For all the talk of HMS Queen Elizabeth’s warfighting capabilities, the fact remains that for the majority of her service life, she will be a tool of influence, not one of direct action. In this article, Tom Sharpe looks at how this deployment should be communicated so as to maximise its effect.
On 4 January, the UK’s Carrier Strike Group (CSG), and its flagship HMS Queen Elizabeth, reached Initial Operating Capability, an important milestone in the development of a carrier strike capability and an essential precursor for their first operational deployment to the Indo-Pacific later this year. (I covered the reasons for deploying to this part of the world in a previous article for the excellent 9Dashline.)
Communications is a fascinating subject; after all, every one of us does it every day, but its ubiquity belies an underlying complexity. Often people think it’s straightforward and common sense. But how often does it go wrong on an individual level? How often is that Tweet misinterpreted or that email misunderstood? Scale that up to complex organisations operating in a geopolitical context and it is anything but simple.
‘Communications is the art and science of influencing the attitude and behaviour of stakeholders that matter most to your future strategic success.’ James Gater, Special Project Partners
Planning
The planning structure that works well for a proactive communications campaign for a deployment such as this is quite straightforward (but must be tackled in this order):
- What is the Objective – the outcomes desired from this deployment?
- Who are the Audiences that matter most to HMG and the Royal Navy?
- What is the Strategy; the ‘idea’ that brings these two together?
- Who are the messengers, what is the message, channel and context that will deliver (Implement) (each element of) the strategy?
- How should its success (or otherwise) be Scored so that the plan can be refined either as it goes along or for next time?
HMG themselves sum-up the above process with the acronym ‘OASIS’; and it makes for an excellent start. There are many ways to get communications wrong and one of the simplest is to skip the first two and jump straight to ‘I want this article in this outlet’ or ‘I’ll only engage with these national journalists’, missing the bit where you work out who you are trying to influence and to what end – which, if you believe the definition at the top, is the whole point of communications. I see this so often, both at home and abroad, I have given it a label – ‘the tyranny of the quick win’. Sometimes there is a valid reason to shout your message from the mountain top, but more often than not, in a congested operating space, convincing your selected target audiences (whilst ignoring those that matter least) is cheaper, more efficient and more effective.
Objectives
Let’s assume that for this deployment, the OASIS system is used. Even at line one, ‘what are the objectives of this deployment?’ there is complexity. Here is a list of organisations and people who will have a view on that:
| (1) Policy | (2) Pol/Mil | (3) Navy | (4) Defence | (5) Allied |
| No 10 | MoD Comms | 1SL | Joint HQ | NATO |
| FCO | Mil Strat Comms | RN Comms | UK HQ Bahrain | US Navy/USMC |
| SecDef | Com Strike Group | Info ops | Regional Allies | |
| Defence Ministers | HMS QE | RAF | Other Allies |
Table 1: Stakeholders in the CSG deployment
What is the likelihood of this group being aligned on what the objectives of the deployment are even from an operational perspective, much less a communications one? And who amongst them has the authority to define which it is to be? Arguably that job falls to No 10, but they’re quite busy right now. Below that, it gets muddy…and competitive.
Audiences
Next we have the audiences. Doctrinally, you want to reach the part of the distribution that matters most to your future strategic success. Trying to convince Sir Max Hastings ‘we don’t need carriers or even a navy’ group, or indeed adding ammunition to Richard Kemp’s ‘let’s go there and blow them all out of the water’ cabal, is probably wasted effort (although worth noting that many campaigns can and should have individuals as a target audience). With this in mind, I’ve had a go at who I think should be on the list, noting that this kind of work should really be the product of weeks of detailed analysis, ideally involving everyone in the table above:
| (a) UK Domestic | (b) Allies | (c) Potential Adversaries |
| Decision Makers | NATO | China |
| Opinion Leaders | 5 Eyes | Russia |
| Key Defence Commentators | US (POTUS, VP, DefSec) | Iran |
| Defence diaspora | Japan | North Korea |
| Taxpayers | Australia | |
| Other Indo-Pac countries | ||
| Non-state actors | ||
Table 2: Key Target audiences for the CSG deployment
Clearly, any communication plan would carefully define who exactly is meant by each of these groups, however, brevity must prevail here. Column (a) on its own raises some key issues. The first is that the priority UK target audience – decision-makers – also contains many of the key policymakers to the left of Table 1. The fact is that these often have competing agendas. How do you message them when they have their own messages? More on this below.
Opinion leaders are often overlooked as a group but they’re key; they influence the Decision Makers. Think tanks, focus groups and academics are part of this as are MilTwitter – a notoriously tough crowd in their own right!
Next come Key Defence Commentators, which include specialist members of the media. With huge reach, they should be considered both a target audience in their own right as well as an effective channel to and from the decision-makers. Above all others, this audience consumes the attention and resource of the MOD. Compared to say the US, UK political (and centralised) control of defence messaging is aggressive. This can overspill, particularly when it slows the whole process to the point where opportunities are missed. Attempting to embargo a key announcement on the Joint Strike Fighter for five days was a great example of this and besides, the press broke the embargo anyway, not unreasonably. But that’s where we are today and whoever is planning for this deployment will need to keep that in mind.
Fourth is defence diaspora, important because they too influence the decision-makers, or so the theory goes. Only then do we come to those that pay for the whole affair. Clearly, a key audience in their own right who, faced with a barrage of competing voices, deserve clear, factual communications. Logically, if communications with the smaller, more challenging (and more directly influential) audiences above get done well, then Taxpayers will benefit from a carefully curated stream of content to ‘Like’ and ‘Share’ with abandon.
I think that the ‘Allies’ and ‘Potential adversaries’ columns probably deserve a blog of their own, but for now, I’m going to duck out just by asking you to imagine how hard it would be to identify in detail, reach and then influence with these groups efficiently and effectively. Add to that the group in Column C not only has their own voice but also total control over their channels, which makes them rather good at it.
Strategy
The size and length of this deployment mean that the communications strategy will need to be carefully subdivided. The Narrative, which should sit at the top of this section, will bracket the whole thing but the subordinate key messages will need to be split into key phases and regions: passage/workup, Med, Gulf, India, Japan, Korea and Singapore would be where I would start. Key Messages are fundamental because they provide consistency of both message and tone and, critically, can be pre-agreed and therefore used quickly without fear of misspeaking. They should be sufficient in number and complexity to that they don’t become a slogan or the object of derision, i.e. not three words…
The Group Commander’s tweet at IOC certainly looked like the start of this:
- UK no longer dependant on allies for the delivery of carrier born aviation
- The group is now at very high readiness (5 Days) to deploy
- First deployment of a QE class carrier
- Largest peacetime RN group in 25 years
- Proof of UK commitment to global security
- Visible demonstration of Global Britain
- IOC is just the start
I would be surprised if 1, 2 and a merge of 5 and 6 aren’t in there somewhere when the plan is finished.
There will also need to be ‘Lines to Take’ for the whole deployment, and for each phase, to deal with emerging issues. Drafting these is both fun and demanding as seniors need to be challenged by all sorts of scenarios, from a ship being unable to sail, equipment not being ready (from a Diesel Generator to an F35 to an entire capability such as Crowsnest), an accident or collision, an operational delay in The Gulf or the PLAN posturing in close proximity (or worse) and, of course, Covid. The issue here is getting the right seniors around the table to thrash out these various gloomy scenarios and agree on the line before it’s required.
Implementation
Thereafter, you’re into chopping it up into sections for delivery. Each subsection needs a Messenger (see Table 1), a Message (see Key Messages), a Channel (i.e. broadcast, digital, press release etc) and a Context in which the communications themselves will occur (which will often determine the other three). This part of the plan is large…
Scoring
The final part of the plan is a robust series of measures to ensure that the success, or otherwise, of the messaging is being constantly analysed such that the plan can be updated as the deployment progresses. This needs to be rigorously quantitative. Using a Tweet as an example, the number of impressions or even likes is largely irrelevant. Who interacted with it and better still, has their opinion been changed by it (and how) is key. This type of research, insight and evaluation is time-consuming but the alternative is to fall into the trap that ‘reach = success’.
Where are we now?
If one takes the announcements so far, it is clear that a pan-Whitehall communications plan is not yet in place.
Gavin Williamson first mooted the deployment’s destination in February 2019 and then quickly had to defend it as the Chinese cancelled trade talks in response.
All went quiet until the Fleet Commander told the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) last summer that the CSG was going to the Indo-pacific. The jury is still out as to whether this announcement was planned or not. The gagging order placed by the Defence Secretary on the First Sea Lord shortly afterwards suggests probably not.
The autumn then saw various Whitehall discussions about it which started to suggest it was formalised including in the House of Lords on 4 November, by the PM in the multiyear settlement and by Stephen Lovegrove in the House of Commons Defence Committee.
As we move into 2021, things are picking up, with the IOC announcement on 4 Jan quickly followed by a thread from the Commander of the Group. Yesterday came the announcement that the US Navy will be joining the group. Interest will increase from now on and if ‘the system’ doesn’t fill the vacuum, others will. The Sun ran a piece on 7 Jan suggesting that the RN might end up forward basing in Japan. If true, that is huge, so where was the release of this information in the plan?
The MoD will certainly have convened a policy group by now to work on this deployment and try and bring in all the strands. Of course, the best communications plans are worked up lock-step with the operational plans and one senses there is already a lag. However, to mitigate this you have to navigate a web of operator and communicator, classified and unclassified and dare I say it, political, military and civilian divides. Not easy.
Politics and priorities
It’s worth noting where this deployment will sit in various in-trays. To the Royal Navy, it will be the most significant event of the year bar none. To Defence it will be important, particularly given its proximity to the Integrated Review, although don’t think for one minute that everyone in Defence will be behind it; they will not. To senior politicians, it will provide the perfect backdrop for general post Brexit messaging and also focussed messaging in the various countries and regions it visits. Nothing says you mean business quite like the photo on 65,000 tons of sovereign territory. But for much of the time, at that level, it will go unnoticed until something goes wrong then, heaven help anyone who gets in the way.
Other countries will be interested. The US Navy has for years been looking to allies to support with its stretched carrier fleet operations, a calling answered often only by the excellent-if-expensive FS Charles De Gaulle. The USN runs a tight ship when it comes to communicating the right to ‘freedom of manoeuvre’, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, and will be very keen to join up any messaging that comes from the UK doing the same, both bilaterally and as NATO. CNN have already started, “UK says aircraft carrier strike group is ready to deploy. China’s already watching.” Other navies and countries in the region will take particular notice, especially those sending ships to join the task group at various stages.
How interested will China be? My take is very…whilst pretending not to be. The Mil Strat Effects (MSE) team in the MoD will be all over what their responses to the different stages of the deployment might be. There is a document called a StratCom Actions and Effects Framework (SCAEF) that they will have helped draft for this deployment. Converting this from its traditional near mythical status into heat and light for this deployment will be important. And a first.
I have an anecdote that sums much of this up – the ship of shame. In January 2017 the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov returned from conducting bombing missions in Syria to its base port in Russia. Escorted on the outbound leg the previous Autumn by a single Royal Navy destroyer, considerable operational effort went into ensuring this was upped for the return leg. Frigates, destroyers and much of the RAF were duly mobilised.
There is another discussion to be had about what appropriate means when escorting foreign warships past the UK but what everyone (in Table 1 above) was in agreement with, was that the communications element should be downplayed. NATO, the Navy, MSE, FCO all agreed that there was really no need to fuel the Russian propaganda machine and that it should just quietly sail on by. Everyone bar one person: the then Secretary of State. Unilaterally, he declared with a loud voice that he wanted it to be called the ‘ship of shame’ and ‘sent home with its tail between its legs’. At that point, either no one was able to, or had the courage to, talk him down.
My point here is not to argue who was right or wrong in this instance, simply to point out that you can have all the plans in the world, but if a political agenda is at play in Whitehall then your timing will be thrown out and most likely your effect will be reduced.
There is a sub-story to this. The above picture was chosen by many outlets including The Telegraph, the preferred paper of the then SofS. My phone on the Navy desk in the MOD press office duly sprung into life as seemingly half the Naval Service rang to give me their displeasure at having allowed the picture without the RN ships in it to make the press. Out of interest, I rang my friend (who happens to be the picture editor of the Telegraph) to ask him why they chose that one, “because it’s a better picture” he said. So there we are.
Back to the more serious business of inter-ministry politics occasionally hampering sequenced communications. A more recent example saw a respected UK journalist, in Bahrain, reporting ongoing Royal Navy operational activity from the flight deck of a US warship, because she was forbidden from stepping onboard a RN ship.
Communications Control
One couldn’t pick a stronger tide to swim against right now than suggesting that the current centralisation of communications should be relaxed. Only a few months ago, the desire to bring communications under one roof was so strong it challenged whether separate ministries even needed their own communications departments at all. Although those personalities have largely moved on now, it is still the case that political control of even the most tactical military communications often resides with SofS in person (or their SPAD). I’m not suggesting that anyone is ready for a US style freedom of manoeuvre (although I do admire it) however, I do believe that if all opportunities are to be exploited, what is required are suitably empowered experts (not advisors) who can operate within clearly defined parameters. Historically, RN Captains have had rather more freedom to operate multi-million pound weapons systems than they have their own Twitter account. Why are they utterly trusted to do one and not the other?
If one drew a line from ‘state control’ to ‘free for all’ and had to place an arrow where UK military communications lies then, in my view, it should be nudged right for this deployment. However, I also know a lot of people who couldn’t disagree more.
Summary
Admiral Parry’s tweet and letter to the Telegraph of 1 January summaries this nicely: “In order to be Global Maritime Britain and the leading maritime power in Europe, the UK needs to employ our @RoyalNavy carriers and their air power in strategically literate and innovative ways.”
To be ‘literate and innovative’ they will need clear and succinct objectives that have been agreed across-Whitehall and are coherent for both operations and communications. Audience analysis will need to be conducted, refined, tested and refined again. A nuanced and phased strategy will need to generate sharp yet adaptable content that will bring these two together. An implementation plan that makes full use of all channels, not just the favoured few, is then required which must be flexible enough to withstand change and robust enough to defend against criticism, foreign and domestic. Finally, a system of measuring this is needed that is both honestly reported and then faithfully acted upon.
At some stage high-level politics will drive a bus through some, or all of the plan – those are the perks of communicating in a democracy. However, the plan does still need to be there if as many people as possible are to be influenced by this deployment which is, after all, the whole point.
Commander Tom Sharpe, OBE RN (Retd) spent 27 years in the Royal Navy, 20 of which were at sea. He commanded four different warships; Northern Ireland patrol vessel, Fishery Protection, a Type 23 Frigate and the Ice Patrol Vessel, HMS Endurance.
Oooh, does being a commenter here, does that make me part of the defence diaspora?
A successful full deployment to the Pacific is a clear statement that the UK can go anywhere to defend its interests and allies. Close ties with Japan, Australia and India with a few joint exercises on the way, prove the value of the alliance. As the US reduces its commitment to the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Middle East future annual deployments to those areas helps maintain clear deterrence. While the UK probably doesn’t need to go to the Pacific more than twice a decade as a CSG, going to the Med or Arctic annually, along with the French, and covering the gaps in US carriers in the Middle East make us all safer.
I am very proud of how far carrier strike has developed. We have some truly world class assets. However, if we put a strike group into harms way without proper EAW, point missile defence on the carrier and so few F-35 weapons options then I think we’re totally bonkers. Don’t T-45 me…
Lack of EAW and point defence missiles isn’t great. 24 F35B is a good number for the first deployment if achieved but i agree weapons options seem limited at the moment. What will they actually be carrying, Paveway IV and ASRAAM. Anything else?
I worry about such an early deployment to the Far East when key systems are not ready: too few aircraft, test version only of Crowsnest, main aircraft weapons not yet integrated (Spear3 ,Meteor). I can’t imagine China being very impressed never mind influenced. Western commentators rightly derided the Kuznetsov foray to the Eastern Mediterranean. If we want to demonstrate strength, then wait until full operating capabilities have been achieved, rather than expose current weaknesses.
Totally agree. China knows a paper tiger when it sees one. I think the mission will be useful for building operating experience for this type deployment but with so little teeth on our F35’s, no AEW and no TBMD or Co-operative Engagement Capability on our AAW escorts, this group couldn’t undertake combat operations independently against any first world power and would struggle against some second world powers as well.
Yawn.
It’s good to make the nation and government aware of our assets and in turn not cut cut cut like they no doubt are pondering over with the F35b…. maybe “we didn’t have enough aircraft” might help to keep the orders we originally planned for. But hey who really knows. It’s easy to cut cut cut when 97% of the country doesn’t know anything about the vehicle, aircraft ect and makes things easier for the cutters…
Agreed: raising the profile is a sensible aim. But is it sensible to organise a foray to the Far East? There are no vital British interests there and the deployment might even strengthen the view that the carriers are an unnecessary expense with no real role. A deployment down to the South Atlantic, calling in at Gibraltar and Ascension might be a better way of demonstrating a re- acquired capability.
If the aim is to assert freedom of navigation in disputed waters, the best way to do this is a multi- national task force- US, Japan, Philippines, Australia etc to which UK could contribute. That would send a message.
,
There are historic british interests there though and we have commitments to help the security there, and we still have gurkhas based in the Far East.
As an follower of the Westland Enthusiasts fan page, the crowsnest Merlins are doing a lot of flying…. if they are embarked surely they will have had quite a bit of time flying with the F35s. Agree they need to get a move on with Meteor (although I believe the RAF have AMRAAM stocks and thats already integrated?)
The Merlins may be flying, but the kit inside isn’t! Any Merlin MKII can be fitted with CROWSNEST equipment if the Link 16 Terminal is present inside! What you have seen flying is just an airframe with pretend equipment bolted onto it.
Influence isn’t about a single deployment to the Far East (or any where else for that matter). A single deployment will make the headlines and then disappear very quickly. What matters is the ability to persist.
What is the UK’s ability to persist with meaningful weight in the Far East, or any other distant part of the world?
We don’t have that depth. The USN need four carriers and about fire air wings to keep one forward. That is an operational momentum. We don’t have enough ‘escorts’ to even hand over station now let alone carriers and aircraft.
Just a question, for the second day in a row, Prince of Wales, doesn’t appear to be flying the white ensign, is she decommissioned???
Sunk I heard.
Always tricky when that happens in a commission. A craftily hidden Mars bar won’t turn Jimmy’s head at rounds if your messdeck is completely flooded……
Good article, thank you.
I think you touch on something that has a lot of impact domestically- how are the armed forces viewed by the population. I know that it can sometimes be a fine line before propoganda is reached, but it is so much easier to keep informed about genuinely interesting and exciting developments in the US than it is for the UK. Well managed communications could very well improve recruitment and retention across all branches, as the military becomes viewed as a positive contributor and defender of society and an eventful and fulfilling vocation. At the moment that is hardly the case, as information is so controlled you either have to be in the military or interested/invested in defence to have the determination to go digging. This souldn’t be the case.
I know this is quite a long way down on your “audience” considerations when it comes to communications, but I think it would change a lot for the better.
I have to say, what a Stunning Picture. Wish I was in the RN, Wow, I can only imagine being on a ship like that.
You would die of agoraphobia.
It’s OK, I like Spiders.
🙂
Really interesting article. It is always fascinating to hear what goes on behind the scenes. I will have to re-read this as it is a subject I know little about.
Navy lookout you are killing it in 2021 so far 😀👍
Flight Global reports that the United States will be lending the Royal Navy a detachment of F-35B’s and a Burke-class destroyer for the next deployment of the Carrier Strike Group.
https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/us-marine-corps-commits-detachment-of-f-35bs-to-hms-queen-elizabeth/142052.article
Yes. The USN supplying assets to help the carriers has been a long time in the planning. Very generous with the Burke considering they are running out of escorts too. The aviation push within the USMC plus the sheer size of F35b compared to Harrier means they are helping themselves as much as us. If there was ever a large naval action in the future the carriers will probably be with the Gator Navy hosting F35b to free up deck and hangar space for MV22 in the USN’s large amphibs. Our carriers are as much a USN as ours.
The lending of some F-35Bs and a Burke is definitely mutually beneficial. Its gives our Marines additional operational experience and the Royal Navy gets to work with a ship and crew experienced in carrier operations.
I wouldn’t go as far as saying our carriers are as mush US as our. We will no doubt fly from marine carriers in future and Italian and korean and Japanese, doesn’t make the, ours.
Well we could dance on the head of the pin on this if you like. I can’t see a national emergence where we alone would need a carrier. I refuse to play ‘Falklands what ifs’. And as the USMC could actually fill the ship with cabs and we can’t they will probably make more use out of it than we will. What you have to consider is that we are practically wholly reliant on the US for our ‘conventional’ defence. And in many ways our forces are just a reserve to theirs. And have been such for many decades.
How would such paper tiger “strike force” deference itself against China’s Ballistic anti-ship missile and Russia’s Hypersonic anti-ship missile?
An operational Hypersonic anti-ship missile does Not yet exist.
It is just Russian propaganda!
You would use ABM missile to defend from Ballistic anti-ship missile.
China already has DF-ZF hypersonic missile but do keep on underestimating the adversaries.
And RN has no operational ABM missile and too poor to afford any.
Remember HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales? All show and totally inadequate air defense, both sunk in the South China Sea.
RN does not even has enough escort ships for the paper tiger “strike force” and has to ask the US and Dutch navies to help out, let alone buying more F-35.
Keep on dreaming and ask Bojo for some money first.
OK, so you have made a hypersonic missile steerable against a moving and evading target – think not.
If a carrier was steaming in a nice straight line might stand a chance. But ICBM type missile are mainly OK at hitting fixed targets.
Any EM is blinded during reentry – unless basic physics has been reinvented. In Earth’s atmosphere the thing is blind unless it slows down a lot at which point it is JAM “just another missile”
I’m only being slightly facetious. I’ve never seems anything that convinces me that these things really exist or work. Putin’s CGIs made me grin rather than take it seriously.
Oh and BoJo did actually give quite a decent lump of money to modernise things……
The old saying, “We do not have it so the adversaries could not have it operational also” comes to mind.
Even India has the BrahMos-2 hypersonic anti-missile in development.
Fortunately, some navies take these threads more seriously, the US has the RIM-156 ER/RIM-171 while the French/Italian is developing the Aster30 Block 1NT/Block 2BMD.
RN does not even has any operational AEW assess with this “strike force”, so air deference is no better than 1982 Falklands war against subsonic Exocet.
Radar is still limited by the earth curvature, that is basic physics for you! While now supersonic AShM is already operational with many navies and this is no CGI.
And is there any passive deference on the carrier beside the 20mm Phalanx as last ditch?
Bojo is a politician and he will promise 350 million quid every week on the side of a bus, just wait till the Treasury and the next Deference review.
Even with the extra funding promised, sorry for the RAF and the Army, the total number of Type 26/45/31/32 altogether will just be barely 24 and some could only be armed with 40 years old design subsonic Harpoon or glorified Bofors 40mm.
Keep living in Cuckoo land.
Type 45, Merlin Crowsnest, P8, Satellite, Aegis, F35B, Sea Ceptor , Sea Viper, Phalanx. All unavailable in 82. Just Sayin.
Still won though !
I would reroute the task force through Suez, India, Diego Garcia, Australia, New Zealand. Japan, Hawaii, Chile, Falklands, South Africa, South Atlantic and Home.
Send something through the South China Sea but forget the Carrier it isn’t ready to defend itself Fully.
Against Who exactly ?
Airplane, helicopter, car, steam engine, electricity, television, radio, telephone, machines gun, all unavailable at Trafalgar, is this a even better comparison? Just saying too!
In 1982, there were 60 destroyers and frigates in RN, now a grand total of 19 with one third not operational.
Yes won, with enormous help from the USA.
So this “strike force” is only capable against some third world tinpot adversary for a 1982 re-match?
And where is South China Sea? It is not near Portsmouth.
No actually, as we are not at war. Just sayin again. I think you underestimate the UK and It’s history of Winning Wars when it matters. South China Sea seems to be getting closer to Portsmouth every Year or so it will if nothing is done to keep China from Bullying It’s neighbours. Crikey ToraToraTora Keep up with History Mate, Bullies always lose, you should know that from your reference to the attack on a peaceful Pearl Harbour.
You better start digging a hole to put your head in, by 2030 the PLA Navy will have 99 submarines, 4 aircraft carriers, 102 destroyers and frigates, 26 corvettes, 73 amphibious ships and 111 missile craft, 415 ships in total, plus a few from Putin.
Yes, I know, been saying it for years now, good job we are looking to counter their buildup by producing such Ships as the QE’s and such aircraft as the F35B’s, so on and so forth. Oh and I’m doing my bit by avoiding buying anything Chinese too ( as much as possible ) unlike the Rest of the World. Maybe we can export a deadly Virus to slow them down a bit…. smirky face emoji.
I am sure you have been saying out of your backside for years, wait for a Pakistani Hatf-VIII to plug it.
Crikey, much love you are giving there, a veritable rocket up the Arse. you seem Angry ?
Think I might have attracted another Multi Account follower. !!! ( Smiley Face ).
derro drongo brain fart
Well that’s a new one on me….. Anyone able to shed any light ?
It is websites like Ebay are heavy promoting Chinese sourced items on their site. There needs to be political pressure on this big tech entity, to allow more alternative sources of listed items. The UK needs trade deals with countries like India, so to make it easier to import goods from them, so Ebay would have no excuse but to allow much more goods from alternative sources.
The UK should have a trade deal with Taiwan as well, a good alternative source of electronic products.
You seem to have forgotten the UK has more then equivalent of the DF-ZF missile, it is called Trident.
The UK is returning to the Pacific as part of a coalition.
So we do not need to take there every single warpon now in existence.
DF-ZF is not a nuclear weapon and it does not need to be, the amount of kinetic energy of a hypersonic anti-ship missile on impact would already be fatal.
So in order to deference against a conventional anti-ship missile is to use nuclear weapon, the weapon of last resort, this only highlight the inadequacy of the RN.
And does the PLA Navy has no nuclear SLBM of its own? It already has twice the number of ballistic missile submarines as RN.
What about Russia’s 3M22 Xircon hypersonic missile that you insisted only as some CGI fantasy? But then it is easier to ignore reality and live in fantasy land.
So a RN carrier force can only sail as part of a coalition, this only prove the point that RN lacks the resource and capability.
Return to the Pacific, a dream for Empire 2.0 but don’t tell the Treasury when the bills of Brexit and Covid-19 start coming in.
Obviously you have ignored Supportive Bloke’s post on the issues of hypersonic flight, which makes much more sense then all the propaganda from the Chicoms, and the Kremlin that you have been carried away with.
You are very much a fantasic here!
Log out, bring back Arjun, he makes more sense !
China pushing against the world again with its flights (Today and yesterday) into Taiwan airspace by fighters, bombers and other craft.
The UK FON deployment needs to go ahead to show China that the legal right of navigation remains, and that the SCS is not Chinese territory – as per the recent ruling.
I hope that Australia, New Zealand, and the nations surrounding the SCS all join the CSG for the FON. The world needs to stand together against Chinese expansionism
If you want communication to have maximum effect, you might want to use a proofreader before publishing to avoid spelling mistakes in your own communication! It’s ‘CNN have already stated’, not ‘started’.
As for our deployment to the South China Sea; the country is in the grip of Covid, being battered by Brexit uncertainty and in the grip of an economic downturn. I doubt we have the tax receipts to even pay for the modest defence spending increase promised by Boris. Whatever money is received now will be whittled down by future Defence Reviews.
We have other priorities closer to home to be dreaming of Empire 2.0. We are a Great power, not a Superpower like the US and increasingly China and must learn to live within our means. We simply don’t have the resources or appetite for power projection.
Thanks for proofreading but I meant ‘started’. It makes sense.
The Integrated Review is imminent. I agree that joining its ambition to the treasury, especially now, will be key. But we do know that overall spending is set to increase.
This deployment is nothing to do with Empire 2.0 and I don’t get the logic that because we’re not the US we shouldn’t bother. Are you proposing that we shouldn’t have carriers or that we shouldn’t send them to the Indo-Pacific?
Real power projection 😂
“During 2020 Prince of Wales had been at sea just 30 days”
Source: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Prince_of_Wales_(R09)
Propaganda circle jerk.
Thank you for this very helpful post. A British Embassy expecting deployment to arrive soon. This has been very useful. I hope we can get access to great visuals in advanced to promote on our social media in advanced of the arrival.