Like all navies, the RN is seeking to reduce the number of sailors needed to operate its warships as qualified people are expensive and in short supply. While putting fewer people in harm’s way, a small crew can have limitations. In this article, we look at how the designers of the Type 31 frigate have balanced lean crewing with effective operation.
Background
The Type 31 frigate has been designed from the outset to minimise crew numbers. This is part of the overall philosophy of driving down both upfront and through-life costs for the programme. Although based on a parent design, Type 31 differs very significantly and meets a completely new set of naval standards. The programme also presented an opportunity to take advantage of the latest technologies and implement them from the outset. For example, Type 31 makes the first use of the Unattended Machinery Space (UMS) notation in an RN Frigate.
The value of a warship itself comprises several elements that are enabled by the original design and the quality of the personnel onboard. The four most important factors are; (1) lethality/mission capability, (2) susceptibility/self-defence capability, (3) survivability and (4) recoverability in the event of being damaged.
Overall mission capability is defined by offensive weapons and supporting systems through to smaller elements such as seaboats. Self-defence can be hard kill effectors such as missiles or guns and soft kill systems such as decoys and electronic warfare capabilities. Passive protection also includes a reduction in radar cross section (RCS) and underwater radiated noise (URN) signatures making it harder to detect and target the ship.
The survivability of a ship depends on the measures in place to mitigate the effects of damage and carry on functioning while also preserving life onboard as far as possible. A good part of the cost and complexity of good warship design and construction is devoted to mitigating the effects of blast, shock, fires and floods and having resilient systems that will continue to function even if parts of the system are destroyed. Recoverability is the ability to promptly react to damage, restoring the ship so it can remain in action or counter follow-on attacks. This resilience can only really be achieved by features and fixed systems incorporated during the ship’s construction, rather than retrofitted once the vessel is in service.
Bitter experience has ensured the RN continues to build warships with high standards of survivability and recoverability including the Type 31 frigate. Lessons in the modern era from the Falklands War (1982), the serious collision survived by HMS Southampton (1988), the grounding of HMS Nottingham (2002), and the near sinking of HMS Endurance (2008) have driven this priority.
Determining Type 31 crew size
The watch & Station bill of about 165 sailors for the Danish Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates that are the parent design for Type 31 only provided a very rough starting point. This is because the Danish Navy’s crewing model differs from RN practice. Type 31 is also built to more exacting survivability standards, has a very different combat system and benefits from 20 years of technology development.
Type 31 will have a ship’s company of only around 110 sailors but will be able to sustain combat operations primarily through increased levels of automation. The crew has been intentionally structured to include the necessary personnel for recovery actions in case of damage, such as fires or flooding, while ensuring enough hands are available to maintain operations without excessive fatigue. The ship has very generous spare accommodation for up to another 80 personnel in addition to the core ship’s company. Specialists will be embarked as needed such as the ship’s flight, Royal Marine boarding teams and operators of uncrewed systems.
No ‘black box’ software tools were used in determining the Type 31 crew complement. Instead, a large table was employed, listing each individual by row, with various operational states arranged in columns (cruising, defence watches, and action stations) and tasks (eg. Replenishment at Sea, Boarding Operations, Humanitarian Aid & Disaster Relief etc.) This manual approach ensured that the workload of each crew member could be tracked and understood in every scenario, avoiding the risk of logic being lost or distorted within a software model.
The specific responsibilities of each crew member was examined across various operational states and evolutions. For instance, a junior Seaman Specialist finishing a ‘morning’ watch (04:00-08:00) after weeks of watchkeeping at sea couldn’t reasonably be expected to immediately serve as the on-call bowman for the recovery boat in the event of a man overboard and still perform effectively in this crucial safety role. Similarly, engineering personnel had to balance preventive maintenance tasks with watchkeeping duties, which could require several hours of service each day depending on the operation and threat environment. These factors were carefully considered when formulating the crew complement, with outdated notions like “we managed it in my day” being dismissed as irrelevant.
Once the Type 31 Design Authority had compiled the complement plan, it was presented to the RN through a series of Operability Working Groups. These groups held multiple sessions with representatives from different branches (Warfare, Logistics, etc.) and sub-branches (Communications & Information Specialists, etc.), scrutinising the validity of the complement and the functionality of the advanced technologies used on the Type 31. For instance, RN Warfare branch managers tested the TACTICOS Combat Management System in the simulator at Thales’ Crawley site to validate the number of personnel required for the Operations Room.
The process culminated in a series of whole-ship ‘Fast Cruise’ events, where personnel from all branches were involved. These events simulated a range of operations, incidents, emergencies, unexpected deployments, and combat scenarios to ensure the crew could effectively handle the full spectrum of duties expected of a frigate. This proved the minimised crew numbers could cope without overburdening individuals. After several years of development, the first members of HMS Venturer’s crew joined in July 2023. With the nascent ship’s company now assigned to the vessel in the shipyard, the complement plan is now being put into practice.
At higher levels, consideration is also being given to double-crewing the Type 31s when in service. The frigates HMS Montrose and then HMS Lancaster, forward deployed in the Gulf with double crews, have proved this model can work very successfully for larger combatants. This model is popular as it gives personnel a much better ability to plan their life, knowing when they will be away, while also avoiding the cost and time lost on lengthy transits between the UK and operating areas.
Equipped for lean crewing
Personnel numbers needed on watch in the operations room have been considerably reduced. In legacy frigates, many repetitive tasks have to be carried out manually, often with poorly designed user interfaces. The TACTICOS CMS fitted to Type 31 automatically manages routine picture compilation and tracking functions allowing the operators to concentrate on unexpected or anomalous events. Additionally, some of the advanced capabilities of the NS110 primary radar, enable superior detection of small drones and low-RCS missiles at considerably increased ranges, using automation to alert the operator. This solution reduces fatigue during long watches and avoids unnecessary distractions for the picture compiler.
The output from the 360° staring EO/IR camera surveillance system is available to any operator on the CMS; providing a better view than from the bridge. This enables the ops room to make visual classification of tracks without constant recourse to the bridge team.
The advanced automated threat engagement functionality within the CMS, allows the Type 31 to counter large swarms of hostile actors, using the fully integrated suite of gun turrets and missile effectors. This is faster than possible with purely human operation and also reduces the number of operators while maintaining necessary control over weapons under the rules of engagement.
The ship is fitted with centralised digital incident boards, fed from a camera network with motion detection, fire, flood and equipment monitoring sensors. This reduces the workload required for damage search and system fault diagnosis.
The number of marine engineer watchkeepers is reduced by the use of uncrewed machinery spaces. The Ship Control Centre (SCC) machinery monitoring function is replicated on the Bridge. When the tasking and threat environment allow, the SCC can be closed with the systems overseen by a single engineer in the Bridge. This frees up time for engineers to conduct preventative maintenance instead of watchkeeping in the SCC.
The maintenance workload for the equipment fitted to Type 31, was thoroughly analysed. Using Babcock’s own data from decades supporting in-service platforms and assured data provided by the suppliers of new systems, the workload was broken down by engineering department section. An example of the reduced maintenance gains from modern technology can be seen with the selection of the Bofors 40mm Mk4 gun. This weapon needs approximately 30% of the annual preventative maintenance time required by the 30mm ASCG fitted to existing RN platforms.
Manual tasks traditionally requiring lots of sailors such as ’store-ship’ have been mechanised. In the forward mission bays, a transverse handling system that extends over both sides from midships can pick up whole pallets of stores from the dockside and bring them into the ship where they can be struck down into storerooms using dedicated lifts. Gash can be off-loaded from the ship using the same equipment. This stores handling system (separate from the seaboat-launching arrangements) also doubles as a launch and recovery system for small UUVs. Modern deck coverings have been selected that can be kept clean with no polishing required and bathroom units are designed for easy cleaning, reducing this burden on junior rates.
The designers of Type 31 have devoted considerable effort to finding the minimum viable ship’s company size for a globally deployable general-purpose frigate. This has not been achieved by reducing numbers at all costs but by ensuring the workload on individuals was realistic. A larger ship’s company might be preferable and more capable in some scenarios but the RN has to balance this against the decreasing pool of qualified people and the costs that come with training and employment.
I can understand the drivers but with safe crew levels being so tight, a serious problem arises when the crew numbers are not available.
You can guarantee ( like the QE carriers predicted and actual compliment) those numbers will probably rise by 20 or so in practice.
If being sent to war, the core numbers will likely rise again.
Loving the 80 additional bunks, it really gives the T31 some operational flexibility, without over crowding.
The original paper that this article is based on includes a lot more detailed information on the analysis and the solution.
https://www.babcockinternational.com/insights/type-31-frigate-delivering-a-warship-design-solution-to-address-navies-personnel-challenges/
The main think I took from this is that Scotty can manage engineering from a bridge station…
The merchant navy tried this in the 80’s and quickly realised it did not work. UMS does work but the ECR needs to be adjacent to machinery spaces. Simple example: Remote bilge alarm fails, duty engineer has to go all the way to the bridge to answer alarm and the head down to the machinery space, whilst there another alarm goes off so he/she has to go all the way back to the bridge. The only way this works is to have repeater stations in all machinery spaces which equals more cost and more hardware to go wrong.
Inevitably the Desk Top exercise that this is will under estimate the manning levels to fight a warship in action. For a frigate of this size and tonnage feels tight to me even with all of the automation. I assume this number does not include the Flight or Royal Marine contingent who will embark as required. Hopefully all crew members will be fully trained in Damage Control to the highest standard. If my memory is correct weren’t both the carriers under-crewed to start with. I hope those lessons have been learnt. Hopefully if they ever have to fight the ship in a war environment the RN has the manpower levels to increase the crew. Speaking from personal experience the more bodies you have in the Damage Control Teams when taking fire the better chance you have of saving the ship and its crew. FIGHT-FLOAT-MOVE. Never forget it’s Jolly Jack that makes the difference in the end.
I remember outrage from newspapers about the QE’s standard complement increasing by 100. Leaked by certain quarters inside the MOD. Until it was revealed the extra crew were the deployed RM detachment. You may be overly pessimistic. On this the RN has a pretty good record.
Size and tonnage has nothing to do with number of crew required.
You don’t have to assume, the article clearly states the 110 complement doesn’t include RM, flight crew. Hence the extra 80 spare bunks.
The DC teams are a really interesting point. The QEC now operate a staged system of turning personnel to for DC duties when required, empowering the DCO to call on a greater workforce when required but trying to balance the minimum safe requirement with any disruption to operational activity. The interesting aspect is the different mindset needed from those traditionally not utilised for DC duties. Embarked forces, aircrew and ‘the wardroom fireparty’ all had a role when they traditionally would be left out of all but the most significant safeguard events.
Every RN vessel does that.
In extremis you close up the Section Bases for extra hands and equipment whilst still doing other stuff.
That’s not new. If the ship isn’t closed up at Actions Stations then you go to Emergency Stations and creates an available pool of people that aren’t already involved in the incident.
FLOAT, FIGHT MOVE…..Cannot fight if you’re not floating!
WullieD
Mr Bismark put it better = “The first duty of any warship is to stay afloat”
regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
PS Mr Bismark’s team were on the losing side three times during he 20th century:
An excellent article giving insight into the design philosophy behind the T31, and going a long way to explain the costs involved.
It also illustrates why you cannot simply gauge a ships effectiveness and indeed base cost purely on ‘top trumps’ numbers alone.
For those detractors inferring that the RN is somehow being shortchanged by accepting a new vessel based on a 20 something year old design, this article clearly shows that the external tin hull is not the be-all and end- all of the ship, and the T31 are so much mire than a 20 year old design simply using modern bits.
Specifically a generous extra crew accommodation allowance of 80 is surely another hidden virtue, useful for simply extra crew in times if tension,/war, or holding marines/uav operators.
Another little gem is using the stores resupply lift for gash…or UUVs!
Please please at least 24 Ceptors, please…
AA
I was thinking about the Indonesian missile fit out: 32 strike length VLS, 24 medium-distance cells, plus a further 16 for surface attack. Just think about 24 cells quad-packed with CAMM/ER. That could be 96 self/theatre protection missiles, 16 NSM anti-ship, plus a further 32 cells for Asters, Tomahawks, SM-6 or whatever.
A single report says that…and everyone repeats it, yet its still a ‘light’ frigate ?
It must have been a lot easier 150 years ago when a classification was simply anything the Royal Navy said it was.
Yes. Around 1877 the RN reclassified all its frigates as cruisers. Time to do the same.
Some countries invent new designations , as though they are pop stars- multi-purpose combat ship anyone
If it is cruiser, RN will have to pay more to the captain.
Well said.
A very canny idea from the Dutch has just been posted to add additional firepower to their fleet.
https://www.twz.com/sea/new-dutch-navy-support-vessels-will-be-missile-toting-wingmen-to-frigates
I think they are testing the idea. With only 8 crew.
Otherwise they could just take out the SM-2 of their frigates and put the Barak container instead.
It was the 8 crew members to operate it that caught my eye and its resemblance to the Patrick Blackett.
Not additional firepower, its because :
‘Meanwhile, production of the (SM-2) Block IIIA that arms the De Zeven Provinciën class will soon come to an end, with the subsequent SM-2 Block IIICU not being compatible with the frigates’ fire-control systems”
They have to find a different cannister launch missile and their frigate will be just the search and targeting centre
Thank you for the info!
Lol, the pics of the Huitfeldt and Type 31’s made me giggle! So unluttered and simple, compared to a ton more of technology and therefore more to go wrong, perhaps. Given the type 45’s have been such a technical challange, one can’t help thinking things maybe already cursed for the Type 31’s.
I took the opposite view, the type 31 has masses more multiple redundancy, so if one system gets destroyed, you can re-route and use another.
Try rereading the article as you completely missed the point.
Having redundant systems ensures the T31 can continue to function even when systems are knocked out. Your preferred uncluttered design makes it far easier to make the ship unable to function or even survive. You would trade survivability for ‘less clutter’.
More to go wrong doesn’t really apply when we’re talking about having multiple of the same system for redundancy. Past experience has shown that a lack of redundancy can be fatal.
Doesnt have the T45 approach to all electric ship – which used a new Westinghouse US designed intercooler-recuperater fuel efficiency add on to the RR gas turbines.
LPD has multiple redundant electrical systems.
Primary and secondary power supplies via auto change over switches.
Emergency power can be rigged via DC cables if needed.
Some systems also have a battery backup via an inverter.
Having multiple backups in case stuff goes wrong is a plus not a negative.
This all seems sensible and well planned, a good idea for almost new ship classes as long as it doesn’t turn into “how few crew can we get away with”.
The emphasis on reducing mental tasks should make the T31s pleasant ships to serve on and implies a good level of thought about retainment and making sure crews actually enjoy time aboard.
The comments re the “forwards mission bays” is interesting. I assume this refers to the two boat bays either side of the VLS space amidships, but it sounds like those spaces are going to be more flexible than simply being for extra sea boats, perhaps as mentioned with unmanned vehicles etc. Self loading is a good idea, presumably draws from T26 in that regard.
Rumors from the project team are that for most CS and CSS positions they have been instructed to build the Watch Bill to 120% requirements to ensure sustainability all the time rather than suffer the pain of soft gapping for training, medical and leave. There is potential for a real mindset change with the through life career management of these personnel, it may take a few years and a few hulls to get right. Especially with regard to continued use of dual crewing. It seems that the workforce wargaming has focussed in the right areas and – on paper – seems to make sense. Your retainment comment is spot on!
Cheers, NDG.
Cheers NDG for the kind words
I don’t have any experience in this sort of management but gut feeling is that paying attention to individual people’s workloads and trying to reduce unnecessary work for the crew can only be a good thing.
Not good news for new recruitment less sailors ..fewer main jobs to be had if technology takes over there for people will leave ….then if there is a fault with all this technology you can’t be reliant on this alone you should always have back up especially out in ocean …..wrong direction to go I think
Surely this will be better for retaining crew?
Nobody wants to spend their time in the Navy doing nothing but cleaning toilets and polishing the floor, they want to be actually on the bridge etc. helping with combat capability. I certainly know where I’d rather be.
There are too many jobs needed in the RN at the moment anyway. When we are laying up ships because there aren’t enough crew, there’s no need to worry about people not getting enough roles.
You need to finish school first……just sayin.
Oh well…
The T31s do sound like nice postings. No hard work and you get to see the world.
If this is the future RN, I’m thinking much more seriously about joining 😉
Good for you my little mate. I like following all your posts on here and that other place …….It’s so nice to see the future is in good hands.
Come on, drop the insults. I thought we’d left that childish phase behind us here.
Oh dear. I guess you missed all the previous comments on here and UKDJ, where SB declared himself to still be at school (just started 6th form) ……. ?????? Not sure why you interpret my comments as Childish insults…. never mind, I care not one jot.
Cleaning the Heads, Scrubbing out…Should have tried harder at school!
Most people do secondary maintainer courses and training anyway to cover for leave, gapping or in the worst case death/injury at sea.
I covered a lot of sections that where not my Gunbuster speciality. Some I was as a formally trained maintainer for others were as an ad hoc secondary maintainer.
Things like Gyros, Stws, Navaids, Exocet, Harpoon.
If you can retain people as they are promoted they gain experience on other systems that they carry into future vessels.
Same as to Mike. Don’t do the insult thing. You’re mature, knowledgeable, and interesting enough to not need that. You’re comment is just as interesting and informative without the first sentence, if not more so.
Ha ha….. I see right through you now….. multiple accounts and classic troll like activity aimed at deflecting from the focal point. Every site like this has them, you need to try harder.
Presumably you’d like to reintroduce slaves chained to ranks of oars just in case these new fangled diesel engines broke down…?
Or, maybe he has something given the history of recruitment and you can’t see it ? I’m of the opinion that ever decreasing circles are driving the future of the RN ( and not just the RN)
Or maybe he’s just a whinging Luddite?
As far as the CMS is concerned many of the aspects discussed are already instigated in the Tyep45. An ongoing long term consideration is how is a senior operator, required to make significant decisions, ‘grown’ so that they are able to properly conduct their specific job requirements?
The thing that struck me was that with the size of the core crew you could crew three Type-31s with the crews of two Type-23s. If there was ever a reason to get the build rate on our newer ships accelerated this is it.The Type-26s are also expected to have a significantly lower core crew than the Type-23 and this may perhaps help to alleviate the staffing crunch we are currently seeing.
The problem with that idea is it just exasperates the cycle of boom and bust in the shipbuilding industry. You really don’t want to build at a rate far off that needed for a 25/30 year replacement cycle.
Agree, steady build rate even if it meant outsourcing lesser work to other countries. Need to maintain skills & knowledge for the future.
The solution is to get the replacement orders in and not repeat what we are doing with the T23s.
The work on MRSS, SSN-AUKUS and Type 83 is enough to keep the required skills alive across the country until work starts on new frigate replacements.
T23 had a far lower number of core crew during its concept thabn it does now. As systems where added and real-life operations where conducted more bums on seats where found to be needed hence the conversion of offices and store rooms to bunk spaces in later years.
So just how late is this ship. The comparison of a foc with a soc is bonkers. Another flawed procurement made by remote beureacts who know nothing about building ships supported by a bunch of sycophants interested only in their own careers and not the national interest.
As if human trolls aren’t bad enough, we now have AI bot trolls generating nonsensical gibberish…
What gibberish is this
Well, they are rather late…… Are they not ?
Good article. Particularly reassuring the explanation about delay to Venturer being launched.
Sounds very like the Dutch OPV’s that deploy to the Caribbean.
“lean crew” don’t make me laugh, It’s just an excuse for having far to few ships.
Lean crewing allows you to man more ships with the same number of personnel. It even says that in the article! Maybe you should read it first before commenting?
It’s “too few”.
Ermm, my reply was either reported or deleted, sorry, it looks like I don’t have the same rights to comment here.
HNoMS Helge sinking was partially due to ‘lean manning’ according to the report.
If that were the case, it would be due to undermanning and not lean manning.
Please provide link as the only reference I have seen to manning is that the Nowegian Navy was pushing people through qualification as officer-of-the-watch faster than previously, but even this was disputed.
From what I can find, the sinking of the ship had nothing to do with lean manning or even being undermanned; it was primarily a lack of experience and crew competency, combined with incorrect lighting on the tanker and design flaws in the frigate.
‘design flaws in the frigate’
Why Navantia has zero chance of winning the Norwegian navy frigate replacement program.
Given the Royal Norwegian Navy’s stated preferences, Type 26 looks like a favourite. The admiral in charge of the project stated the desire to buy ships from a hot production line, to the same spec as the original design, with a focus on ASW. Additionally, he highlighted their relationship with the UK and RN as strong and very important.
Given how tight we are on manpower, I wouldn’t be surprised if one or two hulls from Batch 2 ended up going to Norway before the remaining 3-4 ships were tagged on the end of our order
Think you’re right. We have to think long term. It’s highly likely Type 83 will be moved to the right. That will leave an order gap for BAES. A 5 ship order from Norway would be extremely important. If it means a longer wait for 1 or 2 at least they’d be going to a close neighbour and ally.
Exactly my point.
Wasnt ‘incorrect’ lighting on tanker – but the wrong conclusions drawn by the frigates bridge
https://www.navylookout.com/learning-the-lessons-the-loss-the-norwegian-frigate-helge-ingstad/
Thats when the real errors of judgment were made, after the collision.
This class are not suited to high end conflict! Without a suite of decent ASW sensors and weapons this class are floating coffins in the wrong theatre. It’s as though the MOD decision makers have never read about the Bacchante Class and how they fared. Still less crew in this scenario is a blessing.
What Bacchante class are you on about, exactly? The trio of ironclad corvettes from the 19th century that aren’t notable for anything beyond a few colonial conflicts and carrying two serving royals simultaneously?
The reality is the RN, and navies in general, have a range of responsibilities outside all-out warfare; disaster relief, trade protection, anti-piracy, defence engagement. Those are all daily tasks that can’t be ignored and need suitable hulls in a lot of places simultaneously; even at its peak, the navy was building both battleships and first-rate cruisers AND second- and third-rate cruisers for commerce protection.
Perhaps then further savings could be made? What about the deletion of Sea Ceptor? The 57mm gun? Delete the helicopter and turn the hangar into an exhibition space and restaurant?
Type 31 is an escort. The RN can’t afford to have escorts at sea without an ASW capability. Listing all that tertiary stuff may make you sound ‘reasonable’ but all you are doing is excusing the inexcusable. These things are built for all out warfare. They doing those other things in the gaps in between.
Ah yes, the perfectly logical argument that because the ship doesn’t have comprehensive suite against one specific type of of threat, it’s completely useless in any war and should be an unarmed OPV. Excellent use of rationale thinking.
I’d certainly prefer the ship to have a full ASW capability. The RN would also have preferred it had every bell and whistle under the sun, I’m sure.
Unfortunately for all involved, budgets exist, and they always have. At no point in history has enough money existed to make every ship a first-rate combatant, capable of doing everything.
Fortunately, however, not every task requires full-spectrum capability. The ongoing conflict off the Horn of Africa requires warships, and it’s a situation that has persisted and will continue to persist. The T31 is a good enough warship for what it needs to be, and it’s a hell of a lot better than no warship at all.
Both of you have a point.
Back to Corporate – a T31 would have been ideal in bomb alley. The 40mm/57mm/Sea Ceptor is ideal for a localised air umbrella. The NSM and 57mm would be ideal to support marines going ashore. Ok not as good as a heavy calibre gun but a lot more use than nothing.
They do have a very definite purpose.
Its the same or better than medium gun ( heavy is 6in plus) as its the weight of fire over say 5 secs that matters.
This wasnt the heavy RC bunkers at Normandy landings
You are ignoring the, well known, psychological impact of a very big bang every minute or so to keep oppo heads down.
There is a massive difference in air-burst effect radius between 57mm and 4.5” or 5”.
57mm would be useful for specific targets.
When a peer conflict does arise they won’t likely be able to pick and chose where they’re sent! Where there’s a sub surface threat this class and her crews will be as vulnerable as Abokir, Hogue and Cressy were! History lessons needed?
If the T31s had ASW capability they’d be the price of the T26. So instead of 5 T31s we’d have instead 1 extra T26, at a time when the RN is sorely lacking hulls.
In a conflict it’s the Admiralty that will ‘pick and choose’ what vessel goes where, and as the experts you’d expect them to assign the most appropriate vessel.
The cruisers Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy were lost because their accompanying destroyers had to return to port due to bad weather. Meanwhile the cruisers were diverted south, without their destroyers, to support the large cross Channel troop transport that was going on, but also brought them close to U-boat bases.
In short, a similar situation in WW2 to Prince of Wales and Wales being due to the absence of Ark Royal that was meant to supply air cover.
They were lost because they had no means of detecting subsurface threats and no means of defeating it. T31 not much different? In the wrong theatre against the wrong threat floating coffins. A capable enemy N2 will easily work the weaknesses
Of course they didn’t have any means of detecting subsurface threats, because they were sunk at the start of WW1, long before sonar was invented. That’s why destroyers were used to screen capital ships and try and spot submarine periscopes.
You’re disingenuously trying to distort history to support your arguments.
Absence of HMS Illustrious? She had a nose for trouble and I thought she copped out by running aground after her refit in the States. Wise decision.
Phillips should have known better.
TBF it was the RAF that failed to provide air cover for PoW and Repulse.
If a peer conflict arises the RN hopes to have sufficient notice to spend more money on upgrades first. Hopes rather than expects. It’s just making the best of a bad situation.
In a peer conflict it wont be acting as a singleton.
Other vessels and assets with ASW can cover that need and the Helo can be used as a pony to deliver torpedo’s via Vectac.
How about training? Any job requires a percentage of staff in what are effectively training posts and this is particularly so for the Royal Navy. I would guess that, for this reason, the ship’s company will need to be some 20% to 25% larger than the minimum required to man (?!) the ship.
No mention of the manning requirements for the Ships Flight helo maintainers. Traditionally, one crew expected to provide 24/7 operational coverage.
SMR, Grubber, pinkie and greenie SR and JR doing maint and deck crew. Helo controller for the Ops room.
Due to gapping I was the only FDO on a T23 so covered that job and my own as a WE SR Weapon Supply for one deployment. If push comes to shove get the SMAC 233 people up to assist.
Come on mate you’re known as FiDO 😉
My question is about the following sentence, ‘For example, Type 31 makes the first use of the Unattended Machinery Space (UMS) notation in an RN Frigate’.
Why would you say ‘an’ RN Frigate? It doesn’t work for the abbreviation or the full unabbreviated word. It should be ‘a’ RN frigate.
Also, frigate in that context shouldn’t be capitalised as it’s not a proper noun.
Clearly, I didn’t make it past that sentence before commenting. I’ll read the rest now!
There are ways around fewer crew for damage control. Fitting sprinkler systems for example. A ship built for lean manning would need to have accommodation spread throughout the hull. That would be both for ratings and officers. Double bulkheads and longitude strengthening is something that would be good but I doubt we will see the RN adopting such due to cost. Plus ‘safe routes’ to get around fires. (Distribution of extra equipment too, pumps, and timber wedges as there is plenty of volume for DC stores in a big ship.)
If Type 32 is a thing I would like to see it as a class, or a one off example, built with survival of both crew and hull as the main driver for layout. It wouldn’t impact on sensor or weapons placement.
Oh you so need to visit a monohull LCS to see how the fewer crew for DC concept works.
If the RN has done anything similar to that then it will be a disaster.
If the RN have learned lessons from the colonial cousins experience, then they should be in a better place.
LCS unmanned spaces are built with no consideration for access because they are unmanned. Doing maintenance in them is a nightmare. I need to employ orangutans to get to some of the stuff!
Very interesting article. Lean manning is a necessity in today’s RN but I would be a little concerned about such small crew numbers being able to handle a main machinery space fire. When automated fire suppression doesn’t do the job you eat through support parties very quickly.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5_VF1vjtAk&ab_channel=AndrewGoodeTV
Filth!
(Former NBCDQ)
The French FREMM frigates that operate at the Red Sea need 160 crew in total to keep the vessel operational. The standard crew was determined as 96 in peacetime. French FREMM frigates have a standard of 123 personnel on board, including the aircrew. As a result of the ongoing operation in the Red Sea against Houthis, there is a need for an additional 40 personnel to keep the vessel operational as it should be.
So what makes the RN think they can operate a Type 31 in a wartime scenario with only 110 crew members? Probably works when you’re floating around in the Irish Sea but not in the Red Sea!
Good point. They have thought of that
“The ship has very generous spare accommodation for up to another 80 personnel in addition to the core ship’s company
I’am sure they have. But are those extra crew members available? Or do they have to transfer crew members from other vessels?
“ HMS Venturer under construction at Rosyth (April 2024). Her time in the build hall is being extended beyond the original schedule for reasons of efficiency – more equipment is being installed undercover before float-off.”
Right….
So the overall plan has been changed…which suggests that the planning wasn’t very good. Because keeping #1 and #2 in the shed means #3 isn’t in the shed being built. So the whole program has gone to the right.
Or that there is another driver to this.
Could it be that RN don’t actually want T31 too quickly given the crewing issues? If all of T31 come fast then there is the embarrassment of T31 or T26 sitting around on the wall. If T26 can’t be crewed the pressure is on to sell one or more T26 to the Norwegians.
Either that or Mk41 and other goodies are going in from the off.
Babcock have never built a warship from scratch before. The idea that they might have planned inefficiently the first time seems pretty credible to me. Remember that blocks of #3 are being built in Poland.
Of course you are right that a delay might suit the RN, but it wouldn’t suit Babcock who will get paid on stages. Why would Babcock deliver more slowly than agreed on the contract just to save RN’s blushes?
Depends what was agreed in the renegotiation?
That was never announced?
It might be that a smaller workforce due to labour rates shooting up was a favoured outcome?
The key to commercial renegotiations is not to have a circular firing squad as the output! It looks like this has been achieved.
I do suspect some extra bits were added to spec to provide a ‘reason’ for the changed timetable for external consumption.
I see the armchair admirals have taken cushy jobs in private industry as high vis vest project managers
I do run a company that runs multi million pound projects!
I’ve got a bright orange high vis jacket in the boot of my car.
I’d better go and buy an armchair….
Caption to the main photo
‘She is already at a far more advanced stage of outfitting than HMS Cardiff when she was floated off. The application of Pusser’s grey is being delayed until the last moment rather than being applied multiple times purely for aesthetic reasons.”
I see.
So in your world painting five coats of paint takes six+ months?
Painting it, my friend, has nothing to do with this delay which is dressage to cover for either of the two main options I’ve described above.
Didnt you a month back show a picture from X of the unpainted ship to imply they were way way behind.
Meanwhile NL provides answers which are ignored for further uninformed speculation. I had my own company too, and there was often delays for all sorts of reasons
Interesting to read that you had your own company, can I dare ask what field it was in ?
No.
I don’t generally post images.
The article actually, and curiously, doesn’t contain any answers as to why this massive delay has occurred.
“The watch & Station bill of about 165 sailors for the Danish Iver Huitfeldt-class frigate”
That is BS, in the interview seven years ago with Capt. Haumann of HDMS Peter Willemoes in Baltimore he states basic crew of 117 excluding extras though accommodation for 173 and that’s for a full fat frigate not the “light” T31 frigate with minimal weapon systems.
Think video very worth while a watch, 7:50 re crew
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O1rg3Qa3FpU&t=1s
I remembered that video when I read 165 and I wondered if it might have something to do with the dual crewing system they’ve used on the IH.
However, despite Wikipedia also claiming the complement is 165, a little digging shows this is the maximum number stated in several places, not the core crew, and even that maximum number varies between 165 and 175. One American sourced comment on the early crewing of the class was “…the Danish ship was forced to take on nearly 20 extra crew members when the lean 100 person complement was found insufficient for operational needs.” This chimes in with the 117 number from the video.
I agree with Jonboy’s comment that the lean-manning claims typically underestimate what will actually be needed.
Good points . However the lean crewing numbers will used as the base line for operational funding by the Treasury types who control RN accounting and funding.
Any extra crew costs will then have to be funding by cuts elsewhere or more likely a lot more dockside time for one of the class
It would be interesting to understand how the current ship design intends to operate in a CBRN environment
That makes sense, overwork your loyal engineers and underpay them… when outside the Navy they can get 50% more pay for half the pressure and be at home with their family and not have the “what if” about returning home. Stop undermanning ships and start paying the serving personnel what they deserve. Best decision I ever made was leaving the whole “Officers and the Men” narrative because without the men, the officers can’t justify their jobs.
Nothing is Jack/matelot proof especially watch and station bills.
There will be issues that arise that have not been foreseen. Good crew management onboard is the key to dealing with that. The management team need to manage expectations and the “we can do that” attitude that sometimes originates from the top down.
Recent USN issues such as collisions on ABs and incidents with LCS have had crew fatigue as a big big factor. Doing to much with to few people.
Also consider that the people pushing lower crew numbers are the same people/ desks in Fleet who thought Operator/Maintainer OMs where the future ! 😏
“ The survivability of a ship depends on the measures in place to mitigate the effects of damage and carry on functioning while also preserving life onboard as far as possible. A good part of the cost and complexity of good warship design and construction is devoted to mitigating the effects of blast, shock, fires and floods and having resilient systems that will continue to function even if parts of the system are destroyed.”
And how all that interacts with operational efficiency.
You can’t be closed up and moving munitions…if you aren’t moving munitions you are not fighting.
Anyone who has been on any ship that is closed up knows how tiring it is to do a trip to the heads that would have taken 5 mins and then takes 15 mins as you unclip and reclip each door. That is 15 mins off station.
So the bit missing, to me anyway, is ‘how fightable is the ship for a prolonged period closed up?’
The next question is ‘how much limited opening up for essentials impacts DC?’
Most ships cannot be considered 100% closed up all the time, there will always be a person going through an opening at anyone point in time – there is always a must-do to keep the ship operational.
Supportive Bloke
Very unusually…….I am going to have to “agree to disagree with you”
Operation Corporate was over forty years ago: and things have moved on a bit since then
Furthermore, it was mostly a battle between the RN and the Argie airforce – thus the RN “usually” had a few minutes of “air red” warning time
Furthermore, overall, we were extremly lucky that the Argies did not deploy inside Falklands Sound either:
If either had been present = you would never have been allowed to nip out for a Jimmy Riddle !
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Frankly NATO and RN damage control and survivability standards have not moved on much in the past fory yaers = the RN is still stuck in 1984
Much warship design is still based on the key US Congressional study from the late 1970s’:
(Note: a key engineering design document, Unfortuately it was one which the RN only got around to reading properly after Op Corporate had finished)
————–
So, taking the Norweign example – of how not to do automation;:
—————————–
In modern peer-on-peer warfare, the warning time from any type of enemy threat – air, surface underwater – is very likley to be minimal
Even a non-nation stae actor like Hezbulla have used anti-ship missle afgainst Isreali ships i the recent past!
So, as hjave been prived by
—————————-
so, when it comes to “lean manning” several points;
Overall I will only belive that the RN is getting really really sroious aboyut “laen nmanning (note 1) when the current RN stanard of a MOPS (note 2) is replacd by a far -more modern piece of ckeaning equpment = they are lled a electrically operated floor scrubber.
The Rn is on the right trcaks: but it has a very long way to go yet…..
The Lockheed Skunk Works prototype in the 1980s; the protoype for all stealth ships “Sea Shadow” had crew of just four
Regards Peter (irate Taxpayer)
Note 1. Why in the 21st centry is the RN still calling it “Lean Manning”. That is surely a open and shut case fur a court martailling: obviously fllwoed by madatory attendance a several weeks of “Rainbow Awareness Training”. This phase must be realced by a suitabke TLA soo
Note 2. TLA translator – = MOPS – Manually Operated Pole-mounted Scrubbers
Note 3. The word Mandatory really ough to be replaced – anybody ny ideas?
All
regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
I don’t really think anyone noticed.
“ If either had been present = you would never have been allowed to nip out for a Jimmy Riddle !”
There is only so much time a ship can operate fully closed up.
There is a difference between fully and partly closed up.
Unless you can get Harry Potter involved you still need to open up for the 4hr changeovers.
Sorry but I strongly disagree with the RN part of this: “Frankly NATO and RN damage control and survivability standards have not moved on much in the past fory yaers = the RN is still stuck in 1984”.
Exceptional damage control by the ships companies of Brazen (1994) and Nottingham (2002) rewrote the book on damage control by exceptional leadership, thinking outside the box and a can do attitude in general (that and they didn’t want to lose their cd collection).
I returned to sea not long after both of these incidents (funnily enough joining Brazen in 96 in the Adriatic) and a lot of the lessons learned/lessons identified were taught to us during BISC / ISSC at Phoenix (Whale Island).
These were my shipmates, oppos and bezzy wingers – they didn’t fail each other or their ships.
Russ
I made no critisum whatsover of any RN crew(s) (past or present)!!!!
My orginal comments, about the need to “very soon” change some key RN engineering design standards, was frankly spot on.
Damage control standards and surviveability and crew training etc etc were all throughly revolutionised in those busy two years after 1982.
The two crews you mentioned were both trained to the “1984 standards”….
....and those two incidents were the two big “post-Falklands” flooding incidents
Yes, I will agree, plenty of “recent lessons learnt” have been added to the sylabus. However the “core basics” and “key principles” were never changed!
—————-
Nottingham
You are quite correct that Brazan’s and (especially) Nottingham’s crews both did exceptionally well to save their own, and their shipmates, CD collections.
That was in “marked contrast” to the more-recent Norweigian example I gave more details of…..
Nottingham was, and it now has to be added “very very unusually” – ripped right open – almost from end-to-end along the ship’s entire hull.
The two key reasons Nottingham stayed floating were:
Note the word “large” in the first sentence.
The three key words in the second sentence are “no asymmetric flooding”
The two other RN T42’s that had previously gone to the bottom – quite ironically as result of both of them having suffered far less combat damage inflicited below their waterlines – both suffered from severe asymmetric flooding. They were also in rougher seas. Thus both other T42 ships rolled over (i.e. before finally sinking).
Quite ironically, it was only the very very unusual fact that Nottingham was ripped wide open – both very very low down and also right along its entire hull – which meant that the sea water level inside the hull stayed “level” = and that allowed the crew time to be able to save it (mind you: only just!)
Overall, that was a very very unusual pattern of damage!
————————-
So, let me now explain why I said that things have not moved on much since 1984.
Both NATO, and also the very similar RN, engineering design standards for ship stability in the “severely damaged” condition have always assumed – and they still assume today – two key things:
Thus the assumption is that the crew “on the spot” will be able to report the damage: and close up the hatches and also start damage control operations (i.e. be the first little finger in the small hole in the dyke and all the rest of that useful “Dutch Schoolboy Stuff” …)
However, in an near-future era of lean manning, with all of the ship’s engine rooms and machinary spaces being unmanned below the waterline = that key assumption is no longer true.
And, as we all known = making incorrect assumptions at the very early stage of a new ship’s design processs will be the “Mother and Father” of all fouls-ups……
……….which is why the Norweigian Navy quite-recently sunk their own frigate…….
Reduced Warning Times
Furthermore, to add a fuhur complication “into the mix” , since the end of the Falklands conflict enemy weapons systems have, generally, got both faster and/or more lethal
So what was a Mach 1 Exocet back in 1982 is today’s Mach 2 ASM: – and that halves the available warning and reaction time for the RN crew on the receiving end…
Therefore we are now living in an era where a RN warship will be attacked:
And so – if it takes two minutes to close up the entire ship with a well-trained, but lean manned crew – that will be one minute too long…...
Lean Manning
My key point was that, when lean manning is introduced, I believe that the fundamental engineering design standards for RN warships now need to be throughly revised: ideally starting from first principles.
To take your point about crewing and damage control…..
On board any RN warship of the near future there always going to be a need for well-trained damage control parties: simply because an enemy may welll try to sink you….However, in any lean manned ship of the near future, those damage control parties will “normally” be located well above the waterline
Thus, in the event of serious flooding, the DC party will have to move down into the danger zone below the waterline. That may well mean they have to open up a hatch = and in an “already flooded compartment” that could be catastropic…
…and, so that fudamentally means that we really do soon need to be rethinking how future warships are both designed and operated…..
—————-
Finally, a bit of light bedtime reading for you:
https://shipstab.org/files/Proceedings/STAB/STAB2009/STAB_2009_s03-p1.pdf
The first paragraph refers back to the key engineering study in the 1960’s
Trust me: the rest of this Quinetiq boffin’s document is an cure for insomnia.
Regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
PS I still reckon that the Oliver Hazard Perry class of frigates was the best designed NATO escort sized ship of recent decades (especially structually) for surviving enemy-inflicted damage. Any other offers for “top of the class”?
While my knowledge of RN crewing is currently undeveloped, I imagine that once we improve crew numbers, these automated ships will be able to divert more crew to damage control than previously. This could be a canny investment by the design teams.
I leave it to the experts on here to correct me if necessary.
I think you need to develop your knowledge a fair bit before commenting again.
I think you need to develop your manners before commenting again.
“Defence Thoughts” simply brought up a point of discussion and deferred to those more knowledgeable. Judging by your answer, you are not among those with more knowledge…
I think you need to mind your own business.
Its clearly regrettable that the Type 31 wont have a bow sonar as this would complete a well rounded GP package now that Mark 41 VLS has been included. Perhaps some of the sonar 2150 being installed on Type 23 could be transferred across as they go out of service (or are they already ear marked for Type 26)?
In any case the Type 31 will have the Surface Ship Torpedo Defence System and so in practice wont be much worse off than T45 currently are (I understand the T45 bow sonar is not highly regarded). That’s not to say its an ideal state of affairs, but hopefully a decent bow sonar will be high on the list of early upgrades.
T45’s sonar was based on a mine and obstacle avoidance sonar that had one customer the Brazilian navy.
You might want to check out the other customer for the type 45s hull sonar. I will save you the time…. It was the australians , for the hobart class.They must have wanted a crap sonar too….or perhaps it isnt crap. The back end processing is by ultra who l think might be quite good with sonars.
Lean manning with the 23’s had ships companies of about 90 (excluding flight) and one of my mates was on Norfolk and he said they struggled back then.
This article suggests they have considered quite a bit in terms of where to put bums on seats and where to automate stuff but you do wonder if it takes into account casualties when you take any sort of incidents, fire/flood, battle damage etc.
The paper that this article is based on says this about damage control:
“The ability to carry out damage control activities required to react to both peacetime incidents and enemy action was a driving consideration. Supported by advanced monitoring systems, fixed fire suppression and containment solutions the number of personnel in the Type 31 complement was tested against various scenarios to ensure there were sufficient numbers to sustain the safety of the platform and to restore or maintain capability. This also included stress testing of the solution, in conjunction with serving members of the Fleet Operational Standards & Training (FOST) organisation and RN damage control school instructors, by removing personnel as casualties to examine whether the solution would remain effective.“
So it looks like they did consider it
From a terminology point of view… survivability is a general term and comprises three parts.
1. susceptibility, the ability to avoid being seen, shot at and hit by a threat
2. Vulnerabilty, the ability to withstand being damaged by a hit from a threat
3. Recoverability, the ability to restore capability and continue a mission once damaged.
Susceptibility can be broken down more (dont be there, dont be seen, dont be shot at or hit).
Is that a bow sonar I see in the bottom picture?