A recent paper produced by the Council on Geostrategy suggested that the RN should buy at least one additional Dreadnought-class submarine reconfigured as an SSGN to launch conventionally armed missiles. Here we consider this proposal and other options for increasing the submarine force strength.
It should be acknowledged that any discussion about expanding submarine strength might seem disconnected from reality when the RN has struggled to field any SSNs in recent months. Putting this elephant in the room aside as a temporary affliction, the longer-term strategic view is that the undersea battle will be increasingly important and submarines will exert ever greater influence on naval warfare than they do already. With the £30Bn+ Dreadnought programme in full swing and the commitment to SSN-AUKUS, it could also be argued that large investments are already in play. The Geostrategy paper does, however, raise an important point about whether further submarine procurement might deliver force-multiplier results disproportionate to the cost.
The case for SSGN’s
Missile-carrying submarines have been around since soon after the Second World War, typically in the form of SSBNs carrying large ballistic nuclear-tipped missiles or submarines that could launch cruise missiles via torpedo tubes. The ‘true’ SSGN can be defined as a boat with a main armament consisting of vertically-launched cruise missiles. These have essentially been a superpower asset, a concept pioneered by the Soviet navy with their Oscar class submarines designed as ‘carrier killers’ and subsequently perfected by the USN with the Ohio-class SSBNs converted to deliver an huge cruise missile punch.
The SSGN takes the threat of the cruise missile and multiplies complications for defenders with the ability to strike suddenly. Able to position themselves undetected for extended periods, without revealing their location. This stealth capability makes them less vulnerable to enemy defences and able to mount surprise attacks with rapid, concentrated firepower against well-defended targets. In the anti-shipping role, the SSGN could be an especially potent way to take out high-value units by overwhelming the escorts with a saturation attack from multiple axes.
For the UK, the primary advantage of an SSGN would be the ability to deploy more quickly than a carrier strike group which requires much more complex logistic support and many layers of protection. SSGNs would also be able to exert a conventional strategic deterrent effect that could partially mitigate the UK’s lack of tactical nuclear weapons.
Besides cruise and hypersonic missiles, the SSGN can deliver other payloads, including more spacious accommodation for special forces and delivery vehicles than carried by a typical SSN. The VLS tubes could also be used to house assorted UAS and UUVs.
Dreadnought SSGN – out of reach
Despite the strong appeal of such a powerful weapon for the UK, constructing a single SSGN would be a poor use of resources. A singleton boat would have many commonalities with Dreadnought but still needed substantial modifications and re-design work. Conservatively estimating the average cost of a Dreadnought to be around £5bn (Design and infrastructure costs are included in the £31bn headline budget) then the additional re-design and purchase of payload modules would have to be added. There are much better ways the RN could spend at least £6Bn. For example, ensuring the Type 83 destroyers are equipped with plenty of VLS cells would be a far more cost-effective way to increase RN firepower.
A single platform, that puts all eggs in one basket, can only provide a part-time capability (See also FS Charles De Gaulle) more than one boat would be needed if this was to provide a continuous strategic deterrent. It is also questionable if there would be adequate submarine construction capacity after the completion of HMS King George VI (Dreadnought boat 4) when the SSN-AUKUS programme will be in full stride (The Council on Geostrategy very optimistically recommends the RN builds 12 SSN-AUKUS). A fifth Dreadnought could also overload the specialist support infrastructure that is predicated on 4 having 4 SSBNs.
The most compelling argument against the idea is that the next-generation SSN will almost certainly be fitted with its own VLS cells. Possibly with the Virginia Payload Module (or similar) developed by the USN from the Ohio SSGNs for their new SSNs. Unless lengthened, a Dreadnought SSGN with 12 x 7-cell tubes could carry a maximum of 84 missiles (assuming no tubes are converted for special forces). Although SSN-AUKUS will not be able to match this number (it is not clear yet what the capacity may be) it will spread the missile allocation across a wider fleet of boats. This is arguably the best use of resources, balancing VLS capabilities with the flexibility of SSN hunter-killers.
The real force multiplier
The RN retired its last conventional diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) in the 1990s with the premature demise of the Upholder class. An all-nuclear fleet has the operational advantage but the colossal manufacturing delays and support infrastructure issues that are hampering the Astute-class underline the drawbacks of SSN ownership.
If the UK is serious about boosting its submarine fleet, as was mooted by Ben Wallace in 2022, then an affordable and sensible solution would be the acquisition of advanced SSKs. Modern Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems considerably extend the range of SSK submerged operations and advancements in battery technology may ultimately even make the the complexities associated with AIP systems redundant. While conventional submarines do not possess the global reach of SSNs, they are significantly less expensive to build, about a third of the price and have much-reduced crew requirements. By avoiding the need for nuclear-regulated support facilities, SSKs are also much easier to maintain with far lower through-life support costs.
The main reason to acquire SSKs would be to alleviate pressure on the SSN fleet, allowing them to focus on the global and more demanding missions they are best suited for. Not least the detection and trailing of Russian SSGNs and SSBNs that are an acute threat to the UK. SSKs would have considerable force-multiplier effects as SSNs are no longer tied to the lower-tier tasks. Conventional boats would be ideal for patrols of European waters as well as being able to sanitise the approaches to the Clyde for deterrent submarines. Additionally, they are far more sensible platforms for training purposes, enabling officers to gain command experience at lower cost and lower risk before advancing to SSNs and SSBNs. Currently, the RN must either tie up valuable SSNs for training courses or rely on allied submarines.
SSKs are smaller and more manoeuvrable than SSNs, making them well-suited for operations in shallow coastal waters. Their size and all-electric propulsion makes a well-handled SSK extremely hard to detect. When deployed in a congested and noisy littoral environment they are especially potent and can operate in seas like the Baltic where larger boats may be at a disadvantage. The promised future capabilities of XLUUVs are an exciting prospect but are a very long way from matching the effects that can be delivered by a crewed submarine. The surface fleet would also benefit from increased ASW training opportunities with more boats available to conduct realistic serials without the need to call on SSNs.
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JS Taegei. The lead boat of a 5-boat programme based on the successful Soryu-class, she is operated as a testbed for various new technologies. The JMSDF is the first navy to field submarines with lithium-ion batteries with such power-density that the space requirement and complications of AIP systems are avoided. -
The A26 Blekinge-class SSK. Two are being built for the Swedish Navy for delivery 2027-28. They feature the Kockums Stirling air-independent propulsion (AIP) system, which burns liquid oxygen (LOX) and diesel fuel. (Image: Saab) -
The Type 212CD (Common Design) is a joint effort between Norway and Germany to develop a new SSK. It features the angled casing intended to scatter active sonar signals (similar to that being employed by the RN Dreadnought-class SSBNs). The 212CD will be almost twice the size of the Type 212 base design and will be fitted with a hydrogen fuel cell-based AIP. Up to 6 will be built for Norway and up to 7 for Germany (Image: TKMS).
An acquisition pathway
If strengthening the submarine force was a top priority and political and budget complications could be set aside, then buying 4 -6 boats straight ‘off the shelf’ from an allied nation would be the best solution. Rather than license foreign designs and embark on a huge project to re-establish conventional submarine construction in the UK, contracting with an experienced foreign builder would be far quicker and cheaper. The UK has previously taken this pragmatic route with the £3.2bn purchase of the Boeing P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft, complete with US-made combat systems and weapons to expedite delivery and reduce costs.
Several outstanding modern SSKs designs are potentially available, with Japan, Germany and Sweden offering the best in class. There are also other French and South Korean options worthy of consideration but we will not rehearse the merits of each here. It would come down to selecting the best solution to meet RN needs as well as the ability of partners to manufacture and deliver in a timely manner.
The RN does not need a high-end SSK with extended endurance, VLS or special forces lock-out chambers. A small boat in the same class as the German Type 214 or basic Swedish A26 variant, would suffice. These boats cost under £500M each and have a crew of about a quarter the size of an Astute. New conventional submarines would require the RN to develop another training, logistics and support pipeline, a challenge that should not be underestimated but far simpler than that of its nuclear boats.
There would be political opposition to spending more defence money overseas with no obvious economic benefit but British industry would not really be losing out. The UK submarine construction industry and its supporting supply chain is already struggling to meet demand. The political optics of the RN buying German (or other foreign) submarines could also be mildly controversial. Needs must, and it should be noted the UK will sign a new defence pact with Berlin this week (and a German has just agreed to manage the England football team).
Despite Labour’s fine words and conveniently ambiguous promise to “work towards 2.5% GDP on defence”, no one expects increased funding for the MoD in the near future. With public finances in a terrible state, there is a distinct danger the 2025 SDR may prove to be another round of cuts dressed up as a strategy. Against this backdrop, the RN is likely to be scrambling just to keep the main programmes it has, never mind acquiring major new capabilities. Often advocated by RN submariners, buying SSKs would be a very sensible way to help keep pace with growing threats but an option that is unlikely to be of sufficient priority to become reality.
There are many roles for which an SSN is overkill: SSBN escort to deep water, local ASW etc. I suspect the best solution may be somewhat smaller than an SSK however: if you assume a range of no more than 500nm, you could build a mostly battery powered small sub (say 500 tonnes displacement) with a reduced sensor fit enabled by allowing surface connectivity, but still proper Spearfish tubes (to be loaded in port only). If we bought an SSK, it’s going to be designed as an all purpose sub, and will be expensive. Reduce the requirements and things become cheaper 🙂
BTW, use of weapons outside of 24X7 remote control dictates unmanned options not sensible 🙁
That requires us putting the RnD work in though, as a mini ssk or such is not on the market, which won’t save us much cost.
Absolutely. For small production runs the R&D plus production setup costs kill you. If you had to bring on a second yard to fit the boats into the program it would absolutely break the bank. The only way I could see this sort of thing happening is as a gap filler between the end of full ship AUKUS build in the U.K. and the start of Dreadnought replacement. That puts the opportunity in the 2050’s. Who knows what technology will be available then.
Or you come up with a simple design, like the BMT Wyvern or Vidar 7, that could be handled by smaller yards and cut Barrow and BAE out of the equation….
https://www.bmt.org/projects/project/3322/wyvern
https://quwa.org/system-profile/profile-bmt-defence-services-wyvern-vidar-7-submarines/
A smaller sub builder could handle a build….someone like MSubs…
https://msubs.com/
Mini SSK’s are in market, but it is usually not talked about, most are for covert work.Recently “surfaced” one example from a boutique Italian company for Qatar.
I would say some of the Swedish submarines almost qualify as “a mini ssk”.
They are actually, the Italians are building small ones for the Qatari for example right now
http://www.hisutton.com/M23-Submarine.html
At 500 tonnes the sonar would be next to useless, if you want something that small then look down the AUV route. No crew requirement, very little training pipeline, outsource maintenance to the supplier, programme to do the role it needs to do.
If you want an SSGN then take the last V class SSBN (or best condition V Class) and convert it in to an SSGN when the D boats have been delivered.
Those are knackered though, and with only 1 knackered boat the availability would be abysmal.
Even if the fabric could be spruced up, which is doubtful, they can’t be refuelled.
Errr….you know we just fitted a new core on Vanguard right??
That was a one off. At vast expense and stupendous time span
The expense and time span was primarily because it was the first time we’d done it and had to plan and develop how to do it for the first time. Do it a second, third or fourth time with the lessons learned and the time and cost will drop dramatically.
All the previous sub classes were all designed to be refuelled ( in practice it meant core replacement) most a couple of times.
Vanguard wasnt intended to be refuelled at all, like the rest of the class.
Rolls Royce delayed aspects of the Dreadnoughts’ PWR3s build by several years to extend the time they could work with a PWR2. Now they are fully switched over to the PWR3s. Forget it.
So here’s the thing…the Core Replacement on Vanguard turned out to be unnecessary, but Vanguard now has a core with decades left in it…
True, but the same is not true for the rest of the boat
“Vanguard now has a core with decades left in it…”
when do you think the last Dreadnought will go into service ?
That’s what the US did, their SSGNs are second hand.
They’re not really, they’re part of the current class of SSBNs and will be decommissioned soon along with the rest of the Ohio class as they’re replaced by new SSBNs, replacement for rhe SSGNs is up in the air.
I believe the US SSGN’s were mid life when an arms control treaty made them available for conversion. That’s very different from taking an end of life SSBN and trying to refurbish and life extend it for a new roll.
You say they are “second hand”, I never knew that, how are they so ?
They are converted SSBN. So first the they were SSBN. Not my definition of 2nd hand, but each to its own.
An interesting and thought provoking article but unfortunately just a flight of pure fantasy. With all three services hollowed out and unfit for purpose our thoughts need to turn to managing decline in a practical way, so what remains could actually cope with the horror and reality of war. I’m sure many would disagree and suggest I’m being negative. To them I would say “as a first example lets look at the RFA, a classic case of hollowing out a capability to the point its now completely broken”. Once we’ve confirmed that’s the case we may go on to the next (perhaps the RAF’s AEW capability), then the next!
Managing decline would not allow us to cope with the reality of war. Things have declined too far beyond that.
Unless we increase service personnel numbers and keep the current fleet at its present size with each new procurement, then there is no point in managing anything.
Sadly, you aren’t being overly negative – in fact, to my mind, you aren’t being negative enough; the RN/RFA aren’t capable of fighting in an high-intensity conflict.
Further to the SDR it is my strong suspicion that they’ll be less funding for defence and some very difficult decisions will need to be taken, either the navy must accept continuing and increasing decline/loss of capability or redesign the RN/RFA within the budgetary constraints.
Unfortunately, that would mean abandoning any expeditionary capability (mothballed the Carriers, scraping the LPDs, losing the fast jets to the RAF, ‘gutting’ the RFA and reduce the RMs to SF/Fleet Protection role) and reconfiguring the fleet to a regional ASW force, not dissimilar to the late Cold War navy or a large European navy (a Deutsche Marine on steroids); not a happy outcome, but – the RN could make a contribution, on a NATO/regional basis, at least!
As a more radical variation on the SSK idea, what about just buying the boats the Japanese decommission every year? The Japanese typically retire their boats at around age 22, so perhaps with 8 years of useful life. The decommissioning boats have mostly been well upgraded and are well respected.
There are obvious problems trying to use another country’s platform but the purchase price could be very low and it would give capability in the near term.
This idea in an Australian context is discussed below.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/second-hand-japanese-boats-could-rapidly-expand-australias-submarine-force/
In the near term we have no money or submarines spare for that matter. Need to make the fleet we have work.
4 SSK’s would be a great force multiplier. 8-10 AUKUS SSN’s should be the long-term goal, but clearly that’s going to take decades to realise.
Buying off the shelf from an allied nation is more palatable if it’s in conjunction with business being done the other way. An example would be if we purchase some Vanguard MCM mother-ships from Norway as part of a wider agreement on T26.
We need more of that kind of mutually beneficial procurement rather than the orders from the US that don’t increase European industry/resilience or have any obvious up-front economic offsets in return.
I think this is absolutely right. The Swedish example could work if we could do an agreement around components for Tempest and their future fighter programme as a different example. We can’t build everything and should play to our strengths,
I would say you would need at least 5 and preferably 6 SSKs. The idea being that they would primarily handle home waters, GIUK, and Mediterranean duties. The nuclear boats would then be freed up for global / blue water / AUKUS deployments.
Lots of good ideas here but there are, as noted, problems with the funding and, currently, even greater problems with personnel. Unless the Royal Navy greatly ups its game on recruitment it will soon cease to exist in any meaningful way. The manning of submarines is particularly critical because many would not choose such a life. Incidentally, at a recent reunion with my former RN chums, the ex-submariners were adamant that having ladies in the submarine crew just does not work.
Why doesn’t it work having ladies in a Submarine’s crew ? It works pretty well everywhere else.
Other navies have had women on subs, why can’t it work?
Notice his comment was from a reunion
“ex-submariners were adamant that having ladies in the submarine crew just does not work”
I would say its just out of date thinking by some very EX submariners
I would also note that SSN’s have become larger over time. People bunking in the torpedo magazine was not unusual, especially in SSK’s. Privacy concerns, especially on SSK’s is a genuine problem for mixed crewing. Not to say it is a storm in a teacup, it isn’t. But, both sides have a point. There is nowhere to hide on a submarine. Larger submarines are likely to have less problems, but regardless of size, they never really go away. There is no going back though, so it’s a matter of how to go forward.
DJ
You, and several others posting here, obviously missed this news article earlier this month (note 1)
‘Intolerable’: Misconduct investigation into Submarine Service finds ‘misogyny, bullying and unacceptable behaviours’ | UK News | Sky News
I would add two other points:
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
Note 1. Important Note: Not everything gets reported here on NL!
OK, but again, other nations run SSKs with women on board, so is it a case of them accepting less privacy, or just finding a way to manage such issues?
My own view, which I have stated a few times in various places, is that the UK needs a dedicated North Sea/Northern Approaches squadron that doesn’t depend on allies. A few subs making a show of coming and going from eastern UK ports as they go on station would send a message… Our coastline is protected. We depend too much on a relatively small high end fleet that we miss out on visible coastal/national defence/deterrent that doesn’t need nuclear subs or aircraft carriers.
With you entirely Rob Young. I would bring back the “Home Fleet” moniker for this force—even though it would really be a Home Flotilla or Home Squadron. This would consist of 6 high end SSGKs, 12 smaller multirole guided missile frigates (say around 3500 tons), and various support vessels and assets and there you go.
This force is tasked with GIUK patrols, home defence, and periodic visits to Gibraltar and Cyprus. The rest of the RN becomes your global power projection / AUKUS force.
Problems solved and it didn’t cost a ridiculous amount of money.
Dreadnought will have 12 VLS as opposed to 16 on the V boats, I would have thought that the missing 4 could have been converted to carry 7 Tomahawks each, maybe I’m just over thinking things.
The very last thing you want is your SSBN’s doing “tactical” jobs whilst also providing nuclear deterrence.
So why take away 4 VLS then ? Surely It would be better to have this additional capability, The Americans chose to convert some of theirs entirely for Tomahawks rather than keep them as the main deterrent. Can’t see a problem having this dual capability personally. It would certainly focus the minds of a few Despot Leaders.
While the Dreadnought is sitting close to the coast firing Tomahawk, the CASD role is compromised.
SSGNs need to surface regularly and stay in a fixed area to operate, while the bomber boat ought to be as far out of the way as possible and not making its presence felt.
Imagine if the single at sea bomber got sunk in a fluke ASW find because it was doing SSGN duties?
Sitting next to the coast ? Tomahawk has quite a good range, more than adequate to allow a Nuclear warhead to be carried and exactly the reason the Americans converted theirs. I do get that the bombers are designed to stay deep and undetected but having this capability against non peer states does give them that edge. It’s not like we can seriously deploy any Astute’s ATM.
4 dreadnought class will barely maintain 1 at sea and 1 training, not enough for other roles.
OK. I was just giving another prospective but It seems I’m wrong on this site.
It’s just a bit impractical. The SSBNs generally spend 6 months moving very slowly somewhere deep or sitting on the sea floor
Yes, I know. I also see why they do that but I think maybe they could have a secondary role. We have seen just how ineffective our primary target has been these past couple of years, maybe our focus should now change to those “lesser” threat Country’s ? I’m not dismissing Russia’s undoubtable nuclear threat but there are other players now.
The problem is the likely target set.
If you draw a Tomahawk range ring around e.g. Iran, you have to fire from the Indian ocean or the Mediterranean.
Nuclear subs in the med is a bad idea.
To get to India you either have to go round Russia and China or round South Africa.
From that far south even Trident might be limited in its range against e.g. Russia (there’s a website called Missilemap that lets you test this) and twice in a deployment (there and back) the ability of the UK to use its nuclear deterrent would be compromised, simply to deploy a capability that could be achieved by another method.
Every day is a school day.
An Astute was apparently in the Med a while back, causing a diversionary attraction whilst other assets were launching missiles at certain targets. SSBN deployments and movements are totally classified so no one knows exactly what they are doing or where they are….. Although it seems like this site has a few experts who seem to be in the know…… Do you remember Deep 32 ? …. He disappeared a few months back, I always respected his knowledge and contributions on here and that other site. Wonder where he went ?
The US faced a situation where relatively new SSBN’s would have to go out of service due to an Arms Treaty, and therefore decided to use them as SSGN’s instead. If they hadn’t then the Subs were gone anyway, so no loss of “main deterrent”, as the deterrent force was already being reduced.
They didn’t play “mix and match” of sticking Tomahawks onto active SSBN’s.
Our economy isn’t in a terrible state , our civil service is . Government workers are unprofessional, unproductive and over paid . What’s needed is an intelligent and hardworking Government.. sadly we haven’t had one . Get that in order and cracking down on benefit fraud , illegal immigration, and corporate tax evasion we will have plenty of money to build what we need . It’s crap governance especially at the moment that’s killing this country. What’s required is long term efficient equipment and personnel wage and condition improvements. And promotion through merit not DEI hires .
30 frigates ,12 destroyers , 12 SSN ,12 ss , 2 fully equipped carriers and mine hunters are not out of the question..if we cut the crap from our so called leaders .
The Civil Service is simultaneously underpaid and overstaffed.
Senior civil servants have some of the most important jobs in the country, yet every single one of them could get paid double if they worked in the private sector.
That isn’t a situation which leads to you retaining or even attracting talent, wages need to massively increase if we want the Civil Service to be a competitive employment option.
However, we also have too many civil servants. We gained tens of thousands of them to handle covid, covid is now functionally over and yet they remain. This is situation repeated over and over again at every opportunity by the Civil Service.
I am personally in favour of somewhat drastic measures, something like cutting the head count by 10% every year whilst also giving a base 10% pay rise to every civil servant. Do that for five years and you have 40% less staff and the wage bill is down 5% over what it would have been, whilst also being able to attract much better new hires.
Civil Servants are underpaid when compared to London salaries, everywhere else they are paid exceptionally well for what they do especially with their flexibility, sickness benefits and 18k gold pension.
Senior civil servants are also paid very well, they just don’t receive the huge bonuses they would get in the private sector for being an MD but that is the risk and reward they choose.
I would love to know where these civil servants hired for Brexit and Covid are actually working now when HMRC doesn’t appear to have anyone working for it anymore, unless they are all claiming to work from home without actually answering the phone.
Thats over 3% of GDP on defence like at end of Cold War . Not going to happen
Some interesting figures on defence can be found via this link, and not just defence!
The charts can be expanded for a more detailed view in some cases.
I was surprised Astute didn’t feature VPM’s. Just as I was surprised T45 didn’t have a VLS capacity to match AB. Vertically launch TLAM seemed to me to be a capability the UK should have invested in heavily for all manner of reasons. I think an SSGN would be beyond today’s RN.
Yes a flotilla of conventional boats would be useful. Something like the SAAB A-26. 8 Oceanic ER version to paddle about off Northern Norway to watch the Russians. 4 standard Oceanic variants for specialist tasking. And finally 4 of the Pelagic version for Perisher, Thursday War, etc. etc. Of course it will never happen.
In an alternative better funded more realistic navy I could see a need for 16 SSN’s backing up a fleet based around cruisers. Sea denial backing up presence and commerce protection.
http://www.hisutton.com/images/Swe_A26_poster940.jpg
Worth remembering that the US Seawolf had no VL either….instead like Astute it concentrated on having a very large internal weapons capability.
What I find interesting is that the US has moved away from the Los Angeles Class VL solution, that took up little hull space for the far more expensive VPM solution…
When it comes to SSK I think they could be useful, particularly as extra command berths for training, a potential solution also for Submariners who can no longer commit to long SSN/SSBN patrols due to family reasons for example who would otherwise have to leave…
But we have had decent UK designs before….BMT had the Wyvern design and Vidar…
Wyvern in particular was cheap as chips….it would be very useful as a ‘training’ submarine for FOST, ASW trainings and command…whilst also having use to sanitise SSBN corridors and for SF insertion where an SSN is overkill, not suited or unlikely to be available.
Getting 4 of these I suspect would end up being useful for personnel numbers overall by reducing ‘churn’ of trained submariners…but could also be built somewhere else than Barrow…MSubs for example could probably manage it…
Rather than SSKs I’d suggest that we need something that is a step change.
If we look what has happened with batteries you could design something dramatically more capable and cheaper.
Rather than design a conventional sub create optionally manned underwater vehicle. This would essentially be a battery with a motor at one end. Weapons would be in a pod, crew would be in a small pod with only two sets of operational crew, say about 12 people.
No underway maintenance, it would just have graceful failure due to the electric propulsion system (thousands of batteries/multiple podded propulsors). In terms of range it could cross oceans and would be operated more like a carrier bourne aircraft.
Because it’s electric it would be able to sprint at incredible velocities, quite possibly outpacing a torpedo if necessary (see square/cube). Because it doesn’t have a conventional hull it could also dive much deeper.
This won’t happen because the military bring a massive list of requirements which have been added to subs over the years. These requirements essentially force you to make a sub. Even the mission set or desired effects still have current sub capabilities written into them.
A better design process would be to say, modern batteries, electric drive trains and computing power exist. What can I do with them?
2000 tonnes of lithium ion batteries in battery pack would cost only $50 million. Yet current paradigms see us put everything in a sub into a pressure hull with personnel access around it so subs cost billions in design and integration costs, everything in them is bespoke and expensive.
The key point would be such vessels would have a cost base more like that of aircraft and as a result you could order and operate dozens of them. This mass of numbers defeats any issues where they can’t do precisely the same thing as an existing sub.
Thats the M23 midget sub being built in Italy for Qatar. Theres other concepts with say a crew of 10
https://cdn.turdef.com/images/articles/5190/esHT5qoonVZEWoSnRrCXSawCoMM7rhnb8gm23yvz.webp
If the RN went down the SSGN route, it would almost certainly drop the requirement for VLS from its next generation SSN. It would be a reasonable assumption that you would do one or the other but not both. If the Virginia Block V program is a guide, adding a genuine VLS capability to the SSN program is not a cheap option either.
Trying to be realistic for a moment, if the AUKUS SSN program were to run into serious delays, I now, unthinkable right, building an extra dreadnought is a better idea than another production gap like what happened at the end of the Vanguard program.
We do not need to expand the submarine fleet just to launch more land attack missiles. Installing mk 41 on T26 and T31 will achieve that. But there are roles and areas where a small non nuclear submarine could be useful. Insertion of special forces ( an Astute was used to do this in an exercise in Norway ), operating in shallow waters, tracking potentially hostile surface vessels. With so few SSNs, it makes no sense to take them away from their core roles.
BMT have published designs of both ocean going and smaller sub 1000 t boats.
To some of us, it made no sense turning to an all Nuclear powered fleet, but no-one listened then and no-one will listen now.
I remember the arguments. The RN opted for an all nuclear fleet but no one at the time thought numbers would sink so low.
This is a very good and pertinent article. The downside to putting all our sub-sea eggs in one very capable but expensive basket, the Astute SSN, is that we do not have anywhere near enough hunter-killer submarines to handle the wider Russian submarine threat.
With only 7 Astutes planned, of which 5 will variously be on out-of area patrol/ riding shotgun for the at sea SSBN/ with the carrier strike group/in maintenance or refit, that likely leaves just 2 to patrol the High North exit route and the Atlantic.
The submarine threat to the NATO area is primarily to the east Atlantic shipping lanes, ports and undersea cables and pipelines, plus the threat of hostile submarines traversing the High North from the Pacific.
The case for a lower-end SSK is self-evident. We probably need 6 of them, 4 operational and 2 in maintenance/refit, to provide a hunter-killer capability in Eastlant.
As Barrow is rammed with the last 2 Astutes and the 4 Dreadnoughts, then the AUKUS subs, makes sense to buy SSKs COTS, from the very good Swedish, Norwegian or other allied suppliers.
If there is a gradual increase in the defence budget in coming years, which looks to be the intention, I would think that getting the first 2 SSKs in the water by 2035 would be a practical and sensible option.
The problem is that we don’t have the satellites required to target the missiles. In fact we are the only security council member without the ability to launch our own satellites. We al enjoy a bit of fantasy fleets on here, but saying how much I would love the UK to have this capability takes that game to a whole new level (even though we could afford it, it would be complimentary to our aerospace sector and would probably generate money for us long term)
When you can buy a Falcon 9 launch as cheap as you can today why would you choose to spend some of the limited defence budget on developing a satellite launcher?
For the same reason we develop any sovereign capability: so we aren’t dependent on other countries which may or may not be reliable partners. Why would all the other Security Council members have this capability if it wasn’t important.
It shouldn’t necessarily come out of the defence budget: there is talk for Britains need to invest in future technologies to kick start the economy. Lots of good reasons
(Aware it won’t happen of course)
All,
SEND IN THE CLOWNS!
(on second thoughts – don’t bother – they are already esconced inside Whitehall!)
,
Unfortunately during proper nation-state warfare – which is what is being described here in this article – things are, overall, always a tiny weeny little bit more complex than when one is fighting Terry Insurgent Taliban – an enemy who’s largest rocket was an RPG…..
…which is all that this lot working here in this think tank seem to know anything about
For starters, it really ought to be pointed out that this is the same technicially-illiterate corporate organisation which, quite-recently, hosted a couple of very big, very expensive and also very prestgious naval conferences
….one held onboard HMS Proteus….moored directly opposite theTower of London
Lots of gold braid glinted in the summer sunlight
Yes, that right regular readers…..
I am describing that very same HMS Proteus which is supposed to be out their, in the rough stuff, protecting our critical underwater infrastructure against Mr Putin’s submarine launched frogmen, their MIB’s (Men In Black), deployed from their own huge fleet of SSGN’s
….however Proteus is now langishing at Camel Lairds yard, over in sunny Birkenhead (or is it Portland this week? I loose track easily these days).
This think tank is funded by three organisations:
During the orginal Cold War, a period of (relative) peace – one which these well-dressed lot working for this think-tank are clearly far too young to remember properly (i.e. the period 1945-89) – there were several good reasons why NATO, quite-deliberately DID NOT DO what they are now suggesting!!!!
Textbook Reference:
so, the first important lesson to be learned is –
Sending any submarine(s) to deploy land forces ashore is fraught with risk.
As others, including the editor, have quite-rightly pointed out above – IF you ever want to deploy special forces ashore by submarine – which quite-frankly has never ever been a “very good idea” when one is going up against a peer-on-peer nation state which has proper ASW capabilities – then the best way of doing it is to buy a few cheap SSK’s
= because SSK’s are much smaller, and especially much quieter, than the nuclear boats
So, for example, the one and only Argie submarine we caught out during 1982’s “little punch-up down south” was:
ARA Santa Fe (S-21) – Wikipedia
And, before one thinks of using that using a small and quiet SSK is easy-pesy, there is always a need to check for hostile and horney sea mines: the ones which, just like submarines, like lying abiut twenty feet below the surface
i
(Note: if you voted to remain in the EU referedum and you are still sulking about the results of that democratic vote – i.e. doing a Donald – that is a depth of approx 6m)
In the three-year-period between 1950 and 1953, those very horney and very unsophisticated North Korean sea mines sunk fully half of the entire total of ALL warships, sunk since 1945 (total of of all nations – 1945 to date)
That extensive sea mining by the founding father of the Kim Wrong-Un regime is why US special forces were only very rarely deployed from USN submarine’s during that (first) Korean War…….
Preferably deploy our special forces by a parachute from 30,00 feet: its called freefall jumping: or sneak in by land, whilst disguised as a small bush (naturally, a native species)
———-
So, the next lesson to be learnt is
If one really wants to launch a very large number of conventionally armed tomahawk cruise missiles from the sea: then, instead of buying a single SSGN, it is very much cheaper to buy either:
Furthermore, the very prolonged “ripple! launching of a very large number of VLS cruise missiles from a near-stationary slightly-submerged RN SSGN would be incredibly noisy
………..and furthermore – as soon as they are launched – the missiles themselves can easily be detected by a nation-state’s enemy air defence radars; of the type Russia (fomerly soviet Union) has alwasy had plenty of around its coastline
The combination of disclosing the location of one’s own submarine – simultaneously to both enemy air defence radars and also to many acoustic sensors – could easily be very fatal..
———————————–
However, now for the really important STUFF: a four letter word called RISK
And that – dear readers, and dear readers wives – not knowing what (or is not) on inside the pointy end (correct technical term) of an incoming tomahawk is the key reason why nuclear tipped tomahawks in the UK were only ever kept at Greenham Common and Molesworth during the 1980’s… and not onboard the subs
– because if they were ever to be launched directly from UK soil the Soviet leadeship must immediately know that they have to be our nuclea- tipped ones (i.e. because we had told them that on BBC1’s nine o’clock news back in 1980)
So the fear of MAD (note 1) – from a simple misunderstanding by defensive radar operators of another nuclear-armed nation state’s intent – is the main reason why conventionally armed land-attack Tomahawks only ever went onto the nuclear powered boats – USN and RN etc – soon after the cold war had effectively ended in 1989
—————————-
Their website has a useful career’s link….. so I am now, very seriously, thinking of applying for one of their recently-advertised vacancies: as a TTI (Think Tank Intern) ..
(Important note: please be very careful how one spells out that three letter acronymn: it is very easily confused with Terry Insurgent Taliban): ……
….however as a white male with an professional engineering qualification and also experience – including much highly-relevant experience and knowledge …unfortunately, I feeling that I am a tinny-weany little bit over-qualified to be their new TTI ………
…..as indeed is everybody else here.. because the forty plus others who have already posted their own comments here (directly above) know far more than this think tank
The RN’s leadership really needs to attend a different conference next year…
Regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
TLA Advice
Career Advice for Baby Sailors
Financial Advice:
Quite the note! Your overall premise is correct: if you rely on just submarines in your navy, you actually limit your options around escalation and de-escalation. Submarines are really at their best in all out, peer on peer wars. The Soviet Navy invested in them because they knew they could never match NATOs surface fleet (same things with the Germans in WW2).
I think we should of course have more SSNs. Im not sure how an SSK would do in the North Atlantic, across the GIUK gap. But more T26s. More mission bay equipment. More Merlins. More P8s, all of these can do the job being proposed by an SSK (in RN use): with the flexibility they can do other things as well.
Grant
Totally agree with your key point = that our submarines are best used in a big war
Our submarine fleet prioritising its role as launching Zodiac rubber boats, with just half a dozen special forces on board has, frankly, now become a very major distraction to their proper day job…
That utility in a big war is precisely why, back during the 1980’s, the UK’s submarine fleet (mostly then SSN’s) was being hailed as the “new flagships” of the fleet.
The subs recognised effectiveness in nation state warfare was why about £4 billion quid was invested up at Falsane and Coulport (1985-95). That big, almost all new, naval base was, to all intents and purposes, the UK’s first naval base which had been built anywhere for well over two centuries.
———————
As of today, the biggest threat to the UK mainland is – quite obviously – from Russia’s underwater fleet: their mix of SSN and SSG and especially their SSBM’s.
That key Russian threat is best countered by us – ideally very aggessively – using our own submarine fleet tp hunt down theirs: ideally when they still “up there” in their own backyard.
RN submarines should be used, as you rightly say, to sink an enemy fleet.
——–
The type of people employed in these quite-poxy think tanks really do not have a clue. They are what a former chancellor once called “Teenage Scribblers”
Thus, as of today, I believe the biggest problem at the top of the RN is not lack of money, nor even its lack of manpower.
It seems to me that ALL of the senior RN officers in post today have a complete and utter inability to think things through – logically – for themselves
The really worrying thing is that these pratts have the ear of the RN leadership….so no wonder this website used to be “Save the Royal Navy”.
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
PS. Did you know that the UK civil service spent £4.5 billion quid on outside management consultants during the last full financial year: 2023-24?
P & O boats did pretty well up the gap during the cold war as well as close in shore. Oh and there was a least one down south in 82 as well.
Why do we need a dedicated SSGN, based off a Dreadnought boat it would delay the introduction off SSN AUKUS, which funnily enough is going to come with VLS tubes ? Sorry, but this whole conversation about SSGN is barking up the wrong tree.
Unfortunately I think the current armed forces are so hollowed out that for any additional funding there is a huge list of priorities before we get on to buying new types of equipment. Infrastructure, personnel, preventative maintenance, reasonable numbers of platforms in classes (a defence wide issue), decent stocks of weapons, sustainable industrial strategy, and making sure the ships/boats we DO have are actually capable of what is expected, are all essentials that seem to be lacking (although in some cases slowly improving). We could buy as many additional platforms as we want but without these fundamentals, they will end up as the next astute maintenance type of problem.
I’m not trying to be negative, but I think unfortunately the reality is a huge amount of investment is needed to repair the fundamentals of the RN before we can sustainably add new capabilities. Extrapolating to the RAF and Army (which admittedly I know much less about), I do wonder if reaching 2.5% spending would actually allow for many additional capabilities, or would entirely be spent filling existing cracks or on already planned but not budgeted programmes (AUKUS and GCAP for example).
Potential for an interesting article looking at what 2.5% could actually give?
The issue people are forgetting here is just that…. people. The RN can’t recruit and retain the people needed for the platforms they have let alone with 4 or 5 diesel boats, despite smaller crews.
Until the manpower (I refuse to call it by any other name) issues are resolved or on their way to being resolved you’d simply be building platforms to keep BAE and Babcock, or a foreign yard in business.
In your first sentence, you mention “People”, yet in your second, you mention “Man power” and add a silly note about refusing to calling it by any other name. Kind of confused by the sound of things.
The Old english terms were:
were-man for males and wyf-man for females
The base term for both sexes is man
Your Chinglish is difficult to understand can you write it in new English
Moderators we have the sockpuppet again
I would take it a step further. The RN is cream crackered. Manpower is an issue. But that is just one of them.
I just play fantasy fleets now when it comes to the RN. Beyond CASD, and that isn’t healthy, the RN really is an irrelevance now. We are an auxiliary force to the rest of the west’s naval capability.
Perhaps Elon will buy the carriers?
I tend to agree with you ref the “auxiliary force to the rest of the west’s navel capability” just how did it get so bad given the glorious 500 years of history ? It wouldn’t be so bad if we had half the fleet ready but alas, all we have mostly is a fleet of harbour queens and empty decks. (both Mess and Flight). Just what will it take before the UK’s defence is taken seriously again ? This latest bunch seem to be hell bent on giving away any strategic capabilities, not to mention alienating the majority of hard working, down trodden, native Brits. What next ? Gibraltar ?
I am a big fan of the Japanese and Italian navies; they are both professional well equipped forces that meet their national needs.
But some of the utter tripe that get slung at me for stating those truths is laughable.
‘Neither of them have nuclear submarines!!!’ No but they have submarines at sea that don’t look like they are destined for the scrap heap.
‘Neither of them have strike carriers!!!’ We don’t have strike carriers either. We have two large conventional carriers without enough fleet train to support them. We don’t have squadrons of aircraft and the aircraft we have have hardly any weapons integrated. We don’t have decent AEW either. All we have is two big ships.
And on and on and on it goes.
Yes, I fully agree with you on all counts. The Carriers lack the very thing they were built to carry, they lack sufficient escorts, they lack sufficient RFA Stores and replenishments and to be perfectly honest, they lack any actual purpose. I do wish I could view this situation rather differently but at this time, I really can’t. We don’t need a 2.5% of GDP, we need a government that sees beyond the Horizon.
I will admit back in the day I was very excited about two large carriers. But that was the day when we had 32 front line escorts, 12 SSN’s, 3 amphibious ships and so on. Our only gap was we no longer a clutch of SSK’s.
Many here laugh at the French having only one carrier. But at least their appreciated that a modern carrier to work has to be nuclear. Nuclear reduces the need for a large number of hulls in the fleet train. If we were to deploy a carrier to the Med and operate it at an operational tempo the USN operate their CBG we would need more tankers than we have now. Yet we have tankers at anchor idle. The French operate their own fighters in numbers we don’t have of F35b and I doubt we will ever have. The operate E2 too. They have problems with E2 but it works a lot better than cobbled together Crowsnest. We supposedly have a stealth fighter but can’t have their BVR missiles controlled by offboard sensors. We don’t have a AShM for Bravo either. So we have stealth fighters but they have to fly within detection range to attack anything. But the French are stupid to many here because they have one fully armed nuclear carrier whereas we have two hobbled empty conventional carriers. Yay for us.
Our problems go back to the government’s defence stance post-WW2. Once we had enough nuclear weapons we should have withdrawn from Continental Europe and returned to the sea. Operation Musketeer showed what the UK could do. The Falklands on a much reduced scales showed what the UK could do. But on both occasions the government chose to be a tripwire instead of engaging more actively in security from sea. Something we had done since the days of Elizabeth I.
The RAF are/were responsible for getting rid of our last ASM (Sea Eagle) which was also employed by Sea Harriers – they didn’t want to pay for the mid-life upgrade and the RN couldn’t afford to upgrade our stock on it’s own so the crabs won the political game again.
Seem to remember the ‘we already have stand-off weapons’ being thrown around. Yes, they do/did – just not dedicated ASMs.
Pretty true. Most of us that were serving when they (gov/MoD) were harping on about Carrier Strike (big boys toys) were thinking we don’t need these. The carriers were purely political to my mind (and quite a few of the people I served with).
We needed frigates and destroyers. We got rid of the Batch 2 T22’s early (6 tails (ASW to the uninitiated)) and then the 4 Batch 3’s. The T22’s were great ships, nowhere near as quiet as a 23 but I did a few tail wet patrols on Brave. They could find subs pretty well.
Just nuke the channel.
Nuke the channel ? who should do this and why ?
BMT Wyvern, if we wanted to support our own industrial complex but with a modest capability. Trade off would be R&D time and presumably having yard workers trained for submarine work (outside of Barrow, so Cammel Laird/Appledore for instance?).
Because as much as we might want the off-the-shelf solution, we would probably end up Anglicising the design, and time to service would still be measured in years.
As for a force multiplier and uncrewed submarines, thoughts on the Adjunct Missile Magazine/MMUUV on Cimsec?
https://cimsec.org/two-platforms-for-two-missions-the-missile-magazine-unmanned-undersea-vessel-and-lmacc/
Yep Wyvern or Vidar 7 would make a lot of sense for training (both submariners, sub commanders and ASW crews), coastal patrol, SF work etc.
Suspect MSubs and JFD working together could build most of it….
In greybeard world
CASD is a different line in the accounts to RN and we have five SSBNs for CASD (learning from the recent extra long deployment at the end of Vanguard class’ life).
SSNs do Atlantic and Pacific work.
SSKs allow for shallow water, Special Forces, homewaters, med, baltic operation and as a pipeline for command crew for SSNs and SSBNs (I freely admit that does not solve the issue of nuclear engineers). A26 Oceanic Extended would be my choice (but again happy to acknowledge that contradicts some of my rationale).
SSKs would need a new yard (Appledore?) but ought to be (even) more exportable than AUKUS-SSN.
HOWEVER. Even as died-in-the-wool proponent of boats being our actual war fighters and war winners. The priorities have to be: RFA pay and conditions, RFA platforms, service accomodation, removing pensions from its PR role in Defence Spending.
It is nice to be having these discussions again though after over a decade of ‘this is not the time for imagination or ambition there is no money.’
Have you tried “just for men”…. It’s rather good at disguising grey hairs ?
Nah I favour boot polish.
Oh I laughed, the delusion which runs right through the Armed Forces. From the Army we can deploy Brigades to Eastern Europe to fight the Russians with 12 pieces of artillery to 20 tanks, the RAF we could shoot down the Russian Air Force with at most 4 squadrons of serviceable jets, to the Navy we could have lots of missile firing boats when the cheapest most visible way of deterrent is a Destroyer with excellent anti air capacity with a lot of VLS capacity that could fire ship based ground attack missiles.
But nope the Navy types think they will get enough money to go spend £3/£5bn on a completely new capacity. Dream on.
“ RAF we could shoot down the Russian Air Force with at most 4 squadrons of serviceable jets”
Given Russian AF performance in UKR that could well happen.
“ Navy we could have lots of missile firing boats when the cheapest most visible way of deterrent is a Destroyer with excellent anti air capacity with a lot of VLS capacity that could fire ship based ground attack missiles.”
T45 was meant to have Mk41 as well as Harpoon. BuffHoon wouldn’t fund it and insisted on the money going toward GCS which Camoron and Osbourne then pushed back causing the T23 debacle. That wasn’t an RN decision but Ministerial.
T45 was meant to have Mk41 as well as Harpoon
That’s not clear. Are you saying it shouldn’t have had Harpoon as well as Mk41. Are you saying it was either one or other?
T45 was meant to plug the gap in T42’s weaponry by carrying an AShM missile.
All this is kinda irrelevent unless the Manpower issue is addressed …is there any Harmony anymore ? Possibly not
I remember the adverts but not sure you can still buy it. Edit, I found some on Amazon if you still want a can.
If we’re playing imaginary fleets then I would like a 5th Dreadnought ordered and a brand new construction yard built near the current facility in Barrow (there is space). Then build 7 Aukus boats at each facility.
Yes, you are correct, there is room and it can be done if there is a will. The old Museum dock also has potential but that’s a whole new can of worms.
Yes please
TGinMB
If you have not already done so – I suggest you read my very detailed “condemnation” of the existing BAe submarine building facilities over at Barrow (a couple of weeks back).
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
@IT(P)
This one?

Irate Taxpayer (Peter)
Reply to Callum
20 days ago
Jon and Callum
Devonshire Hall was orginally designed way back in the mid/late 1970’s: so approx. half a century ago.
Homework time. Buildings are maintained , its the equipment inside that matters
https://www.navylookout.com/progress-on-the-royal-navy-dreadnought-class-submarine-programme/
Moderators we have personal attack here again
It simply too controversial to buy complex warships or submarines from a foreign supplier. With the government dragging its heals on 2.5% DGO defense spending there is no scope for any increase to the submarine fleet above 7 SSN/ 4 SSBN. 2.5% plugs holes in the existing force levels & Capability ( RFA first on list) with v little left for expanding. If the RN were to expand arguably an increase FF/DD numbers is a priority.
Fixing RFA costs peanuts. Increase salaries by 50% costs £45m.
That stops people leaving in quite such large numbers promptly.
Absolutely. The cost-benefit analysis seems so obvious.
Even a 25% increase would be a useful measure.
But on top of that we really need to sort the entire maritime training pipeline for the UK. I’ve been a fan of part of the US approach being used in the UK (with acknowledgment that the US has serious issues as well). We’ve had suggestions for a UK Foreign Aid funded hospital ship for an age, plus it would be useful for the UK in time of war…and could replace RN assets in the Caribbean for hurricane season.
What happens if we combined them?
The US has several of the National Security Multi Mission Vessel on the way…its a combined training ship for State University New York (SUNY) Maritime College AND a Disaster Responce vessel. Helo deck, RO-RO ramp, huge berthing with hotel services to match that can handle a large number of additional people onboard, huge classrooms, segregated command area, medical facilities, designated space for containerised units.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Multi-Mission_Vessel
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNmbreNQlF8&ab_channel=MaritimeReporterTV
We could do the same with an RFA training vessel…base it on the Enforcer Design that the Bay Class came from, using the larger Rotterdam Class superstructure. Larger hospital facilties and proper hangarage…
Based in the UK you could do training cruises in home waters for 6 months, then a 6 month cruise in the Caribbean during hurricane season with the trainees and additional medical and disaster relief personnel plus stores….useful training and removes the need for another RN/RFA vessel on station…hell of a selling point for trainees as well, medical personnel would be easy to find from the NHS…perhaps with an understanding that you have to be a reservist to be considered…you could turn out a couple of hundred trainees per year by attaching it to a land based college….
Michael
What I believe is happening now is what happened just before WW1 and WW2 started
In the run up to each war, both the naval and political leadership dithered, and dithered again and rufused to do anything else than “buy British””
A classic case of at first they were indecisive: then they were not so sure….
So, during WW1, over half of this country’s total expediture on UK-fired munitions was spent overseas (much of it in privately owned factories over in the USA)
However during WW2, our expenditure on all types of military equipment aqmde overseas, including munitions, was even more vast
….so much so that the UK only finally repayed the USA for our lend-lease loans etc in 1996: therefore we had about half a century of “big debt”
For the UK to invest in a proper “industrial capacity” will be expensive:
However history has proved, time and time again, that us not having that capacity and capability will be even more expensive!
It is called “a detterent”
Peter (irate Taxpayer)
Why not do what the Americans did: refit two Vanguard class submarines into the SSGN role like the US did with the older Ohio boats. This would of course have to happen once the new SSBNs were in service.
I think the answer to that is that the V Boats are knackered. The USN had excess Ohio class as they were reducing capacity to meet treaty obligations and they still had life left in the hulls. I don’t have or claim any insider knowledge but I do not believe that either of those apply to the Vanguards. I would love to be proven wrong though.
TGinMB
Having inside knowledge = I can confirm that you are “spot on” (on all counts).
Five gold stars are hereby awarded! (note 1)
The recent history behind the converted Ohio’s was as follows;
Finally:
The fact that our own Vanguard fleet are all “cream crackered” is easily proven by one simple fact = that their replacements are now having steel cut for them up at Barrow.
Regards Peter (irate Taxpayer)
Note 1
Due to long-term defence cuts and, more recently, the price of real shiney gold soaring – i.e. because “the markets” now expect that the “The Donald” is winning – these five stars will only be the UOR procured version of naval gold stars.
Look OK at a distance…,,,in poor light….and when one needs to go to Specsavers….. so just like every other bit of UOR kit…
Note 1
Sounds suspiciously like I will be fitted FBNW Gold Stars to allow me to do more with less (probably in a netcentric environment in a challenging age).
I’m not sure that the V Boats are actually knackered though. Not yet at least, just requiring the maintenance and repairs they were designed for …. It’s a long and hard process keeping them in top condition that’s for sure but I think there is plenty of life in all 4 yet. An awful lot of effort and man hours go in to keeping this deterrent real. We aren’t out yet, that’s for sure.
Barry From Barrow
I repeat what I said yesterday:
“The fact that our own Vanguard fleet are all “cream crackered” is easily proven by one simple fact = that their replacements are now having steel cut for them up at Barrow”.
Trust me, they existing boats at not at the end of their useful lives yet ,,,,
However, over the next decade, they will be.. …..so they definitely will be by the time those four new Dreadnoughts replace them
and remember, that process of building and commissioning all four new / big boats will take another decade and a half (at least!)
To conclude
You don’t really think HM Government – and especially the HM Treasury – would have auhorisedthe money for al four of those new boats to be build long before the old fleet was “getting ready to fail their MOT test” – do you????
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
As an ex- submariner and watchleader of an upholder class and 3 SSN’s this is a good article and well argued.
You have my upmost respect.
If RN is looking to do what the article is suggesting, purchase SSKs and SSGNs, my suggestion is they look at 2 conventional powered submarine models with VLS capable of firing ballistic and cruise missiles. They are the Korean KSS-III and the German designed and built Dolphin 2 subs for the Israeli navy.
The 2 types are in production. The problem with either is that they combat systems and the missiles they fire are not UK products and therefore the boats will require major modifications unless off course the UK decides to keep them as is.
Of the 2 I think the KSS-III is the better of the 2 models in terms of being better suited for North Atlantic and UK operations because it is a bigger boat designed to operate further out at sea and capable of carrying a larger ballistic missiles while the Dolphin is a cruiser missile launcher only.
Branaboy
Your assessmet of the potential technical capabilities of these two types / classes of “smaller” submarines is spot on.
However – and you must now be warned that the VERY BIG BUT is coming next – you are completely overlooking the key fact that Israel and South Korea have “very different” national stategic defence stratagies / priorities from us here in the UK.
They are both seeking to deter their “near neighbour” – i.e. another regional power with nuclear weapons – from attacking them.
So:
——
However, in marked contrast, here in the UK our key requirement for our own homeland defence is very different.
The UK is seeking to deter the big nuclear-armed superpower now called Russia
(Note: it used to be called the Soviet Union, or Evil Empire, between 1945 and 1989 = which is why many old gits, like me, know this subject very very well!)
Accordingly, as I explained in my post here on NL a few days ago, the UK launching any type of tomahawk missles from a UK submarine directly into (i.e flying over) the Russian homeland would start WW3.
Thus this whole idea of a “big RN SSGN” and especialy its potential to “start WW3″ has simply not been though through properly by the pratts who are working for his think tank. Frankly – I don’t think they have left primary school yet (note 2)
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
Note 1.
and please remember; North and South Korea are officially still at war = because they never signed a peace treaty after the armistic of 1953!
….and this is the very same North Korea, which only last week, destroyed with explosives many of the remaining old bridges in the border region (DMZ) – all very symboliic – and frankly very very worrying….
Note 2.
Rather than going to their local primary school: I strongly suspect that all of the so caled “experts” working in this so-called think tank went to “a very expensive prep school”
I think the missing piece – and potential force multiplier – here is Autonomous SSKs. A squadron of independently deployable XLUUVs would be very useful. They’d potentially be 20-30m long (same length as a Herc fuselage), come in 2-3 shipping containers, with a 6000nm range and modular payloads to be able to take on ISTAR, mine-laying, and limited ASW/ASuW with a handful of torpedoes to be enough of a deterrent to make an OPFOR think twice. At least free up the SSNs for higher-value taskings.
Shaun
Untold billions of dollars of Google’s shreholders money has been poured into developing Waymo driverless taxis.
However, as of today, they are still only rarely allowed out on their own,
The mai application to date has to drive slowly around the streets of San Fransisco (and a few other big cities) collecting fare paying passengers.
However, despite hundred of humans having being paid lots and lots of money for spending years sitting on a beanbag in a big tech office = Waymo software is still very immature…
That is why the city’s local fire deparment (SFFD) is now actively trying to ban them: mainly because the Waymo taxi’s keep driving over live fire hoses = thus cuting off the water supply to firefighter trying tmo save lives when fighting a big fire.
Automous Naval Underwater Systems have very long way to go yet before they are mature enough to go out and play on their own………
Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
When these underwater systems are added to surface systems, we should have a formidable force of floaters and sinkers that’s for sure.
I am struggling to take this report seriously. It appears to totally ignore any financial, industrial base or manpower / staffing concerns, not to mention demands from the other elements of the defence force. It is simply a fantasy fleet exercise and hence pretty pointless.
Who is going to attack us? Russia is where the Ottoman Empire was in 1915. The only way it could survive is by staying out of the European War then raging. It didn’t and the result was as predicted. If we need urgent protection then perhaps the cheapest way would be ‘pay the Danegeld Mk. II’ Get the Germans and Dutch to patrol ‘our’ waters. Meanwhile a greater enemy is growing steadily among us that no navy however large could overcome..A nation’s defence begins in its soul.
Amen, Barry.
Another option would be to build two more Astutes and lengthen them by a few meters so you could slap in 2-4 Virginia Payload Modules (ideally 4). This won’t happen due to the pressure to get SSN-AUKUS up and running, but the USN did exactly this in modifying the basic Virginia design. Lengthen the “boat”, add in some VLS, instant SSGN.
The PWR2 Reactor is no longer in production, the option of building additional Astute Class boats sailed a long time ago. With the benefit of hindsight, they should have built two more Vanguard class boats and fitted them out as SSGN’s. It would have prevented the valley of death that occurred when the Vanguard class production ended and the Astute class was not ready.
I am not a fan of the idea of converting SSNs into SSGNs. First it is not as cheap as most assume it is. Second It is not a lot different from arguing the RN could just build a larger fleet of Dreadnought class boats (some being SSBNs and the rest being SSGNs) and arguing they could do everything. At some point that bigger sub must be less effective as an SSN.
An extra Dreadnought that is used for VLS cruise missiles, could be switched back to Trident deterrent patrols if something happened to one of the other four SSBN.