The RN’s frigates are supposed to be the backbone of the fleet but it has become increasingly difficult to keep the ageing Type 23s going while their replacements are some years away from commissioning. Here we look at the current situation and the implications for future fleet strength.
Dropping the baton
The original plan for a smooth transition from the legacy Type 23 frigates to the new Type 26 and Type 31s has started to unravel. The RN has already officially retired 4 frigates long before their replacements are available (HMS Monmouth, Montrose, Westminster and Argyll) taking the number left in commission down to 9.
HMS Northumberland was handed to Babcock for a major upkeep period in March of this year but unconfirmed reports say that she has been found to be beyond economical repair. Northumberland is just one year younger than HMS Westminster and completed her LIFEX about 12 months after Westminster. She was run hard between 2018-24 and the RN now faces the exact same dilemma about whether to spend £millions to keep her going for another 5 years or so of service. In the case of Westminster, she was not deemed worth repair, the same conclusion will probably be reached with Northumberland, reducing frigate numbers to 8.
HMS Lancaster is supposed to decommission sometime in 2025-26. She is the oldest surviving Type 23 and has been very active and successful as the forward-deployed frigate in the Gulf. Depending on when she finally goes and what happens to HMS Northumberland, frigate numbers could potentially ‘bottom out’ at just 7 ships in 2026.
Royal-Navy-Frigate-Schedule-2024Back in 2015, it was stated that the frigate force would be maintained at 13 ships. A budget line was established and most in DE&S and Navy believed in good faith that all 13 of the Type 23s would receive LIFEX refits and all but two have would the machinery upgrade (PGMU). This investment was expected to ensure they could serve up to 35 years, with the youngest ship, HMS St Albans decommissioning around 2035. Unfortunately, as the life extension programme got underway, it became increasingly obvious that in most cases, the scale and complexity of the remedial work had been underestimated. Worse still, despite the major refurbishment and equipment upgrades carried out during these LIFEX refits, after about five years of further service, some of the vessels have deteriorated beyond worthwhile repair.
The Type 23s had a hull life designed for just 18 years. Essentially the steel hull plating was kept as thin as possible, with the advantage of lower initial cost and reduced displacement. However, despite the protection of advanced marine paints and cathodic protection systems, corrosion of steel in salt water is inevitable over time. Additionally, extended spells at sea, particularly towed array patrols in the North Atlantic cause stress on the hull structure which leads to metal fatigue and cracks. To the designers of the Type 23, back in the late 1980s it would have been inconceivable that these ships would have to serve so long and, following the delivery of HMS St Albans, the RN would fail to lay down a new frigate for 17 years.
Besides capability insertion, work done during the LIFEX refits has included hundreds of steel inserts, replacing corroded hull structural pieces and hull plating. Also replaced were huge lengths of pipework, valves and masses of wiring as well as motor and plant refurbishments. The extent of the remedial work varied considerably between ships, mainly depending on age. The original cost estimate for each LIFEX project was around £35M (excluding the engine upgrades) but this has been exceeded in most cases. HMS Iron Duke was the most extreme example, She did not receive new engines and required 2,000 steel inserts to make her seaworthy in a package that eventually cost £103M. The official figure for HMS Somerset was £60.7M, although she has continued to suffer from defects that have only now been rectified two years after her LIFEX refit was complete.
The PGMU also proved to be more complex than first thought. Only 3 frigates have received the new engines so far (HMS Richmond, St Albans and Sutherland) with HMS Kent currently about to start upkeep and have PGMU. In terms of future reliability, this upgrade is especially critical and ships still running on the ancient Paxman Valenta diesels need more maintenance and have lower availability. It is unclear if it will be considered worth giving HMS Portland and Somerset PGMU.
A decade of risk
In broad terms, the RN is now into a 10-year period where achieving the number of 13 frigates in commission is either impossible or very uncertain. For the next few years, there is little that can be done to avoid hitting a rock bottom of 8 or even 7 frigates. Beyond about 2028 there should be improvement but it’s very difficult to forecast reliably how quickly numbers increase. This will depend on whether the remaining Type 23s can stagger on into the mid-2030s and if the Type 31s and Type 26 are delivered precisely on time. The indications that the Type 23s will last that long are not encouraging and BAE Systems and Babcock must hand over complex first-of-class vessels and the follow-on ships with no slack in the schedule to allow for unexpected challenges.
Both programmes have already moved to the right. The delays to Type 26 have been officially recognised and a new schedule was agreed some time ago. However, the Type 31 project has clearly also encountered some delays as the original forecast was that HMS Venturer would be in the water by Q2 2024. Just how much Type 31 is behind schedule is unclear at present with no official comment forthcoming about the revised launch date.
To put the current frigate strength in context, the 1998 SDR, (led by Lord Robertson who has now been appointed to conduct the 2025 review) stated that the RN needed 20 frigates (and 12 destroyers). This was at a time when the world was far more stable and peaceful than it is today. By 2010 the arbitrary figure of 13 frigates had become ‘the requirement’ and has become the accepted force strength.
In the 2020 Integrated Review, the Type 32 frigate concept became public and there was even hope that the RN could have up to 18 frigates by the mid-2030s. Although Type 32 remains an aspiration, the gloomy public finance ‘mood music’ suggests that the programme is very unlikely to survive the coming defence review. There is little chance there will be a big uplift in spending and the RN has to prioritise SSN-AUKUS, MRSS and the Type 83 destroyer programmes against a backdrop of underfunded black holes in the defence equipment plan. While of course the RN needs more than 13 frigates, for the purposes of this analysis we must assume Type 32 will be axed or deferred.
Operational impact
The impact of the declining frigate force can be seen simply by observing the fall in RN warship activity over the past 12 months. Any enquiry directed to the MoD about warship availability is met with the bland catch-all statement: “the Royal Navy continues to fulfil all its operational commitments”. One has to assume that those mandated operational commitments must have been considerably scaled back (without any public announcement) in recent years.
While improvements to maintenance routines and the Power Improvement Project will see Type 45 destroyer availability improve in the next few years, they cannot perform the key ASW task of the frigates. Assuming mechanical reliability does not decline further, a frigate force of between 7-9 ships will generate about 3-4 ships that are operational, typically allowing 2-3 to be at sea or deployed.
A key task for RN frigates is the Towed Array Patrol Ship (TAPS) which monitors Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic and closer to home. This can only be carried out by one of the 7 remaining Type 23s equipped with the highly effective sonar 2087. Supporting the nuclear deterrent boat on patrol is also a key role for the frigates. Compounded by the lack of available SSNs, RN assets to detect and deter adversary submarine activity are currently at the absolute bare minimum. Just when the UK needs to strengthen its ASW capability, further reducing the frigate force is the very opposite of what is needed.
Two or three available frigates is a severe limitation on a Navy with global ambitions. At least for the next few years, if the RN is going to mount credible global carrier strike (or littoral strike) operations then it must rely on allied nations to fill the gap in ASW escort capability. It is worth noting that despite their age, the Type 23s are still among the best submarine hunters with few other nations in NATO with modern equivalents that can match their ASW performance.
It seems unlikely that the RN will be able to immediately replace HMS Lancaster in the Gulf when she decommissions and the Kipion frigate may have to be gapped for a while until a Type 31 is ready to take on this task. HMS Iron Duke, once earmarked as the replacement, may instead need to be fitted with S2087 and its complex supporting kit (removed from HMS Westminster) to maximise the number of precious frigates with ‘tails’.
Fingers crossed
Everyone will have their own theory about who are the villains responsible for this sorry state of affairs. Decades of government underfunding the defence is obviously a key part of the story but wider strategic missteps have all played a part. The focus on COIN operations and the belief that state-on-state-on-state warfare was a thing of the past in the early 21st Century did not help. Some will argue rather simplistically the problem is the result of RN’s acquisition of the aircraft carriers. More credibly perhaps, the RN bears some responsibility for the drawn-out gestation, ever-changing requirements, delays and prevarication in ordering the Type 26 frigates. Others will blame industry for painfully slow deliveries of new ships and interminable maintenance periods.
A great deal of credit should go to the RN for establishing the Type 31 project in 2015 against considerable opposition. Although cost was the initial driving factor, at least there are now two frigate production lines otherwise the situation would be even more dire. The Type 31 is not an ASW specialist but frigates offer an all-round suite of capabilities that will always be in great demand.
There are limited immediate options for rectifying this precarious situation. Emergency funding might help accelerate the delivery of new ships slightly but there are limits to industrial capacity, constrained by the number of skilled people available to the shipyards and supply chain. Unconventional off-board systems, UUVs and UAS embarked on vessels of opportunity could all help fill the gap but there is no substitute for a dedicated frigate with powerful sensors, a large ASW helicopter and a well-trained crew.
Short of offering the Chilean Navy a ridiculous amount of money to buy back the 3 Type 23s that Geoff Hoon sold off, there’s not a lot that can be really done at this point. We just need to hope and pray that the Type 26s and Type 31s don’t arrive too late.
Hope is not a strategy, and lessons need to be learned to avoid a future repeat.
Buying back those Type 23s Chile seems a much more practical option than any of the other suggestions for buying/borrowing foreign ships or getting new ships magically built in no time. At least they are like for like.
Still lots of reasons why it won’t happen. Cost, as you say, and no guarantee they’d sell them to us. We also don’t know what material state they’re in, but at least we could use them.
Unfortunately they aren’t going to be completely like-for-like as they would have new weapons and systems fitted when transferred, and then further changes when they were all recently upgraded 2019-2020. They did have Sea Wolf replaced by CAMM (Sea Ceptor) so that’s common, but they also got a new CMS…
You can bet if the Chileans were to sell, they’d drive a hard bargain due to the situation the RN is in. I’d expect they’d want the equivalent to the cost of a T31 for each one.
For sure. Still more practical than any other option to fill the gap.
Unfortunately I don’t think any of the other options being suggested are remotely practical.
Unfortunately this isn’t either, the hurdles (stores, crew, industrial capacity and equipment) and cost would be too great, Norfolk was first of class (probably not run as hard since her sale) although grafton and Marlborough were newer. I’ve heard people mentioning Monmouth and Montrose (currently floating about in Portsmouth) but again it’s an absolute none starter
That’s assuming that the Chilean T23s are in a decent state (Norfolk was definitely pretty knackered prior to her handover), there’s industrial capacity and stores available to return them to RN specifications (absolutely no chance and would in itself cost a fortune), and available crew which there isn’t. On the face of it the idea seems sensible but it’s a none starter. Can see if it’s possible to swap Argyll (her refit was started, stopped for crewing and cost reasons) for Northumberland if BAE will allow it and still practical (not a long term solution, Argyll is one of the older ones and would only deliver an extra hull for probably 4-5 years)
OK so let’s think sideways and out of the box. Towed array – yes I am out of date but hear me out. Could we not fit to a different vessel as a patrol barrier? 2 x Echo class survey ships (or have they gone?) Another oil rig support vessel etc. Then you free frigates up for frigate duties/reduce the pressure. Yes they would not be able to prosecute a target but could find it for a P8 or duty frigate. Need to get inventive. T31…gonna have to be inventive there also. Best order some more. T23 and their crews have done a sterling job way beyond what was expected -BZ to all.
The problem you have is that to be truly effective the TAPS have to be quiet. The T-23s and -26s are designed that way. The other platforms you mentioned are most definitely not quiet. I am afraid this is the ‘Peace Dividend’ coming back to bite us in the ass once more. Someone really should explain to the politicians and the bean counters at the treasury just how accurate the Royal Navy’s motto is.
I did realise that, but we might be in the something is better than nothing esp given most subs are in or awaiting refit. We are not in a good position at all. Agree with the Peace Dividend comment. V frustrating.
Yes there would be no ship board helo
etc. No prosecution ability and very much a very temp stop gap.
All
The last T23 left its slipway back in 1990…so let us not forget what has not been mentioned here – that all of the orginal 1980’s Type 23 only had a planned in-service life of 18 years……
and the T23’s were all orginally planned to operate 100% of the time in the North Atlantic: on ASW patrols against the soviet empire’s submarines
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Since 1990 = the reality is that the T23 have had a “much softer life” than their orginal designers ever orginally anticipated…..
………..and so lets take a moment to think through the implications of my last statement…..
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Don’t also lets now not forget that – concurrently with the RN failing to order any new frigates – that their new build programmes for all of the following:
…were all delivered into service late – and all went massively over-budget
= simply because the RN did not control any of those four big shipbuuilding programmes properly ….
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This complete and utter cock-up is, I afraid to have to say, wholely and solely of the RN’s own making…..
Furthermore, “whinging” that UK defence budgets have been cut really does not cut the mustard = that excuse is on a par with “sorry sir, on the way to school, the neighbours dog ate my homework” –
……………when the “neighbours dog” is a small poodle….
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Furthermore, reading the “open-source material” – what us old gits to call ” a newspaper” – I very much doubt that “all is well” with the two current RN shipbuilding programme “North of Hadrians Wall”
…..and so the T26 and T31 build programmes are “probably running late”….
And, just to make it worse, with Harlands having recently having been “shafted”, there is no effective ship-building capability left over in Belfast.
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Best bet now: keep going with the T26 and T31 build programmes, however, as a very-nececessary short-term expediant…..
RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS:
regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
Note 1. TLA translator of AFM = Another Fine Mess
No point in buying another line of frigates, they’ll hardly be in service before the planned ships before even looking at crew and Funding issues or the horror in government at overseas frigate buys.
I can see the merits of ASW LPHs however we do have 2 flattops already and the RFA crisis makes me doubt we could crew such ships.
Plus where would the helicopters come from?
The USN are mothballing and sundowning their fleet of MQ-8C. Currently configured for ISTAR from the LCSs, these could be had on the cheap. They would need reconfiguration from ISTAR to ASW. It would mean running two per ship, one for sonobuoys, one for torpedoes. Less good than a Merlin but something could be done.
Some minor corrections, if I may.
Based on this statement I am not sure what we actually need the 1st Sea Lord for apart from to look pretty in a nice blue uniform occasionally -only joking.
Actually this really sounds like a not me Guv kind of statement and I don’t think (or at least I hope not) that is what the writer was trying to say.
1) RN officers fill key roles in the DES and have direct responsibility for all major shipbuilding programmes. They cannot escape accountability for this mess.
2) The CDS cant escape accountability as he was the last 1st Sea Lord.
3) Nor can Previous RN leaders who became obsessed with the RN having Carrier Air Power and the F35. They were supposed to enable the RN to project striking power globally funnily enough all that money several billion and counting and I don’t see a single carrier protecting shipping off Yemen.
There are lot of villains responsible for this mess and I am sure DES has it fair share however to suggest the RN hierarchy is blameless is untrue.
Again, mild corrections if I may.
RN leadership have indeed made some mistakes – I was merely highlighting that the powers ascribed to them in the post above were largely mythical. If there is one thing that has led to the current situation, it is the failure to value people – service, CS and industry – sufficiently because the received wisdom was that less were needed.
Its not so long ago that people were suggesting that either Portsmouth or Devonport should be closed because there was “too much capacity”. A decision driven by limited budgets.
Thanks these were useful points and made me reflect.
I think my point is that if as you say RN officers have no experience of ship design or shipbuilding why are at least 4 2 or 1 stars in roles including that of the Programme Director of the Type 26 frigate programme? So much for a careful selection process for senior jobs in the DES.
I disagree respectfully of course with Admiral Mark Stanhope who sadly missed the entire point it does really matter who is accountable for delivering a complete capability. Carrier Strike is an integrated capability not having a single Senior owner due to inter service pork barrel politics is why we are in this mess. It also shows the older generation of Warfare officers (hopefully things have changed) were less capable of thinking about capability v platforms.
Thanks for the other information it was very useful. I do think CDS as 1st Sea Lord tried to bring a fresh and adaptive view to bear but it has taken a really long time.
Your points about people and the need to value different viewpoints are especially well made.
I see what you are doing there with 4. havent you left out the most relevant period to the current situation after 2010
The reality was the earlier projects that werent going to be built while T45 construction had the spending for the destroyer/frigate group.
Duncan was launched Oct 2010 and there was a long gap till the next vessel steel was cut July 2017
Thats your firing squad target
Remember who was going to build those ships and where until Duncan was in the water ? The last Type 23 was under build before the T45 at the last remaining naval yard.
Remember that the Internet is not knowledge.
Care to elaborate on what a “naval yard” was?
Yarrows , Clyde river was where last 6 (of 12) T23 from Oct 93 to Apr 99 were laid down before BAE name was applied ( 5 others at Swan Hunter till 94)
The Type 45 followed from same ‘yard’, the Type 26 was to follow soon after – same yard-but there was a delay for up to 7 years- which I gather from your cherry picking of dates, was your involvement in those missing 7 construction years which led to the crisis headlined here
There was once a company called VT, who moved lock stock and barrel from Woolston to Portsmouth and would have been perfectly capable of building T45 – or T26….
Vosper, they even had Hovercrafts…
Griffon is still based at Portsmouth.
Uh….there were more than 12 T23 built. 16 if memory serves.
Unfortunately 3 went to Chile and T22B3 exited early.
Yarrow yard built 12 of those – that was the issue. By late 90s they were the only working yard experienced and staffed – yes the most important part- to do a full build , fitout and commission of complex under 10,000 t warships.
VT was supposed to be involved with modules of T45 barged to the Clyde but that didnt happen. But they werent building any T23 either.
Au contraire. Once again, there’s a difference between what the Internet tells you and what reality is.
VT were building some of the more complex warships you can imagine (SRMH) at Woolston, but realised that the site was too constrained for the larger ships envisaged for the future (T45). So they relocated to Portsmouth dockyard and created a fully-functioning shipyard there, including panel line, block assembly halls and an assembly dock (14) adjacent to the hall. No 13 dock was filled in to provide the hardstanding for the hall.
That facility was fully capable of entire shipbuilds and indeed the original T45 schedule was to have Dauntless (second of class) built by VT to maintain two yards capable of building such ships. Unfortunately, during the contract negotiations for T45, BAES pitched an offer to MoD that essentially suggested they could make the programme cheaper by getting the yards to concentrate on specific blocks to build. MoD bought that argument – coincidentally removing any competition from BAES in terms of complex warship build – which would be cemented some years later when BAES and VT merged their shipbuilding to form BVT. All in line with Paul Draysons Maritime Industrial strategy as informed by Hans Pung of Rand.
VT Portsmouth built all the bow blocks and some superstructure blocks for T45. Here’s the first going north and a pic of the blocks in build.
Portsmouth Shipbuilding – PA Images
VT Takes a Bow in Portsmouth Harbour | News | Maritime Journal
Anecdotally, they were much better in terms of quality and level of outfit than what was coming out of Govan and Scotstoun. That facility also built HMS Clyde, one of the Amazonas, plus the Khareef class for Oman. As well as two of the machinery blocks for QEC.
Having seen that facility first-hand it was perfectly capable of building T26 and there would have been capacity to do so, had the original T45 plan proceeded.
Exactly so.
I remember the T45 blocks being transported.
“VT were building some of the more complex warships you can imagine (SRMH) at Woolston”
For the RN that was 3 Type 42 in early 80s with the last in service 1985, so no Type 22 or T23.
The ‘complex ship’s you mention seem to have been the River class Mersey finished in 2003. Minehunters are small fry and only in 90s
Portsmouth
in early 2000 VT got the order for 2 large ( frigate size) survey ships- HMS Echo and Enterprise, but couldnt execute and went to Appledore.
No complex vessels built at Portsmouth other than ‘blocks’
Your claims dont add up, as usual,.
The single location decision of the early 2000s was rational considering the plan was mostly continous build and not enough orders to spread around like the 80s and the 90s could only sustain one major yard.
The colossal political screw up after only having one complex yard was to pause it all for 7 years after 2010 but for you history ends at 2010 when for the RN and its T23 problems- on top of the others- starts at 2010
Don’t seem to recall suggesting VT had built T22 or T23. Last DD/FF they built was Gloucester if memory serves. Nor do I recall suggesting that VT Portsmouth had built an entire complex ship, merely that they were more than capable of doing so. Indeed while the Khareef was not particularly complex they weren’t simple either. For those of us who know about shipbuilding, the level of outfit and indeed commissioning work that went into the QEC blocks was very impressive.
Minehunters are “small fry” simply demonstrates the fact you’ve no actual experience of whats involved with them, or indeed any other type of ship. Tonne for tonne they’re among the most complex and expensive ship types we’ve ever had.
With the SVHO, that order came just at the time VT was relocating. Being somewhat familiar with the two ships, they’re also essentially commercial hulls with some military features. Which fitted perfectly into Appledore’s sweet spot – hence the subcontract.
Now, if we’re going to discuss claims that don’t add up, can we start with “VT was supposed to be involved with modules of T45 barged to the Clyde but that didn’t happen”.
One of us has worked in every single one of the yards mentioned in this thread. And one of us lives on the internet and thinks it is the source of all knowledge.
You forget the final deferral in 2010…if the order had gone ahead in 2010 we would not be where we are now…that was the final line that was crossed.
Not forgotten, just different circumstance.
The earlier deferrals prevented the work proceeding beyond concept phase – and actually resulted in starting again largely from scratch – believe it or not, the “options” presented in the three business cases (99, 03/04 and 06) were very different, even though the requirements were essentially the same.
By 2010, the NDP had formed and had conducted a design phase getting to a stage where it could be costed and taken forward to D&M. Unfortunately, at this point, because the projected cost was higher than the pollies wanted – and because the ship was larger than certain VSO and CS believed was “affordable” – SDSR looked at alternatives. More importantly however, the design configuration changed in one significant way, after BAES had spent the majority of the Assessment phase budget of £140M+ doing a lot of (unnecessary) detail. That led to a prolonged stand-off between MoD and BAES as to who should fund the required work, followed by an even longer game of chicken over whether the prolonged build period and budget were taking the p1ss or not.
The problem is not unique to the RN. The USN is also running low on low end frigates. The Constellations are way behind schedule.
Luckily or rather hopefully we do have in place a program that thinks ahead.
It seems all larger Western Navies, need a core of expertise to carry projects through working with politicians who know their onions.
Maybe a ship planning board that plans! That means a board that includes an in depth number of members who are appointed early enough to serve for at least 10 years and if necessary beyond their active service terms (so 15 years) and who have access to the PM and Treasury.
The situation is dire to put it mildly, with no one being held to account for it. The leisurely build pace for Type 26 was dictated by the period over which funding was being allocated to pay for it, could it actually be sped up? Clearly there are issues with the Type 31s as Venturer is not in the water….and I suspect there are major issues with the PIP refits as Dauntless was out of service for far longer than expected and likewise the same is happening with Daring.
Someone, somewhere needs to be asking questions and holding individuals/ companies to account and get this mess sorted out
It is just incredible we are in this situation.
How were the RN so unaware of the material state of their ships?
All of the money that has gone into these LIFEXs could have gone into a faster T26 build.
The reason T45 was reduced from 8 to 6 hulls was to speed up the build of T26, which then didn’t happen.
There has been a perfect storm of MoD, government and RN senior leadership incompetence.
I think we have to bite the bullet, accept the fleet reduction and put extra resources into accelerating T26 introduction. The trials period is very long for Glasgow. We need to look at getting that down.
Like the article says though you can only speed up production so much, if you cut investment from the T23 fleet it will just cease to exist
Meanwhile Italy orders 2 FREMM EVO with planar dual band radars for 1.5B€ . One to be delivered in 2029 and another in 2030. Of note that radars are in 2 structures, one over the bridge as usual but those facing the stern are over hangar.
Maybe RN can rent a FREMM?
Who’s going to lend us a Fremm
Only the Italians, will have 12.
Sure but likelihood of that is muxh lower than just integrating them into our CSGs etc via Nato
Agree on that. But if RN don’t not maintain a certain quantity and level of operational crew how it can then be prepared for the surge when T26 and T31 will arrive?
I have a cunning plan,and it doesn’t involve a FREMM.Bite the bullet with both T26 and T31 builds – they arrive when they are ready,not much can be done about that.What i propose is to Lease 1 PPA,just to cover Kipion until which point Venturer can take over.Let the T23 Fleet shrink ( unavoidable ) and keep as many as possible for CSG and ASW Taskings.
More likely they just abandon the Kipion Frigate deployment for a few years.
PPA is a possible idea.
Why would a navy that’s had a ship built to fulfil a requirement want to lease it out?
Why not also get the Aussies to build the their three cancelled T26s for the UK?! Kind of joking…not. As has been said above, what a bloody awful mess, what with the RFA pay duspute, the availability of Astutes, poor fleet and port management, seems like a huge lack of coordination even listening between parties, is anybody in charge?
Against this background, the plan to have a CSG and 2 LSGs whilst tilting to Asia Pacific looks not just unrealistic but infantile. Since the Labour 1998 defence review was never funded or delivered, apart from the carriers to support the expeditionary ambition, it is reasonable not simplistic to argue that the funds spent on the carriers and their aircraft have squeezed other assets so much that we can barely muster an escort force for just one carrier.
So whilst inadequate overall funding is partly to blame, a series of poor decisions have compounded the problem. The carriers were over ambitious- twice the size and cost of initial plans- and frankly not necessary. In the aftermath of the financial crash, funding was further constrained and new ship orders delayed. Too much time was spent finalizing the design of T26 and arguing costs with BAE. When it was finally realized how low frigate numbers might go, it was decided to plug the gap with a cheap and relatively simple GP design. Even the competition for this had to be re run, so further delay and little sense of urgency. Even when delivered, far later than initially planned, the T31s will have no ASW capability which will continue to rely on a handful of ancient T23s until the last years of the decade.
The failures of politicians and senior navy leaders have been staggering. If we need @Владимир Темников 20 escorts as a bare minimum, we have, assuming a 20 year service life, to build and launch just one a year. How is it even possible to be so inept as to fail to achieve that?
Is there anything to be done? In the short term, an acceleration of the build schedule of T26 and T31would help but might not be possible.
Longer term, learn the lessons of the failures of the last 20 years.
Finally, given the wretched state of the surface fleet, make sure you don’t make commitments that it simply can’t fulfil.
The carriers came about because of the Falklands.
ha.
We won’t need 20 Escorts if we don’t have any capital ships to escorts. The carriers cost less than Ajax. Less than Boxer. About the same as was spent on Chinooks. Individually each carrier cost the same as 9 P8s (which have zero UK content). The idea that the carriers are to blame for lack of budget is laughable.
The overriding issue is New Labour spent all the money when the going was good. The Tories didn’t really do Austerity anywhere other than our armed forces, who they destroyed in SDR 2010 and then smashed a fortune on the pandemic and through general incompetence and as such ships weren’t ordered or delayed. The great news is now at least they are all funded and ordered, but there isn’t the capacity to get them built quickly enough.
The carriers cost £7b, twice the original estimate. Their F35s £9b. Ajax, too expensive I agree, is a fixed price contract for £5.5b
Labour ordered the carriers in pursuit of the SDR of 1998 which tilted heavily to expeditionary warfare. But they didn’t fund them nor ensure that the rest of the plan, including 30 escorts, was put in place. Faced with a huge budget deficit, the coalition heralded austerity, which, as you say,applied mainly to defence and not much else. Eventually, to their credit, the Tory govt started to put things right.with 13 new frigates ordered.
The carrier commitment wasn’t solely or directly responsible for the lack of new escorts. But it added massively to the budget problem. And the RN itself wasted years trying to decide what it needed, ending up with T26, itself further delayed by cost arguments with BAE.
I have no doubt that if we had opted for smaller, cheaper carriers, the frigate famine would have been largely avoided.
Whatever the reasons, nothing excuses politicians or admirals for failing to ensure we build one new destroyer or frigate a year.
Whilst agreeing with much of that, I would argue that it is the costs of the deterrent and the modernisation of the associated nuclear enterprise that has been the biggest force squeezing the budget – over the last decade and the next. The sums are eye-watering, and proportionally far bigger than those of the previous deterrent generations. They make the costs of carrier strike look quite modest. I support the UK deterrent, but when defence spending as a % of GDP is at only c2%, the lowest for over 100 years, its impact on conventional forces across air, land and sea has been devastating.
Agreed. The numbers in the latest 10 year equipment plan are staggering. The new black hole highlighted by the NAO arises for two reasons-
The RN included costs of equipment not yet designed or ordered- T32,T83, MROSS,MRSS , FAD. These added £16b to the previous year’s 10 year total.
Acceleration of the nuclear deterrent added £38b (a 62% increase)
The Dreadnoughts are bigger boats but will have only 12 not 16 tubes, of which we plan to use 8. Why are they costing so much more than the Vanguards?
I dont get the argument over tube count because end of the day were talking about WMD, if theyre only using 8 tubes, a total of 12 sounds reasonable with the benefit of alot more crew space or other such uses. Reason they cost so much more is one the Vanguards were built what 30 years ago, and theyre implementing many new technoligies even above those on the astute class, theyre supposed to be the ultimate detterence after all, they dont get skimped on.
Maybe the other 4 tubes are there for if when needed or for something else? Other future missiles, decoys, drones?
Well during war if it didn’t go immediately nuclear they’d load all 12 I imagine, being limited to just 8 would be rather few, but yes options for other equipment
They do seem very expensive even for what they are, when compared to even the Astutes, but I agree with the overall point that the nuclear submarines place more pressure on budget then the carriers which cost much the same as quite a few other line items in that budget, but are a properly high end flexible capability.
Whilst we’re on the subject of things that seem to cost more then they should, in the NAO report, there is £22bn set aside for defence cyber. More than for ships or combat air. I get Cyber is a big threat but that feels like an outrageous number.
Might be any and everything to do with communications- which are of course all digital.
The Cyber offensive warfare part might only be small- and I bet theres no recruitment or manning shortfall
The reality of cyber is that you can now cripple your enemies with cyber…..china cannot seriously harm the Uk with forces other than cyber and political warfare..so if it wanted to force us out of a U.S. China war..cyber would be its main route to attack the UK.
There has been a lack of strategic foresight. UK and Artic waters demand hard patrols for ASW – so why not shortish range corvette types for that work, supported by drones, aircraft and attach subs. But no – cant have corvettes not proper ships….6 river class set up for ASW could offer more range and scope with other tech. Type 26s become ocean going ASW for blue water and carrier group ops, Type 31 general purpose, do general purpose patrol. All need to be enhanced form point of view of lethality – multi – layer weapons, add cheap martlet as well as NSM and tomahawks – proven stuff. Carriers – well thats the money pit, not one thing or the other need catapults and arrestors to get cheaper planes with same capabilities. As for Albion and Bulwark – why not upgrade to multipurpose combat ships – not just amphib landing stuff, but also anti mine mother ships, add weaponry like missiles and more guns – enough deck space – could provide additional air capability to carriers in places a carrier would not be good. Need to stop bespoking stuff – ukraine has shown simplcty applied with intelligence equals cost and sophistication.
Yup, we need to have these discussions and see what can be done realistically. The art of the possible. Crews as ever are possibly the issue.
We can’t crew either of the LPDs, consider them decommissioned at this point unless something changes drastically.
I don’t see how an ASW River would help when we have so many other crew and budgetary challenges. Would require alot of changes from the current design.
We can’t crew either of the LPDs, consider them decommissioned at this point unless something changes drastically. I don’t see how an ASW River would help when we have so many other crew and budgetary challenges. Would require alot of changes from the current design.
Damen seem to have an interesting solution to the multi-role approach.
Its an intresting ship for deploying drone systems but it would make for a bad combatant.
Indeed, and those Portuguese variants have no weapons.
I wonder if a system such as this could be added as and when required.
I guess it could but still an hack.
Flight deck isn’t a lot of use with that on it?
Evening SB, I think this was being proposed for the back of the RAN Arafura type patrol ships at one stage and they’re only 80m so pretty short and yes, a waste of flight deck.
This type of upright deck mounted vls should be doable with CAMM too. Looks like it’s mounted on a flat low profile pallet rack that locks into the flight deck.
Hello Quentin D63, I tend to agree, being modular in design I would have thought there would be plenty of options available and mission-specific if required depending on the tasking at hand.
At the same cost as a B2 River, it would at the very least be a worthwhile consideration for the future.
“Damen Shipyards Group will design and build a 107-metre long Multi-Purpose Vessel (MPV) with 650sqm cargo deck and space for 12 20-foot containers for the Portuguese Navy.”
MK 70 Launcher
“The Lockheed Martin launcher is based on the MK 41 vertical launch system (VLS) installed on the Navy’s guided-missile warships.
It comprises four MK.41 VLS cells in a 12-meter (40-foot) container.
The MK 70 can launch a range of long-range anti-ship and anti-air weapons, such as the SM-6 and a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, with a range of 150 miles (240 kilometers) and 1,200 miles (1,600 kilometers).”
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F691egMWAAEekQU?format=jpg
It cost Portugal the same as a B2 River, so of course you aren’t getting a destroyer for that money.
Fair but I still don’t see how it would help us.
I would assume fewer ships are required for certain types of operations freeing up crew which we seem to have a shortage of at the moment.
Being modular in design, and the cost of a B2 river as Jon states, could it be adapted to suit other requirements?
“Designed to manage air, surface, and subsea drones, the MPSS also supports amphibious operations, disaster relief efforts, search and rescue missions, diving support, submarine rescue, and helicopter operations. Its modular construction facilitates year-round utilization and straightforward maintenance, with the MPSS Series boasting a minimum of 45 days of sea endurance.
The MPSS 7000 is 107 x 20 metres. It is foreseen that it will be operated by a crew of 48 personnel, with additional facilities for up to 100 special personnel and extra, temporary, accommodation for 42 persons, for example in the event of a disaster relief operation. The MPSS 9000 is 130x 20 meters and is able to conduct even more operations.
Damen has begun construction of the first vessel of this new design. The MPSS range, featuring 7000 and 9000 tons versions, combines the vision of the Portuguese Navy, with Damen’s proven process of shipbuilding, using standardised solutions wherever possible. As a result, the vessel can be constructed quickly and offers a reliable, cost-effective platform.”
Sure its a modular design, but to be adapted to support other roles would require more funds than just the base cost of the vessel. And i still dont see how it would be any use in place of a Frigate, if it doesnt have the defences of one it cannot deploy to areas like the red sea region unescorted.
For us being short on escorts, they wouldn’t help at all. I’m agreeing with you: it would be a bad combatant, and that’s to be expected at the price. I can see a smaller ones doing a good job in the Caribbean over the Summer to supplement HMS Medway. The bigger ones are too slow for an escort carrier to supplement the CSGs, but maybe okay to bulk out the LSGs or as mine-hunter motherships.
If you want a relatively rapid ASW solution and had the crews, perhaps upgun the Albions and add a hangar (they’ll never sail again as a pure LPD so losing a landing spot might be okay). They could carry and release USVs and UUVs with towed arrays. With a diesel-electric drive, they could be made pretty quiet (not T23/26 quiet, but quiet enough). Right now though, no money, no crews — and the Albions swallow up a lot of crew.
hearing daring might not be out of dock and might be put into long term “readiness” – so 45 situation not improving.
If that was true then there is something seriously wrong that even STOROB can’t fix.
Given that some if get sisters are in bits with holes cut in them almost anything could be transplanted.
Given the state of the escort fleet and his pivotal the ASTER system is to UK defence…..
Is it just broken beyond repair?
That’s been a rumour ever since she decomissioned. Scuttlebutt suggests that its a scheduling and prioritisation issue, compounded by intermittent STOROBs. She always seems to be overtaken by getting Dauntless out of dock or Diamond in, or Dragon out etc etc.
The old ‘have less vessels that do more’ theory alongside ‘fitted for but not with’ along with other military management jargon
ASW boats are generally a specific size…for a few reasons…complexity of machine room…your not just talking about a basic marine diesel, you need a combination drive, diesel for plodding, gas turbine for chasing and an electric motor for hunting..then you need the hanger and fight deck for the small ship flight..which in the RNs case is the 15,000kg Merlin which is a very large rotor….before you look at other weapon systems and sensors…your not fitting that machine space and a Merlin hanger and flight deck on a rivers.
As for the carriers, not going CATOBAR is massively cheaper than a CATOBAR. flying 35Bs is far less expensive than flying F18s.
Rather than invent a new frigate design in the form of Type 32, the lowest cost alternative to get more frigate hulls in a timely manner would be to order additional (say 3) Type 31s.
The new government have made it clear there isn’t money for anything. If critical infrastructure projects are being canned I can tell you with near total certainty that T32 is dead.
I doubt in my lifetime that the RN will ever grow beyond a 20 fleet escort force.
The public don’t care about defence, most no longer know anyone who serves and regard even the current spend as being too much.
The death spiral will likely continue I am afraid. I cannot see T45 being replaced on a like for like basis.
T32 is the notion of new frigates, not just a revolutionary design, either way it’s unaffordable
Exactly this. Trying to introduce a Type 32 class will just mean more squabbling over design, more prevarication, more delays and a no doubt ludicrous length of time before anything actually gets into service. A second batch of Type 31’s would (or should) take all of that away and give the RN a respectable force of GP frigates which would allow the Type 45’s and (eventually) the Type 26’s to specialise in air defence and ASW. The addition of NSM for the Type 45’s and TLAM for the Type 31’s would also provide a welcome boost for multi-role capabilities.
How much difference do we actually know about though, apart from speculative concepts from BAE and Babcock all we have is the notional idea of some kind of Drone or Autonomous platform. Could well be based on the same T31 and will probably have even less weapons and equipment than it.
Point is if we can’t get T32 we can’t get more T31
The optimist in me was hoping the Treasury might be tempted to sign off on more units of a mature and therefore risk free design. But you’re probably right, with the new Government making controversial decisions on things like the winter fuel payment, the chances of defence getting more funding are looking pretty non-existent. It’s horrifying to think frigate numbers could go all the way down to seven, potentially leaving us in the embarrassing position of needing foreign navies to provide some of the escorts for a CSG deployment. The word “strike” might need to be deleted from CSG anyway with the F-35’s block iv upgrade several years away meaning the carriers will be unable to strike anything significant this side of 2030. Combined with Billion pound A class submarines that never seem to actually go anywhere (does anyone know why the Astutes seem to be stuck alongside?), the RN really is in a depressingly parlous state.
There is no capacity to build any more in the same time frame as those already on order. At least not using the same processes we’re currently using.
I agree there is no capacity to build more in the current time frame, but there is an obvious follow-on opportunity after the current 5 ships are delivered
Lets see how they get on delivering the contracted five, first eh?
Would it be worth adding back the hull mounted sonar & towed array to the T31, as well as rafting the machinery, for the last couple of T31’s?
You would be getting towards T26 costs if you did all that…..and created another sub class of ship…..
Really?
The IH frigate has hull mounted sonar as standard as does the great majority of frigates everywhere (including the non ASW T23, Anzac etc). The IH frigate has space reserved for a towed array (but not fitted). The related Absalon frigate is getting the towed array (& it’s definitely not in T26 class). Rafting the machinery needs to be done at build to be financially viable, buts it’s not rocket science. Your car has a degree of rafting with its rubber engine mounts. The T26 has rafted machinery plus a hull designed to be as quite as possible & a propulsion setup to support that. Babcock list it as a standard option on A140 & no matter how you twist it, A140 is never going to get close to the price of the T26.
In case it’s not obvious, not all the T31’s have been laid down yet. Hence rafting is still possible for those. Is the GP T23 a subclass? Not really. Any class of more than 3-5 tends to have variations as time progresses. It’s why navies build in batches. Add a towed array to a GP T23 & you have an ASW T23. Machinery is already rafted. A little different? Yes. But it’s still a T23.
Not sure why SB thinks this will approach T26 in cost. There isn’t a frigate out there that can match T26 in cost. They are, as far as I am aware, one of the most expensive & largest frigates out there. The Australian version even makes UK T26 look value for money (it’s more like a T83 & BAE are already suggesting 64 & 96 Mk41 vls versions thereof).
Not saying my suggestions are free. They definitely are not. But these are standard options on most sizeable (3,500t+) frigates anywhere in the world (& quite a few corvettes). The ships are being built now (so decide now!). The options have been there since the IH frigate. In fact they had to purposely remove them for T31. It should be noted, neither Poland or Indonesia have followed suit. Note to those pointing at the US frigates – the FREMM does. Stupidly knows no bounds.
T26 , FREMM and T23 have electric propulsion. T31 do not.
What Babcock don’t tell you – because they don’t know – is the difference between a T26 signature and an A140. I guarantee you they are significantly different.
Signature reduction is not just a question of “rafting” – that’s almost the easy bit. The harder bits include design of the marine fluid systems to minimise vibration which covers a mass of things from pipe hangers to pipe bend radii, inlet and outlet grille design, materials, pump speeds, isolation mounts etc etc.
That’s why I asked the question as to would it be worth it? Sure, it would not be a great ASW frigate. It doesn’t have to be. How much would you need to spend to make it at least useful? Right now, in some situations, a T31 will need a T23 to escort it. There will be 5 x T31 (& likely 0 x T23), well before there will be 8 x T26.
They wont be escorted by an ASW asset, they will just make do. Same goes for T45, they have essentially no ASW detection.
A disgusting and desperate state of affairs for such a venerable and once illustrious navy.
Was sadly all too predictable that Westminster wouldn’t be the last of of the troubles in keeping them going.
Fast reaching a point where we’ll have 2 huge carriers but sod all escorts to go with them anywhere!
The T26/T31 need to be urgently sped up as much as the industrial picture allows, and forget T32 as a new design, get 3-5 more T31’s lined up for the 2030’s.
Agreed.
Who is going to crew these extra 3-5 frigates?
You assume the difference between T31/T32 matters, don’t have the crew or funds for more of either.
The article doesn’t mention the risk to T26 production from the reported Norwegian interest in buying 5 vessels. There are good aspects in increasing the production run from 8 to 13 ships, mainly in reducing unit costs, but if Norwegian requirements caused the delivery of RN vessels to be delayed then there are serious implications for RN ASW capabilities. Norwegian T26s can, however, easily substitute for RN T26s in the key North Atlantic area.
In particular, Norway has expressed interest in getting T26 vessel 3, due around 2029-30, to replace the lost frigate ‘Helge Ingstad’. From an RN perspective vessel 4 would seem to be the earliest potential candidate for Norway.
I think it’s safe to assume Type 83 will be moved to the right so selling Type 26 to Norway becomes essential to avoid another order gap. I think/hope we’ve learned that lesson. You made the point that a Norwegian Type 26 could fill in for the RN which would mitigate that problem. All in all we are where we are. Speeding up 26 and 31 is the best we can hope for assuming the money is there to do that. Then we have the RFA strike (absolutely justified) to worry about. All in all interesting times.
Coming at this from a different direction, would it be possible to lease a couple of frigates from the Americans for an interim period, while waiting for our frigates to be built.
The Americans don’t have any Frigates.
If you mean Arliegh Burkes those require more crew than any of our Escorts
They would have to be “wet leased” destroyers, including ship, crew, maintenance etc. Not clear the US Navy has spare ships and the RN have no money to pay for this.
Some LCS/Frigates are up for FMS…. but on the face of it arent suitable for RN needs
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/u-s-plans-to-make-six-new-vessels-available-for-sale/
I work on LCS …
dont touch them.
They are awful in systems and construction.
There are Freedom class LCS that could be available quickly on leave for UK waters patrol. Shares some systems with T31 and could be fitted with common CMS to replace US one. Just run them on diesels only to avoid combiner gear issue. 3 would be helpful at this point.
I don’t see how those would help at all
With what money and which crew?
One for the defence review. As the LCS is lean manned and T23 retired early, crewing would be possible if the need there.
Freedom has a planning hull, i would not say it is a good fit for Atlantic, Probably neither the other version.
I would suggest lease for UK waters and north sea, free up reminding T31 for Atlantic. Designed for modular operations, lots of opportunity for UK innovation and a large helicopter deck. I’d call it a light patrol frigate with right fit out.
The whole problem is the modular system failed so their fit out options are very limited
Swapping the modules failed and they instead became semi permanent.
The ASW module has been cancelled completely but the other 2, Surface warfare and Mine countermeasures are still in development
Bit more complex than that.
I have just done a load of work on an LCS. You cannot separate the combining gear issue.
Its a whole system of systems issue.
It was built cheap and they got what they paid for.
Right …
The GTs and Diesels feed into the combining gear to “mix the power” from two completely different motive sources into a shaft line. That shaft line then goes to another compartment with the splitter gear in it to split the combined power into the shaft power to each of the 5 waterjets.
The whole system combining and splitting is squeezed into two compartments that you struggle to stand up in and basically you need to be a dwarf orangutan to do any maintenance in. The seawater cooling system for the lub oil system is a disaster. It constantly causes cross contamination of the lub oil system. I just spent 4 weeks rebuilding parts of it. That involved cutting holes in the ship to get parts out because there is zero access to remove them by regular removal routes.
The vessel build quality is appalling. I found welded seams on the upper deck that where not finished by the builders. The superstructure is ally and suffers from structural cracking.
As I said just No!
As GB says – no. They’re not known as Little Crappy Ships for nothing…..
There are a lot of CODAG frigates, that is not the issue.
He’s not describing the CODAG bit……
Picking arbitary numbers of ships as the requirement is silly, be it 20, 13 or 7.
We need a coherent plan that includes what we want to do, and how much it costs, and the willingness to pay for it. The Strategic Defence Review (1998) had lots of aspirations but no clear commitment to pay for it. A quarter of a centry later it feels like nothing has changed.
SDR 1998 cut many things , what aspirations are you talking about ( a 1998 government cant financially bind a 2010 one)
– the carriers and Astutes were built ( which had been a a election gimmick order 2 months before the polls while the design and contract hadnt been finalised)
The big question is how much trouble the T31 is in. A few posts ago I stuck a stick in the ground (based on the level of pre outfitting visible) and said Venturer was 12 months behind schedule. I see no reason to change that assessment.
The rule of thumb for large projects, civil and military, is that time lost early is never made up unless someone throws a lot more resources at the problem.
As that seems unlikely someone should start planning on the basis that you will not see a usable T31 before 2030 with consequent flow-on’s to later T31 vessels.
The risk here is as much to personnel as it is to anything else as you cannot train and you risk an acceleration of separations.
Maybe the immediate need is more Stirling Castles just to get people to sea. Put a towed array on them if you want, they tend to be diesel electric and reasonably low noise.
I’d agree with that assessment for Venturer. There’s also a nasty rumour afoot that similar issues are affecting T26.
Building ships is tricky – no amount of high-definition product models change that….
That won’t go down well in Power Point / CGI land….
Unfortunately, shipbuilding f requires dirty hand and skills…..oh and also people who understand how that works to manage it….
Regardless of the cost, Northumberland clearly needs to be extended and the PGMU work undertaken so that the frigate force can actually be expanded during the ‘zone of uncertainty’ and three additional T26 and 3 AAW focused T31 variants. There was £5.5bn for Civil Service pay rises (some very much deserved, some very much not). Keeping our country defended is the first order of business for Government,
“Keeping our country defended is the first order of business for Government” that’s clearly not true and hasn’t been for decades. Plus the electorate isn’t interested in either cuts to education,health,pensions or social support or tax rises. As a result defence will be based on what you can fund from 2 – 2.5% of GDP.
I am unsure. I don’t think your average Brit loves the mass welfarism we have, and I think they like Britain being a strong, capable country.
They certainly don’t vote for that sort of thing to any great extent.
I think that the news from Northumberland isn’t just bad but catastrophic, it would be more plausible to try and swap her with Argyle if possible.
Is there not an argument to be made for the Royal Navy to look into Corvettes? Something like the Israeli Sa’ar? They wont have massive range but seeing as we forward deploy our ships surely these could offer cheaper alternatives to buying large frigates whilst maintaining a warfighting capability. Would also free up Type 45, 31 and 26 ships from trivial duties such as drug busting or “presence patrols”
Unfortunately like the article says, no money or crew. And would probably undermine how many proper frigates we can have.
Stop that narrative. The Government have a lot of money. Record taxation except in WW2 and in biggest population.
They are not just going to defence
I mean I can be more specific as no money for defence but either way its unlocked to change.
Unlikey not unlocked
Theres that and in general defence is seen as not being a good steward of the money they are allocated. What I see as happening is that because of many other things going over budget a savings approach is done elsewhere
And isn’t Babcock UK working with SAAB Sweden on their new corvette/light frigate class which i think is 117m. That’s got to be worth a look at and it’s with UK content including CAMM. And the MOD is alteady looking at the Konesberg Vanguard for MCM motherhood so can look at other patrol/light/asw frigate variants and maybe have some shared manufacturing? Might sweeten the T26 deal with Norway.
Navy Lookout
@NavyLookout
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.@JohnHealey_MP
confirms the https://abs-0.twimg.com/emoji/v2/svg/1f1f3-1f1f4.svgNorwegian navy will contribute to the UK Carrier Strike Group deployment to the Indo Pacific in 2025 #CSG25
They’ll probably look at Vangaurd, don’t see more escorts anytime soon
At this stage, there is no point in any more debate. We know what the situation is. We know the general reasons for it. We have no option but to just crack on now and try and get the new ships into service as soon as realistically possible.
Agreed.
Agreed, talk of hiring ships or buying ships and converting to frigate duties is nonsense.
Given that it’s unlikely that we’ll see A T31 or a T26 fully operational before mid 2028, the key question for Kipion is what will be in the Gulf for the two years prior? You can’t realistically expect to extend Lancaster beyond mid/end 2026. Here are some options:
1/ Iron Duke: Plan A, the cheapest and easiest solution means no upgrade for the Duke (beyond Peregrine and odds and sods) and no risk in extending the dual-crewed Lancaster beyond 2025.
2/ If Lancaster is extended by a further year and Iron Duke gets a tail, taking Duke out of the mix for at least six months –
2A/ A Type 45 or Type 23: We will still deploy an escort for 18 months and Iron Duke is out for 6 to 9 months to get the tail on. We gain virtually nothing.
2B/ Nothing: we could just capability gap the Gulf until Venturer is ready
2C/ Venturer: Let it do Navy sea trials and work up in the Gulf.
I’d rather we just went with Plan A, and simply replaced Lancaster with Iron Duke next year. Otherwise we would probably get an ASW frigate in Iron Duke and end up putting it in the Gulf anyway.
A ship in the hot Gulf without a sonar?
I assume you mean the T45. We have spare hull-mounted sonars, with space to refit one if we thought if was useful. As far as hot goes, the Caribbean in summer isn’t exactly chilly. I think that problem is mostly history.
T45s have their sonars far as I recall but they were pretty bad ones and they’re noisy ships too.
I meant the Venturer.
Fine for dealing with the Houthis, as T45s have already demonstrated.
But if things went hot with Iran, it would be an issue due to their 3 Kilo SSKs and their force of 20 midget submarines.
Houthis /which are basically Iranian Regime) already tried submergible drones, i think one was intercepted. You can see what will be going on in less then 10 years time…
Huge difference between a submersible drone and a submarine in terms of technology and engineering skills required to build and operate it. It’s same magnitude if not greater than that between a Shahed drone a Typhoon jet.
It is irrelevant if it does make an hole in your ship.
Take on loan the USS Sioux City, Little Rock, Detroit and Milwaukee
Those are LCS are they not, what would be the point in that
LCS are just a fancy name for frigates for shallower seas{North Sea, Baltic, Med, Red Sea-Gulf Caribbean etc]. They are for sale but money is the problem anyway let alone the other issues
Theyre not really Frigates with their loadout though
I think Greece is getting the best LCS being retired
“Numerous reports, statements from Greek public figures, defense journalists, and the leadership of the Hellenic Navy (HN) indicated that Greece was actively considering the acquisition of LCS following their retirement from the US Navy” -naval news
This was an earlier modified LCS new build
That is not the US LCS, and modifying it like that would be too expensive.
I have worked on them.
Sioux city in fact a year ago. Currently working on another one.
No, just No!
Unless you have actually worked on them you won’t get how really bad they are.
The future must be smaller modular ships that can be adaptable and cheaper…remember the Black Swan concept ?
Why must it be smaller ships, smaller ships have shorter lives and are less adaptable.
It was a crap idea then and remains so now.
I wish I had a pound for every time I have seen you say that about that idea down the years. I would have enough for a good takeaway by now.
At least 80% of the cost of a complex warship is its sensors, weapons and the crew to operate and maintain them. Reducing the size would produce minimal savings. Plus you would have a ship with less capacity for future upgrades in sensors or weapons.
There is plenty of blame to go around for this, and all parties mentioned shoulder all of it between them. The fact of the matter is where are the consequences when things go wrong? No one in MOD, BAE etc or the RN are ever held accountable so therefore there is no reason to be anything other than blase whilst feathering their own nests. Combine that with the fact we overpay to a ridiculous amount. Its about time we started handing out frigate and destroyer contracts abroad.
Fat chance of them going abroad, and you assume they wouldn’t rip us off too.
Damen produces Frigates to order…just a thought
And well get those before our current order of frigates? And be able to crew them?
Irish have 3 boats they might want to rent could they have any uses?
Theyre just OPVs/Patrol ships iirc
They aren’t for rent, nor are they in anyway an ASW capable platform.
Just order another 3 T26 with relevant up dating design changes for delivery in 2-40’s and do the same with the 3 Type 31 with relevant up dated design changes to Type 32 delivery ASAP and all will be sorted in time. Just keep ships coming every two years on going and stop totally redesigning from scratch!
Doesn’t really fix the current crisis. And there are other programs with funding Priority
That is not the point of the article Iain.
Can stop the boats either. just test fire Trident.
deleted sorry.
1: I think it is clear that UK must “pay” the £100-150M to upkeep the aging T23s, including HMS Northumberland? It is not the best solution, but surely better than leaving the gap, hoping for “bad thing not happening”.
Why not?
One possibility is, man-power crisis is MORE significant than Frigate crisis, so that even “7” frigates are enough now. Looking at the LPD situation, I think this is the real problem. Actually, RFA is also losing man-power and Tides and Forts are tied up.
2: Independently, if lack of ASW is the problem, how about start introducing USV-ASW kits. UK company Atlas UK has a solution SEASENSE for ARCIMS USVs. It will never serve as a North Atlantic ASW asset. But, ASW is everywhere, including English channel, North Sea, and Irish Sea, and even Persian gulf (or Holmz strait).
These choke-point / shallow water ASW is where these USV-based ASW asset can work, I understand?
In late 2030s, when the ASW frigate numbers regains, this USV-based ASW assets can do any other jobs. For example, if we use the 15m-version not the 11-m version of Atlas boats as the base-hull of SEASENSE, they can be partly used as a Archer class replacement (as URNU), or any other basic-training or workboat or even unmanned Sentry tasks?
Try to get USV’s in service with all rules the UK management created…. To not talk about operational stuff like sea state for a 15m boat in North Atlantic with a VDS sonar…
Westminster, Northumberland and Richmond were all built at Swan Hunters and launched over a period of 18 months. If Westminster and Northumberland are abandoned this year, then Richmond will go next year. “The plan” called for them all to be refitted one last time.
Has anyone heard a real reason why Argyll went?
Simply cost and crew (same for Westminster although I think argyle was in a better state and they at least started her upkeep). I can see a situation where there is an attempt to swap Northumberland with argyle. Hull numbers are a worry but all these ideas that temp leases or borrowing other units are just a bit silly, the really low force numbers we have now are knocking around with substantial gapping.
Here is a crazy stopgap idea for you folks to solve the loss of frigates. I suggest the RN lease the 6 or 7 of the LCS vessels being retired early (some are less than 5 years old) by the USN for a the 5 year period to fill in the frigate shortfall until all the Type 31 are operational. The remaining 6-7 Type 23 can then be focused on the CSG support role.
The leased LCS can be focused on the “policing” roles in the Gulf, Mediterranean and Atlantic, fitted with the combat modules for the roles that the RN wants to use them. The LCS’ needing less manning levels than the Type 23 means the RN manpower shortage will be somewhat eased and thus make it easier to start operationalizing the incoming Type 31 and Type 26s’.
Yes the LCS have less combat power than the Type23s but as a fill in, with less manning requirement, for less than decade I think it is an idea worth looking at.
Just my crazy “2 cents” worth!
Its happened before – a short term lease
There are no modules. Specially there are no sonar modules. It failed and the ship makes too much noise.
An LCS have no sonar. You need to adapt it to the Merlin if possible or lease the SH-60.
Let’s lease a crew or three, let’s base them in Florida! Or Mississippi where they can get fixxed.
Careful. I suggested the same thing and the local pitchfork brigade rose up, complete with torches and angry expressions on their faces.
As someone who actually was an LCS fan, or at least a fan of the concept, NO! The Freedom variants, the only ones we are actively trying to divest are an atrocious money and manpower hog. They require Petty Officer level expertise for all positions, the idea being we can run with lean manning if everyone is very well trained and willing to do 8 hours of regular work, then 4 hours of additional maintenance tasks. Fun times, good luck with retention. Another key element of lean manning was contractor support for most maintenance. So unless you plan on dumping money into Lockheed Martin.
Let’s Get into roles, a ex-USN Freedom variant LCS can do anti-piracy and drug interdiction missions. Thats it. You’ll get the 57mm main gun (optically controlled) and 30mm guns or little boxes of Hellfire missiles. They haven’t deployed with NSMs, only the Indy variants have. The help based drones seem to be a developmental dead end. I think you’d have issues fitting the Merlins in the hangars (not sure and I don’t want to waste time researching it because transferring them to you is laughable to begin with). In the end, you get one role, for an extremely finicky platform that probably has the sea keeping features in the North Sea as a sheet of 3/4 plywood. If you want to send them to the Gulf, fine, that was our intention too. You can see how well that is going.
But the reality is the UK is a key strategic partner of ours and we need you to help cover certain areas of interests. Yes, we want to divest them and ideally sell them, but I don’t think we’d even give them to you for free knowing how much of a problem they are, and your current issues manning, maintaining, and deploying what you currently have.
You’ve made certain acquisition choices, and you’re going to have to live with them in the context of 2-2.5% GDP.
The most straightforward solution is to authorize Batch II for both the T26 and the T31. The assembly lines are up and running and the UK treasury would benefit from economies of scale if additional units are authorized. I’m not talking about anything crazy here. Say, 2 more T26 and 5 more T31. So the final tally would be 10 of both types for a total of 20 frigates. Forget about the T32, which never made sense to me except as half sisters that resulted from a reworking of the 31, and even then, why bother? Just crank out more 31’s.
From there, I think at least 8 DDGs should be built in the next class, but realistically I suspect it will be one for one replacements for the current six units of the T45 class. Still, 6 new destroyers and 20 frigates would be….well, still not enough, but you’re at least getting to the point at which you can realistically field a CSG while still fulfilling most other tasks.
I still think the floor for the RN’s escort fleet should be 32 ships, the breakdown being 8 destroyers and 24 frigates.
That is not the point of the article.
Well, AlexS, why don’t you enlighten me as to the point of the article.
The point of the article is there is that there is no way to fix the current issue anytime soon and no money either as its prioritised for other Naval programs.
The point of the article is that there will be nadir of numbers in frigates until T26 and T31 will arrive, the RN will have 7 or even 6 frigates only.
Building more will not make them building faster, it will be even worse due to workforce limitation.
I see. So now what?
The RN doesn’t have the crew to man the ships it has, this needa to be addressed before getting carried away with dreams of 19 frigates.
You can train a new crew a lot quicker then the 8 years to deploy a new frigate, you plan to crew the assets you need, not the other way round. The RN does get plenty of applications to join, the problem is the incompetence to get them in very quickly before young people seek other opportunities. My sons friend applied to be a submariner and it took forever, they even told him to wait for the astute to be ready, in the end he got another offer and took something else.
Imagine the submariners are leaving in droves rn with SSN availbility.
The Final paragraph is spot on
“There are limited immediate options for rectifying this precarious situation. Emergency funding might help accelerate the delivery of new ships slightly but there are limits to industrial capacity, constrained by the number of skilled people available to the shipyards and supply chain. Unconventional off-board systems, UUVs and UAS embarked on vessels of opportunity could all help fill the gap but there is no substitute for a dedicated frigate with powerful sensors, a large ASW helicopter and a well-trained crew.”
Nothing is going change in the next five years as far as RN Frigates. Even buying unmanned ships isn’t going to happen this decade.
What options if any does the Royal Navy (assuming a supportive government) have?
Unless you drop sonobuoys by the million you cannot not do the important work of tracking enemy submarines – as in replacing the function of a frigate.
Easy to be critical of options being proposed, harder to come up realistic options that can be executed in a timely manor.
The only option on the table, assuming limited additional funding, as far as frigates that I see, would be to retire more type 23’s ASAP, and transfer the maintenance funding and resources to new construction, namely the type 26 as the type 31 is not an ASW asset anyway.
The fact of the matter is successive Governments have criminally underfunded ALL of the armed forces over decades of mistreatment, and virtue signalling money wasting misappropriation, leading to our relatively small Island being dangerously vulnerable and possibly incapable of defending ourselves, meanwhile there is a criminal lack of self sufficient industrial capability,never mind capacity.
4 years to build one ship is absurd, in 1945 it took 364 days after keel laying, to entering service, now I know modern ships are vastly more advanced, but the shipyards aren’t under threat from air raids either and the population is far greater than it was in 1945.
It seems to me that our politicians have for decades been more interested in virtue signalling, instead of prioritising the safety, security and overall welfare of our own population, our industrial capability/capacity is virtually non-existent across all sectors of manufacturing and steel production etc…etc…
Other countries like China and Russia and India are laughing at Great Britain all the while they are building up their own industrial mighty, and what is Britain doing, arguing amongst ourselves over DEI and other Bullshit that has been allowed to gain traction and cripple the entirety of Western civilization !!!
I despair for the future !!!
The government is not immune to the overall culture and what are the journalists fancies.
If the noises about Northumberland are remotely true then it might be possible to swap with argyle (depending on amount of work already done to prep her for the trip up north). T31 and 26 build schedules aside the T23s are deteriorating rapidly, they have done well and given great service well past their intended service lives. The amount of crew gapping in current extremely small surface force is concerning.
Id argue Argyll is a done deal, they probably didn’t finish her refit.
I know but they at least started her (unlike westy). The news from Northumberland sounds pretty catastrophic so was wondering if bae would take her to practice welding on in place of Argyll (depending of how far along the welding up of Argyll ready for the transfer has gone)
Just one point in this article I would contest. Arguably the RN does not have to prioritise T83 over the frigate fleet as it could place that capability on the MRSS or T26 platforms,
T26 could lose/reduce its mission bay and MRSS has the size to be configured as a large scale AAD asset
frigates give us a whole load of utility and with TAPS a key skill set we can offer allies. I would really like to see what the cost of an extra 12 T26 would be given current rate is c. £680m and BAE have invested heavily.
the adaptable strike frigate has some flex style modules that I am sure could be implemented into any of these platforms with the skilled design teams we have.
whether we like it or not perhaps we will need to reduce hull types but configure them for tasks
T26 is not a particularly good hull to be an air defense platform and MRSS at the most is only going to get self defense missiles. T83 has to go ahead, all the trouble with Hunter has made an AAW T26 questionable.
You don’t have radar in Type 26 for that.
True if you are talking about the RN Type 26. Not true if are talking about RAN Hunter class derivative of the type 26.
The option does exist, I would not call it ideal, but it could be done. Given how long the type 26 build will take, and the fact that the RN budget issues are not going away any time soon, it remains one of the options to replace the Type 45 in a timely manor.
What more important to you, getting ships sooner, or getting the ship design you prefer. You don’t get both, it will be a choice.
I don’t see it as an option, we still don’t know how the Hunter will actually perform, in terms of Sea worthiness, and the suggestions for more than 32 vls are still just suggestions.
I would not rule out an AUKUS approach to the Type 83. Splitting the R&D cost with another Navy like Australia may be enough to get the project across the line.
My concern is the budget will limit the options.
Maybe but there are very few candidates for a Destroyer Partner, maybe Austrlia but they may have gone off of BAE.
Yes, either the Australian and Canadian are valid choices for AAW.
Canada are probably going to modify their CSC if they need an air defence ship, Australia depending on how this GP competition goes may find new partners, plus aren’t the Hobarts going to serve longer than T45, or should say we’re introduced at a later date.
Remember folks BAE also wants to divert two RN Type 26 to Norway in order to win that contract.
Better hope RN doesn’t fall to five frigates.
I don’t see a RN spec type 26 suiting Norway. AEGIS will be a requirement for sure. BAE’s problem is they don’t have an export spec to sell, just an option to go down the same rabbit hole both Australia and Canada have. The cost explosions we are seeing in both those programs will have then looking elsewhere.
Maybe not Aegis, don’t think any of the candidates have that, but certainly there are more appealing options in terms of Long range radar, FDI for example.
The Norwegian navy has stated they want a Frigate ASAP and that that would mean one with minimal changes from an existing in production design.
Thats the same thing the USN wanted from its Constellation frigates….and then they didnt
Norway don’t start to add Noway bits everywhere like the Constellation.
This is a catastrophic failure of the UK political system, pure and simple. 7 frigates is not enough even for home waters defense, let alone AUKUS and “Global Britain”. What is going on with all of this? Why is this happening?
PS Although it would not be an ideal solution by any means, the US has a number of “little crappy ships”—the LCS or Littoral Combat Ships—that are either being decommissioned or else barely used by Admirals who are desperately waiting for our own new frigates to be built and commissioned. I’d be willing to bet the USN would sell a few of these to you cheap. Maybe operate half a dozen of them to bolster home waters defenses and maybe (if their hulls can take the pounding) GIUK patrols while you wait for your T26 and T31 programs to bear fruit. Better than nothing.
They’re struggling to train crews for the new frigates, let alone to man Littoral Crappy Ships that won’t do us any good.
The USN LCS program is drowning in high maintenance costs and low availability rates. The last thing the RN needs is another maintenance money pit that does nothing but add to the maintenance backlog.
Not only that. The LCS capabilities are a 57mm gun and heli platform/hangar.. basically a super fast, super expensive glorified OPV.
Okay, but 7 frigates—seven—in your entire navy? Better do something about that, and fast. If not the LCS, then what?
Sorry, there is no quick solution to a problem like this which is the result of a decade or more of poor decision making. The problem will get worse, a lot worse before its better next decade. Your seven frigates sounds very optimistic to me, The RN Frigate numbers will probably bottom out at three or four before numbers start to increase. Don’t get me started in sub numbers.
There is no so spare ships you can rent, nobody has ships under construction they don’t desperately need. Nobody can build quicks quickly anymore expect China.
I have outlined a summary what I think is possible above. I don’t expect anybody to like it.
Another fine mess – but totally foreseeable. When the Future Surface Combatant project was quietly cancelled (i.e. not funded) in the early 2000’s, I did a simple spreadsheet that assumed no new frigates would now be ordered for a decade (and then just one a year), and that the life of the T23’s could be extended from 18 to 25 years (anything longer seemed unrealistic). The results were so depressing – a low point low of 7 – 8 frigates in the early/mid 2020’s – that I assumed that I must be wrong and that the government had some kind of plan B in mind, maybe ordering a few more T23’s? Plan B turned out eventually to be 5 expensive OPV’s.
Been saying for ages we build our ships out of too thin metal and they look awful after 10 years. The additional cost of the real deal is inconsequential. We need a director of naval construction to shake things up.
When we are likely going to operate back in the Arctic and North Atlantic more often again, we have to pull things together.
What! We already have a national shipbuilding strategy. That’s why H & W are not getting any tax money.
Because Prudence Mk2 thought the Treasury might lose money if she guaranteed a cheap loan, not caring that the MOD will likely lose even more if she didn’t. So Harland has had to borrow even more money at stupidly high percentages. Harland will go under at this rate, driven there by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the only people who will gain will be the American finance house to whom Harlands owes the money.
The Chancellor talks about growth, but show her anything with the slightest whiff of risk and she runs away crying for Mummy.
The Chancellor relies on the advice from the Treasury. Just having a PPE and Economics masters doesnt make someone a expert on structured finance in industry
Short sighted penny-pinching, another example being the defunding of the Edinburgh Exascale computer.
It’s Austerity Mark 2, and you won’t achieve GDP growth that way.
Although the T32 project seems moribund, I’m still hopeful that the defence review may announce a small T31B2 (3 ship?) order. Good PR, the new government can claim that they are increasing the size of a RN that the Tories cut to the bone and beyond, modest cost (under £1 billion), will allow the old River class B1’s to be replaced by the B2’s, and assuming a much reduced build rate (one per 18 months?) will keep Babcock in the shipbuilding business until the mid 2030’s.
More likely Babcock will have to bid on MRSS or if FSSS moves shipyard.
Navantia is H&W partner already
I know its supposed to default to Navantia but there were rumblings they’d rerun the contract rather than it going to Spain
The contract’s signed. Too late to re-run it.
Depends on the penalties, would look bad for Labour if they were built in Spain.
I suspect HMG’s plan is to force Navantia to buy H&W in order to meet their contractual U.K. content requirements.
It has always been thus. To all the Walter Mities- I’m glad you bore each other here. Saves the rest of us the annoyance.
We are where we are, we got here how we got here, what are we going to do about it?
If we have 7 T23’s that can be kept sea worthy until their replacements come along, then we have 7 ships that can focus on ASW tasking as we have 8 sets of T2087 towed array sonar. They must form the backbone of North Atlantic Towed Array Patrol and carrier group tasking. However we expected to have 9 T23’s to keep us going. We are not going to buy anything new, it wouldn’t’ be built quickly enough to make a difference.
People have suggested buying surplus LCS – the Freedom class are plagued with gearbox trouble, and the Independence class have cracks, and the earliest examples of each have been taken out of service for a reason – so no thanks.
If we are not worried about ASW (because 7 T23’s) then we have only one class of vessel in service that can be made more “fighty” reasonably quickly to replace the GP frigates – the River Class B2 OPV’s. Take the budget that would have been used for 2 x T23 refits and spend it on 3 or all 5 River B2. We know the Thai’s run identical ships with medium gun, 2 x 30mm and one even has 4 Harpoon. It has all been discussed here before of course:
https://www.navylookout.com/enhancing-the-royal-navys-batch-ii-opvs/
Go all in on at least 3 of them? – 57mm Bofors fwd, if we can get them supplied in a timely fashion, port and stbd 30mm’s, remove the crane abaft the funnel and stick a Phalanx mount in?
I have struggled to find a single photo of a River with a Wildcat ranged on deck, has a Merlin ever actually landed on one? Either way, we don’t have the luxury caring about the enormous flight deck – stick the NSM on the fwd end of the flight deck, you would still have enough space to fly a Schiebel S100, and for Wildcats or Merlin’s to drop stores or winch people up. See the attached pic of a River with 20ft ISO containers on the flight deck to get an idea of the space.
Is this ideal, no. Are they the only ships we have built to naval standards, with at least some damage control capability and upgradability – yes.
Also they are fairly easy to replace as OPV’s quite quickly by taking the RFA Stirling Castle model – pick up some off shore support vessels and make minimum mods necessary. A long time ago Think Defence did the amazing “Ship that is not a Frigate series:
https://thinkdefence.wordpress.com/2011/08/29/a-ship-that-is-not-a-frigate-part-1-introduction/
Followed up more recently with “A ship that is still isn’t a frigate”
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/a-ship-that-still-isnt-a-frigate/#:~:text=One%20of%20the%20first%20multi,on%20a%20range%20of%20non%2D
7 x T23, 3 to 5 upgraded “light patrol frigates” and 3 to 5 civvy ships converted to OPV – is this doable with personnel released from 2 x T23 and the budgets that would have been spent on upgrading them??
What would be the point, they still wouldn’t be capable of covering frigate roles like Bahrain on the Red Sea with little to no air defence.
Yes, that is the main question. Self air defence.
Oh I mostly agree! so you don’t think a 57mm with appropriate radar FCS and a Phalanx cuts it? AEW and CAP or patrols from Emirati AF and RAF out of Bahrain? For Red Sea, maybe not, or maybe have to be in loose company with an allied ship – you take the ballistic missile with your SAM’s and I’ll take the UAS with my 57….?
I get where you are coming from Hugo and Alex – but like I said, while less than ideal, they are hulls we have, what else do you suggest ?
They will probably just have to gap several frigate roles, the Rivers are already extremely busy, what would cover their roles
Hugo, I covered that above, take civvy off shore support ships like RFA Stirling Castle, they can be converted for OPV duties pretty cheaply. That is why I included the links to the TD “Ship that is not a frigate” articles. A quick Google last night and I found 4 identical Ulstein PX121 available for charter. Ideal time to experiment with “Navy PODS” to fit RHIB davits etc.
What are the chances of that, they’re not upto RN standards and the RFA can’t spare the personnel. I get these ideas for trying to cope with these situations but when has the Navy tried anything out of the ordinary to solve their issues.
To do what River B2 OPV do, in Carribean, Med or tootling round the Pacific doing defence diplomacy what “RN Standards” do you need? Its a stop gap measure to help with a lack of frigates, non of this is ideal or even optimal – doesn’t mean it isn’t doable!
Against 300kph drones – depending in quantity – it should but you realistically have only one gun.
The Phalanx is the last ditch and will intercept only at 1km from the ship.
This ^^^^ plus a few more P-8s would seem to be the only realistic way forward for the RN. I would think that a few more Batch 2’s could be built fairly quickly as well, not necessarily with the idea that they would become corvettes or light frigates but to take the place of the OPV’s that will be upgraded. Definitely not ideal but far better than nothing, which is what you are looking at now.
Ok needs must time. 1. Approach the USN to transfer the two LCS 2 variants to the Royal Navy for Kipion and to add another hull that enables the Type 23 to focus on TAPS. LCS is decommissioned and yes had problems obviated by not pushing them at high speeds demanded by the USN. This includes fitting them with NSM 2. The government abandons Type-32 in favour of up to 8 x Type-31 Batch 2 with towed sonar (Captas 2?) to grow the Frigate fleet to 20 (more realistically 18). Yes not ideal but quantity has quality all of its own. Right now we lack both.
8 more T31s? Where does this idea that T32 will be a better/more high end design than T31 come from, were not getting any new frigates full stop
The USN retired early examples of both types of LCS because it considers them to be shit, in fact they said the first 4 of each type were “experimental”. The LCS 2 Independence Class have a problem with cracks in the hull as well as with the main machinery – up thread it was suggested up gunning River B2 does not provide enough air defence capability for the gulf – the LCS has the same lack of capability – a 57mm and a SeaRAM, which we would probably replace with a normal Phalanx. So taking these defective maintenance hogs might not really eliminate even this short term pain?
And upgunning the River’s to what? One non-magazine fed 40mm and a couple of 30mm’s that demands investment in a CMS involving a lot of money for an underarmed OPV. LCS had gearbox issues if you run them at 44 knots. What else is available, you tell me? Chile’s Type-23’s are out of the frying pan as they have the same hull fatigue issues as ours. We need to plug an escort gap, right now, until the Type-31s commission. As for “better/more high end design” from Hugo, I think most people here want to see RN mass than forever trading capability for fewer hull numbers, That’s why the escort fleet is parlous but with MK41 VLS installed, the Batch 1’s are potent. Adding something like Captas-2 makes them truly GP frigates.
Mk41 is still unclear as to how many and when, don’t see them getting Sonars anytime soon, certainly I don’t think the nessecary space and access to install one will be in the design.
Off-topic. I wonder if Navy Lookout could look into this claim by the DT and keep us posted on the facts of the matter.
“Britain’s nuclear submarine software built by Belarusian engineersFears that coding work outsourced to Russia and its allies could pose a national security threat”
“Admiral Lord West, the former head of the Royal Navy said he was “shocked” to read about these “extraordinary” revelations, and urged the MoD to carry out a review into supply chains to ensure they are secure.
“This whole area is an area that has been worrying me more and more. If you go back years ago there wasn’t the same reliance on coding and software and these sorts of things,” he said.
Lord West, who served as the First Sea Lord from 2002 to 2006, added that it can be “highly dangerous” now that everything was so reliant on software.
“This is a world where software can make such a difference. We have to have mechanisms where we can absolutely be certain that no one has broken into the supply chain, even at the lowest level, and that there is no one who hasn’t got the clearance to do the work,” he said.
“I think certainly the Ministry of Defence needs to look very, very closely at this and to make sure that [their supply chains] are absolutely secure. They need to make absolutely sure that every single supplier is secure and has signed the Official Secrets Act.”
The RN has two anti-submarine forces;
• the ASW Type 23s frigates
• the Astute class SSNs
Given the first is falling apart with age, can the second take-up the slack in terms of increased patrols, less downtime, etc, etc?
Also if the Astutes are worked harder – remember their reactors aren’t designed to be refuelled – are we going to see a rerun of this issue in future? In other words, might the Astutes end up being worn out before their replacements are in service?
Astutes are all dock side and have been for months, can’t really take up the slack unfortunately
Even Anson? She only completed trials off the US East Coast earlier this year!
Could it be the others simply need regular maintenance but are queued up due to lack of dry-dock availability at Devonport?
Astute has been in maintenance since its deployment end of last year, Anson as well, will be very telling if/when those 2 return,
Ambush and Artful have been in Faslane for a year plus, reason unclear but the first 3 Astutes may have required modifications to fix design flaws, without some kind of dock that will take alot longer.
Audacious has some work being done but still waiting for a dock in devenport.
Triumph may be retiring now so we may have 5 Astutes that don’t work.
I vaguely recall mention of a design change during the build of the Astutes, though I can’t remember from which boat onwards. So maybe there’s plans to retrospectively apply this to the earlier boats? I assume that the first two boats have already been upgraded to the new Common Combat System installed from Artful onwards.
Ambush is reportedly undergoing prolonged maintenance at Faslane.
Sounds like the wait until Dock 10 at Devonport is ready for Astute work is having an operational impact.
I think Boat 4 Audacious was considered the Batch 2 and involved design changes, Ambush and Artful have been the ones out of action for more than a year so hard to tell what’s wrong with them, could they even get to devenport dock even if it was available.
Yes Boat 4 was supposed to be the first with the CCS but the software was (shockingly) delivered early and in time for installation on Boat 3, Artful. But it was Boat 4 onwards that were considered Batch 2 with various design improvements.
I think they must be, at a real pinch, be still operational which is why they’re at Faslane rather than being tied up at Devenport. But I think they’re awaiting maintenance in a dry-dock.
Good grief.
Something going on with Astutes.
Don’t forget the RAF’s P8’s too.
That’s why I said RN, but I’m sure the RAF will be using this situation to make the case for more P8s
RAF make the case for more ‘ recon planes’ for the Navy to have operational control
Thats a funny one. If its doesnt have an afterburner then they prefer ‘cyber this or space that’ where they can wear to multi star hats
No surprise that would make such a stupid blunder as to think the P8 are under RN control.
They are operated by, and under the control of, the RAF.
Try to at least get the basic facts correct. Or does the tin-foil hat prevent you from googling?
There is no reason why a T26 variant could take some of the AAW work load.
They are large ships so can carry a radar high and that probably is the most important feature given the RN’s preferred use of EW.
They have SeaCeptor and volume for strike length missiles if not enough of them.
Perhaps expand the midships VLS by using up ‘mission bay’ space? Perhaps use it as place for VLS ASW missiles too?
Replace lacklustre Phalanx with SeaRam.
Replace the 5in with the Strales 76mm. Perhaps be really brave and cut into the flight deck space with a Sovraponte on each beam? You could fly a torpedo carrying drone or Wildcat from the reduced flight deck.
So easy to up arm with little structural change needed. You would lose a Merlin hangar but the RN hardly has loads of large helicopters and isn’t short of hangars either. Still retains all the ASW capability with sensors and stealth features.
The biggest issue is the radar and that shouldn’t be insurmountable. Not hard to imagine Son of Sampson; it would probably be a better set given advances in tech. A T26 AAW variant would be more of a T42 replacement than T45 has been.
For T83 as I have said before I would get in with the Italians on their DDX program. I doubt we will get six of them anyway. I think at best four probably three.
The next problem is T31’s lack of ASW capability which makes them virtually useless for anything more than flag flying. Our nearest enemy them there Ruskies’ main naval weapon is the submarine. China is building and refining submarines as quickly as their yards allow. T45 was given a pass thanks to SeaViper. T31 will something else that will have to be escorted. There are no shady backwaters these days. Shame 6 of them with ASW capability would have been really useful. 5 without not worth the steel. The RN would have been much better off with a 9th T26 and save on some crew too.
Having so few ships of any class is now biting us in the rear proper big style. You want 9 T26’s as opposed to 13 mixed T26/31’s which all sounds good until you see just how few of the remaining 9 T23’s we are actually able to use. I think the real answer here is to increase both T26 and T31 numbers to avoid the future repeat of this diabolical situation we see now. We need realistic numbers of ships and crews more so now than at any time since the end of WW2.
I don’t follow at all. T31 without sonar is just a target. If you read what I said 6 with ASW would have been useful. No point in sending what is supposedly a front line escort to sea under armed. So yes 9 useful T26 is better than 5 useless T31. As for what I wanted was 16 first rate ASW ships with the ability to deploy AAW missiles. That’s what I want.
With T31 they build the wrong Absalon / IH variant. They should have built 6 Absalons with rafted diesels and decent sonar fitout. There is no for these to have speed but range is important. Big flight deck with good hangar access. Lots of volume for stores so need to call on the RFA too often or go into every port. Perhaps carry a couple of better boats like CB90. More CAMM especially the ER version. That would have been useful. But a 28 kts ship with no sonar adequate hangar access? Not so much.
You need ships that can fight and see another day. Not just fast grey ships that provide target practice.
Youre saying they need to be escorted, in your opinion. In practice they will regularly be deployed alone or even forward deployed without any kind of ASW, how wise that is well thats been plenty discussed but to say theyre useless isnt really true seeing as they will most likely be extremely busy vessels.
Dont see how we wouldve got 6 ships with a more expensive fit out, the treasury or whoever is still stuck in the mindset of 8 ASW and 5 GP total, otherwise we wouldve seen more, even small orders
Well you tell me what are they going to do then? They can’t tackle submarines. They have a small gun. Small missile load out.
My point oh humourless one is 5 without an adequate fit out is probably a bigger cost than 6 with an adequate load out.
How can a hull without ASW be general purpose?
I don’t disagree but it’s what they’re getting, it’s still capable of covering the Bahrain role and many of the Presence roles better than the Rivers.
Only larger cost if they sink, which let’s be honest is unlikely, any war will have plenty of warning.
They can’t tackle subs but that’s only 1 of the many tasks the RN is expected to cover.
The gun loadout is actually pretty well suited, probably better than any of the ships we have now for the red sea situation. We’re still not clear on the missile loadout, at Worst it will have very limited sea ceptor loadout though most of the euro Frigates in the red sea only have 16 missiles lol.
At best it will have a pretty high density of Camm in Mk41.
They can’t tackle subs but that’s only 1 of the many tasks the RN is expected to cover.
Oh. Perhaps they should paint something down the side to that effect in Cantonese and Russian?
Type 31 isn’t capable of covering the presence role better than the B2 Rivers. Far from it.
First: T31s need three times the crew (if dual crewed vs three watch)
Second: They’ll cost more than three times as much to operate
Third: They’ll have fewer available sea days per year (by design)
Fourth: There are countries that won’t take a visit from an RN warship for political reasons that welcome a constabulary vessel.
Five: The countries they most need to visit are smaller countries with which we wouldn’t otherwise exercise. These often prefer smaller vessels for logistical reasons and because they are closer to the size of their own vessels.
Six: balanced against all that is the deterrence element of presence, which the T31 should be better at if they have the right missiles.
I score that for the B2 Rivers by a country mile.
I’m not talking about say the Falkands or Caribbean roles. But being forward deployed to the SCS and patrolling the North Korean coast would be a better place to have a warship, as well as giving us the opportunity to provide a naval vessel for Excercises that isn’t just following the rest around. Having them in conjunction with the Rivers would provide alot more credibility.
Yes, I agree that having the T31s as well as the Rivers is the ideal. I’m only arguing against instead of.
Early last year Spey went from South Korea on a tour of countries bordering the SCS, including Cambodia, one of the few places outside China to host a Chinese naval base. It was the first RN ship to visit Cambodia since the 1950s and not a peep out of China. Imagine if we had sent a real warship.
For whom’s benefit being in SCS and North Korea coast
Let Taiwan the SCS along with Pacific Nations, so the RN can be [insert recruiting slogan] in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean.
Its clear as a bell the RN cant afford it should say so.
Its a duty were currently fulfilling and i expect we will have to continue to fulfill, the Royal Navy doesnt get to decide to drop those duties without discussion with the government, and we have important allies in that region.
The River’s are OPVs with no defensive aids and a limited CMS. The Type-31’s have MK 41 VLS and a pukka CMS. I score that a clear win for the Type-31 as we need warships.
We were discussing the presence role. Obviously T31 is a better warship. As they stand, I wouldn’t call the Rivers warships at all. Having said that, the Rivers have BAE’s CMS-1 (INTeACT), so I’m not sure why you picked on the CMS.
Tacticos is still a bit of an unknown quantity to the Royal Navy. When the Iver Huitfeldt had to come home early from the Red Sea because of radar and gun failure and an outage of ESSM, that was ascribed by some to the CMS. Not Tacticos, rather Terma C-Flex, but that was supposed to be a pukka CMS too. Uncertainty over Tacticos was the reason given an admiral to the Defence Select Committee why T32 wasn’t coming out of Concept: not until weapons had been integrated with Tacticos on the T31s.
Well they’d be pretty useful in the Red Sea swatting Houthi drones and missiles, and in doing so they’d free up a T23 or T45 from having to be there.
The Iver Huidfeldts have unrafted diesel propulsion but also have a hull mounted sonar and ASW torpedoes. Babcock is offering export Arrowhead with hull mounted sonar. Even if less capable than a dedicated ASW hull, T31 could have been given some ASW capability, if only a self defence one. I assume cost constraints excluded this but it seems a short sighted decision, given the plan for them to be forward deployed.
“I don’t follow at all” You seemed to want 9 ships instead of 13, I merely pointed out the danger of having fewer ships given the dire situation of availability we have today. That’s all.
Hope that helps.
If HTM have MOD and RN the budget, Babcock would be happy to build Arrowhead 140, oops, T31 with a hull mounted sonar and a tail…..
The T26 could indeed become a GP “carrier escort” – the work done by BAe for Australia (attached image) showed a whopping 64 Mk41 cells amidships in place of the multi-role bay, plus 16 NSM, with the midships CAMM cells removed. Leaving the fwd cells exactly as they are on T26, gives 24 Mk41 for a VL ASW weapon, and 24 CAMM cells, while the midships cells could be quad packed CAMM-ER or dual packed CMM-MR – this would be enormous magazine depth, to the point we probably couldn’t afford all the missiles! Say 32 x 4 = 126 CAMM-ER and 32 x 2 = 62 CAMM-MR, plus 24 CAMM fwd, equals 182 SAMs !
No need for new items like SeaRAM or Strales, just replace Phalanx with the Bofors 40mm, keep the 127mm for BAe’s HVM or replace with a 57mm. Replace the current 30mm’s either side of,the hangar with something like Aseslans 8 round HVM Starstreak / LMM Martlet launcher.
A cheaper towed array and keep,the Helo hanger, multi-role ships still.
Perhaps 4 added to the end of T26 production would give 1 always available to escort the carrier, 6 would be even better.
Sure it would be useful if we had the resources to spare, certainly wont help the current situation though, and with Dreadnought, MRSS, T83, Mine hunting motherships i dont see where were fitting in more T26 and a more expensive variant at that.
Also if we go off the current OSD for T45 and the potential for T26 exports from the clyde, there is no room for more British T26 to be built by BAE before T83.
Dreadnought doesn’t impact as it is in barrow.
MCM motherships will probably be brought in
As the RN won’t in all probability won’t be getting all 6 T83 sharing a design with the Italians and building on extant design could actually save money.
But that is a bit too positive isn’t it? Better to spend 5 minutes bashing out some gloomy eh?
Was referring to cost with most those examples.
Perhaps it would be better to share a design though DDX would still require several modifications for Royal Navy use, but in all likelihood it will be a new BAE design.
Being realistic is all, hard not to be with the current situation.
You are incapable of having a regular conversation
As my fantasy fleet budge is unlimited I get carried away with my 76mm fixation. 🙂
But yes you are right there are the options selected like the 57mm (which I like) and the 40mm too (which I also like.)
I would build a 9th B1 T26. And then build 3 B2 with enhanced capability. And then 3 T83. For a carrier escort group of 2 B1 T26, 1 B2 T26, and 1 T83. That would leave I T26 B1 for oop north……..
The escort group could carrier 4 Merlin plus the smaller rotary plane in B2 T26. I don’t think there would be much loss with having a ‘destroyer’ and an ‘AAW frigate’ over 2 T45. And with all hulls ASW capable all round protection would be improved.
I expect I’m missing the point here but ASW capability is crucial! No one has mentioned that possibly the most important task for the Navy in wartime is to keep the North Atlantic convoy routes open. We came within an ace of defeat in the war when up against 700 ton really basic U boats. So far as I know, merchant shipping hasn’t improved much since then, other than to create bigger targets, so defending our supply lines is vital. What is the point of a T31 that can’t find an underwater target of any sort?
Because we have plenty of other duties that aren’t ASW, do we need more ASW absolutely, that doesn’t mean more hulls to perform other tasks aren’t also needed.
Agreed. But, does that mean we have accepted more duties than we are capable of discharging and therefore scaling back is required. Just a thought…
I mean yes we are absolutely doing more than we can actually handle but government would probably bawk at scaling back on paper commitments, though they won’t cough up thr material to do it.
No the most important role of the RN would be to close the GIUK Gap to Russian submarines and kill any that get through. If they do that, there’s no threats to shipping in the Atlantic and no need for convoys.
We are not facing a rerun of WW2;
• The German navy had nearly 1,200 submarines, Russia has 50
• Shipping was the only method of supplying men, material, food, to the U.K. and Europe.
Don’t make the mistake of planning to fight the last war.
1) Closing the GIUK Gap such that it could be guaranteed not a single Russian submarine could get through is patently wishful thinking in my view. How many Akulas would it take to decimate a convoy?
As to a re-run of WW2 let’s look at the numbers:
2) Germany may have built 1,200 U-Boats over the entire course of the war but only around 30 were on patrol at any given time. Doenitz’s own memoirs record his frustration over these tiny numbers.
Nonetheless, over 3,500 (!) merchant ships were sunk over the course of the Battle of the Atlantic.
3) Shipping still is the only method of supplying quantities of food and war materiel.
4) In 1940, Britain required over one million tons of imported goods to survive and fight (Wikipedia). In 2023, we imported over 69 million tons according to Gov.uk
I agree that planning to fight the last war is a mistake but so is wilfully ignoring its lessons. ASW capability please!
I have seen silly arguments here such at T45 doesn’t need ASW because there are no submarines in the skies. The numpty who came out without one, more than once, seems to forget that both T45 and the submarine are in the sea. And if the submarine removes T45 from the board then it cannot shoot down enemy planes. There is also an odd strand of thought that ASW and AAW ships are fundamentally different in design and that you can’t have both in the same hull. That ASW happens below and AAW happens above and that measures to quieten an ASW ship will work just as well on AAW seem to get over looked. There is no disadvantage to a destroyer having a quiet propulsion system.
It is all about sea control over and against sea denial. If you want to make use the sea it means surface ships. Simple as that.
To put your WW2 into some sort of perspective about 90% of all convoys didn’t see any German action. And of those that did there weren’t total massacres. But even those loses impacted production here and food supplies. If the West settles as a block it will have to secure the Atlantic, the Med, the Indian Ocean, and a Pacific route from Oz to the US and Canada. That’s a lot of water. Western Europe will be even more dependent on resources from North America and Oz and will have to pull its weight.
Ah the flat-earther having his deranged two-pennies worth…
The major disadvantage of a warship not having a quiet propulsion system is obvious to anyone, cost!
That’s why we can’t afford 13 Type 26s and are having to settle for 8 Type 26’s and 5 Type 31s. If you gold-plate your ships then you can’t afford as many, and as you maintain, the next war is about numbers and mass.
1) It wouldn’t take any Akulas to decimate a convoy because we wouldn’t operate convoys now. That’s a WW2 tactic. We’d proactively hunt any that get through the Gap, not wait for them to attack a bunch of ships that we conveniently group together for them to hit.
2) And just as Donitz could only have a small fraction of his submarines out on missions, the same will apply to the Russians.
3) We have air-freight now. Go to your Sainsbury’s and you’ll even find fresh fruit that’s been flown in from abroad. The current air freight restrictions; against night-flights and prioritisation of passenger traffic, would be dropped in wartime. Military airlift capacity for troops would be massively increased through the chartering of civilian airliners.
4) In 1940 continental Europe was occupied by the enemy, everything had to come across the Atlantic. Do you really see the Orcs conquering the whole of continental Europe and making the U.K. dependent on imports from across the Atlantic?
That 69 millions tons includes all the Chinese made crap bought on Amazon that as a consumer society we now consume. We can survive without it.
I don’t know about T31 at all. A modern large surface combatant needs air defence, ASW, EW, and an anti-surface capability. Even when the RN trialled the idea of specialist ships those specialist ships had capabilities in all spheres. I don’t see anybody here saying T26 doesn’t need SeaCeptor because it is ASW ship. Submarines are a less common but a far more dangerous enemy. And modern SSK’s are more capable than WW2 boats.
Type 45 is somewhat different due to SeaViper. With only six T45 they only going to be deployed at the centre of groups within ASW screen. T45 never turned into a true T42 replacement. If you were to design a specialist AAW ship to provide area defence you would probably not give it a hangar when that volume and upper deck space could be given over to more VLS and improving sensor and weapon arcs.
At least they chose a big ship capable of keeping up with the carrier. Normally at his point somebody hard of thinking and very ignorant will say they aren’t for that. In a small navy there may be no choice in time of conflict for a T31 to join the screen. I cannot imagine the CO’s of the T21’s during the Falklands War refusing to take their turn as close in goal keeper because T21 is just a patrol frigate and small!
In a few years time we will have 8 ASW ships, 11 ships with no ASW capability beyond being a park for ASW cabs, and a greatly reduced number of SSN’s. Just as China is building and refining more submarines.
The next war won’t be an industrial war. That is a war of mass. But the modern SSK is a lot more capable than the WW2 boats. Having to consider the possibility of one at a choke point or outside a harbour should be enough to give any commander pause. There are reasons why every modern large surface combatant has ASW kit. There are reasons why this is the first capability many classes are designed around.
None of those who speak about T31 can actually tell me what they are for beyond vague allusions to not every task being ASW centred. But what those tasks are they cannot say.
Interesting.
Also, “But the modern SSK is a lot more capable than the WW2 boats. Having to consider the possibility of one at a choke point or outside a harbour should be enough to give any commander pause.”
Spot on!
The world is changing, The West is about to become one of many blocks and it will be a maritime block if it survives as a block. Submarines are force multiplier. I don’t apologise for not being in favour of T31 as it is being procured. We should have at least out fitted the 5 we are getting with decent ASW equipment. The kit doesn’t cost much really in terms of a billion pound plus project. Just to blindly accepted as so many here do and then argue for it from a position of ignorance is daft. But I can’t block them so I have to put up with them.
This is the enemy. Imagine these built for every BRIC state that wanted them. 4 for 1. And then the PLAN main fleet on top.
The West is already short of escorts and submarines. Opfor haven’t got to control the sea just deny it. And opfor are for the most part a land power..
http://www.hisutton.com/images/China-Type-039C-Submarine-cutaway.jpg
FFS the BRIC is not a military alliance!!!
Brazil is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the United States with them both being signatories to the Rio Pact (whose Article 3 is similar to NATO’s Article 5).
And Indian and Chinese troops regularly fight each – short of gunfire – over disputed border territory.
I can’t see where I said BRICS was a military alliance.
How does buying equipment from China suddenly make you an ally of China?
Stop reading what you want to read Stupid SImple Sean. You fall for it every time you snide fool.
And please stop responding to my comments. You are ignorant. You don’t contribute enough discussion. You are not some appointed overseer for the site. Foxtrot Oscar………
Sheep-shagger you previously posted
“This is the enemy. Imagine these built for every BRIC state that wanted them. 4 for 1. And then the PLAN main fleet on top.”
First you claim that we face a threat from China supplying BRIC states with submarines which could operate in conjunction with the PLAN, then you whinge that you didn’t say that.
Dementia may prevent you remembering what you previously said, but does it really stop you from checking? Or you just trying to row back again after making hysterical and stupid posts?
You really are an utter prat.
You really are deluded… as well as a self-confessed misogynist (you don’t want women in the navy), a racist (only white peoples can be British), and a conspiracy theorist (man-made climate change doesn’t exist).
I’m surprised you aren’t out busy rioting with your mates instead of posting on here.
As far as the RN goes, the point of the Type 31 as originally specified was as a prayer that enough money would come in later to fit the hulls out properly. Five good-sized hulls coming in the 2020s in exchange for a promise of two fully specified T26s in the second half of next decade (or as we thought at one point when on the T26B1 rhythm, in the mid 2040s), and which might well have been cancelled by a later government in favour of the T83s.
Politically, it was to show the Treasury that the MOD can bring in a project on a fixed budget without changing the spec. Which it can’t. The hope was if MOD could pull this off the Treasury would trust them with more money. Which it wouldn’t. The Treasury doesn’t understand risk and MOD doesn’t understand the Treasury.
Industrially it was to show BAE there is an alternative.
None of this is directly linked to an immediate military capability, which is why nobody can explain in those terms what the T31 is for.
GP Frigate is the military requirement and thats upgradeable even soon after coming into service
It isn’t a GP frigate if it can go after submarines day one. Or is it just a Colonel Purpose frigate until it gets promoted?
How some of you function is beyond me.
Yes. We all know. I suppose for completeness it needed to be articulated.
Submarines and targets…….
If Argyll was partially refitted, can Westminster’s refit budget not be redirected to bringing her back into service instead? Let BAE tinker with Westminster instead.
They might want a ship that isnt about to sink at its moorings
What’s more important? What BAE want, or what the RN needs?
Both are still going to require massive refit costs which we can’t afford to give them a handful more years of service though. Either way I don’t think they will look at bringing back argyll.
If there were no aircraft carriers, there would be enough sailors available to ensure other vessels in the RN could be sent to sea rather than rotting alongside or perpetually swinging around a mooring! Rather than “World Policing” Britain could defend its shores!
What vessels, the T23s are all rotting so no there arent any lying around waiting for a crew.
Against this backdrop, and assuming CSG25 is still happening, is the RN still pursuing the notion that CSG25 will be an all-RN affair? I have seen no mention of foreign participation as with CSG21. Unless they will scrape together two T45s and rely on Merlin and the accompanying SSN for all ASW, which rings a lot of alarm bells.
We had foreign vessels along in 2021, Dutch iirc and US (they were covering ABM)
But I thought the culture of being stupid cheap was just a India problem- Guess they learned from mommy England after all..
‘Some will argue rather simplistically that the problem is the result of the RN’s acquisition of the aircraft carriers….’
I don’t know why the writer calls that simplistic, it is a pretty clear statement of the obvious
The RN’s equipment/ships budget was until recently about £1.8bn pa IIRC. It needed to stretch to cover the replacement of some 50 warships, minor warships and RFAs over their 18-30 year lifespan. (The subs have a separate budget). It was of course nowhere near enough, by a rather large factor.
£7bn for the carriers made a huge dent in that. It is the equivalent of about 7 T26s or 17 T31s.
To maintain the planned total of 19 escorts, with a lifespan of 18-20 years, means we need to be commissioning one new escort every year. What we got instead, once the last of the T45s were commissioned in 2013, was a 16 year gap in which not one single escort was built or commissioned.
What the RN got instead were the 2 carriers and some little River 2 OPVs. That is where the money went and why there was none left over for escort building.
Sure, the decision to cut the number of GCS frigates and embark on the low-end T31 caused some delay, but the fact was there was nothing left in the budget for escort building.
Blame Gotdon Brown and the RN jointly. If we were spending 4% of GDP on defence, carriers might be feasible. On 2.07% – which is what we actually spent last year – there is no way they were ever affordable without making significant cuts in surface ships.
Equally, on 2% of GDP, talking about a tilt to the Pacific – the ostensible raison d’etre for the carriers – is just facile, anything we can send there is at the expense of ASW in Eastlant.
But the RN prevailed and got their carriers. The question to the 1SLs of that time has to be: What did you think would happen if you gapped escort building for 16 years? Did you honestly think the T23s could soldier on for a decade beyond their OSD? Or was the lure of having showpiece carriers too great to worry about the little matter of providing them with ASW escorts?