Royal Navy submarine diplomacy: sending a warning to Russia

In this article, we consider in more detail the implications following the revelation that an RN submarine deliberately surfaced close to the Russian spy ship Yantar in November 2024.

It is extremely rare for a submarine to chose to give away its position. This goes against the instinct of every submariner to remain covert and undetected at all times. Stealth and invisibility are the submarine’s main advantages but once detected, the boat is inherently vulnerable, especially when on the surface. However, being unpredictable and evolving tactics swiftly to have relevant effect is part of why RN submarines are so feared.

The move was undoubtedly effective, a 7,400-tonne Astute-class submarine surfacing is quite spectacular, even when expected, but rising unannounced from the deep would certainly have got the Russian’s attention. With maritime patrol aircraft overhead and warships already observing the Yantar’s every move it might be argued that surfacing an SSN was unnecessary. Besides the lethal threat to a ship posed by a submarine, it was a reminder that the UK can also deploy under water assets to counter Russian activity.

While unorthodox, this demonstrates an increasing determination by the government to deter any interference with Critical Undersea Infrastructure. The decision to surface would have to have been balanced against the risk of Yantar gathering close-up signature information about the Astute. It seems unlikely she carries sophisticated hull-mounted sonars but might able to deploy off-board sensors quickly. Yantar is an unarmed ship, capable of about 15 knots but if there had been a Russian warship in the vicinity, the whole scenario would have been very different.

Intentionally revealing the presence of a boat is unusual, although not entirely unprecedented. There have been incidents of submarines deliberately showing themselves to achieve either a specific tactical objective or for strategic signalling reasons . Few are recorded in the public domain, but in the 1970s HMS Osisris kept her periscope raised close to a Soviet AGI (intelligence gathering vessel) to distract attention away from a Polaris boat leaving the Clyde at the start of a deterrent patrol. (See Hunter Killers by Iain Ballantyne). During the Cold War, aggressive submarine operations by both sides were more common than today. Recent events are closer to the spirit of that ‘cat and mouse’ game that occupied enormous effort and resources but took place largely out of sight.

We see you

Speaking in the Commons Defence Secretary Healy said: “I want President Putin to hear this message: We see you, we know what you are doing and we will not shy away from robust action to protect this country”. Armed Forces Minister, Luke Pollard subsequently explained to the BBC: “…that’s why we declassified the incident that took place in November. That’s why we are making public that we had Royal Navy, RAF and RFA assets observing what the Russian Spy ship was doing – we surfaced a submarine alongside it to send a very clear message”

It should be noted that, although close to the UK, Yantar stayed outside the 12-mile territorial limit and was entitled to enter international waters nominally conducting ‘innocent passage’. The MoD says that so far, Yantar has complied with normal rules of navigation but this does not mean she has not been surveying undersea infrastructure or at least trying to give the appearance of doing so.

During Yantar’s voyage from her Northern Fleet Base, she intermittently chose to turn on her AIS, thus intentionally revealing some of her activities to the public. Her AIS was active on 7th November when over the Langeland Nord pipeline that supplies the UK with Norwegian gas. She was monitored passing eastward through the English Channel but her unusual detour into the Irish Sea first became public on 14th November when she again briefly turned on her AIS just north of the Isle of Man. At the same time, the RN SUBFACTS scheme that provides warnings to fishing vessels advised that there would be submarine activity in the same area.

Unconfirmed reports in the Daily Mail say the surfacing incident occurred (probably a day or two later) in the southern part of the Irish Sea, off Widemouth Bay on the north Cornish coast. This is a landing point for several transatlantic cables and not far from the GCHQ listening station at Bude.

Signalling and messaging

From the Russian perspective, they would probably consider this aspect of Yantar’s recent voyage something of a success. For a relatively small cost, they tie up NATO naval resources and get plenty of attention which may stoke disproportionate fear of Russian capabilities. The deployment is not just performative, they gather intelligence, test reactions and signal their potential to interfere with UK CUI, should they choose. The ship that has become a household name may also distract from other more nefarious activities being conducted by their submarines and submersibles that can be deployed more covertly underwater.

The timing of the incident was fortuitous as the RN SSN force had finally begun to recover from its long spell of inactivity and there were three boats at sea in mid-November. The very rare example of a Minister talking publicly about submarine operations has provided a badly needed ‘good news’ story for the RN. This incident neatly showed the navy at its best, protecting the nation in a way that is clear for everyone to understand. Media coverage also showed the more ‘routine’ escort duties carried out by HMS Somerset, including deploying on Christmas Day, as well as RFA Proteus, pictured facing down the Yantar in a kind of disease versus cure moment.

Main image: composite mock-up.