Royal Navy nuclear deterrent submarines conducting increasingly long patrols

On 11th September a Vanguard-class submarine returned home to Faslane following a patrol lasting 195 days. Here we look at the background and implications of these extended periods at sea.

Home from the deep

As the submarine headed up the Clyde it was observed she was covered in marine growth to such an extent that had not been seen before. This is believed to be the second longest patrol by a RN deterrent submarine and the build up of algae and barnacles is possible because SSBNs remain undetected by spending the majority of their time on patrol at very slow speed. This is to minimise their noise signature and once in their assigned waterspace, are not having to go anywhere in particular. This level of biofouling may also suggest she could have been operating in either shallower or warmer waters than is usual.

In recognition of an exceptional patrol, the boat was welcomed home by the First Sea Lord and the Deputy Prime Minister although official coverage made no mention of the fact her crew had spent more than 6 months underwater. This itself represents something of a heroic achievement and the crew should be recognised for their sacrifice. From a more pragmatic perspective, it must be accepted that this comes with a significant cost to a lot of people, not just the submariners but their friends and families as well as longer-term impacts.

When the RN took on the CASD role in the late 1960s with the Resolution class boats, patrols were typically around 3 months and considerable effort was made to study and mitigate the psychological impact of being in a metal tube without seeing daylight or having meaningful communication with the outside world for so long. The effect of such a period without proper rest and relaxation must inevitably take its toll on the crew and it is an inescapable fact that human error becomes more likely as fatigue increases.

Some submariners adapt well to the supposed predictability and routine of life on a ‘bomber’ and when at sea they spend little money while accumulating good submarine pay. Longer patrols also qualify for further bonus payments and an extended leave period. Patrol lengths also used to be quite predictable allowing family life to be planned around them with knowledge of when you would be at sea, living at home and working in the base or on leave. Patrols of excessive duration or patrols that are suddenly extended at short notice inevitably damage morale and will lead to the resignation of more people at a time when there is already a dire shortage of trained submariners.

Relentless

We cannot say for sure exactly why the recent patrol was so long but, although there are 4 boats, effectively there are only two boats at high readiness. The scenario imagined below is a typical example of how the 4-boat force has limited resilience and is pushed to maintain one boat at sea at all times.

Boat D is on a planned 5-month deterrent patrol deep underwater in an approximate area known only to a tiny handful of people ashore and a couple of the officers on board. Boat A is in a major multi-year refit and no one can accurately forecast when it will be completed. Boat B is working up after coming out of deep refit and needs to conduct a DASO before she is ready to conduct operational patrols again. (The Demonstration and Shakedown Operation involves the test launch of a Trident missile at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center off the Bahamas). Boat C is conducting a short workup and FOST certification before replacing boat D on patrol. Due to the nature of being an ageing submarine and a long time since the last major refit, Boat C experiences a significant defect while at sea and is forced to return to base prematurely. This results in the CO of boat D having to inform his unfortunate crew that their patrol will be extended by several weeks. There is a mad scramble to repair boat C which takes a couple of weeks and involves taking important parts (Storerobbing) from boat B. Eventually boat C is ready to go to sea and conduct a very compressed workup, missing key certifications but can finally relieve boat D, allowing her exhausted crew to come home. Boat D having been at sea for so long will now be out of action for some time and require an extensive maintenance package. Boat B’s schedule is badly disrupted and must wait until equipment can be replaced with parts taken from boat D. And so the domino effect continues…

Verifiable figures for patrol lengths are hard to come by but defence sources say the record for the longest was achieved by HMS Victorious in 2021. In the last 3 years, the average time at sea for a V-boat maintaining the deterrent is calculated to be 163 days (5 months and 2 weeks) a huge increase in the 3-month standard of the past.

The price of prevarication

There a multiple reasons for the pressures faced by the submarine service today, the first of which is the failure to provide timely replacements for the Vanguard class. In 2010 the Cameron government decided to delay main gate approval to start the Successor (now Dreadnought) programme by five years. This supposedly saved around £750M in the short term but in the long run, is adding additional costs that run into £billions. Even more seriously, it places the whole submarine force under growing pressure through the 2020s and risks the credibility of the deterrent itself.

The final decision to commit to the Successor programme was approved in July 2016 and first steel was cut for HMS Dreadnought in October of the same year. The MoD is extremely vague about when she will be operational but the project is not paced with the urgency needed and she will probably take around 15 years to build. (About double the length of time it took to construct HMS Vanguard 1986-93).

If Dreadnought’s construction had begun around 2011 as originally intended, she would now be just a year or two away from coming into service. Fortunately, the Vanguard class has proved to be a very sound basic design overall and just about continue to be effective in their ability to silently disappear while maintaining the ability to launch missiles. They were constructed with an intended service life of 25 years from the time their reactors went critical which should have seen HMS Vanguard retire in 2017. Like any piece of engineering, these boats become increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain as they get older, especially as they will all have to be run for 35-40 years.

A Defence Select Committee investigation into replacing these submarines as far back as 2007 predicted all the problems the RN is facing today. Noting that “past experience with UK submarine programmes suggest that even a 5-year life extension will involve some risk” with boats facing “a significant loss of availability and increase in support costs towards the end of their lives” and “Extending their service beyond 30 years would be a substantial technical undertaking with considerable risk and cost implications”

The support deficit

Besides the wait for replacement submarines, the force is further hampered by serious issues with its industrial support, lack of nuclear-qualified engineers and delays to upgrading infrastructure. These were contributing factors to the refit of HMS Vanguard which took over 7 years. Failures to make adequate preparations 10-12 years ago sowed the seeds for this colossally delayed and expensive project. There was not enough investment in the workforce or dock infrastructure and the resulting bill at thought to have been well over £500M. The MoD has refused to make the total cost public, claiming “disclosure would prejudice commercial interests.”

While contending with staff shortages and COVID, those involved with the project say Vanguard’s material state was such that she was almost rebuilt from the inside out. Work included properly rectifying the damage sustained during the extraordinary underwater collision with the French SSBN Le Triomphant in 2009. Many major items of equipment on board have to be taken out and completely refurbished in addition to the unplanned refuelling of her reactor. Due to severe corrosion, the entire tail section containing the aft hydroplane bearings had to be reconstructed and replaced. These bearings have to be machined to very high tolerances in order to maintain stealth and this operation was just one of several complex engineering tasks that had never been attempted before.

The delays to Vanguard meant HMS Victorious had to be patched up in Faslane and kept going longer than planned. This may or may not have been a contributory factor to an onboard fire caused by an electrical fault in Sept 2022. Although fortunately not on deterrent patrol at the time, she was forced to surface and return to the Clyde. HMS Victorious arrived in Devonport in May 2023 to begin her major refit. Some lessons will be learned from the painful experience with Vanguard and she does not have to be refuelled, but her material state is likely to involve another lengthy project.

Babcock has now started work at Devonport to upgrade number 10 dock to efficiently support future SSBN and SSN maintenance. It will be at least 2 years before this work is completed as the dock has to be reconfigured and reinforced to meet the stringent regulations for nuclear facilities. It also requires a particularly strong grade of concrete of which there is limited supply in the UK and is also in high demand for use in civil nuclear power projects. When 10 dock is eventually ready it will relieve a major bottleneck in submarine support as there is currently only the shiplift at Faslane available when a V-boat needs to be taken out of the water. (Apart from 9 dock at Devonport which is fully occupied with Victorious’ refit).

What can be done?

Right at a time when the deterrent is especially critical to the security of the UK and its allies, the problems highlighted here are grist to the mill for the unilateral disarmament enthusiasts who can claim with some justification that risks are being taken to maintain CASD. There is little that can be done in the short term to relieve the pressure on the force but there are steps that can be taken which will pay off in time. Since the nuclear deterrent is always priority one, the RN similarly important attack submarine force has often paid the price in availability as there is an interdependence on people and facilities.

Like so much of defence right now, future success depends on building up a cadre of good people. In particular nuclear, marine and civil engineers along with project managers, logistics and procurement experts. Further investment in recruitment, training and real incentives for retention would pay off in the long run. Continued spending on dock infrastructure, industrial development and the submarine supply chain is also needed with government making multi-decade commitments to allow contractors to plan and invest for the future. The Dreadnought class need to be delivered as soon as humanly possible and come with very robust in-service-support arrangements together with a deep reserve of spares.

Most of the issues the RN faces today are the result of decisions made several years or even decades ago. The individuals in command, the Civil Servants and leaders in industry running support today are mostly not the ones to blame and are doing the best with the hand they were dealt. But it is incumbent on them, and more importantly on current politicians and those that may form a new government to grasp the situation and leave a better future legacy. In the meantime, the UK is especially dependent on the skills and stoicism of its submariners who continue to put to sea for long periods in boats that are growing old.

Main image: Sheila Weir