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An amazing adventure.


I bet it was great


At the time, It was just that, then people started dying, not that we really expected anything less.


Looks great, the barrier landing on a spanish cargo ship made me laugh, we should have landed more into spanish naval ship….




Having read Rowlands previous books Vukcan 6p7 and Phoenix Sydney, I expect this to be an excellent read covering one of the very important but less well publicised aspects of the Falklands War.


Vulcan 607 and Phoenix Squadron


We met one of the navigators every year for 3 years in Kendal from the Vulcan bomber what an absolute fantastic guy to listen too ,his team we’re literally married to that plane
Also many stories of their sorties during the Cold War and many missions they left fully loaded with the A bombs


Has this just to be the best place ever to have never had a downvote ?


I bet I have several by tomorrow. These comments have everything. Idiot trolls. A downvoting numpty. Makes the site look really great. Really serious.


Think I spotted an Incy wincy little downvote earlier, but it’s gone now !




Looks like someone has been really busy this last few days. Great work, you must be really proud. ( as well as lonely )


Vulcan 607……a really great read……don’t think we could do it again

Supportive Bloke

With a Vulcan No. With other resources Yes.

And we could for arguments sake strike Stanley Airfield a lot harder and more accurately than we did in ’82 with a large number of resources.

  • Laser guided or other guided Paveway munitions from F35B on QEC – definitely in service – most likely
  • Cruise missile from subs – definitely in service
  • P8 has heavy stand off capability with Harpoon – maybe in service status unconfirmed. Requires AAR that we do not have to extend the range. AAR would need to be fixed on an UOR basis anyway.
  • UOR to upgrade Block I Harpoons to II and fire from surface ships. Block I still just about in service.

So I think the job the Vulcans did is, for now well and better covered, by alternative assets.

When Corporate started laser guided was in its infancy and while there were laser designator sets there best use was not made of them.


Exactly. Astute should have been built with VLS for jobs like those. Virginias have 2 VPM.
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Last edited 3 years ago by X

I spoke too soon it appears.


You do have to wonder about their mental health.


What a deadly loadout those Virginias have, Hope the successor to Astute class has them.


Well Astutes are roughly the same size. I would have thought it would have been a natural progression from the T-boats being fitted with tube launched TLAM that the larger successor class would have gone VLS. If for no other reason than to keep in step with the USN. But no…….


I think Block V of the Virginias will have 4 VPMs?

I must correct myself: They have one Virginia Payload Module (VPM) wich will add 4 further Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT). So they will have 6 VPTs? Makes 42 Tomahawks.?

Last edited 3 years ago by Sebastian

The specs are ever changing. Yes 7 missiles per module.


“With a Vulcan No. With other resources Yes.”

Can a Typhoon make the trip ?

If not no you can’t. That capability is lost.

Supportive Bloke

We have a fully working aircraft carrier with F35B on it.

Vulcan dropped dumb bombs onto Stanley Airfield. One F35B Can drop 6,800kg of smart munitions. I stated Paveway as it is known we have a decent stockpile of them and they are highly accurate and quite cheap. As well as F35B being cleared to use them.

So it is a fully functional response.

Why fly a typhoon down south why we have QEC + F35B = made for the job?


Vulcan(or Vulcan like bomber) can do it after 1-2 days prep . You have to send the carrier, and escorts down for more than a week and only then make an attack.

It is a completely different scenario.

Supportive Bloke

Black Buck made little difference other than say ‘this is in reach’

The actual bombing itself was not terribly effective.

Hence why The range of options, I outlined above, we now have is far more accurate and far better. With laser and GPS targeting you can take out aircraft on the ground rather than try to crater runways.


It scared the argies enough to base their jets on mainland though, so it worked.

Supportive Bloke


But how much more effective would three messy holes all punched in the runway have been? We can do that now from a submarine.

I wouldn’t underestimate how much the Argentinians were also scared of being strafed on the ground by Harriers – there was no protected standing. When they lost the two MIII’s on day two of aerial engagement the calculus changed.

If we could AAR P8 then it would be doable with stand off too.


Yes P8 might work for that it can AAR..But needs upgrade for proper weapons i guess.

Supportive Bloke

My copy has arrived: will review shortly!!


The published work on the air war in the Falklands is strangely patchy. Rowland White’s Vulcan 607 was a cracking read, probably the best book there’ll ever be on the first Black Buck raid. But almost inevitably, he exaggerated the significance and impact of that first raid, claiming that it was responsible for the withdrawal both of all Argentine Mirage aircraft and of the Argentine navy from the Falklands theatre.
Elsewhere, the best first-hand account of the air war is still Sharkey Ward’s excellent Sea Harrier over the Falklands. David Morgan’s Hostile Skies is also first-rate, even when it’s written from a very different perspective from Sharkey’s book. Jerry Pook’s RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands, meanwhile, is weird, because it approaches the war from a position of ludicrously exaggerated criticism of the Royal Navy, where among other things he repeatedly accuses the RN of regarding the RAF Harrier pilots as “expendable ordance” – though none were killed, in action or otherwise.
The best secondary account (not written by folks who took part) is Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic, which benefited both by being published within a year of the war, and for the fact that the authors interviewed both British and Argentine pilots.
Anyway, I look forward to reading this latest book by White.

Supportive Blok

Agreed.. It is very patchy…

The British mania for secrecy shone through.

And it had to: until a totally new generation of ships and systems came into play.

I agree White exaggerated Black Buck, not just because of my RN centric view. Sinking of Belgrano put the Argentine Nay into port and I don’t think anyone really disputes that. They had no answer to our fleet of nuclear hunter killers. And they were really there and they did the job well. A bit of the war that did go to plan.

I do agree, insofar as showing that the RAF had reach was pretty important though and changed the calculus.

the Argentines moving fixed wing off Stanley was more to do with the risk of strafing runs from SHAR GR3 and the vulnerabilities of a missile SHAR trap at the end of the runway during takeoff or landing. Given they understood from day two of the air war the effectiveness of SHAR and knew perfectly well how effective Dart could be in the right conditions.

I’ve read 2/3 of the book and there are some strange inaccuracies in it: where it flies in the face of declassified documents that are in the public domain. Makes me doubt a few other bits of it as well TBH.

It is a great yarn, no doubt about it and I enjoyed reading it, but I‘d be cautious about calling it a researched source.


You’re maybe picking up on things I’d missed. i was impressed by the fact that he interviewed many of the key participants.

Supportive Bloke

I will write it up in some detail and post it on here….Some of it is good verging on great and it is very readable.

I don’t resent spending the money on it and would still recommend it.

Alan Reid

Hi Adrian,
Although no RAF Harrier GR3 pilots were killed, three aircraft were shot-down by AAA (including one piloted by Jerry Pook) – and one pilot was badly injured and taken prisoner. It’s also worth stating that No.1 squadron did take on the lion’s share of dangerous low-level ground attack missions – with about 130 GR3 sorties flown, compared to approximately 20 Sea Harrier sorties.
In his book, Pook argues that the Admiral’s staff on Hermes did not understand how to conduct air-to-ground operations, particularly on the need for effective pre-strike photo-reconnaissance. He states GR3s were sent-out too often on speculative armed-reconnaissance missions which produced limited results.
After reading Jerry Pook’s book, he did strike me as a very confident and professional airman, who made a personal contribution to victory in 1982. In some respects, too, he appears cut from the same cloth as Sharkey Ward, and his criticisms in the conduct of the air-war seemed to echo with those of Ward – both argued that Woodward’s staff on Hermes did not properly know their business.
It also seems clear from both accounts that – whatever the warm personal relations between RAF and RN Harrier pilots – a characteristic of the Falkland’s war was the bitter rivalry between the services.