 was remarkably similar to today in 2024 = the RN is paying out for huge refits costs in the dockyard because Mr Wally forgot order the new series of frigates in good time.
Regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
PS Mr Wally wokes for the HM Treasury
I know John Nott – I’ve sat in the same room as him on a number of occasions.
Submarines he got right.
Withdrawing County Class he got right.
I agree with you the costs of converting WW2 cruisers into helicopter carriers was lunacy.
The amounts of money being spent on converting old rubbish into other forms of short term rubbish were crazy.
The issue was that politically MOD couldn’t shut or reduce the Royal Dockyards…..so they had to have something to do…..which was a job creation scheme…..
But from that the wrong conclusions were drawn.
No major refurbishments was not sound.
Not the same as: no insane conversions of old ships into old ships with whistles and bells; or Small ships into small ships fitted [with the aid of a very big show horn] with cut down versions of the big boy systems that don’t really work and BTW damage control is out of the window.
The main reason for a lot of the post ‘82 surface fleet drawdowns was the appalling lack of damage resistance. And that was my bag – at least in part.
Even the worst of the Leander refits never cost as ‘much as a new vessel’. The inflation in the 1970s pushed up the price of new ships ( T22 ) as well.
They werent time expired either, the 10 T12 batch 3 ( broad beamed) were built from 1969-1973, so were only 10-15 years old by the time of Nott.
The first T12 were only a bit older and their mid life updates started in the 1970s
Of course putting in far more capable weapon systems/sensors in itself costs money
Eg Sea Wolf, towed arrays- towed array needed computer mainframes at the time for data analysis
Because the theory was that combat system evolution (on the back of computing power) was always going to need major capability upgrades, which Leanders had shown to be horrifically expensive. So design short life ships that could be disposed of for new.
Theoretically it’s great – and you see people making similar arguments for build drumbeat – the NSBS also toys with the idea. Trouble is it always fails the Treasury test. Which is exactly what happened with T23, starting in 1999.
The counter arguments now is that the computing end of the systems actually gets progressively smaller and more powerful. The networking becomes easier as it has all moved over to fibre optics or LAN.
But the effectors……..
I agree about theTreasury test but they only work in short term cycles [as does The City sadly] and not the necessary long term investment cycles that UK PLC needs.
T23 entered service ( apart from the first two sold in 2005) in 1991-2 ( Argyle)
The FSC was program/spending was speeded up in 2006/7 ( instead of 2 more T45)
So orders could have been made in 2009-10….but was deliberately delayed until 2017.
But Im sure BAE have their own procrastination /deign problems to explain why no contract was signed before doomsday 6 may 2010- not that it stopped the Conservatives to sign up for a shambolic Astute ‘ development/build’ 2 months before 2007 election date
The Conservatives were not in office in 2007 ….
Of course since have they speeded up anything.
Doomsday was in 2010 the election with the harsh austerity forced on the MoD.
With the Astutes building in the 2000s, the carriers started ( Jul 2009) and the T45 ( last of class 2007-2010) there was literally no chance of the FSC/T26 build starting in that decade – unlike our friend who makes farcical claims they were blocked by Brown…..
Of course, one of us was part of those submissions and still has the various papers. And one of us wasn’t….
See if the internet tells you when the first submission for FSC was. And the second. And the third
I do know where to find it – but what does that prove . Apart from if you spelt it all out first I could show your memory is faulty
People are still arguing over battle of Jutland , who claimed what and who covered it all up ( supressed report found many decades later )
Internet just speeds it all up and beats going to PRO, which might only have sanitised records !
You won’t find anything in TNA Kew [was renamed from PRO a long time ago] on anything that is currently in service.
Those files will be closed on, perfectly reasonable, security grounds until the platforms are out of service.
Under the Public Records Act they are not sanatised. They are however weeded. If you understood the mentality of archivists they like a good story!
Off you go then, in your own time. There won’t be any sanitisation required.
Very true.
Anybody know what the plans are for the Frigate Complex post-Type 23 work, as none of the subsequent escort types will fit?
Would be good to know ????
It appears that the centre dock in the frigate complex is just large enough to accommodate a T31 frigate. The work going on around 5 basin 9-15 docks (no 13 dock) wil ensure we have the infrastructure to accommodate the new larger vessels from later this decade – no idea if that would include the prospective T83 as that’s at least a decade away from build, if it ever gets the go ahead.
There isn’t really any practical way the FRC can be extended, there has been no news on what may or may not happen to the facility.
How on earth did we ever build Battleships !
We built them at pace and with beam to fit the Docks which meant they had less beam than was optimum. Pre war all ships, cruiser and above, had galvanized plating, viz one reason for HMS Belfast 1939’s longevity. Now she’s in the Thames she should last longer anyway due to fresh or brackish water. Maybe when we lay up ships we should have them in fresh water where possible or in dry dock; Just saying.
At that time Britain was creation country, now it is a quasi socialistic country.
Flatten it. It’s too small to be useful.
It is also how the cranage and everything else is arranged.
It is from another era in terms of working environment / standards / facilities.
No point in investing in 1960’s ideas.
N-a-B and Suppotive Bloke
Too late!
One-Devonport-Blueprint-2050-Ver-1.2-Jan-21.pdf (babcockinternational.com)
regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
Thing is, there is huge scepticism in MoD that Babcock’s can pull that off.
N-a-B
It is not only the MOD who are “rather sceptical”……
IPA-Annual-report-2022-2023.pdf.pdf (publishing.service.gov.uk)
All of the details of the progress, or rather the lack of it, on all of the MOD major projects – starts in the chart on Page 68… a sorry tale….
Suffice – to say, as with all previous IPA reports about the MOD’s major projects – the ten year old who is working for the IPA only very infrequently needs to use their LGFT (Little Green Felt Tip) to colour in this chart.
The ten year old much prefers using yellow, red and black
regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
PS Those of you working for HM Treasury who are wishing to print out this IPA report are strongly advised to use coloured ink….as trying to save a few bob by using black and white ink is not good value for money…
Babcock said in “One Devonport Blueprint”: “Surface Ship Support – The Devonport site will continue to service and support an array of current and future Fleet, RFA vessels and visiting foreign ships. In addition to Fleet Time Engineering and wider logistic support, the Fleet Frigate Support Centre will provide surface ship deep maintenance for the T23 Duke class of frigate until the 2030 timeframe when modern, updated and flexible facilities will be developed across the site. These facilities will accommodate the Future Frigate Force”
I read this as the Frigate Refit Complex (FRC) will be demolished and the drydocks rebuilt to fit Type 26/31 sometime in the 2030s when T23 will stop doing maintenance in the FRC.
That site that is currently getting built/refurbished is surrounding 5 basin. Several of those docks will be used to refit the newer classes coming into service including T31/26 and MRSS.
We should be keeping all our ships and adding to them, we should stop pretending we can get the lgqbta and the Muslims and the Africans and the every other wminority represented and get on with allowing those that want to join to join in what ever numbers they can, pay the decently, don’t prosecute, don’t get hung up about representation, just get our armed forces into shape before the war with Russia and china is actually hot and on our doorstep. Churchill would have already had us building the things we will need within the next 2 years
We don’t have Churhill, we have Cameron Mk2. And the worst part is, Sunak wouldn’t even understand how insulting I’ve just been.
Any particular reason for your Islamophobic and Xenophobic comments, other than them coming from a general belief in fascism?
Granted Dave’s phrasing isn’t exactly PC, but his point is correct; the forces are putting a great deal of effort into recruiting women and minorities in an effort to diversify and look modern, when the vast majority of those groups have no interest in fighting for this country. Meanwhile, white males are being ignored and in some cases outright rejected.
Where exactly does fascism come into that?
I have no problem with the forces putting a great deal of effort into recruiting women and minorities, so long as it also puts a great deal of effort in recruiting men and whites. I don’t believe in diversity quotas, or ‘positive discrimination’ – which is just another form of racism.
But I do object to his dismissal of people and whether they would want to serve simply based upon their religion or ethnic origin. Judging people on religion or ethnicity is fascist.
Culture, language, borders and history matter, whether you like it or not. These and many other factors are crucially important in the maintenance of the real world fighting power of any nation.
So you think criticism of Islam is phobia?
Hatred is, this was not criticism. I’ve no doubt we have Muslims currently serving in our armed services, and Dave’s comments is insulting to them.
Yes, all perfectly good and lovely, because Islam is entirely compatible with British and Western values, history, culture, tradition, and civilization. Right?
Given that
is it premature to label HMS Westminster decommissioned, or would failing to do so just have been ignoring the inevitable?
Although T23s are aging like 30 years, LIFEX span tells us that they were out of service for 3-4 years. This “may” mean that there material states is “younger” than their age. Hopefully, they can be active until an age of 35 or so, which is virtually 31-32 years old.
I know things are not so simple, but the stress to the hull has been surely reduced (or non-existing) in the 3-4 years. Just a comment.
The counter argument is the time they were left to rot swinging on a buoy with grass growing on the decks.
Things deteriorate very fast in that environment.
Thanks. How many of the T23s had that experience? I guess not many…
A good few.
Because #1 is delayed #2 has a programmed crew dispersal and reassignment.
#2 disbands on schedule and waits on the buoy for the dock refit slot to come free.
This is the problem with the extended timeline.
Slightly misleading. None of the T23 awaiting refit spent any time whatsoever swinging on a buoy. They were alongside, destored with systems largely drained and tanks empty and cleaned, cathodics working. Trouble was, they were in basins with lots of lovely salt water and bacteria chomping away on the sea tubes.
Ok so we are slightly splitting hairs?
The difference between de-stored and tanks cleaned on the wall or on the buoy is errr not much when their hull is in salt water?
Fact was they were in static salt water which, as we both acknowledge , is worse than dynamic salt water…..or clean water…..or pretty much anything.
Swinging on a buoy – as in Fareham creek or similar – suggests no care and maintenance at all or active cathodics. There is a difference as I’m sure you know.
That is very true.
The point is that either way there is no active changing of the sea water in the sea tubes by ships movement and motion. Out at sea there is a natural purging effect from the inevitable pressure changes.
So the stagnant sea water allows oodles of lovely [or not so lovely] bacteria to build up and have field day nourished on best T23 fittings.
Certainly true of the T45’s. We should do all we can to retain them as reserve fleet in home waters for ABM defence and yet start to build the T83 on schedule. Fanciful I know but they have been relatively underused.
Things could be a lot worse but BAE need to get their house in order. Hopefully they can see the writing on the wall. Nobody should work to fill in time; shocking people do that; its theft from the tax payer.
What makes you think BAES are “working to fill in time?”. The issue with T45 is actually MoD failure to contract for the correct level of spares and ILS. The amount of nugatory work taken up by STOROBing the ones in refit to keep the ones in Fleet time going is significant. It also delays the set to work of systems in the ones towards end of their refit. There is a reason Daring is still not preparing for sea trials over a year after escaping Cammell Lairds….
You mean the fantasy land of no spares stock and industry will magically spring to life and make another one that hasn’t been made for 15 years and nobody can remember anything about at the flash of Harry Potter’s wand?
Its BAE who has the multi year ‘service support contract’ plus the ‘class output management contracts for the T45 at Portsmouth
Surely its the responsibility of the contractor to have the spares on hand for the work expected – after all they built the things.
Or is another ‘vapour’ contract which isnt anything like the support promised
The reason I said what I said was because a Polish who worked on the Carriers said he was doing 3 pieces of work a day and was told to just do half a piece per day.
Government cheque.
I believe it. We were ship builders back in the day, but stopped new build and went onto repair work because the Unions 100 years ago were making new build unprofitable.
If you’re referring to the Anon post up thread, you do realise he was talking about Rosyth? Which has still not built a ship from scratch.
See earlier comment re contracting with MoD. The T45 CLS contract was let some time after FoC ISD. In contracts with MoD, things you can’t control (eg third-party suppliers) tend to be put down as GFX, That’s because the risk provision you have to put in the contract to cover these sorts of things tends to be large. So you put the responsibility on MoD and their commercial managers squeal like Ned Beatty. Which is – again – why contracting takes so long.
Classic example being WR21. How much do you think RR would charge BAES to keep a spares line running for the life of the class, given there’s only 12 engines in the world? An arm and a leg of every virgin daughter in the BAES team. So they understandably put that risk on MoD. Who do nothing, cross their fingers, close their eyes and hope for the best.
The same applies across a wide range of spares. Just because BAES built the ships doesn’t mean they control the equipment suppliers.
The contracts T45 are multi year, so it seems it would be rolled over after say 4-5 years with price adjustments.
RR have have heaps airliner long term engine contracts – power by the hour they call it.- Its not a thing any more to say its unusual
WR21 – RR side – is based on its then large turbofans built for airlines. Not much hours being run on T45s when at wharf.
Northrop Grumman took over the Westinghouse side which is the troublesome intercooler- recuperator- generator
Power by the hour is quite often used by Marine diesel suppliers these days for specific applications. However, they tend to be for predictable applications – much like airliners – where you can plan in exchanges or similar. Doesn’t easily work that way for military shipping.
NG may have taken over Westinghouse. That doesn’t mean they’re providing support (particularly as the tricky bits in question were actually made by an SME in the middle of nowhere). I used WR21 as an example – could say the same about the rudders and steering gear, converters, various pumps, chilled water plants etc.
All these OEM would require ongoing contracts with BAES to provide support. Some will find it easy and business as usual. Some will not because they supplied “specials” or have since changed business line or simply don’t exist anymore.
It all comes down to cost. When BAES put the proposal price to the MoD, they’ll be told “too expensive – we don’t have that budget, sharpen your pencil”, to which the BAES response will be to hack out the riskier bits of supply chain and support and request them as GFX – essentially telling MoD if they want a contract price of £Xm, they will have to arrange their own separate contract with suppliers A, B, C.
Whether MoD then do fund those contracts – and to the right degree – is down to their own risk appetite and budget.
If you want another analogy, its one of the reasons why the advanced bit of MFTS has been struggling. Ascent requires a sufficient number of Hawk T2 to be available at RAF Valley to support the training programme. Hawk T2 is supplied by BAES, but the engine is supplied by RR. Now Ascent could theoretically have contracted with both for a guaranteed number of flying hours per week and number of aircraft available. Depends entirely on what price BAES and RR were prepared to offer and the associated commercial terms. Or – because they can’t control those two companies – they can put the onus on MoD. Which is what happened. No commercial director worth his or her salt would willingly take that risk, particularly when MoD is in the habit of appending punitive performance metrics and associated fines.
Power by the hour is not new – most marine diesel suppliers use that model for some applications – primarily predictable routes, predictable loadings, predictable service intervals. Doesn’t quite work that way for naval ships.
NG may have taken over Westinghouse – that doesn’t mean they took over the contract for the intercooler / recuperator, which from memory was actually built by some mom n pop outfit from the deep south.
I used WR21 because its the one everyone knows – I could have easily used rudders and steering gear, converters, pumps, CW plants, etc. It very much depends on the product line – if they’re standard items, it may be easy to get that support, if they’re specials, less so.
BAES can price to include them, but quite sensibly will include a significant risk provision for each – primarily because MoD tend to put Key Performance Indicators with some punitive financial penalties. When MoD see the proposal price they tend to squeal and say “Its not within our budget, sharpen your pencil” and so BAES go away and line by line the items in the risk budget, taking out the more expensive ones, but at the same time putting the onus on MoD to provide them as GFX via a dedicated contract with the OEM. For quite a few of those, they’ll do nothing, cross fingers, close eyes and hope nothing happens. Except it usually does. Late provision of GFX is one of the main causal factors in contract delays and cost escalation.
Can’t blame BAES for wanting to make a profit on a firm-price contract.
Semi duplicate post.@NavyLookout, you can delete this one.
NG Marine took over the WR21 head contract . RR was just a subcontractor
NG Marine bought the business in 1996 and their current interests are is
‘Northrop Grumman’s Marine Systems business unit, based in Sunnyvale, is the prime contractor for the program and has overall responsibility for the engineering, systems integration, the intercooler and the recuperator. Rolls-Royce designed and developed the gas generator and power turbine. DCN is providing the enclosure.
Sunnyvale is in California area better knows as Silicon Valley where Westinghouse Electric had a presence for over 100 years-
Mom and Pop ROFL- you really should get to know how to use the internet-properly
“Northrop Grumman’s Marine Systems business unit, based in Sunnyvale, Calif., is prime contractor for the WR-21 engine program with overall responsibility for engineering and systems integration. Rolls-Royce Industrial & Marine Gas Turbines of Ansty, England, designed and developed the gas generator and power turbine, while AlliedSignal’s [now known as Honeywell] Aerospace Systems & Equipment Group in Los Angeles provided the intercooler and recuperator heat- exchanger cores.
Nice try Bubbles.
However you may wish to check whether NG still actually support the units – which was the original point I was making. Cutting and pasting 20 year old press-releases doesn’t really pass the test.
You might also want to check out the patent holder some of the ancillary kit. Not to mention – again – whether Honeywell, Ingersoll or any of the other companies involved actually manufactured (as opposed to subbed out) the kit, or indeed still support it.
In your own time, jog on.
So where did your silly claims about the mom and Pop outfit for the non RR hardware come from ?
And the idea that NG Marine or its suppliers have just ‘ditched’ their product after they were installed on board is even sillier.
Rolls Royce still has it sub contract part of the WR21 gas turbine system ( or similar) in production as the MT30, a naval GT in production
The detail of the other subcontractors who had the technology and manufacturing ability
Allied Signal- now Honeywell- Intercooler manufacture
Ingersoll Rand – manufacture of recuperator
CAE – manufacture electronic electrical controls (EEC), based in Canada but experienced in electronic controls for naval ships
The stature of these companies-easily found on the internet – just shows how ridiculous your claims are.
Like most of your claims , just made up from a bit of background knowledge and easily refuted
Found the patent yet Bubbles? Or anything more than a 20 year old press release? Thought not….
Keep on missing the salient point of the post. Go on, see if any of those firms actually support WR21, or more permanently, address the wider supply chain issues…
But they are only contracted to do specific things and have specififc spares level as funded by the contract.
If MOD say ‘we won’t fund that’ BAE will quite reasonably say ‘we won’t do that’…….they are a business that functions on profits.
As N-a-B says down the thread why would BAE take the risk for some of the large bits that they don’t even make? How do you expect them to fund keeping a line open for one off items that they themselves don’t make.
With SAMSPON they might contract to keep the jigs and various other bit of the production facility under dust covers for X years for £Y. The will probably be contracted to keep spares for various specific bits of active electronics for a longer period. Probably, I am guessing here, specially made semiconductors.
BAE would not be expected to keep spare bits for SYLVER or the Mk8 gun system [Babcock have the contract on those from memory].
So it is a complex synthesis of supply chain issues.
Alternatively you go back to T42 days and you have warehouses full of spare propellors [yes really – there were, I think, four left over when T42 went OoS] basically all of the parts life span assessed and the numbers likely to fail were stored in the knowledge that those bits would become EoL and EoP otherwise they would have to be type replaced. In today’s terms that would simply be unaffordable.
Nothing is ever new and it’s all been seen before. We’re back to what happened in the 70’s with frigates being gutted and overhauled at huge complexity and cost!
The T23’s have provided fantastic service but trying to retain and keep them up to date for 30 plus years, with thousands of inserts, millions of man hours and hundreds of millions of pounds is madness!!!
A salutatory lesson in the need to keep a constant drumbeat of construction if ever there was one.
How many salutory lessons does it take to avoid that one Treasury question: is there any way we can avoid paying for a new <whatever> in next year’s budget?
Is it the Treasury really?
Surely the MoD gets the 2% budget and then decides itself how it spends it across the services, and between OPEX and CAPEX? Or do they have to refer individual major purchases back to Treasury?
There are thresholds that are delegated for CAPEX.
Ordering new frigates isn’t under that level of autonomy.
I’m a bit of a novice on this score, only looking into it from the outside. Here’s my understanding. The 2% of GDP, or whatever it happens to be that Defence gets that year, doesn’t all get spent by the MOD. A chunk might be spent by the Home Office on security for example, or by either the Treasury or possibly the Cabinet Office. The budget allocated to the MOD is split into four (as with other spending departments): RAME, CAME, RDEL and CDEL. Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) is for large, hard to forecast/manage expediture and isn’t really in the control of the department. You can’t suddenly decide not to fund pensions and buy an extra frigate. Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) is largely within the control of the department. RDEL is resource and CDEL is capital. I believe these are separate budgets allocated and agreed with the Treasury, and the MOD isn’t allowed to switch between the two. There are further limits that need to be agreed within the RDEL and CDEL budgets, such as headcount within RDEL. Again not a free choice by the MOD. Then capital projects within the CDEL budgets, are graded from Major Projects on down. From memory I think there are 5 gradations. As Supportive has said, each gradation has different processes with differing levels of autonomy, so the project replacing small boats like the P1000 was probably handled with more autonomy than frigate replacements are.
And it won’t just be the Treasury that will have a say. Politicians will debate the big stuff directly, and the Chancellor, the PM or even the cabinet might weigh in. Others will audit the plans, such as the NAO and the PAC, and their comments and recommendations will influence politicians and civil servants. Even within the MOD there will be varying bids from the different services for budget chunks, and both internal and external politics will have their influence.
Others on here will understand the process better. It all seems a bit opaque to me.
You are not far wrong.
Large projects like ship class orders will have to be approved at cabinet level once they have got past Treasury.
The one exception to this was the Doris @Владимир Темников No10 era when he did bulldoze stuff through.
Ultimately if a strong prime minister with cabinet backing decided then that is that.
Very odd that the *[at]* No 10 converted to Cyrillic.
I’m actually a bit concerned now…..
Its been happening for a while . Its clearly Navy Look out software intrusion as Ive looked into the HTML code
The US just convicted the leader of hacking enterprise running since 2009- he was caught in Switzerland 2 years back.
He was Ukrainian not russian !
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/18/us/cyberattack-vermont-hospital-guilty.html
Thanks for the detailed response.
Sounds all very similar to private sector’s OPEX/ CAPEX approach but with the additional complications of answering to elected political masters.
Though there does seem a degree of extra complexity as regards capital projects, which I would hope have budgets set at the start for each year they will run.
Would be interesting to know what % of the 2% actually goes to the MoD, and what % goes to (presumably DWP), for servicemen’s pensions, etc.
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/defence-departmental-resources-2023/mod-departmental-resources-2023#defence-expenditure-by-commodity-block
In see than in other numbers comparing departments ‘Scotland’ is just £1 Bill more than MoD plus another £51 bill for the other devolved governments
Shapps tells us we are entering a Pre-war period but what are the Government doing about it?
Everything Shapps says is calibrated for best (or least worst) electoral effect. The impact on defence is totally secondary.
Hes saving the ‘best announcements’ for closer to the election – Tories always do as their focus groups show voters have short memories – unlike commentors here !
So when all of our Specialist Steel plants are closed down after they have learn’t all our production processes where are we going to get our Virgin Steel from? Any coded welder will tell you it’s Imported steel is usually crap & will never pass x-ray certification!
Very little of our indigenous steel production is Shipbuilding grade. There are plenty of European suppliers able to produce A, AH, DH and EH grades.
Your coded welder should also be telling you that you don’t certify steel by bombing it. That’s for certain weld inspections. Your steel gets certified by Class societies through chemical and mechanical tests for each batch
Beat me to it.
Plate of whatever type gets approved by Class Authority such as LLOYDS/ ABS. They examine and test the plate by batch, mark it and issue a cert. When you use the plate, wherever it is exported to, you present the cert for the local rep to certify its authentic and that the markings on the plate are the same as the cert. Block Chain is getting used for this to ensure authenticity from birth to insert for plate and all the other bits below that are required.
Welding is down to the skill of the welder who must also be LLOYDS/ABS approved, certified and be in date for their trade test. All the equipment such as the machine must be in date for cal and test. Rods for SMAW or IG Wire must be approved for use by class. The weld construction should be drawn up with detailed explanations of weld make up and approved by class. How many passes, how much Interpass, NDT, is back grinding required, ceramic plates used, welding temp monitoring or preheating required (Mostly Ally and Phos Ally Bronze Prop work for those though)
Yes some steel is rubbish but mostly its down to poor welding techniques that welds dont pass DPI, MPI, UT or bomb inspections.
Exactly things are much more precise now than they were before.
The days of gaps and voids being filled with weld rods are thankfully behind us.
I think the government buying Sheffield Forgemasters in 2021 and placing it under the control of the MoD shows that HMG is (perhaps finally) taking seriously the need to maintain certain strategic industries.
Forgemasters output is very different to supply of “shipbuilding” steel. That’s why people got interested.
My comment was with regard to strategic industries. I know Forgemasters aren’t involved in shipbuilding – unless you count the components manufactured for SSNs/SSBNs.
Thats the bit that got people interested.
It interesting that we make some of the super high specification castings and forgings in the UK but don’t bother with the mid/high spec plate.
Trouble is that there wasn’t the seaman’s for it for years given the stop start nature of naval ship building.
If you want to understand why it all stopped I was involved in surveying a site that used to do a lot of MOD steel work. Most of the machinery was from before 1930’s and there was a decent slug of Victorian kit in there. It was a horrendous working environment more of a museum than anything else.
I’m not at all suprised to hear that about the site surveyed. For some reason British industry is extremely bad in investing in new equipment and machinery… which helps explain why productivity is also lower here.
The chilean frigate in the last photograph is the FF-07 “Almirante Lynch” ex-HMS Grafton.
Is the only Type 23 with the 4.5 Mk-8 Mod 0
‘An interesting comparison’ – no, just a bland statement. HOW do they compare re cost, time, life extension, etc?To be a comparison – nice to actually compare them…
Especially given the disinclination of our allies to spend billions on supporting Ukraine and our inability to man these frigates, I’m surprised I haven’t seen an announcement to gift a number of these expensively refitting ships to Ukraine?
Because warships (fortunately?) can’t actually be delivered because the straits are closed, they could be manned by Ukrainians and safely loaned back under Royal Navy Command until they can actually be sailed to the Black Sea. These frigates could have a final flourish of life for diplomatic visits, disaster relief, escorts and naval exercises, and anti-piracy convoying (while giving Ukraine a better fleet than they had before). Win-win-win.
With a refit of a new towed array, plentifully stocked with retiring Harpoons and 4.5 ammunition, and one Merlin HM2 and one HC4 helicopter each (while we put in an order for replacements with the new Safran Aneto engines), they would also be able to hunt submarines and land at least a company of special forces anywhere in the Arctic or Pacific.
The mere possibility could no doubt lead the Russian Navy and Air Force on several nice panicky wild goose chases for a few red herrings, in the process permanently tying down dozens of Russian companies for the defence of inhospitable places and remote islands and random frigid peninsulas. (Sucks to be a Russian soldier I suppose). A daring raid or two could also be a nice propaganda boost, and in the final stages of the war help bring the Russians to the negotiating table.
Ukrainian Type 23s could also be replaced/supplemented by additional gifted Type 31s and River class Refits/Batch II OPVs (e.g. with ASM Quad launcher amidships, a widened Ops room, 57mm Bofors, ASCG, decoy launchers, an Armed USV, a UAV with container hanger, an LLM container VLS, engine upgrades, and new radar upgrades, see attached image). Ten or so such ships should be able to make life jolly uncomfortable for any of Russia’s divided fleets (and land an amphibious battalion), and it’s unlikely Ukraine will win the war before they could all be finished/delivered c. 2029. And then Ukraine would probably want to buy some more from us to maintain compatibility within their fleet.
And if those ships can never be delivered, they could stay with us anyway.
I’d be most interested in your thoughts, my fellow Armchair Admirals? (And proper experts)?
The fact a third of the Black Sea Fleet has been destroyed by a nation with no navy, suggests that ships are not a priority for Ukraine. For both sides, the Black Sea is just one big killing zone for surface vessels.
Indeed. The point is that they can’t get to the Black Sea anyway because the Strait is closed.
Simply put, this arrangement is designed to help
(i.e. improving the headline figures for aid to Ukraine and making the US and EU look like heartless misers by comparison)
to have the ships
(i.e. saving our money)
used
(i.e. prodding the conscience of the Americans and filling in gaps in ship availability for the Royal Navy and annoying the Houthis and that sort of thing)
and to
(i.e. being a fleet in being with options for commando raids)
Any of which should be much more useful than getting shot at in the Black Sea.
Unfortunately having some Ukrainian surface vessels roaming the oceans harrying the Russians, while a pleasing thought, has practical issues. You’re looking at a similar situation as faced by the Kreigsmarine by its commerce raiders.
How do you logistically resupply them?
Fuel, food, spares, can all be supplied by neutral ports. But munitions would violate neutrality, though I’m sure many would say (including Russia) that the West has violated its neutrality by providing Ukraine with weapons.
In theory Russian reconnaissance satellites would be able to track any Ukranian vessels, and the Russian air would be able to intercept any that came within range of land. But this war has shown Russian assets often don’t live up to their billing…
What Ukraine needs is some SSKs and somewhere to support them. They could then ravage the ghost fleet of tankers that Russia has recently bought to export its oil. Sink its tankers and Russia’s main source of income dries up.
(Americans consciences don’t need prodding, they’ve supplied a huge amount of support to Ukraine. The small Trump/Putin wing of the GOP are the ones holding up further support, and they obviously have no conscience…)
Whilst the thought is enticing. Where would these “Ukrainian” vessels be docked when not in use? Russia would see not only these vessels as legitimate targets, but also the dock the ship is moored to.
There would be little risk to the ship or dock from Russian weapons.
However, the risks to nearby counties would be real….
Nearby continents you mean…
Russia has submarines in the open oceans , no?
Indeed enclosed seas are a bit of a death sentence to war ships especially in the modern drone age..where your enemy can just keep throwing cheap attrition drones at you until they get luckily.
Definitely. Does not bode well for the Russian Baltic Fleet if Putin ever does try to move on a NATO member.
Its a british bulk carrier Ruby mar that seems to have taken one for the team vs the Emirate of Yemen
The UK can’t supply more than half a dozen ships, and all clapped out. It might be possible to harry Russian subs in the Med. Of course, the opposite is also true.
That suggested upgrade of the Batch 2 River OPVs looks like a pretty functional corvette. Why the UK doesn’t built a dozen or more of these vessels to flesh out the numbers in the escort fleet is completely beyond me. Even if “all” they were used for was home waters, North Sea, and Mediterranean patrols, who cares? They would have enough teeth to have a fighting chance in a hot war scenario, they could contribute something useful to a task force, and they would free up the Royal Navy’s “Cadillac” assets for the power projection and blue water – AUKUS missions.
The Rivers can never be full escorts due to lack of size and crew spaces. Therefore it is largely a waste to turn them into “barely enough” escorts when that is the whole idea of the T31, which would always be the better option.
With warships, you get in broad terms what you pay for. Either you get a lightweight corvette on the cheap that is toast if an anti ship missile heads it’s way or you spend frigate cost to get near frigate capability, at which point a T31 is still the better option.
My point is that they would be fleshing out numbers but nothing more; what we need is a set of escorts that can cover all of 4 or so MRSS with a basic escort and a CSG with the whole T45 and 26 shebang. T31 is perfect (albeit without hull sonar) as a GP frigate. Why spend money on a dead end?
I agree the Type 31 is much better, and the River class a dead end by comparison.
But I was also thinking that for Ukraine having a hanger for long distance patrol isn’t necessary, the lighter weight is valuable for keeping the ships in the Danube or hugging their coastline, and it’s the fastest way to get 3 warships (although the Type 31s can perhaps be built a little faster due in the large Type 31 hall, I expect that it would be really tricky to get even one extra one within three years of an order)?
For the Royal Navy, I’d fear the Treasury bean counters would say that ordering even 2 Type 31s isn’t a reasonable replacement for sending say 3 River class OPVs to Ukraine. Therefore my thinking was we might as well make the replacements also capable of at least operating unmanned vehicles, LMMs, be useful with point defence, have some artillery with the 57 mm, have a few NSMs so they can sink something, and use them as an excuse to order 3 more Merlins too (which could then be mostly operated from the carriers instead)?
(A bit “see-through-deck-cruiser” carriers all over again, but Cochrane would agree that great works of fiction are sometimes required for the Royal Navy to win something).
Or do we fear the Treasury would be able to turn around and say to the MOD “you don’t need more escorts, those are frigates too!” and never order a Type 32? Or would they never order more frigates anyway?
Also there’s a bit of a shipbuilding capacity issue; if we revived another BAE shipbuilding line and workforce, even for only three ships, that’s a plus? And it could lead to exports/refits for the foreign ships as well.
Certainly the T31 is a significantly better option—no argument whatsoever. The problem from what I can tell is that there doesn’t seem to be sufficient political will to build additional 31’s, whereas the Batch 2 Rivers were built (if I understand this issue correctly) initially and mostly to keep a shipyard open and workers busy so their skills wouldn’t be lost with a company shutdown. I would think this same rationale would still be appealing to Parliament, though presumably by this point many of those workers are now employed on other projects.
Just continuing with the thought exercise, additional Rivers would obviously be cheaper even than the 31s, and something > nothing. Also, how long would it be before a second batch of 31s would hit the water? Another ten years or longer? Does the UK (and the broader West) have that long before China and its friends go adventuring? What about the Red Sea and the Middle East?
RCB2 were built due to the ToBA between MOD and BAES which required MoD to either provide sufficient shipbuilding work to maintain skills, or to pay BAES to keep those workers on the payroll waiting for work.
At the time, the T26 programme was engaged in a massive stand-off between MoD and BAES as to the design and associated cost, just as the carrier programme was moving from build to commissioning. Which meant that the steel trades (platers, shipwrights, welders) on the Clyde were short of work and BAES would be charging the MOD for them to sit around.
MoD decided that it might as well have something for the money and so grabbed the nearest “ready to go” thing it could find, which was the design for the Amazonas supplied to Brazil. Trouble was that originated as a coastguard vessel for Trinidad and Tobago, before they pulled out and the Brazilians took over the contract, which meant that it was not designed to the standards required to pass the MoD Ship Safety Certification regime. Which meant a big chunk of fairly rapid redesign.
Its a different world today. The ToBA is no longer extant, the Clyde has T26 work until the early to mid 30s and Rosyth is building T31 until around 2026/27. As yet, none have been delivered, or even entered the water, so they’ve got a way to go before anyone suggests another contract.
Even if they did, the more pressing issue is manpower to crew them, which is another budget and problem set entirely. You can’t just magic folk off the streets and send them to sea. It literally takes years if not decades to grow the various senior rates in the various branches to allow you to expand a fleet. That is the price we are paying for all the reductions since 1990 – and particularly the headcount hit in SDSR 2010, which while understandable at the time, wasn’t particularly sensible given the planned expansion of the fleet in terms of new ships etc. Arguably the decision in 2015 to keep naval manpower essentially the same to avoid cuts to the Army were more egregious.
Political will is part of it, but also financial orthodoxy. That spend comes from Resource budgets, which HMT hates and tries to minimise, because resource spend can’t be seen as an asset with value, its just an ongoing expense. Arcane accounting rules are the issue there.
The picture shows just what a poor package the River is when you attempt to stretch it.
Compare with say Fassmer 80m OPV.
All,
OPV’s
I would totally agree with the sentiments expressed above = that sending the River Class OPV (s) – even ones significantly upgraded to the improved specification being proposed by RAN (directly above) – into the Ukrainian “hot war zone” would be tantamount to writing that ship’s crew a (very short) communal suicide note…..
(i.e. so at the present time = coming out of the port of Odessa and turning left (Sorry, when posting on NL, I must do it properly = “Turning sharply to port to head due east out into the combat zone east of Odessa, skipper”)
Frankly, all that was ever missing from the MOD-written original specification for the RN OPV’s were the four key requirements of:
To be fair……..the RN OPV has lived up to its TLA: OPV = Over Priced Vessel.
———————
Small Frigates might (sometimes) be useful
Having just said that, a properly-armed small frigate (or a large corvette) warship may indeed come in quite useful in defending those now-vital coastal food / grain convoys that Ukraine is more recently dispatching out from its key trading port of Odessa, south towards Constantinople.
These convoys closely hung the coastlines of Ukraine, Moldova and Romania and thus stay in the very shallow water = to avoid the risk of Red October getting a “kill”.
These convoys are now absolutely vital to prop up the battered economy of Ukraine. A very useful side effect is they also stop numerous Polish farmers moaning (aka rioting) about Ukrainian grain imports being shipped overland via Poland; thus wreaking their livelihoods….(Thus both Polish, and even the placid Dutch, farmers are both now copying the French (whom, it has to be said, are easily the best and most experienced rural rioters to be found anywhere in the EU’s 27 nations).
However, even in that convoy escort role, any relatively small warship would still require fitting very effective air-aircraft and anti-missile defences onboard.
—–
Corvettes
With regard to the debate (above) about the “best specification for a good-all round corvette”; in their day, I was personally a fan of the UK built (Vosper Thorneycroft) Qahir class corvettes for the Royal Oman Navy, which were delivered in the mid 1990’s.
These two 85m long ships had a good weapons fit (8no Exocets; 16 Crotale; 76mm gun), excellent sensors and also a helicopter flight deck (Lynx).
The ship’s gave decades of excellent service; especially when patrolling the Arabian Gulf to deter the twin threats of AIS (Ayatollahs In Speedboats) and the much larger IRGC frigate sized warships.
———–
Are the RN’s Existing Large Frigates too Large?
Lastly, what the Toby’s of this world are overlooking is that the one key technical reason that all of our current RN escort ships are today so large (i.e. ordered in best Big Mac style: “for an extra £100M, does Sir want to go supersize?”) is the overriding RN requirement for a 30m long flight deck, which is required to fit onboard a Merlin. This large helicopter also requires building a large hanger (i.e. to stop Merlin getting cold and wet) This one requirement has been THE key requirement in determining the size of every frigate class built for the RN over the past forty years (T23, T26, T31, T32?)
That one key requirement alone – so accommodating a supersized BFM (a Biggles Flying Machine to the uninitiated) – has a massive effect on every aspect of a frigate’s total overall size, weight and especially stability
(Hint: compare the size of the old ocean escorts of the USN Oliver Hazard Perry class – or the more-modern French Fayette – to the modern RN Type 31).
Accordingly, reducing the size of the embarked whirly-birds embarked on a new RN small frigate design (or large corvette) to two x wildcat (or, even better: one x wildcat and one x apache) would dramatically reduce the size, weight etc – and thus the cost – of any future UK built “small” frigate|: whilst still retaining space for a very-good weapons and sensor fit.
As Will has quite-rightly pointed out (directly above), these types of ships could be very useful in the European Littorals.
regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
Note 1: Obviously with the option, as a expensive contract variation, to revert back to Clint Eastwood’s original wording (“Punk”) when operating anywhere else in the world…
Everyone is upsizing , including those without Merlins, so that claim is invalid
eg these new boats for Germany – frigate sized at 10,500 tons ( not sure if that ‘standard’ naval displacement or GRT ( which is based on internal volume)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F126_frigate
I had been aboard all the B1 Rivers except Clyde. I could never understand why they weren’t all bought with flight decks. You can never have too many flightdecks. The Fassmer has a hangar. It has a launch ramp for a large intercpetor RIB. The Rivers aren’t bad. They are just not a good package. If the RN still peformed fisheries work we could have purchased something smaller. Rolls Royce had a 1100 tonne design with Merlin capable flightdeck with davits amidships at the 2 deck level.
Your appraisial of the situation in the Black Sea is off. Far easier for the Ukraine to go through Western Europe.
Clyde does have a flight deck as Im sure you know. Its the hangar thats missing
This is NZ’s 2 OPV at 85m by 14m
“This one requirement has been THE key requirement in determining the size of every frigate class built for the RN over the past forty years (T23, T26, T31, T32?)”
No, really it’s not. There are many drivers for ship size and while the helicopter facilities do have an effect, it’s by no means the dominant one. If it were, you wouldn’t have the wild disparity in length between T23, T26 and T31 – T32 doesn’t count as it doesn’t exist as yet. The German F125 is as long as T26 and it doesn’t have a Merlin, rather the NH90, which is quite a bit smaller.
Length tends to be driven by separating weapon system positions and deconflicting radars and comms antennae, as well as things like RAS and boat operating positions, removal routes and all sorts of other factors. There’s also the small matter of accommodation standards, which has had a major impact on deck area demand – which has an even bigger impact because you can’t just squeeze accommodation in wherever there’s space. You need to maximise the amount of it that’s above the DC deck so you don’t end up having your WT integrity at risk when watches change or people go back to their racks,
None of it is simple and it all leads to bigger ships.
I agree the trend everywhere is for larger ships; I’d also note that arsenal ships seems to be a trend; this is the age of the missile.
So perhaps if we gifted Ukraine a few refitted River class OPVs (keeping those ships under Royal Navy command until the war ends and delivery is allowed under the Montreux convention; mostly used for diplomatic visits, humanitarian aid, making Putin worry about commando raids, and escorting carriers and Red Sea convoys) – then we could “stretch” the replacements for the Royal Navy.
Such a Batch IV would still be cheaper than replacing the River class with the Type 31; and probably still be around the same price as for the original Batch II ships plus their refit and refurbishment for Ukraine, so the cost for such a Batch IV replacement could still reasonably come out of a Military Aid budget.
Would something like this stretched replacement be much good?
making Putin worry about commando raids
In the same way Biden worries there won’t be his favourite ice cream after lunch?
I very much doubt the Ukraine will have a coast by August.
I have no doubt that Ukraine will undoubtedly have a coast by August, and will have sunk yet more of what remains of the Black See Fleet.
I share some such doubt, but although soft power diplomatic visits or hurricane relief to prod the hearts of Americans might well have more impact on the course of the war, Russia will still have random islands in the Pacific/Arctic which can be attacked by helicopters. A squadron of ships on the high seas crewed by Ukrainians but under Royal Navy command could very quickly and legally become a Ukrainian squadron striking some far flung Russian port or airbase, before switching to commerce raiding/capturing oil tankers, e.g. if Ukraine was desperate for some good news.
More “possibility” than “imminent threat”, sure, but mere military possibility has worked to tie down thousands of soldiers before now, and Russia has a long coastline to defend?
Russia has its own ocean fleets apart from the Black sea , plus nuclear subs and satellite recon to catch the ‘raiders’ much like the RN did against the Graf Spee. A complete fantasy fleet and fantasy operations you suggest.
No. What amounts to a 25-30% increase in length will leave the ship with a bending moment challenge that will need a significant structural redesign, as well as all the lovely new systems you want to put in.
Might as well start with a clean sheet and do it properly.
Thank you very much for that reply – that makes a lot of sense.
(Sadly this hypothetical scenario requires a c. like-for-like replacement for a ship sent to Ukraine, so that the replacement cost can be categorised as aid spending, so one might as well go for a Type 31 as a clean sheet.
Although – would you estimate one could get away with 10% or 15% perhaps, or is a rule of thumb too unreliable)?
Dimensions for the stretched version would be, what, around 100 meters or so? And maybe 2500 – 2750 tons or so? Just guessing.
Yes, it seems lots of wasted space.
It was interesting when the 1st Sea Lord gave evidence to the Def Select Ctte he was asked for his priorities. He stated more OPV’s and MRSS. This suggests even with the current problems around the 23’s he’s at least comparatively comfortable with them.
Thats because he wants to keep his job and not ‘lean forward on his waterskis’ and say things the ministers wont like
Sadly true..coming out and saying what is actually needed to fight the next war would get him a job as an ex first sea lord.
So Australia has decided to cut the number of Type 26/Hunter high-end ASW ships it intends to build from 9 to 6, supplemented with 11 general-purpose frigates. Similar to the pivot the RN did from T26 to a T26/ T31 mix.
Thoughts on Babcock’s chance of selling the Type 31 design to Australia for their new general purpose frigate?
Fantasy, you’re either very poor with facts or just ignore them completely.
If that were true, you would have pointed out where I was factually incorrect. But you haven’t, so clearly you’re a liar.
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/type-26-frigate-purchase-reduced-by-australia/
Contenders for the general purpose frigates announced as:
Meko A-200
Mogami 30FFM
Daegu class FFX Batch II and III
Navantia ALFA3000
Those are the four identified so far.
But T31 could have been discounted already either because;
• the RAN might want to buy a design that is already in service (as the USN did for the Constellation class, which ruled out T26)
• size, as all these are substantially smaller in tonnage, compared to T31
Yes. The current terminology is light frigate or corvette at around 3000 tons
this is Navantia Alpha 3000- maybe where the B3 Rivers should/could have been?
N-a-B
My original post was, very obviously, referring the potential great utility of smaller frigates (or larger corvettes) for many of the patrol and escort tasks that are often required of the RN.
The whole point of a frigate is that (or rather…. it should be) a relatively small warship (key hint there), one with a good all-round capability, but a ship which is not too large. Thus they could be affordable and could be procured (see below) in greater quantities, and also much quicker, than much-larger and more complex ships.
Next, as professionals, lets be a bit careful here with making sure that the key technical differences between describing “size” and “length” (i.e. As the “actress” once said to the vicar….) do not confuse many other “non professionals” reading our “little duel” on NL.
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Over the past few decades, the RN has always chosen to “Go Large” with everything they specify for their frigates = up to and including the helicopter.
However, I will say that many of your other points are “fair comment” = especially the one about how modern RN accommodation standards have definitely driven up the need for more CC (“cubic capacity”) in those grey-painted spaces above the damage control deck.
But, on the subject on flying machines, I made it clear in my post I was referring to helicopters as “Wildcat vis Merlin” = so your comparison of “NH90 vis Merlin” is not really a fair one…especially as both once started out together on the same drawing board……….
I will stand by my point that the RN always specifying large helicopters for our frigates has definitely driven up the size of “our” RN escort ships.
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Furthermore, in my defence, I must now point out that one of BAe’s competitors (hint: a big shipyard based much closer to the equator) is now offering a 3,000T ship with a very considerable warfighting capability.
https://www.navantia.es/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ALFA-3000-1.pdf
On a very sea-worthy grey-painted package – which is just 104m long – is a comprehensive set of SAM’s and SSM’s; full communications (note 1) and sensors; quite old fashioned UUV’s (I seem to recall they were called torpedoes when I was a lad…) and a very good medium-sized helicopter (Not forgetting the nice warm hanger for Mr Seahawk to sleep in…).
To be fair to you, and thus supporting your earlier comments, in addition to the smaller helicopter, I would strongly suspect that a large part of the effort which has made here to reduce the total size of this modern ship (especially the overall length and its total weight) is down to automation. The Alpha 3000’s entire crew numbers are well down on those now required to “run” an RN frigate (which, given the RN’s current retention and recruitment “crisis”, may be “somewhat advantageous”……)
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Given that Mr V Putin is appearing far to often on the headlines on the BBC’s News channel, I believe that now is definitely the right time for MOD to switch over to a much-quicker, and thus more effective UOR procurement procedure….. .
To decide what patrol craft the RN should buy next year; I believe we should dispense with all of the conventional MOD contracts and Defective Purchasing Agony standard procurement procedures (PS. especially as BAe never like signing any standard MOD/DPA contracts!)
Accordingly, can I suggest a Spanish (Alfa 3000 ) vis Scottish (OPV) duel (with war shots …) on a range in the Irish Sea
First ship to sink (or chicken out) immediately looses out on the next contract for RN patrol and escort craft
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Comparing the warfighting capability of a Scottish built (and only very-slighter-shorter RN OPV) with one of these very-modern Spanish build small frigate(s) is comparing chalk and cheese.
To conclude, I know which ship I would prefer to fight on; especially late on a wet and cold Saturday night in a tough foreign neighbourhood………..
Regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
Note 1. the full set of satellite communications is needed so that the Ship’s captain can obtain expensive legal advice from Temple Bar; all before he (or she) decides to tell a Ayatollah in a Speedboat that his (It is unlikely to be her…) time is up.
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