The exact dates of the departure of HMS Queen Elizabeth for sea trials and her subsequent arrival in Portsmouth have been subject of intense media speculation. Briefings last year had given the impression that sea trials would probably be conducted in March 2017, although many journalists overlooked the caveat that timings maybe subject to change. It is now clear that the sea trials date has slipped slightly but disappointment over minor delays must be seen in the context of a very ambitious 8-year building project. There have also been various other rumours about the project circulating, some of which are addressed here.
At the time of writing HMS Queen Elizabeth is alongside in Rosyth and well into the ‘test and commissioning’ phase of her construction. This includes the trials and integration of many systems. As the first ship of her class, she is effectively a prototype and much of her equipment is either entirely new, unique or has never been fitted in RN vessels before. As testing is conducted, a multitude of technical challenges have to be addressed and no one can say with absolute certainty when this process will be complete. The good news is that the Aircraft Carrier Alliance (ACA) confirm they have not discovered a ‘show stopper” or any specific serious problem could cause a major delay.
The ACA contract with the MoD stipulates that the ship must be handed over to the Royal Navy by the end of 2017 so, contrary to received wisdom, the project remains on schedule.
Overall there is great confidence amongst the builders and Ship’s Staff in Rosyth that the ship is sound, will meet its specification and perform well at sea. It is a virtual certainty that the ship will go on trials this summer and be delivered to the RN before the end of the year.
The sea trials programme
‘Spring sea trials’ will now be ‘summer sea trials’ but this is not cause for great concern. Considering the size and nature of the project, those involved should be congratulated on the relatively smooth progress that has already been made. The Ship’s Company is now working on board 24/7 and the ‘Ships Staff Move On Board’ (SSMOB) date is not far off. She is already transforming from a building site into something more like a warship. Safety and the operational readiness of the ship are the top priority of the contractor who remain the owners of the ship until she is formally handed over to the RN. It is obviously sensible to wait until they are fully confident in her before they declare the Ready For Sea Date (RFSD). The ‘delay’ maybe frustrating for government, the navy and the ship’s company especially, who would all like to get the ship to sea as soon as possible. Common sense dictates it would be unwise to rush departure, merely for political convenience or to meet an arbitrary deadline. HMS Queen Elizabeth will be under an intense media spotlight from the moment she puts to sea. Eliminating as many technical issues as possible while still alongside in Rosyth, before departure is wise.
Real cause for anger about delays should be directed towards the government of Gordon Brown which deliberately delayed the project in 2008 by two years for a short-term ‘cost saving’. Apart from extending the gap David Cameron then created in RN carrier capability, this eventually added around £1.5Bn to the total cost of the project.
The exact timing of sea trials for this mighty ship will be dependant on several factors. Departure from Rosyth is only possible under certain tidal conditions and there are several weeks between ‘tidal windows’. Manoeuvring a 70,000 ton ship out of the basin and through a very narrow lock cannot be done in high winds. Once she has left the river Forth, it is not intended that she will return to Rosyth. Like the whole test and commissioning phase, the sea trials schedule is only an outline plan and subject to change. The trials phase will be conducted in the North Sea and at the halfway point, the ship may use the deepwater berths at Invergordon or anchor in the Cromarty Firth.
“The QE Class programme represents an engineering challenge of unprecedented scale and complexity for UK shipbuilding. HMS Queen Elizabeth is at a mature stage of the testing and commissioning phase, which is designed to thoroughly assess her vast and complex systems and identify any requirements for further work in advance sea trials. We remain focused on delivering this critical capability for the Nation. HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH will undertake her sea trials programme in the summer of 2017.” Aircraft Carrier Alliance spokesperson.
Landing craft will not be carried
As the Queen Elizabeth Class (QEC) will also have to undertake the role of amphibious assault ship, many commentators have assumed that one, or both of the ships will be fitted to carry small landing craft (LCVPs). This is not the case and there is no provision for the carriers to embark LCVPs, CB90s (fast assault craft) or Hovercraft. Troops will essentially have to be transported helicopter (or possibly Osprey tiltrotor). For more detail see previous post. There is however, a small platform at the stern of the ship, colloquiality referred to as the ‘wodge’, which offers the option of loading and unloading personnel and equipment onto other small craft, mexeflotes etc. in benign weather conditions.
The original design has always included space for two Passenger Transfer Craft (PTC) and RIBs which will be deployed from sponsons. As many ports will not be able to accommodate the ship alongside, she will often have to anchor offshore. Fast and safe transport for the ship’s company and visitors is an important requirement. The first of the PTCs has already been delivered by Alnmaritec Ltd, and with a nice nod to Fleet Air Arm history, is named “Swordfish”. She is highly manoeuvrable, can make up to 18 knots, has a crew of 2 and can carry up to 36 passengers. The seats can be removed so bulky items could be carried. The cabin area is heated and there is a set of heads forward.
Confidence in automation
In order to reduce the personnel requirement, the QEC are fitted with a Highly Mechanised Weapons Handling System (HMWHS) to transport ammunition and stores around the ship. Manned by around only 50 people, it can be operated with as few as 12 in an emergency. Similar to many systems already in use in commercial warehouses and airports, loads are palletised to a standard size. FIAM (Flight In Air Material – eg bombs or missiles) come in many shapes, sizes and weights but this palletised rail system has the flexibility to quickly move all types. Sophisticated, but largely unseen capability such as this, allows aircraft to be readied quickly and maintain a high sortie rate. There has been some concern that automated systems like this are vulnerable to action damage or breakdown if used for extended periods. With a small Ship’s Company there would be few sailors available to make repairs or move loads using more manual methods. However HMWHS has been thoroughly de-risked on land-based test rigs, and there is confidence that it is sufficiently robust and reliable.
The QEC incorporates advanced magazine design to reduce the risk of fire and detonation of stored ammunition or fuel. There are dog-legs in delivery routes and measures to reduce the effects of flash and blast. One of the cost drivers and time-consuming aspects of any good warship design is to ensure it is properly battle-hardened and this is the case with the QEC. In the event of equipment failure or damage, there are work-arounds and back-ups to maintain a measure of fighting capability.
Structural concerns unfounded
A press report that suggested HMS Queen Elizabeth would suffer hull distortion from ‘hogging’ and ‘sagging’ is entirely unfounded. (Hogging is caused by the movement of waves which push up on the centre of the hull, causing the upper deck to bend down at each end, sagging is the opposite effect) This phenomenon affects all ships and is a foundational concern for any naval architect. At the design stage many hours were devoted to computer modelling the dynamic structural stress and deflections that would affect the QEC hull. The greatest stress caused by movement through heavy seas occurs around the aircraft lift openings at flight deck level. This has been addressed with major reinforcement and curves where it is cut out from the deck. A very experienced team spent several years designing the QEC and there is no reason at all to have any doubts about the structural integrity of a ship intended to last up to 50 years.
The QEC has two deck-edge lifts capable of moving two armed F-35s (or even the entire ships company!) simultaneously. They have been designed and manufactured by MacTaggart Scott, probably the world leaders in aircraft lift design, drawing on long experience with many other carriers. The QEC lifts avoid the many engineering problems encountered with the centre line ‘scissor lifts’ employed on the Invincible class.
IEP propulsion – like the type 45, but not like the Type 45
The QEC and the Type 45 destroyers both use Integrated Electric Propulsion (IEP). There are no direct drives from either Diesels or Gas Turbines which provide electricity to the main propulsion motors. Sophisticated Variable Frequency Variable Power (VFVP) technology is used to control speed. That is where the similarities end. BAE Systems designed the Type 45, although the MoD made the key propulsion decisions. A specially recruited Thales team designed the QEC. The QEC are designed to cruise on diesels with their MT-30 gas turbines brought online for higher speeds. The Type 45 was designed to cruise on its supposedly very efficient WR-21 Gas turbines, and only use diesels for extra speed. Unfortunately the intercooler-recuperators fitted to the Type 45 gas turbines have proved problematic. The MT-30s used by the QEC have been well tested and is a simpler, more reliable option.
QEC has duplicated main and secondary machinery in two well-separated complexes with independent uptakes and downtakes in the two islands. From a propulsion perspective, the QEC is like two ships. If the forward system is damaged, the after section will keep going and vice-versa, another reassuring measure and a resilient design.
Although there are some aspects of the QEC project that are cause for concern, her designers and builders should be commended for an incredible British achievement. After years of anticipation, we can look forward HMS Queen Elizabeth putting to sea in the summer and a world class warship being delivered to the Royal Navy in 2017.
*Technically, as she is not yet in commission, the ship should not be called “HMS Queen Elizabeth”. However dropping the ‘HMS’ prefix is likely to cause unfortunate confusion with the reigning monarch.
Related articles
- Technical Issues Behind HMS Queen Elizabeth ‘Delays’ (Forces TV)
- Why your CVF should not moonlight as your LPH (Save the Royal Navy)
- When will HMS Queen Elizabeth arrive in Portsmouth (Save the Royal Navy, Oct 2016)
- Swordfish Passenger Transport Boat – Video (Alnmaritec)
- Highly Mechanised Weapon Handling (Ship Design Blog)
•Swordfish Passenger Transport Boat looks great and impressive, I don’t suppose it will have HMS in its prefix,
The carrier, im sure will be a great success and prove very worthy,
as for operations and future combat zones, I suppose time will tell but very impressive all the same.
We had similar issues with HMS Ocean. During Trials and Commissioning phase forecasting completion is more an art than science. Even with the best project management skills problem solving is not finite. This does not stop observers wanting finite dates to fix in diaries. First of Class problems continued for sometime after she entered service, but with joint effort between the Builder, MoD and the Ship’s Staff these were overcome for her to become a major asset for the fleet.
It is true that the integrated electric propulsion system is common to both, the QE aircraft carrier and the Type 45 destroyers. What is also an undeniable fact is that both of these acquisition programmes are subject to the same, tried-and-failed procurement processes used by MoD.
Here is one reason why.
Anyone who has worked in the defence engineering industry will know that financial risks start-out as innocuous looking technical risks on the Defence Contractor’s premises, where selected ones are deliberately concealed by the Contractor during the design and development phase, then skilfully transferred to MoD Abbey Wood, Bristol where they morph into ‘show stopping’ risks and come to the fore immediately after the main investment decision has been taken (as they have done so spectacularly on the Type 45 destroyers with total power blackouts), ultimately ending up as an additional cost burden on the Front Line Commands, who have recently been given day-to-day responsibility for managing the defence equipment budget.
This happens because a key behavioural characteristic of Defence Contractors is that they will always choose to conceal technical risks identified early in the programme, by engaging with procurement officials and getting them to focus on declared risks which ordinarily fall in the trivia category, whilst skilfully diverting their attention away from those really huge ‘show stopping’ risks which they will only reveal later on, when things go wrong, to realise their objective of ‘growing’ the Contract by getting Abbey Wood Team Leader to raise Contract Amendments and/or let Post Design Services Contracts.
They achieve this by contriving situations which entice procurement officials into partaking in detailed design decisions relating to the evolving Technical Solution, and then use this involvement to coerce procurement officials into raising Contract Amendments later on. Indeed, it the very existence of Contract Amendments and PDS Contracts that causes Contractors to conceal ‘show stopping’ risks in the first place!
These concealed risks then come to the fore immediately after (never before) the main investment decision has been taken, surprising everyone (except the Contractor) and imposing a budget-busting burden on MoD.
And because there exists no ‘Code on Ethical Behaviour in Business’ which would offer protection to good people on the Contractor’s payroll (generally in the direct labour category) who are driven by strong professional, ethical and moral values and who would otherwise blow the whistle on this conspiracy of concealment, they are forced to remain silent.
The only people who are not in the know about this blatant scam are those in the pay of the State!
So the chances of financial risks coming to the fore soon after the main investment decision has been taken are about as certain as night follows day.
@Jag Patel on twitter
There must be considerable truth in what you state. If you can prove a case it should go before the commons defence committee for exposure and possible prosecution for fraud.
In my experience both personally and professionally there is/was a golden rule; never change the contract till the delivery is complete. The hidden flaws are always going to be the existential threat.
I have been saying the RN needs its own commercial yard to run against and understand how construction works. When there was an inhouse design office ships rarely had major problems. It seems the problem started in the 60’s when orders were scarce.
Looking back further I’m not sure whether the main armaments of both Nelson Class and KGV weren’t however seriously flawed and did Vickers have a hand?
The Germans meanwhile designed, built and got into service Bismark and Tirpitz without as far as I’m aware any problems. Impressive.
All very nice but no actual facts applicable to the Type 45.
Fact is that Bae recommended a GE gas turbine for the Type 45’s. An engine that was already in service and at sea in many warships. As well as being low risk, it was also cheaper. Bae was very concerned that the WR21 had never run outside the development lab, was a new a revolutionary design and therefore very risky, and very expensive.
The MoD overruled Bae and insisted on the highly risky and expensive WR21 primarily for political reasons (UK jobs in a key constituency).
Of course this hasn’t prevented the MoD blaming Bae for both the high cost of the Type 45’s and the unreliability of the engines.
Want proof? The MoD is having to pay for the entire cost of repairing and fixing the ships. Not because of any sneakiness by Bae, but because the MoD overruled Bae and were expensively proven wrong. The current Minister admitted this in Parliament.
Actually no Bae did not recommend a GE turbine fit for the T45 class this is a common idea trotted out. Bae put forward two solutions one involving a fit if GE2500 the other WR21, they stated the WR21 solution had a higher risk than the GE one but left the decision to the MOD. Bae stated both solutions could meet the requirements.
At the time Rolls-Royce were at risk of leaving the defence Marine Turbine business and the then Defence Secretary Geof Hoon had the Rolls Royce factory in his constituency, it was a politically unpalatable situation to go for an American solution under those circumstances at the time so the government accepted the higher risk.
What a load of pish . I work on the ship and it will not be out the basin this year. To many f** ups and no one will put there hand up . Woodgroup who I work for are a shower of incompetent bastards . all a smoke screen our saftey put at risk on every shift to please a bunch of idiots with no clue what they are doing .
John,I know nowt about the shipbuilding industry,but as an old ex-coalminer,who suffered from investment in inferior gear for our coal-faces,which was a direct safety risk to life and limb,by British Coal Directors,and Governments of the day..mainly Thatcher -the- hatcheter,I can fully sympathise with your feelings.
It was a case of people at the top who knew nowt about coalmining playing with our lives for political reasons,and cost-cutting excercises.
The lads in the armed forces had the same carry-on in the Desert..tanks breaking down because of inferior caterpillar tracks,when for a few quid more they could have had better quality stronger steel,for tracks and armour plating….and even better boots on their feet!!!
Never mind,mate you have built a beautiful ship,I salute everyone who was/is involved,except those you refer to!!
This video was provided by Alnmaritec on twitter. https://vimeo.com/192467538 I suggested that the names of the other boats might be Barracuda, Skua and Fulmar, but they said that while I was close, they wouldn’t be able to confirm their names until they were handed over.
“MacTaggart Scott, probably the world leaders in aircraft lift design, drawing on long experience with many other carriers”…
ITS Cavour and SPS Juan Carlos, what else…?
Are you counting helicopter lifts, ammunition lifts, food lifts…?
True, PAR systems is technically only the world leader for aircraft elevators, not lifts…
They supplied the lifts for the Invincible class is that long enough ago?
Does anyone know what the faults actually are so we can have a more informed discussion?
The issue of hogging and sagging arose after QE was floated out of the building dock. Shortly afterwards, it was found that the deck edge lifts were jammed. No matter what anyone says, this is factual information.
Possible cause: When a ship is floated out, or launched conventionally, there is a possibility of a phenomenon know as the still water bending moment [well known to naval architects]. There are many papers on technical ship construction and naval architecture sites which explain this in detail. I am a seaman, and not a naval architect, however still water bending moment is induced as a result of the uneven distribution of weight in the hull upon floating for the first time. It puts stress on any large openings, for example around hatch coamings in a bulk carrier, and obviously around deck edge lift openings. It was very difficult to obtain information regarding this; obviously the MoD did not want a press witch hunt. One would hope that all is well with the installation.
Incidentally, McTaggart Scott as an engineering company go back to the 1890s, and have produced aircraft carrier lifts and elevators, ammunition hoists etc, etc for many years. Think back to RN carrier strike of the 60s: HM Ships Ark Royal IV, Eagle, Victorious, Centaur and Hermes, for example.
D C Graham.