The notorious Russian ‘research vessel’ Yantar is currently in the Irish Sea. Yesterday she briefly made her presence public by turning on her Automatic Identification System (AIS) in an obvious messaging operation.
As we previously reported, the Yantar, in company with the frigate RFS Admiral Golovko and the tanker Vyazma transited the English Channel, heading westward on 9th November. The Golovko and Vyazma were monitored the length of the channel from the start of the Dover Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) to Ushant by RFA Tideforce and HMS Iron Duke. They then handed over to the French Navy as the group progressed Southward. (The use of an auxiliary Tanker to escort Russian warships is unusual to say the least). HMS Iron Duke subsequently took over shadowing duties of a second Russian group, the frigate RFS Neustrashimy and her support tanker Akademik Pashin, heading in the opposite direction through the Channel back to their base in the Baltic Sea.
The Yantar broke away from the Admiral Golovko group and headed north into the Irish Sea where she is being shadowed by minehunter HMS Cattistock.
This became public knowledge when the Yantar activated her AIS for about 4 minutes yesterday afternoon while in international waters to the south of the Isle of Man. The Russians are unlikely to actually damage any subsea infrastructure at this site and this mission is probably more about strategic signalling and intelligence gathering. There are important interconnector pipelines that supply natural gas to Ireland from the UK as well as internet cables in the area. Interference by the Russians is more likely to be carried out discreetly in more remote areas where they would have greater plausible deniability. In the middle of the Irish Sea, they have made it easy for their activity to be watched in minute detail from the air, at sea and, potentially also underwater.
This activity may also serve as another reminder to the Irish government about its inadequate defence capabilities and almost complete reliance on the UK for protection. RTE reports an Irish Air Corps aircraft has been involved in surveillance and LÉ James Joyce, one of the 2 operational Irish Navy OPVs communicated briefly with Yantar while it was close to the edge of the Irish EEZ. The American hydrographic survey vessel USNS Bruce Heezen, is also reported to be in the area.
The research ship Yantar is officially classed as Auxiliary General Oceanographic Research (AGOR), with underwater rescue capability. She is tasked by the shadowy GUGI (Main Directorate Deep-Sea Research) which is an arm of the Russian Defence Ministry but separate from the Navy. The vessel can deploy ROVs and deep-diving manned submersibles. Yantar has been seen operating close to seabed infrastructure on multiple occasions by open-source intelligence analysts and is doubtless tracked much more closely by professional naval intelligence. There is no hard evidence of nefarious activities yet, but Yantar has likely been primarily engaged in information gathering, charting the location and vulnerabilities of cables and other undersea energy infrastructure should they wish to interfere with them in the future.
For once, there is no shortage of UK assets to keep watch on the Russian’s activity. P-8A Maritime Patrol aircraft from RAF Lossiemouth have been actively patrolling the area. and the more persistent presence provided by HMS Cattistock may also be complemented by other vessels. HMS Prince of Wales is in the Irish Sea. She is expected at Glen Mallan for another 4-day ammunition on-load soon, ahead of becoming the high-readiness carrier and the CSG25 deployment next year. She left Portsmouth on 12th November with two Chinook helicopters embarked but is unlikely to have major involvement apart from possibly refuelling helicopters involved in surveillance.
RFA Proteus sailed from Birkenhead in late October with a new ROV launching cradle and various containers on deck indicating she may now finally be ready to begin the CUI patrols she was intended for. She subsequently arrived at Fairlie on the Firth of Clyde and may not be far away. As we also reported, there are now three RN SSNs at sea which provides a few options for tailing Russian vessels, should the need arise.
Would be a shame if they lost their ROV while in the Irish Sea.
Bloke Down the Pub
The Russian’s have just – quite-deliberately and very provocatively – ignored what has been a very-well established international law of the sea since 1st Jan 2005
This incident is a very clear breach of international maritime law by the Russian’s
(The law is IMO / SOLAS V19).
However, whilst Yantar was near to UK waters: it did not have its AIS transponder on..
Accordingly, when Yantar was firsts een approaching British waters, Yantar should have been, as a mattter of long-stading routine and, frankly, standard operating procedure
The correct procedure would be, initially, for this SOP to be done by the MCA.
The three-stage escalation in these type of quite-regaular situations should have been::
And then – when the Russians then (most-probably) either refuised to stop and/or refused to allow the MCA aboard – then the Yantar should then have been, quite legally, forceably stopped by the RN
Finally, the correct – and well-established – international law of the seas for what should happen next = is very clean-cut
The offending ship must be brought to the nearest UK port: for a full safety inspection.
So, once again, Navy Command / PJHQ (Northwood) were asleep on the job
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
SOLAS:Regulation 1 – Application 1 Unless expressly provided otherwise, this chapter shall apply to all ships on all voyages except:
Correct. I had during my time involved in international monitoring, control and surveillance of fisheries waters much to do with UNCLOS82 and its subsequent amendments. Warships and government owned vessels [for example, the RFA] are exceptions to the rule.
As this activity is within the UK EEZ, UNCLOS is clear about the responsibilities of coastal States. However, this activity is in international waters [Albeit within the UK EEZ], so it is hard to see how an MCA officer could intervene. How does he/she board this Russian ship? If the officer does, how does that official get the Russian ship to proceed to the nearest UK port? I have been involved in boardings in exactly these situations, and I can assure readers they are fraught with difficulty, and I was only dealing with fish.
Having been closely involved during the Cold war with submarine activities I can envisage what might have happened then, but who knows what the rules may be in 2024.
Know Your Rules
Quite correct…..
…however
..the rule applies to warships and auxillaries etc operating out on the high seas...
This is what the UK government officially says about this situation:
“The Administration may decide to what extent this chapter shall apply to ships operating solely in waters landward of the baselines which are established in accordance with international law”
In this case, the adminstration is the UK government…and the baselines are defined as the sea areas lying between the UK and Irish and European mainland land masses
The Yantor was operating in the Irish Sea; so waters which are officially defined as being part of the UK’s (or Ireland’s) EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone(s)
UK Exclusive Economic Zone | Navy Lookout
Thus the Yantor was operating “between the legal baselines”, and thus within an enclosed body of water which is located between land masses:
Hence, in this case, thefour weasel words contained in your own quote apply :
“Unless expressly provided otherwise”
Thus Yantor should be, very easily, be subject to any proper legal challenge by the UK…..
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So, next, taking a suitable modern analogy directly from the aviation world:
In situations when any civilian-operated, but government-owned plane is flying over the high seas:
In this particular case, what should have happened out in the Irish Sea over the past few days should have been exactly the same as what always happens whenever any civilian airliner is not properly communicating its position to others
The rules of engagement are, paraphrasing: “it might be threat and/or a collision hazard: so we have the right to check up on it:
Then, if the potential threat does not respond: we can take appropriate action …
Note that this ship is owned by that very nice Russian military intelligence agency = the very-same one which the ongoing public inquiry into the Salisbury novichock attack in 2018 – an attack which was wholly concurrent with the aforementioned ariel intercept by the crabbs……
I quote the words of the ongoing public inquiry = “it could have killed thousands”
So, knowing full well that this ship is owned by the very naughty boys
= in this case it would have been “quite legit” for the MCA to go out and check up on it as a potentail collision hazard
and then, when it did not respond, theMCA to officially declare it a possible terrorist threat…the rest is an SOP
—————
So, globally, what is “good for the goose” over here in the Irish Sea must also be “good for the gander” over there, over in the North West Pacific.
So, to prove this key point of maritime law once and for all, and also because we are planning to be sending the QE Carrier Strike Group to the Far East next year anyway
UK Carrier Strike Group to visit Japan in 2025 – GOV.UK
= why not a day-long cruise by the RN CSG around the Sea of Oknotsk?
Which is definitely as all being international waters:
The sea of Oknotsk is just one day’s sailing north from Japan
But, Russia claims it as its own waters. because it has Siberia on three sides
So tell the QE’s captain to turn the AIS off; and also not to bother to go to action stations?
—————–
Nobody reading this particular website should need any reminder whatsoever that it was on Tuesday 1th Sept 2001 that just four transponders were turned off, on just four large US owned civilian planes…… and…..what happened next?
The US military was unable to react in time: unable to defend its own HQ.
——————–
The UK needs to get quite-a-bit smarter with how we “play by the rules“..
i.e. we should abide by THE key UN mandate: “the right to self-defence”
In this case, as the black Russian Navy fully appreciates, they were deliberately operating inside a legal “grey zone”: and the RN did not call their bluff
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
The 12nm limit is UK territorial seas. beyond the ‘economic sea’ for resources
Beyond the 12nm limit is international waters for shipping transit
The map shows EU fishing within the 12nm limit but shows the extent of what is UK territorial waters including straight lines connecting peninsulas and islands
?lossy=1&strip=1&webp=1
You finally post something shorter than a doctoral thesis…
and you make a fundamental blunder as to its applicability to warships…
Not Navy Command asleep but yourself.
Good morning Sean,
I take your points and totally agree. When I was still in the Navy, and when I did my Staff Course I studied International Maritime Law because I was interested in it, little realising that would stand me in good stead when I left. When the Falkland Islands fisheries directorate [as it was then] was established in 1987, I became operations controller and was therefore responsible for boarding operations. I mention this to assure readers I am well familiar with UNCLOS 82, EEZ regs as they apply to coastal states, the territorial sea and contiguous zone etc.
One of the fundamental issues is could Yantar be boarded in an EEZ? yes, of course, but that would require the co-operation of the ship, highly unlikely in this event. The only safe method is from a RIB; don’t listen to nonsense about boarding from a patrol boat, inevitably smaller than the target vessel. think a Border Force cutter alongside the much larger Yantar. Like everyone who has done my sort of job, I’ve done lots of boardings of moving vessels on the high seas, and the watchword is take care, as each and every one is a potential accident, particularly if one is not really welcome.
Perhaps submarine activity is the answer here? I had a number of appointments on the Faslane Ops Staff, but that was during the Cold War when the situation was a tad different.
Exactly 👍
Boarding a Russian Naval likely with armed agents on board who are not that well trained or restrained would likely end badly unless you had enough firepower to sink it in short order – and that is a massive escalation.
In this instance we would likely want to have a very close look at what they are up to and maybe get in the way – ‘accidentally’ mind.
Always a terrible shame if some of their kit is ‘damaged’ while in use?
David and Supportive Bloke
You have both – quite incorrectly – stated that I said “board” in my first post.
I did not.
There are very many other possible ways of gradulally escalating……which could all be done long before long before sending over a RN or RMC boading party
This most-recent Russian operation (and also, it now has to be said, your two comments) yet again highlights just how smart the Russian Navy planners are when they plan this type of “grey zone” operation.
The RN really needs to learn – or should that last phrase have read “relearn” – how to react properly to a far-to-obvious provocation.
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
Its not a grey zone. The middle of the Irish sea up till the Isle of Man is international waters.
The North Channel isnt- but Yantar can only do ‘transit’
This is the fibre cable network in Anglo-Irish sea from
https://www.submarinecablemap.com/
Peter,
The reason I mentioned boarding is that any attempt to board such a vessel will end in tears. We monitored the Malin Head AGI throughout the Cold War, both with surface assets [often Clyde Division’s sweeper, other Tons or sometimes RFA Blue Rover]. Sometimes also by 3/SMs SSKs.
Our Coast Guard in its present form are powerless to do anything about this kind of event; you are right in that a more robust approach is needed and I suspect this present administration haven’t a clue as to what to do in case it is seen, for whatever reason, as a “provocation”.
David G
I totally agree with you
That is precisely why I – “quite deliberately” – did not use that very nasty little word “board” in my first post….. because I wanted to be procative and thus provoke a reaction ….
and so why I later remarked that there are “other ways” of escalting
Like me, you are a former Cold War Warrier: given away by the fact that you used the term “AGI”
Baby sailors (Northwood) AGI = Auxillary Gatherer of Intelligence
What nobody in the RN sems to have spotted is that this particular ship was located to north of the Isle of Mann; to do what Russian AGI’s were always very good at = electronic intelligence gathering
I very strongly supsect Yantor was sent up there to monitor the large number of NATO aircaft flying into and out of Prestwick in southern Scotland. They were transiting to / from eastern Euope for supporing the big NATO exercise
Accordingly – because the UK military leadership were simply not smart enough to have diverted those very many allied plane well away from Prestwick – and thus well away from this fhis AGI – this ship will have collected plenty of very-useful avaiation-related data.
(Big hint: Use another airfield !)
Furthermore, as you will well know from yur own experiences, the primary purpose of the Russian (ex Russian Empire) surface fleet has always been to provide support for for their primary weapon systems: their submarines
I very strongy suspect that the real hidden purpose of those very-provocative Russain manouvers were to distract the navy from what Mr Ed October was doing below the waves.
The real stroy if what went on last week will be below the waves
So, no surprse that 3 no RN submarines surged last week……
i.e. there must have been a “flap on”
(Note: I am bit disappinted that the editor of the very-well-known Navy Lookout website did not link the two stories)
Frankly, with my first post – and the statement made directly above – I was being quite deliberaely very provocative: to see what reaction I got…
So, just like the Russians did to UK PLC last week I got a reaction….
The final score on that game is:
Russian 3 ; UK 0
Three goals :
A hat-trick by the Russian’s: without needing any extra time.
———–
Next, you are quite correct that a far more robust approach is now needed. Frankly, we need to be doing to them what they always do to us when we go into their backyards
In my own very humble opinion, in this case the RN and RAF should have been instigating all three of the following reactions. (I correctly called them interceptions in my first post)
These three interceptions should have been coordinated to be one after another in the middle of dark night: ideally at about 3am in the morning.
All three of these intercepts should be done when operating under full EMCOM (so not emitting any radio, radar or AIS) and also not shoiwng any lights at all
………as is allowed by international law in international waters
In other words, we copy the modus operandi of their AGI
And, finally, to finsh it all off nicely in cyberspace, post a tweet = on the platform now owned by The Donald’s new best mate – saying:
“Very sorry Mr Putin: but how did we know your ship was there. Please tell you ships to turn their AIS on!
For all baby sailor, including those based deep underground at Northwood, this is how it used to be done properly. It was well before my time, but it is still a very good training film (from 1970)
Youtube – “hms ark rotyal collides with soviet ship”
Imperial War Museum (IMW)
HMS ARK ROYAL IN COLLISION WITH RUSSIAN KOTLIN GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER. NOVEMBER 1970, ON BOARD HMS ARK ROYAL, OFF CRETE, EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WHEN SHE COLLIDED WITH A SHADOWING KOTLIN DESTROYER. SEVEN RUSSIAN SAILORS WERE THROWN OVERBOARD AS A RESULT OF THE COLLISION, FIVE WERE RECOVERED BY ROYAL NAVAL BOATS AND TWO WERE MISSING. ARK ROYAL WAS HOLED ABOVE THE WATER LINE IN THE COLLISION, BUT WAS ABLE TO CONTINUE IN THE JOINT NAVY-RAF SEA EXERCISE ‘LIME JUG’. | Imperial War Museums
However that game – playing by the letter, but not the spirit of the SOLAS collision regulations – was done back in the “good old days”
………in an long-forgotten era: when navy plates were square and cannnonballs were larger and when our Navy’s leadership had balls….
Oh, my god, I am allowed to say that in the 21st century?????
Too late: I just pressed send!
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
PS Essex Police
If you are reading this: sorry, for me not being very PC. I was born in the 20th century, an era of free speech.
PPS Duker
For the second time of me asking, can you please post the map of the big Russian Sea surrounded by Siberia. We are all waiting to see it
PPS Duker
And also one of the Chinese EEZ in the South China Sea ….as we are going there next year with our CVS. it will soon come in very useful
Hurrrruuumm Peter
You were hinting at boarding!
I was pointing out that boarding anything isn’t easy, or if opposed a terribly good idea.
Supportive Bloke
Reread my first post very carefully
Interception can mean many different things to many different people.
Boarding is however a word that is far more precise and prescriptive.
Thus your and David’s one key assumption (i.e jumping straight into the “wose case senario” by concluding that I meant “boarding”) is why I said the Ruisaisn ae better at playing this grey war game than the RN
In lawfare the exact meaning of words is very very important.
I said yesterday that this operation by the enemy surface fleet was to distract abd divert the RN away from th real underwater action
This morning, on MSN news, it was reoported the Lion internet / communications cable between Gernamy and Finland has been cut!
Regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
PS An example
(I agree with Ukraine)
Those “research vessels” certainly do have armed agents on board. I have seen footage on TV in which particularly nasty looking people, armed with assault rifles, appear on deck when such a vessel is approached too closely. I think that makes boarding it a particularly bad idea.
Rules are flexible in order to be able to react to these scenarios
Your rigid rule sticking is like pre rourkes drift or gallipoli prep
Eejit
“Rules are flexible in order to be able to react to these scenarios”
Don
As of today = your comment is simply not true
In the good old days, the RN’s rules of engagement were quite flexible: and so commanders out there on the “hot spot” had considerable leaway……..
However these days, any initative whatsoever by the “lower oders” is very actively discouraged by navy command
The over-use of SatcComs actively discurrages “thinking it through for oneself“
Thus, nowdays, in these type of grey zone situations, it is always a case
Then, what happens next, is a message from Navy Command; telling the RN commader on the spot to avoid doing anything that might be provocative = usually for fear of a poor photo opportuity and/or a provocative tweet with arude emoji.
I agree 100% with you = the rules now need to be made far more flexible
Peter (IrateTxapayer)
PS you mispelt the word Emoji at the end of your post!
A fisherman I know has trawled up all sorts of things from the English channel over the years. Maybe I should suggest he drops his net in the Irish sea, you never know he might find a Mimi sub? lol
Or they lose something deliberately?
It’s possible they could be pre-positioning things for possible future use/ activation.
Probably not, but still a thought…
Hopefully this Russian ship was/is being monitored from below as well on its obvious “fishing trip”. Maybe time for some diesel subs/drones for coastal patrolling and some serious monitoring of sub sea infrastructure and some coastal patrol frigates, so the UK can also “send a message” to would be intruders and free up the main fleet for other duties?
Absolutely.
It alway was a fear that remotely / timer detonated charges could be placed.
In ancient times it was North Sea infrastructure that was felt to be vulnerable and there was a lot of effort to train for it.
Nordstream 2 a prima face evidence of positioning Explosives for subsequent remote detonation, being much cheaper than honouring the supply contract which provides a get out on acts of war… (SMO)
What is interesting here is the fact Russia sent different groups through the straits at the same time but in different directions. Clearly pressuring and testing the RNs ability to respond. I suspect that the fact an RFA was used for the task will be noted.
Infact it really should be noted that the RFA took on this role as this highlights couple of key key issues
1) considering the importance of Northern European sealanes to our direct security the RN and the nation has very little patrol and monitoring capability. The rivers 2s have been sent across the globe because we don’t have adequate escorts but actually there is a job of work that needs doing in the Irish sea, eastern Atlantic, North Sea, channel and Norwegian sea..and 2000 ton patrol boats that could act as autonomous vessel mother ships as well as support boarding parties and monitoring enemy vessels ( and Russia is our enemy) and needed in our region.The RN needs to get its escort numbers back up so it can project and protect our interests in other regions and develop a decent level local regional patrol capability.
2) The RFA more and more are taking on front line Naval roles, infact a lot of their platforms are now essentially front line naval platforms. The RFA was set up to provide logistics..moving stuff from A to B. But they now operate 100% of our nation’s available amphibious capacity as well as patrol and monitoring vessels, these are naval activities and its a bit of an issue because international law treats commissioned warships and auxiliaries differently and this is a big problem. Under the international rules of law an auxiliary is not legally allowed to undertake a belligerent act, but it may be legally attacked and only then if directly attacked may it use its weapons to defend itself. This is not really an issue for logistics vessel..carrying something from A to B but when our amphibious vessels are now classed as auxiliaries or we have patrol vessels that we may wish to locate detect and maybe destroy autonomous vessels that becomes a problem.
So does the RFA need to be moved back to focusing on logistics and only have the purely logistical vessels, so losing the new sub surface monitoring and patrol vessels as well as the bays and argus..because in reality what are they going to do when they bays, Albions and Argus are replaced by MRSS..at some point the question over that fact that the RFA and navy are massively overlapping will come to a head and it will be around the MRSS..will we have some run by the RFA and some commissioned warships..so two of our MRSS that can undertake belligerent operations ( attack ) and four that legally have to wait for someone to shot at them before they can shot back.
Who writes this? “auxiliary Tanker to escort Russian warships is unusual to say the least”. With first hand experience of the auxiliary Tanker going up to the arctic circle shadowing and handing over to Scandinavian navy whilst RN warships sit in port is very usual to say the least.