On 17th November 2021, an F-35B ditched into the sea on take-off from HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Eastern Mediterranean during operation FORTIS / CSG21. The basic cause of the accident was understood very quickly but the full board of enquiry report published recently highlights multiple contributing factors and reveals broader issues with UK Carrier Strike capability.
The F-35B aircraft ZM152, also known by its construction number, BK-18 flown by an RN pilot known as Lt ‘Hux’ was attempting to take off from the carrier for a training sortie. Due to a protective engine blank being left in the intake duct, the engine was only able to generate 55% of the thrust needed for the aircraft to take off from the ski ramp. Realising something was amiss, the pilot attempted to abort but it was too late and the jet was about to fall off the ramp when he was forced to eject. Following the successful ejection, Hux descended by parachute, fortunately landing on the flight deck, avoiding the extreme hazard of landing in the water and being run over by the ship. He suffered cuts to his neck and other minor injuries but was not seriously hurt. The aircraft was seen to be afloat as the ship passed by but sank shortly afterwards.
Small mistakes, big consequences
The report specifies a series of small issues that contributed to the accident. Some are part of a systemic force-generation problem while others might be seen as typical lessons learned through experience with new jets on a new carrier conducting its first long deployment.
A key misstep was the way that red gear items used to protect the aircraft were handled by engineers. The storage solution and logging methods for recording the issue or return of red gear was weak and there was no system in place that would immediately make it obvious one item must still be on an aircraft due to fly. The risks from FOD (Foreign Object Damage) were always treated very seriously but red gear was perceived more as a risk to other aircraft rather than the aircraft it was fitted to. This is despite the fact that 4 instances of red gear being sucked into F-35 engines had been recorded by US operators although they had been very fortunate, none resulted in the loss of an aircraft.
The design of the red gear for the F-35 had gone through various iterations and was not entirely satisfactory. Ironically the text ‘Remove before flight’ was printed on the intake blanks by the manufacturer but the characters were found to peel off and present a FOD hazard so 617 Squadron engineers removed the lettering. A pop-pin used to secure the intake cover in place was not always used and there were numerous instances of red gear being blown off aircraft on the flight deck, including on the day of the accident and several had been lost overboard.
Due to these problems, red gear was not routinely fitted to aircraft on the flight deck when the ship was at sea. In this instance, the Government Special Access Programme Security Officer (GSSO) responsible for maintaining the secrecy of some aspects of the F-35, ordered them to be fitted for the visit to Oman and the transit of the Suez Canal, although gave no instruction when they should be removed. The intake ducting is designed to shield the fan at the front of the F-35’s engine from radar in order to help maintain the aircraft’s stealth. This feature is covered when it might be viewed close up by those without security clearance.
The reason the engine blank was left in the engine was primarily down to faulty assumptions made by two engineers tasked with conducting routine maintenance on BK-18 which was due to fly the following morning. The combined Post Operation Servicing (POS) and Before Operation Servicing (BOS) schedules mainly involved thorough inspections. The first engineer went onto the flight deck and conducted his work which involved removing the right blank to inspect the engine. When work was complete he took the single blank back to stores but could not carry the full set of red gear. The second engineer was delayed as he was required to assist with moving containers in the hanger so there was no handover. Working alone he did not see the left-hand blank which had likely been blown down the duct and was almost invisible. At night 617 engineers believed they were not allowed to use white light torches so as to preserve the night vision of the bridge team – the use of coloured light further reduced the chance of spotting the blank.
Early the following morning, 617 engineers conducted a mass removal of blanks on UK aircraft but also missed the blank stuck down the left duct of BK-18. Due to the posturing of (Russian) assets in the Eastern Mediterranean, the air wing was held at readiness for Combat Air Patrols (CAP) as it emerged from the Suez Canal. The pilot of BK-18 was scheduled to lead 2 sorties as part of an instructor qualification work-up, supervised by an experienced instructor flying in BK-21 as the number two. The pilot and the ‘see-off’ team that prepared the aircraft just before take-off also failed to spot the rogue blank. Tired engineers at all levels of seniority fatigued after 6 months at sea made small but understandable errors and the squadron had become too lax about handling red gear.
A people problem
The biggest contributory factor that led to a small error resulting in a costly and serious accident was a lack of people and a lack of carrier operating experience. It was not just a shortage of aircrew (although the Defence Secretary admitted in 2022 the UK had a combined total of just 33 pilots trained to fly the 29 F-35s then in its possession, including three foreign pilots on exchange). To generate the 113 personnel needed for FORTIS, 617 had to borrow 15 people from 207 Squadron. 14 of the engineers that deployed were very inexperienced and joined directly from Phase 2B training. Only 55% of the whole unit had ever spent time on a carrier and 23% had not completed the Embarked Forces Sea Survival Course (EFSSC) which is supposed to be mandatory preparation for sea time.
Unlike RN aircraft engineers, their RAF counterparts did not qualify in flight line servicing during Phase 2B training. Either they needed to be fitted onto the limited spaces available on RN courses or get by with on-the-job training. This meant 617 had to borrow engineers from 207 which disrupted the Lightning Force as a whole and reduced cohesion and efficiency. It also placed even greater demands on the core of experienced personnel, increasing tiredness. The restrictions imposed on the whole ship’s company and limited opportunities for runs ashore as a result of COVID also compounded the fatigue.
A high turnover of people exacerbated the issues, especially in senior posts. The Senior Engineering Officer job in 617 Squadron had been filled by 5 Officer’s in 2 years leading up to the deployment. This was a Sqn Ldr/Lt Cdr post but had to be filled by two less experienced officers for a period. The Squadron Warrant Officer Engineer (WOEng) had 4 years Lightning experience but only joined the Squadron 5 months before FORTIS and had never been to sea. Only one of the personnel in the four key engineering management positions of SEngO, two JEngOs and WOEng had completed more than one of the carrier workup embarkations.
Slightly ludicrously, wherever the US Marine Corps Squadron VMFA-211 also embarked on the ship is named in the report, it has been redacted, although it is quite obvious which unit is being referred to. The methods and establishment of VMFA-211 provide a very useful benchmark for comparison and 617 Squadron comes off badly. It is no coincidence that it was one of the 8 UK jets and not one of the 10 US jets that suffered this particular avoidable accident. 113 personnel of 617 Squadron were embarked for the deployment (12 of them were repatriated at various stages for personal or health reasons and not replaced) while VMFA-211 brought 255 people. 617 effectively had 14 personnel to each jet while the Marines had 25 per jet. If we assume the USMC has correctly determined the optimum support requirement for sustained F-35B operations at sea, then the UK squadron began the deployment a whopping 44% understrength.
In preparation for FORTIS, the CSG conducted 10-day exercise Strike Warrior in early May. This provided a little further maritime experience to 617 and established many of the routines for that would be used in FORTIS. A lesson identified from the exercise was that insufficient engineers were available to conduct flight line ops and aircraft rectification concurrently. Despite being a deployment that had been in the planning for 3 years, it was then too late to properly address the pressures that 617 engineers would inevitably come under on a 7-month deployment.
The pitfalls of part-time carrier aviation
In April 2000 the Joint Force Harrier was formed and the RN permanently gave up direct control of its fixed-wing aviation. Subsequently, when the Harrier was replaced by the F-35 Lightning and selected as the jet to fly from the aircraft carrier, the joint force was well established and the arrangement continued. To compound the pressure on the Lightning Force, the F-35B was also double-hatted as the replacement for the RAF Tornado force. This was the result of a fudge created by politicians failing to appreciate the exceptional value of naval aviation and more broadly, fund defence adequately. The effects of this continue to reverberate and impact the development of carrier strike today and can even be seen as an aggravating factor in the loss of the jet in 2021.
This is not an inter-service issue as such and at the time of the accident 617 was commanded by a Royal Navy aviator and the Squadron is a mix of RN and RAF personnel. The joint force concept works harmoniously at a micro level but the problem is at the macro level with the expectation on the force to perform in two separate and specialised roles. There is a constant tension between the need to force-generate for carrier operations while at the same time being tasked to operate from land on deep strike or air defence missions. Despite being in the early stages of development, the Lightning Force has already sent aircraft to Cyprus and Estonia to participate in live operations. As the number of jets and people grows this should ease the pressure a little but without a focus on a particular role, the jack of all trades risks being a master of none.
The ‘Dambusters’ 617 Squadron is arguably the RAF’s most high-profile unit, flying the most potent 5th generation aircraft possessed by the UK. Surprisingly the report admits the squadron was under strength, morale was low, there were insufficient Quality Assurance checks being conducted at Marham and general readiness for FORTIS was lower than COMUKCSG had been led to believe.
On the surface, it may appear there is little difference from an aviation perspective between carrier or land-based operations. As the accident demonstrates, HMS Queen Elizabeth is not just a floating equivalent of RAF Marham. In fact, the working environment, the increased level of risks to people, added procedural complexity and the pace of operations it very different at sea. For example, the simple and apparently minor issue of red gear storage arrangements on the carrier differing from what was routine ashore was a contributing factor, together with crew fatigue and inexperience. It is not possible to eliminate every mistake but ensuring the investment in UK carrier strike reaches even half of its potential and delivers maximum effect safely while maintaining the promised high readiness level, demands continual practice and focus.
The need to regularly rehearse these specialist skills goes beyond the squadron personnel working on the carrier but to the pilots and the wider Royal Navy fleet that need to frequently exercise the procedures and develop tactics for the maritime air battle. US Navy aviation personnel spend their time focused on operating at sea and are generally not expected to conduct land-based operations for sustained periods, that being the job of the US Air Force. Despite being wholly dedicated to their art and their aircrew considered to be amongst the elite of aviators, the USN still suffers occasional accidents as aircraft carriers are an inherently dangerous environment.
Following the all-out effort of FORTIS, F-35s were embarked on RN carriers for just 18 days in 2022 (11-29 Nov). This pitiful output becomes something of a vicious circle as the length of time between embarkations means a proportion of this precious time has to be spent on pilot carrier qualifications. Reacquainting pilots with the basics comes at the expense of conducting more complex sorties as well as integration with the fleet. This issue will clearly be exacerbated if there are too few support personnel and a high turnover of people is permitted, accelerating the loss of what are already perishable skills.
Air Marshall Steve Shell, responsible for the investigation admitted that The Lightning Force “has not yet reached the critical mass at which experience can be retained through posting cycles whilst still offering attractive job opportunities… and force growth cannot be maintained while front line squadrons are deployed. Until critical mass is reached, Defence must recognise the trade-offs between readiness, growth and safety”. HMS Queen Elizabeth will shortly deploy on CSG23 operating in northern European waters. It will be instructive to observe how many jets are embarked, and what operational tempo is maintained.
The second frontline F-35 unit, 809 Naval Air Squadron was supposed to be stood up in April this year but this has now slipped to December 2023 due to shortages of people. Although badged as a Fleet Air Arm unit, it will be another joint squadron and will operate in exactly the same way as 617. Full Operating Capability (FOC) for the Lightning Force is supposed to be achieved by 31 March 2025 but the delay to 809 does not bode well. It would seem that the post-COVID people shortages undermining the RN are just as problematic for the RAF, already beset by a lack of pilots thanks to the well-documented failures in the UK Military Flying Training System.
Silver lining
Several other minor deficiencies were revealed by the incident including an issue with limb restraints on the ejector seat that could have been more serious had it not been an ejection at slow speed. The pilot’s lifejacket also failed to inflate properly when later tested. The medical response was rather confused and there was a lack of clear communication within the ship in the immediate aftermath of the incident. The FOST syllabus did not include training on how to respond to an ejection close to the ship. Some of the data in the combat management system which should have formed part of the investigation was lost due to a lack of established procedures following an accident. Finally, the sonar locator beacon that was supposed to help locate the wreck on the seabed failed to activate, although in this case the exact position of the ditching was known making it fairly straightforward to pinpoint the wreck.
The loss of a jet valued at £81.8M and the subsequent £2.3M salvage operation is clearly very serious but fortunately, there were no major injuries or loss of life. If there is a silver lining to this cloud it comes from the multiple lessons that will be learned, potentially saving lives in future. Assuming the message that running short-handed with too many inexperienced people is addressed properly then it can only help make for a more effective capability in the long run.
I posted at the time that this had all the characteristics of an accident caused by crew fatigue at the end of a long deployment with all on board having one eye on getting back home.
..and guess what.
Partially caused. As stated, there are a myriad of other contributary factors, both personal and procedural. It’s can’t just be levelled at late-deployment sloppiness.
I presume that the RN has plane captains like the US Navy that’s responsible for a duly inspection, including a FOD check. And, the Flight deck chief along with the maintenance chief would be double checking…The pilot would be doing a walk round. Prior to the shooter signaling launch he’d get a thumbs up from final checkers ( badgers I think you call them ) and the pilot/shooter would concur ready for launch? Perfectly good airplane lost…
The non air crew complement of the QEs has already risen from a planned 600 to > 700. If the USMC, with far greater experience of operating F35 at sea, think that 25 aircrew per aircraft are needed, the total complement to operate at full capacity will be impossible to deliver. Given current and foreseeable manning problems and the ever present cost pressures, I don’t see how UK is going to be able to operate both carriers at the same time.
I’m not entirely sure the USMC does have far greater experience of operating F35 at sea. Both services are still on a learning curve here and I suspect that the actual manning per embarked aircraft is likely to be somewhere closer to 20 bods, rather than 25, given the US are usually notoriously manpower heavy.
Still illustrates the somewhat limited understanding throughout the RN. The early CVF/FCBA (later JCA) work based a lot of its assumptions on SHAR manning levels. This was always going to be too low given the combined effect of a bigger airwing and more capable jet which means you tend to do more demanding missions with higher demands on bombheads, chockheads and lineys. It’s worth remembering that proper embarked operations on a regular basis stopped around 2005/6. We’re still paying the price for that and the lack of interest from previous senior leadership (eg Stanhope) who decided the aircraft were someone else’s problem and were only interested in the ships.
What is clear is that getting sufficient critical mass into the Lightning force is proving much harder than planned for a variety of reasons and needs some attention sharpish.
Fair points. Fixed wing carrier aviation is never cheap and always operationally challenging. In theory, replacing one STOVL aircraft with another should have proved the least difficult route to regenerating the capability. But for the money spent, what we have to date is disappointing- too few aircraft, too few trained pilots and delayed integration of the intended UK weapons. The USMC still fly the AV8, so have maintained STOVL operations without the long gap the RN suffered.
A much earlier than F-35 UK-US collaboration , the 1951 Nash-Healey ( Nash mechanicals 3.6L) which was the origin of the later Austin-Healey with 2.6/3L engines
I’m not entirely sure you’re correct in your assessment that ‘the actual manning per embarked aircraft is likely to be somewhere closer to 20 bods, rather than 25’. The bigger question is, what is the maximum complement for this ship? Already we’re seeing the need to increase the non-aviation complement, and now it appears that there is a need to increase the aviation complement as well.
This was not war and mission intensity was not comparable to war so i am not sure manning is the issue here.
USMC does seem to have a good deployment schedule done already – including one on QE. Including 1 deployment of F35C on a carrier already
https://www.key.aero/article/us-navy-and-usmc-f-35bc-squadrons-complete-guide
VMFA-121 (F35B) Wasp, America, Tripoli
VMFA-211 (F35B) Essex
VMFA-122 (F35B) America , Makin Is
VMFA-242 (F35B) Japan , Australia land deploy
VMFA-225 (F35B) –
VFMA-314 (F35C) Abraham Lincoln as part of the naval air wing
What has made it easier for USMC of squadron strength of 10 planes normally a LHD deployment was 6, but they have started to grow that to the full 10 . Plus one LHD as a test carried 20 planes with 2 VMFA
It’s not the plan (or in the budget) to operate both carriers in the fixed wing strike roll at the same time.
The second ships main roll is to provide maintenance cover for the other ship. Without it you end up in the French situation of a good carrier force but only for some of the time. With regularly months and occasionally a year+ of no availability.
The original plan was to operate 2 carriers with access to a fleet of 138 F35s. The carrier decision was a reduction in hulls from 3 to 2, justified by their larger planned airwings. Only later, when it was clear the funding for the original plan was not going to be forthcoming( partly caused by the near doubling of the vessel build costs and LMs complete failure to deliver an affordable replacement for several legacy aircraft) was the idea of operating one carrier with the second as a reserve floated. Because of the newness of the ships, this has not gone as far as the approach to the LPDs, with one vessel in extended readiness with just a skeleton crew.
But with manning problems and the continued inability to afford the original planned number of F35s, we may be heading towards that solution. Increasing crew numbers just makes that look more likely.
I’d like to see paperwork that supports your contention that there was ever a plan to simultaneously operate have both carriers and airwings at anything like full readiness.
Strategic defence review 1997 for starters. There was criticism at the time of the loss of one platform but the initial plan was for 2 larger 40000ton ships with @50 aircraft each. The commitment to the F35 was made in 2001 ( we invested $2.5b in the development programme) and with the choice of a heavier aircraft, the designed size and displacement grew substantially. When the final contract was signed in 2007, there was no suggestion that we would only operate one vessel, even though refits would mean that at times, only one would be available. The F35 plan for 138 aircraft, a one for one replacement of the RN and RAF Harrier fleets, was intended to allow 36 to be deployed routinely from each carrier.
As I noted above, the costs of both acquisition and support of the F35s, and the continuing manpower problems, mean that we will never achieve the original ambition. Whether one vessel is put into extended readiness or both are kept fully crewed but with minimal air wings is yet to be seen.
Originally envisaged with cats and traps requiring dedicated aircraft, switching to cheaper f35b operations meant dual raf / navy roles
Always looking to STOVL as primary plane
Refer to SDR 1997
28 “No decisions have been taken on a future carrier-borne aircraft but a version of the Joint Strike Fighter currently under development in the United States remains a strong contender. We are therefore participating in the concept demonstration phase of the programme.”
No ‘originally’ a cat trap type at all as the JSF was already in the wind
Thanx for correction. The carriers were envisaged firstly with French interest, was uk always going with what became f35b ? A risk at the time to bet on one undeveloped project.
Post flip flop over F35B or C the current plan has been in place. Before that is ancient history in defence policy terms.
That was just a smokescreen to delay the follow on carrier, but wasted time and money
Just as another smokescreen earlier over looking for a cheaper T26 design study came to nothing just before the election , but 5 years wasted as was intended
No. It couldn’t have ever been that way. Buying 2 for 1 is a minimum for availability. These things aren’t cross channel ferries. The RN was struggling and never really operated the Invincible on a 3 for 1 basis.
Are you sure on that 3:1 for availability . It gets banded around a lot but a better measure for a frigate is 100-160 days per year depending on where they have been before .
100 days when they have come back from a decent deployment
160 days when they have just come out of refit
Yes.
The French paid for the rights of the carrier design they intended to build the third carrier.
I think intended is much to strong a word. Looked at is more appropriate. In the end they were always more likely to go with a national nuclear powered cat & trap design.
Yes. I think the French involvement was really about getting work for their shipyards for some of the hull modules and maybe some of the main systems.
They always wanted cat/ trap and nuclear propulsion, plus they had designed and built CdG so what was there for them to learn?
RM haven’t ever liked CdG.
RM were explicit they didn’t want CdG #2
RM actually wanted RN thinking injected into the process so that they didn’t just end up with political fudge carrier again and they really wanted to have two of them.
I don’t think RM are that happy with having one very expensive solo carrier
RM style QEC was always going to be Cat’n’traps and nuclear. It is why QEC is the way it is. There was space for the cats and the hull explicitly allowed for nuclear propulsion – at least until the French parted company and that design strand stopped.
” Space for ” was just a tick box that was never taken up once the detailed design with STOVL got under way as was revealed when the smokescreen of conversion appeared again- seems to come a round every 5-8 years
“Research by the National Audit Office reveals an exceptionally lax assessment had been done of the true cost of CATOBAR conversion in 2010. Part of the problem was the ‘adaptable carrier’ just had some empty spaces that could theoretically be used to take CATOBAR equipment but no detailed design work had ever been done.”
https://www.navylookout.com/cats-traps-and-claptrap-why-the-royal-navys-new-aircraft-carriers-operate-vstol-aircraft/
Did the USMC and RN squadron had the same number of aircraft in QE?
For me this is not related to F-35 but mostly to the retirement of Harrier from RN ages ago and no RN carrier aircraft for a long time.
There was, is a big loss of know how – institutional procedure – with that hiatus in capability.
There is neverthless a bad red mark in this document: there is no comparison with procedures by USMC and Italians.
Italian carrier aviation is a token ornament of the navy, not a capability they sustain. They rarely if ever deploy and have almost zero experience outside the med. The Spanish are in the same boat. The French, US and UK are the 3 nations that attempt sustained carrier aviation capability.
The French and the UK don’t attempt sustained carrier ops at all. We would need another carrier at least. Four times the fleet train. About four times as many escorts. At least 4, not 3, full carrier air wings. Having carriers isn’t using them at an operational tempo as the US does. Heck we don’t even operate escorts on station at an operational level now.
It is irrelevant, their F-35 fly and have procedures to remove these devices that might be better than RN.
Much like the RN then
https://decode39.com/6143/cavour-carrier-indo-pacific-italy/
End of 2023
The story says 8 for RN and 10 ( standard squadron size) from USMC
Thanks Duker
Comment based on historical facts, may be out of date, but I doubt it: Number of USMC is a red herring.
USN ships crews are enormous compared to RN, compared to most other navies in fact. Why would USMC aviation be different? Their trade structures are different, with more specialisms.
Now I left the mob in the mid 90’s so I might be out of date, but I will spin a sit to illustrate anyway:
As a Radio Operator (Tactical) (“Bunting Tosser”) my basic Comms training was the same as a Radio Operator (General) aka Sparker, we all did message handling, we all learned what we needed to work in the Main Communications Office, how to set up to receive a broadcast, how to set up ship-to-shore RATT, how to route signals, how to off-line encrypt/decrypt, how to change and reset the online crypto etc…. On top of that we did our “trade” training – flashing light, flag hoists, maneuvering of ships in a group, and most importantly tactical voice radio nets.
Imagine my surprise on my first trip to the Gulf in the 80’s and popping onboard the USS La Salle to swap “flags and hats” to be refused entrance to their MCO equivalent, and given directions to the Flag Deck to find the Signalmen (same badge – crossed flags). ALL these guys were trained to do was flashing light, flag hoists, semaphore and civvy VHF voice. They were not taught any message handling and were not allowed in the MCO. In fact we found out that there were 5 communications trades specialisms in total equivalent to the RN’s 2 – extrapolate that across all trades….?
The RN has since merged Buntings and Sparkers, and then merged them again with the Greenies who maintained our kit to create Operator Maintainers – how many USN ratings does an OM with a Comms specialism equate to?
So, apologies for,the long dit, by USMC numbers will probably always be much higher, especially with the F35 and all its “stealth secrecy” concerns, oh and of course “every Marine is a rifleman” too!
A normal LHD with USMC F-35B det on board is 6 planes only.. So was unusual for a whole 10 ship VMFA-211 to be deployed at once – but they are working on that now for their LHD as well.
Some suggestions that a deployed squadron is 10 planes in 2 divisions with 2 planes as backup. Maybe for LHD its 5+1
The example most often trotted out is the USN had ‘damage control specialists’ which for some reason always makes me laugh.
Apparent USN and USMC very similar and run their support/ maintenance squadrons very differently . The Support squadrons CO are pilots on rotation while RN has degree qualified/ highly trained engineers for that job.
Im not sure of the details but the CPOs and such arent as well trained either but more of logistics manager/specialists in maintenance- look up the manual, replace the part that sort of thing
crew fatigue? what utter nonsense.. God help us if we have to fight a war and people are ‘fatigued’ after a few months at sea.
So you’ve never been tired then? Never gone to work having a poor night sleep or not feeling your best? Please do tell me your secret!
Compound all of the above 7 days a week for 6 months getting run ragged because of top down pressure in the process and you’ll quickly see.
And no relief valve courtesy of C-19 protocols either. No decent runs ashore on that deployment.
plus as someone who was there on that deployment, just about any change of plan that could happen from the start happened, the fire on fort Vic, the suicide on kent (who was a friend of mine), diverting to provide top cover for the withdrawal of Afghanistan, the longest period at sea went from a planned 5 weeks to not far off ten, so people were eating some food that was probably should have been got rid off, even the ten days in standdown which was meant to be in japan was cut short in Guam for a typhoon coming. add all that up plus the daily grind of on average 7 days a week, for nearly 8 months and you see why things didnt go to plan
Thank you for your service.
Sorry to hear about your friend, very sad 🙁
My dad was away 5 years on his ship w2 chif in boiler room fighting not fannying around on a useless lump of metal and getting tired cause they miss there mummy’s. Sweet jesus
Did he walk up hill both ways in the snow too?
The navy your dad served in and the navy of today are two very different beasts and not much of a comparison. The fact is the lads/lasses today are being continuously asked to do more with less and less. Gaps left right and centre with insufficient resources.
Do they actually do any maintaining on board because when they come into port they are fit for scrap.
What evidence do you have for that?
They do but there’s a limit to what can be done for various reasons. In a lot of cases ME/WE’s hands are tied and reliant on contractor support. If you’re regarding the rust streaks etc 99% of that is cosmetic.
The RN is reliant on contractors like never before. An ex-CPO (served on the old Ark Royal) once told me that once you get into international waters you have to become a ‘professional bodger’ at times. When a ship came in for AMP I would find all sorts of wonderful temporary fixes. It’s the nature of the beast. Low crew numbers, limited spares. Cost cutting- I can’t remember the exact number but the T23’s had something like 10-12 CPO’s at the start and this was chopped down to like 6 so each CPO took on double the work and responsibility. The bodging incidents increased as a result. You get what you pay for.
Did you ‘appen to work 28 hours a day at t’mill and pay t’mill to let you work there? Did your dad used to murder you in cold blood every night and dance about on your grave singing “hallelujah”?
Is your real name by any chance Obediah?
Spot on.
28h a day? LUXURY! We got up before we went to bed
That’s highly disrespectful towards our servicemen, and as a veteran I suspect your father would be ashamed of you for making such a comment.
This is such a stupid comment. They deployed the the middle of a pandemic and had many people (80-100) at anyone time forced to isolate. They pushed on because they are a well trained military force and the elastic snapped. We asked them to do too much with no runs ashore for 7 months and a mistake was made that lost an aircraft.
Possibly the best analysis on here 🙂
If your doing something high intensity you get nackered and make mistakes simple as..if your effectively on the job without a break you start to loose your edge..especially if that job requires a high level of concentration and significant consequences if you fail.
As an example my old teams shift pattern was 7 nights in a row, 12 hours a night (9 to 9) Monday to Sunday and by the time we got off shift on Monday mornings we looked like zombies and our thought processes were the same. I’ve seem an experienced member of my team in a resus just staring at the defibrillator saying over and over “I need the defibrillator, I need the defibrillator”….he was so fatigued after 7 nights of high intensity emergency department work he could not see what was in front of him.
I actually wonder if it is true and if so that is not due to bad planning.
Because the numbers do not add up.
They are not a at war, so how it is possible that the number of sorties that frequent?
Or is the squadron personel forced to do a lot of stuff that it should not?
Back in my day, used to do 25 hours shift a day, work 8 days a week for thrupence an hour an still av time for me tot and 15 pints. I’m sorry wil but it’s you who is utter nonsense.
Interesting article that paints a gloomy picture. As is pointed out even as the Lightning force grows trying to do it on a comparative shoestring will unfortunately result in smaller deployments and slower regeneration cycles. Robbing Peter to pay Paul with pilots and engineers that’ll inevitably lead to increased strain and fatigue.
Then again what’s the alternative? We don’t have the people to man vessels and squadrons in the way the Americans do and even if we could find them it’d risk further eroding other capabilities across the RN & RAF.
Is there any way, without massive injections of cash and manpower beyond the already hefty commitment that we can now avoid getting into a situation where the services break their backs to get 12 jets onto QE & PoW for a few months every 2 or 3 years and we have largely empty carriers for the intervening periods whilst everyone tries to recover?
As long as we have the ability to surge people and kit to the carriers in crisis/wartime does it matter what training trips “look like”? Is the idea to have the capability in extreme circumstances or to look good on exercises and port visits?
In order to have the capability at least one of our carriers needs to deploy on a regular basis with all the Jets we can muster to ensure our pilots and crews are proficient in high tempo combat operations. The US Carriers do that for exactly that reason enabling combat operations at short notice with maximum effect. Sticking a few jets on here and there won’t do it!!
But until all the F35’s have been delivered you can’t both build up the fleet and do regular deployments. If you try the training system will need to work flat out to replace the leavers and not build the fleet.
So at least for the next 5/8 years time at sea outside emergency’s will have to be limited.
30 F35Bs have been delivered to date with 7 more due by end of 2023. Allowing for 3 in the states and one lost that’ll be 33 available. Starting in 2024 we can easily put a carrier to sea with 15 and still leave plenty for the OCU. BUT, and its a big BUT, that would upset the RAF who believe, as they did with joint force harrier, that land ops have priority…..
From this the number of air frames does not seem to the limiting factor at all, it’s the number of people…unless they start growing the number of people they are not going to be able to sweat the airframes at all.
And that is the issue! The RAF!
Its back to 1936 all over again. Carriers and crew RN, the planes ‘belong’ to RAF
I think you are forgetting about the airframes in major maintenance and upgrade. With the OCU being larger that normal to help build up the fleet you probably need nearer 40 aircraft delivered to be able to send 15 on deployment and not compromise training and maintenance.
Most are fairly new , its not like they are 10 years old and some need deep maintenance.
Training and maintenance can be carried out at sea, that’s the whole point. It’s no good having airframes sat on tarmac when you can be training the pilots to actually operate from the carrier and attain the skills required to actively participate in combat operations if you have any hope at all of conducting them in a real wartime scenario.
You also have to ensure your deck and maintenance crews actually know whats its like to work on a crowded deck with significant numbers of jets whilst maximising sortie rates
Don’t ground crew travel with the jets?
You don’t do the conversion to type and basic tactical flying at sea. Neither do you do major inspections and upgrades at sea.
I agree. If you have to go from 10-12 aircraft typical to 30+ in a crisis the ship will come up short, and not of its own fault.
Just remember cats and traps requires pilots to constantly be refreshed with the carriers, they are more attached to the carrier. The Americans do like to pack their decks it is a good look. Uk in near future can surge when needed.
USN Cold war policy was to ‘pack the planes’, no longer the case as modern CVW are considerably smaller even though the carriers remain at 96,000tons
‘In the 1980s a typical air wing had approximately 90 aircraft, 60 of which were fighter or strike aircraft; in contrast, contemporary air wings hold a mere 64 aircraft approximately, 44 of which are fighter or strike aircraft. “
https://cimsec.org/the-evolution-of-the-modern-carrier-air-wing/
The RN needs to get up to speed and fully deploy on 1 carrier at a time, and shift the entire air wing to the other carrier when 1 needs to be in maintenance. It’s easier to do with 3 carriers, but that’s not an option.
There is no RN air wing. Theres a shared RAF/RN group of squadrons who spend most of the time at an RAF airbase
Bristol helicopters lost a Wessex in the North Sea due to an intake blank left on. Easily modified with new blank with red lanyard tape attached to cockpit door handle. Can’t miss it.
My thought exactly. How on earth did anyone design an inlet blank that *can* be sucked in, whatever the colour? In a single engined aircraft it may not be obvious to the pilot that one inlet is blocked, so this seems to me to be more of a design issue than the question of staffing, fatigue, long deployments etc. As with everything. get the design right and many such problems are avoided. A simple modification such as described by @Bob should already have been implemented. I would add passive flow sensors in both inlets to help in a hostile seabird situation.
Surely there is an indicator in the cockpit to show the thrust to engine is to low. My car beeps if the doors not shut
A point I made at the time.
On static spool, brakes on, up the monitors should have picked up that airflow was too low for the thrust setting.
It should have been the big red flashing ‘abort’ light as thrust was too low for the flight rules for take off.
Remember the single engine has intakes both sides and for ‘B’, one on top
Only one was blocked.
Makes me wonder the following:
1) What is the point of this joint force if it cannot deliver sustained carrier ops, would we be better of doing the following:
a) The F35b force pegged at 60 airframes and an RN only asset. Two front line squadrons of 12 and an OCU. One carrier only operational the other in extended readiness or refit. Order additional Typhoons for the RAF.
b) Sell both carriers to the US and order additional T26s and Merlins.
C) Accept F35B too complex and limited and go for a cheaper cats and traps or Stobar alternative. Ie Raffale/Gripen and carrier share with France?,
If while engaged in a proxy war with Russia, defence spending hasn’t shot up significantly, and weakness’ in recruitment and retention UK air defence, ASW and modern artillary and Tanks haven’t been addressed. They never will be so we need to just accept that and go for smaller ambitions.
The RN/FAA would take 15+ years to build up to man a 60 unit F35 force. The fixed wing part of the FAA is tiny. 2 squadrons will never cover advanced training and exercises as well as keeping 2 squadrons at high readiness. That’s not much less than the the planned output of the of the current planned full F35 force.
Cats and traps is insanely more fun expensive and people intensive…the RN went for the F35b because it’s less people intensive to operate than cats and traps.
I think what is very clear in the report is number of airframes was not this issue, the issue is the number of trained people…there is no point having a force of 60 airframes if you’ve only managed to train 30 pilots and have a couple of hundred air crew.
Spot on.
And you get a very large % of the military effect for a smaller % of money.
With a full F35C operation the spreadsheet doesn’t work. It is a simple as that. So no CSG.
Also F35C is the variant that has had the least export success. So RN would be on the hook, with USN for development costs.
So actually F35B increasingly looks like the cleverest solution.
Indeed, the F35b carrier air wing was a very very good choice…proper pragmatic thinking means the Uk now has a realistic ability to generate a carrier with a fifth generation air wing when needed….if we had to cats and traps we would have been trapped in the same place as France…having huge gaps in capability for years at a time and struggling to keep its pilots carrier qualified…..i
Need gen 5 plane to go into hostile air space on first night.
You think the RAF and RN can’t share F35Bs and need separate dedicated aircraft, but you think the RN and French Navy could share a carrier and aircraft??
That’s called cognitive dissonance.
Raffael/Gripen are ok 4th gen jets, but in an air-war with 5th gen stealth jets, they’re simply flying coffins.
It’s naive to think an any U.K. government, regardless of political party, would make the humiliating decision to sell the carriers. The USN might be interested since the loss of the Bon Homme, but given there would few other potential buyers, the USN could haggle for a knock down price. Which would only increase the humiliation.
The Italians have separate aircraft for navy and airforce 15 F-35B each – even for the airforce has F-35A
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/09/21/joint-but-separate-italy-navy-air-force-settle-on-f-35b-plan/
And in doing so they have successfully dramatically increased their maintenance costs as there’s only 25% commonality of parts between the 3 variants. I think the U.K. makes enough mistakes without copying the Italians mistakes.
Why does the phrase ‘operating on a shoe string’ come to mind?
Its a shared shoe string for 2 pairs of shoes!
The silver lining is the RN has produced a thorough report of both the incidental and systemic issues that contributed towards this accident. A great many organisations would not be so honest about their failings.
I’m a little surprised the side intake ducts were so critical at take-off for the F35B. The aircraft has two air-intakes on top that are open at take off, one with a large ‘pedal-bin’ style cover and the other with two doors opening along the centre-line. I believed one was for the lift-fan, and the other was an air-intake for the engine. The idea of the latter being to reduce the chances of FOD intake.
The extra air intake on top for the main engine is only a supplementary intake ( not FOD reasons) For the intakes to be common amoung all 3 F-35 types ( despite F35B having higher thrust engine) there had to be an extra ‘takeoff’ thrust intake only some where .
Harrier had blow in doors just next to intake duct , the UK Phantom F-4 with higher thrust RR engines had one extra intake door along side fuselage where engine was and closed in normal flight
Stealth reasons mean blow in intake doors are a nono
There were warnings that the carriers would drain money and people from the rest of the fleet. It now appears that both have insufficient resources.
They are doing it any way even with 2 carriers in service
Navy numbers are down 1-2% over the previous year.
The UK needs a second FJ fleet more than it needs a carrier.
We are where we are, again.
Everything too thinly spread.UK has to decide what the Navy is for.
Agreed, but someone also needs to wake up and realise the whole idea of purchasing the F35B was for carrier ops….. and that the ‘joint force’ concept needs to be scrapped with F35B allocated for Carrier Ops only, perhaps pegged at 80 with F35A purchase for RAF.
Who would crew and maintain these dedicated carriers F35’s? It certainly can’t be the FAA in the next 10 years. Also where is the money coming from for an F35A buy?
Your plan is both impractical and unaffordable.
So are the carriers.
Not if the FAA is integrated intelligently into Home Defence.
No need for an F35A buy ….. RAF have 30 or so Typhoon Tranche 1 which are for the chop by 2025 . Paid for and in service now.
Transfer all F35B to RN AND fund them for their operation as the joint force and just sending a joint squadron to sea with a carrier is unworkable.
I think the RN always knew this but its not what the Treasury people would tell their political masters and the RAF knew they would get the best part of the deal
Who would fly them if you keep the T1 Typhoons. Those people already flying them will already be earmarked for their next type.
Walk around the MoD main office and offer some a sweet bonus for a return to a flying tour
Thats what the USAF is doing to keep the flying squadrons up to strength
The tail doesnt wag the dog
The RAF is stuck on its right to be supreme for Home Defence which all stems from WW2. The fact the UK is an island and has overseas responsibilities means we should look at integrating the FAA into Home Defence as it was in WW1.
I do think huge mistakes were made in WW2 where the RAF failed significantly. Norway, Malaya/Singapore, Greece and Malta all spring to mind. If the FAA had been at strength in 1939 those outcomes might have been different.
For an island nation Naval aviation needs a higher priority and its sad to see the way the UK is handling it in 2023.
Given the carriers spend less than half their time at sea, what do you propose to do with the FAA-only F35Bs for most of the year? Hire a hanger at Heathrow for storage?
Ask the USN or USMC how that works out as they have long deployments and even longer at shore base.
Its not like the Dover ferries where they run 24/7 with short time for a quick overhaul
The USN has naval air stations for their aircraft. How many airfields does the RN have?…
They share Marham of course but have Culdrose and Yeovilton soley as RNAS
the USMC does ok with just 2 MCAS for west coast squadrons incl choppers and C130,
Yuma[4 F35B sq plus 1 F35C]
and Miramar[ 2 F-35C plus 2 F18C plus training sq for F18 and F35]
Whats that about ignoring the evidence and just having an opinion far from facts
Theres far more informed people here than I your humble duke
Marham is RAF, and the this thread is about the RN and RAF going their separate ways rather than a joint force.
So given it cost £250million under Project Anvil to upgrade RAF Marham for F35 operations it’s probably going to cost similar to upgrade RNAS Yeovilton to the same standard.
So which T31 frigate would you cancel to pay for that?
Then there’s the ongoing operational costs of running separate engineering facilities at both…
You “humble”? You think you know better that Nobel Laureates when it comes to climate-change. Hardly humble.
Climate has always changed , not that far back Britain wasnt an island because it was very different
2022 Physics Nobel winner agrees with me
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/worlds-leading-physicist-dismisses-climate-emergency-pseudoscience
Do you really have to insert your climate stuff here ?
Climate has always changed, but never so dramatically at this speed. As for the Nobel winner you quote, he’s an expert in quantum mechanics not meteorology or climatology. So he’s speaking off the top of his head about a subject he has no expertise in. Whereas the 2021 winners actually won the Nobel for their work on man-made climate-change.
If you can’t see the difference then I assume that the next time you feel ill you’ll be visiting a vet, or a mechanic, rather than a medical doctor.
Climate has always changed, but never so dramatically at this speed. As for the Nobel winner you quote, he’s an expert in quantum mechanics not meteorology or climatology. So he’s speaking off the top of his head about a subject he has no expertise in. Whereas the 2021 winners actually won the Nobel for their work on man-made climate-change.
If you can’t see the difference then I assume that the next time you feel ill you’ll be visiting a vet, or a mechanic, rather than a medical doctor.
(For the record you originally raised your anti-science climate-change denial on this site.)
RAF and RN share the operation at Marham. The base CO is one service and the deputy the other.
In 2020 617 Sq had a naval CO
If/when the RN takes over full control of all the F35B they clearly would have that base, buildings and all its equipment as well as its specifically designed for that model. No need to rebuild elsewhere as you suggest
Because they have a joint lightning force. But the preposterous proposition of this thread is that the RAF and RN sharing the F35B doesn’t work.
They would have to rebuild elsewhere because RAF would want the Marham facilities for the F35As that Paul wanted the RAF to have once the F35B were transferred.
Try and keep up…
10 empty hangars at RNAS Yeovilton. Hint for the future???
Picking up illegal immigrants mostly.
Think one purpose was to relieve USA a carrier fleet to go to China plus trump reminds us that USA may not be relied on all the time.
I don’t doubt for one minute that two of the key issues highlighted in these recent posts are correct.
Firstly is the key point that the UK Royal Navy is still learning (or should that have said “relearning”?) how to effectively use its carriers with the F35. Secondly, more than one post makes the point that this particular deployment was very long, fatiguing and made much worse by the nightmare of managing Covid-19 onboard an operational warship
Both factors were, very obviously, major contributors to this “rather expensive” accident.
However nobody has commented on what I would describe as the key “root cause” issue: namely the very poor design of that “red gear” engine intake cover. Quite simply, had it not been left deep, and almost invisible, far inside the intake, this accident would never have occurred. These covers (apparently) only needed to be used very occasionally.
So why were these red gear covers not originally engineered to fit either to the outside of the intake: or to fit snuggly only just inside it? In either position they would then have been very obvious, both to the ground crew and also to the pilot
Peter
Reading the actual report exposes a number of issues with the red gear, both design and procedural. I’d suggest that an actual fix that all seagoing operators can live with isn’t quite there yet. More difficult than you might imagine to get a solution that is both practicable and compatible with LO coatings. The procedural elements are highlighted in this article.
As ever, its often the little things that bite you in the @rse.
Very true.
There is the question of whether the deployment was in the circumstances of the time a sensible idea. Did inertia combined with a wish to show the flag post Brexit lead to a deployment which was in reality beyond what it was sensible to ask the carrier force to undertake given its then state of development?
I think in this case, it’s more an example of “unknown unknowns”. I’d bet decent money that in terms of the training milestones and activities undertaken, the various component parts thought they were in a good place. You only find out you’ve underestimated what you actually needed when you actually do it.
That’s the hidden effect of not really conducting sustained embarked ops since 2005/6, particularly with f/w. There were probably three instances where CVS conducted sustained f/w embarked ops from 2006 – and one of them used a USMC AV8 squadron, because JFH was fully committed to Herrick, Which means that by the time you’re doing detailed planning for CSG21 it had been ten years since we’d done it at all. Which in turn meant the senior planners were relying on distant memory (or worse, folklore given the exodus post 2010).
I agree that the effective stopping of carrier operations in 2005 and the exodus of deck qualified staff in 2010 was very, very toxic. Allowing a century of institutional knowledge to fade was not clever at all.
It was a very silly and very expensive decision to pay off the Harriers and carriers so early.
The original plan was to phase out Harrier when F35B was being phased in.
Whiling I would agree that Harrier is pretty useless compared to F35B that wasn’t the reason for retaining it in service – keeping skills fresh was.
IMO yes yes and yes. It would have been embarrassing for the RN and UK Govt as a whole to cancel Op Fortis or even delay it. Let alone the knock on effect to fleet planning down the line. Too many people afraid to say no as it may jeopardise their report.
Yup, not being able to use white light at night is obvious issue.
Note that it is VMFA for USMC fighter/attack squadrons, not a VFMA designation. (How about 50 pushups by the author?) Otherwise an interesting and informative article, as always.
“The Squadron Warrant Officer Engineer (WOEng) had 4 years Lightning experience but only joined the Squadron 5 months before FORTIS and had never been to sea.”
Wait, what? A Warrant Officer RN who had never been to sea?
Isn’t going to sea our core business in the RN?
617 Sqn is RAF(RN personnel serving in it), perhaps the Sqn WOEng was actually an RAF bod instead of a RN bod, which would explain why he had never been to sea don’t you think?
All the F35 squadrons are fully joint with both RAF and FAA personnel. This is irrespective of the historical association of the squadron number.
Yes, fully appreciate that, but you don’t get to WO in the RN by not actually going to sea! So just perhaps, and as it is a RAF Sqn, the WOEng might actually be RAF, coming out of an RAF base at Marham, and being the first operational Sqn, might just have meant that certain posts started out with RAF bods before RN equivalent started arriving.
Is EBD (Engineering Branch Development) still ongoing in the FAA? It was at least 10 years old when I left front line service.
I think it would be wise for the RAF to keep tranche 1 Typhoon in service until at least 2030. Those 26 jets can do simple tasks, leaving the F-35B for more time at sea. We are where we are & I cannot see any other way of keeping FJ numbers up.
Where would you get the extra pilots and ground crew from? The RAF like the rest of the U.K. military is already critically short of people.
Not buying that second tranche of T2 Hawk, has led to pilot shortfalls, on many types. Training is a whole other issue for the RAF .
The Hawk has been an issue but the biggest bottleneck is apparently at the OCU level. This is causing issues with people needing to go back to the Hawk after a long holding posting to refresh them in preparation for OCU.
Also doesn’t help when the RAF are restricting thier recruitment targets with woke/diversity ideology.
The aircraft mechanic A/E shoulhave picked this up on pre flight inspection and daily inspection and the pilot should have seen this on his pre flight inspection. Time to wake up , this is basics.
No one should be surprised. I have operated on USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63). You can’t do carrier battle group operations on the cheap or with reduced crews. MoD has to get over the concept of defence on the cheap….but sadly, it seems devoted to the practice.
It’s not the MOD that decides to do “defense on the cheap.” It’s the politicians. As long as the MOD bends over backwards to give the politicians the impression that everything is fine, it will continue. It will take large humiliating public defense failures like Germany has now to change the tide.
This is so true, the £80 million accident sums up the carrier program, spending fortunes trying to save money. Fact remains this century defence has been underfunded and ambition has overtaken funding.
Set aside all the failings that occurred at all levels. Let’s get down to basics. The intake cover was on the left side of the aircraft , the pilot enters the aircraft from the left side , feet away from the intake. Why didn’t he see the red gear in the intake on entering the aircraft. Don’t pilots do a walk around anymore before a flight ? Finally , with one intake covered restricting airflow into the engine , wouldn’t this have shown up in some way by irregular readings from the engine ?
Yes it is pretty dire:
he did do a ‘walk around’ and he picked up another deck crew fault with a before flight pin left in the undercarriage assembly. However he was wearing his helmet because of noise and maybe face cover down ?
For various reasons the the red blank cover was pushed well into the intake to be almost invisible ( another error in itself)
I’d call that a design flaw with the red gear. Since three different people missed it it was clearly very difficult to spot.
There was an earlier version with with sort of front edge tabs that fitted leading edge of intake to hold in position at front face , but that caused wear of the stealth coating
It needs some flashing LED’s perhaps? It wouldn’t take much.
A simple lanyard ribbon would do the job. There must be something to attach it to on the outside of the inlet. The stealth coating seems to be an issue though.
Lessons will be learned so that’s alright then,80 million squid down the plug hole plus the £80 million to replace it.
what more can you say, you cannot take it back..no one did it on purpose, clearly the evidence was that it was a number of small issues and poor systems that created the failure and not one person. Sack all the team because of procedural failures that were still effectively in development…that helps manning and moral no end.
in these cases the best you can do is learn..and wait for the next failure.
Utter rot. The issue is that the carriers have undermined the defence of the UK and stretched the budget to the point of breaking. The UK does not need carriers like these; there is no credible argument for them. In order to bring them into service, the RN has reduced surface vessel numbers, the Army has lost thousands of personnel and the RAF has lost AEW and its Sentinel aircraft. Plus the RAF now has the less capable F35 variant. Even worse, the nation has two Services trying to maintain a fast jet capability.
The carriers need to be sold and defence rebalanced accordingly. The war in Ukraine shows how British defence needs to be configured and two obsolete carriers are not part of that
Despite being the read headed step child oddly Bravo is turning out to be the most successful variant. The USN are operating less than 30 Charlies. And the USAF is hardly a fan of ‘Fat Amy’; these are in use because there is no 5th gen alternative not out of preference.
SHAR was a very flexible aeroplane and cheap. With Bravo we have gone two sizes and jumped ahead 2 generations. A good deal for us. Probably more aircraft than the USMC actually needs. But the USMC has the budget and personnel (just about) to operate Bravo and we don’t. But saying that we do need 2 fighter families. These things are so advanced we can’t be invested in just one.
It’s a mess.
The USMC operates 2 types of F-35 and is the second biggest user of F-35s in the world (USAF being the biggest). The USMC will operate around 350 “B”s and just under 70 “C”s.
Do you think discussions about UMSC operating C are germane?
Yes, particularly in reply to your comment about the Marine Corps being able to (just about) operate the bravo.
It isn’t really.
The USN also made a deliberate decision to increase buys of new generation F18 instead of the low capability early versions of the F35C.
The Marines went the other way with the Harriers being retired early and their F18C kept on plus have deployed an F35C squadron on a carrier- very few of which have had the deck and internal upgrades to take them
Retired Harrier early? The USMC has 124 active AV-8B.
USMC has publicly stated that it wants to retire AV8 as soon as it has enough F35B.
F35B is massively more capable and USMC are very happy with it. From personal contacts starve coal face.
Yes. It is a leap over AV8x. I think it will be 2029-ish before they are all gone. But as where we needed a mutlirole aircraft as general purpose work horse the USMC need was for CAS. (Though they pushed it as we did.) It is perhaps therefore a little more than they need considering they have USN and UMSC squadrons in CVN in full fat fighters. PGM, attack helicopters, and drones could all provide for CAS now freeing up deck space for CV22.
Yes. Thats the new priority now , all AV-8s gone by 2025. The F18C will be required to last longer instead
ummm I would say the carriers are vital to the UKs defence…they are movable airfields..when every other airfield is mapped and know… these can hide in the occean. Every major power in the world is trying to generate or keep fixed wing naval aviation…is every major military power in the world wrong ? And obsolete…these are two of the most advanced carriers in the world with a fifth generation air wing…you cannot get something less obsolete…as for Ukraine showing how Britains defence needs to be configured….umm Ukraine is continental power engaged in a war of attrition….we happen to live on an island that is effectively impossible to invade as Napoleon or Hitler..we have completely different needs regarding defence…that’s why we have always had a large navy and small army compared to our continental neighbours.
It is always dangerous to base your armed forces on narrow assumptions. Carrier-based air power has three advantages: (a) it is moveable, (b) it is not reliant on host nation support and (c) it is harder to attack than a shore base with a known location.
One problem is, as we found with JSF, that the RAF prioritised shore-based operations and never grasped the difficulties of integrating into the maritime environment.
A second problem is that RAF mechanics are more specialised than FAA ones, so you need more of them but there is limited room at sea, even in the biggest warships the RN has ever had.
A third problem is the 9 year gap between the end of sea-bourne Harrier ops in 2010 and the beginning of Lightening carrier ops in 2019. Maritime aviation demands a complex set of highly perishable skills.
An outsider might think that a state-of-the-art warplane like Lightening 2 might need fewer people to operate than a 30 year old aircraft, (which the RN was so desperate to acquire that it bought the development version).
Of course, all the comments about tiredness and a high pressure deployment with few decent runs ashore (anybody remember SOUTHLANT deployments from 1983 – about 1990?) are all fair, but the genius of the British armed forces has always been to achieve great things with inadequate resources.
The decision to choose VSTOL over catapult/arrestor wire was not easy. Now that Warships are diesel/electric and gas turbine rather than steam, the choice lay between untried electromagnetic catapults or the addition of a steam generator. This would have allowed our carriers to launch tankers and AWACS as well as fighter/bombers. But it was considered less risky to go down the VSTOL route, which also offered quicker on-deck turn round times.
Perhaps, if UK practiced joined-up defence thinking, the RAF could have bought F35As instead of Typhoons, but we have to look forward, not back.
Once the F-35B was real and with UK participation in its build there never was going to be a catapult and trap carrier for RN.
The decade ago ‘controversy’ about conversion was just political tricks to slow the spending at the time all the forces were being cut. Same happened with the T23 replacement which was under development before the 2010 election , was put on hold for 5 years, as “alternatives/cheaper” were played out in media. Nothing came of that cheaper alternative either except a 5 year spending pause
Nope.
The C variant argument wasn’t about spending curve manipulation. It actually cost more.
I was around when the arguments were going on and some persuasive, not very well informed bods, got the right ears and a lot of money was wasted.
Wasnt ‘spending curve’ for the plane itself. It was to delay the shipyard spend for specific budget years for political reasons even though it added to overall cost – but in different budget years.
Just as development cycle for the design and construction planning works through a process for some years same goes for the contruction , fitting out and testing phase. They needed a circuit breaker to stop/slow the build cycle for the 2nd carrier . The old chestnut of catobar was plucked out of the fire to be the ‘reason’ – Theres always a smokescreen reason that will make the evening news soundbites
Except AEC/ASaC and tankers are force multipliers that greatly enhance a carrier air wing’s capabilities in terms of utility and security. Not going CTOL cuts us off from any advances in USN carrier aviation. And finding space for a steam generator in 70k tonne hull wouldn’t have been a problem. CTOL planes can even land themselves now.
Cheapness and lack of capability isn’t really much of an argument against CTOL.
Emals only just becoming reliable after a long time. We could covert midlife. see how the French get on with their future carrier. Cats n traps is expensive club obviously the best. Steam would takes away advantages of Emals much softer on aircraft frames likely more drone friendly.
I can’t remember expressing a preference for the launch system.
Do you mean expensive? Or just costs more? And what about the total cost of the whole system and dare I even say value? Either the UK is operating a carrier capability or it is not.
All I see here is the same thoughtless Main Building propaganda re F35B.
I would be more inclined towards the idea of VSTOL being optimal if there had been significant investment in supporting systems such as Crowsnest but there has been none.
Crows nest is the weak point of F35b navy’s. Billion + say for emals and another billion + for cat launched Hawkeye USA run 5 per carrier
Maybe . The reason the lost F35B was being launched ..at night.. was to act as an airborne sensor for the carrier as the eastern Med has a complex mix of different nations active – Israelis, Russians, Turks, Greeks .
“ Perhaps, if UK practiced joined-up defence thinking, the RAF could have bought F35As instead of Typhoons, but we have to look forward, not back.”
F35A didn’t exist when Typhoon was bought.
If we didn’t do Typhoon then Tempest we would be out of sovereign aircraft manufacturing and shortly after that out if airborne radar and missiles.
If you look at the way the US behaves with foreign weapons integrations it isn’t great.
As I said above we do need two families of fast jet.
Right now I think if we had budget and manpower available for the RAF I would buy Charlie not Fat Amy. Keep Typhoon on QRA. But mount deep regular patrols out over the Norwegian Sea with C.
Not a C but the A model with only the extended wing tips from the C – is it 4 ft extra each side ? All these parts are made on same jigs but different thickness of spars etc
Doesnt need the bigger wing flaps and horizontal tail surfaces from C they are only used for carrier landings
Im sure the Germans and some others- Israel? could be interested in an optimised LR strike fighter
Yes. I hear you.
The more I look at F35 the more I wonder why 2 seat and 2 engine options were not included in the mix.
STOVL ruled that out
The Carriers are and were funded from the RN’s share of the MoD’s budget. The RN are not responsible for the Billions wasted on Ajax, Warrior, FRES and the Strike Brigades. You seem to have ‘issues’ with the Navy that might receive a more sympathetic hearing on a website that isn’t focussed on the RN.
The Army can’t even decide what vehicle is going to replace the LandRover, Dhuh! To see the Paras driving round in them in their training deployment to Kenya made one wonder if they shouldn’t go back to horses or mules.
Shhh !!
The two carriers cost 6.12 billion, the army has burned around 10 Billion and not yet managed to replace its aging armoured fighting vehicles, that has nothing to do with the RN carriers and everything to do will piss poor procurement on the side of the army..for the money they have spend they could already have an up to date fleet of armoured fighting vehicles…
Exactly this.
Factually true.
Hilarious! Encore please ????
I can’t say I agree wholly with what you say.
But at least it is your own opinion.
Agreed. The carriers were ordered by Gordon Brown who knew he was going out at the coming general election and left two poison chalices for the incoming Conservative government ie expensive and useless aircraft carriers.
Sell them to the Indians.
That was just the final paperwork in 2007
The decision was made much earlier
‘On 30 September 2002, the MoD announced that the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force would operate the STOVL F-35B variant and that the carriers would take the form of large, conventional carriers, initially adapted for STOVL operations.’
There was allways going to be an F35B type carrier to replace the Invincibles. Just the size and design up for discussion.
Enough of the fantasy that it was a poison pill left to frustrate the glorious conservatives who wanted to save the country by ‘starving the beast’ of the public and defence services
GFC hadnt happened by 2007 for those with memories like a social media influencers
Sorry, I don’t remember saying anything about ‘glorious conservatives’ or ‘starving the beast’. Maybe your imagination was running in overdrive.
No you didnt , but was in same vein to this — “knew he was going out at the coming general election and left two poison chalices”
New carriers was always going to happen and was clearly spelt out for 10 years previously , so much for ‘chalice’
Clearly dont remember the Astute contract- a very bad one it turned out- was awarded 14 March 1997, a few months not years, before Blair and Labour took over .
That was a real poisoned chalice as it was a major build difference to the earlier RFT
Having served a tour on 4sqn RAF Harrier force early 80s I see here basic training and awareness mistakes also a whole raft of excuses why it happened. 81m a/c lost due to the most basic of mistakes. We have all made them but not to this extent. You cant do away with your VSTOL land and carrier force for 10 years and expect to be able to magic up an experience and training level required to operate complex frames in all situations political ineptness at its finest. Financial diversion to non military purposes because it gets a better vote return if dished out in society to people who would never serve in our forces. I left the RAF in 1989 after 10 amazing years and even then the writting was on the wall, we are now reaping what our politicians sowed 30 odd years ago culminating in Harrier force destruction in 2012.
Yes. Though I would say ‘Harrier force’ destruction began with the decision to build new SHAR (a mark one airframe) and Harrier II sans radar at the same time. Harrier II with radar would have been worth keeping. Bonkers decision.
The one with Blue Vixen radar was Harrier I ?
Yes. SHAR had radar.
Quite a good radar too. There was an upgrade in the works that got canned.
A very good set. The FAA really pushed the Sea Harrier. The Falklands War should have perhaps prompted the establishment in to recognising that this sea is where our defence efforts should be vested and not sitting in Germany with by then decaying infrastructure and a field force in desperate need of equipment. Not hard to imagine a new larger CV, perhaps LHD, project being started, plans for a supersonic VSTOL jet being revisited, and holes in our capability being plugged (from AEW to radar layed AA to perhaps involvment with Aegis etc.) with the Army being reformed along USMC lines.
At the time of the accident Ithought it was no big deal but from the article and all the comments so far it sounds like it was made much more likely by skimping on the defense budget and preparing for the next war by disarming like we did for WWII. It seems like the Fleet Air Arm has been virtually abolished, no way the RAF is going to be a substitute. I know inter-service rivalry thing is a problem but this idea of a joint force of F35s does not seem to be workable.
Especially after Brexit it would seem logical to reduce taxes to make Britain more attractive to busines, encourage British free enterprise, and in public spending use more of it for what government is really needed for (defense) and less on such things as the ever-expanding socialist nanny state which to be fair started before WWI, and so-called green energy policies that are actually far from green and rely on slave labor in the Congo and China, they are all just a drag on the economy and already Britain is way lower than it was on GDP per capita, in direct proportion to the percentage of GDP devoted to socialist goals.
In the last century Britain never gets real til wartime comes, so I guess we are in the same mode as usual. The difference is that that timeframes are now much shorter and the likelihood of being able to ramp up defense industries before being beaten in any likely war is much less than in those days,
Cheers
John
Actually Britain embarked on a massive rearmament campaign in the 5 years before the start of WW2.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_re-armament_before_World_War_II
Green energy policies are in fact both essential in combating climate-change and boosting the economy. If we hadn’t made such an investment in renewable energy generation then U.K. energy prices would be far higher than they are.
Yes we did finally start rearming in the late 30s.
Czechoslovak paid for our complacency.
Mid 30s after Hitler came to power .
Just looking at RN 1935 development began for 5 new KGV battleships ( 3 ordered in 1936) and 5 armoured carriers (4 ordered in 1937), modernising extensively existing ships such as Renown Warspite Queen Elizabeth.
Town class cruisers ordered from 1934, Arethusa/Dido class from 1933/37 along with Fiji class 1938
List of new FAA types from mid 30s is a bit sad ( except Swordfish) but that was because RAF had control there, the only worthwhile one was Grumman Wildcat in 1940
Instant development didnt happen even then but certainly was well under way by 1935
Your thinking along my lines.
When something flares up it’s going to be quick and won’t wait for Sunak to discuss it at committee.
It will happen in one of three places, The Baltic , Central Europe or The West Philippine (South China)Sea.
Why throughout the report is the pilot, who we know was male, referred to as “they”? It is a nonsensical use if the English language, as there was only one pilot. Has the Navy gone into “gender neutral” language for everyone? If so please stop it.
Shocking woke report. Indeed there is no He pronoun anywhere in the document.
Her is used for HMS, but should be short… I guess in the future will be TMS They Majesty Ship?
Reading it… This is really an unprofessional report you don’t know if there are 2 or 1 person doing some action.
The FDO was first to arrive at the pilot’s location. Other than some
the pilot appeared unharmed, fully conscious
and in good spirits. The pilot was keen to stand up, declaring that they were
fine. The FDO aided the pilot to their feet and walked with them back to the
FDO’s office in the aft island
Translation:
The FDO was first to arrive at the pilot’s location. Other than some
the pilot appeared unharmed, fully conscious
and in good spirits. The pilot was keen to stand up, declaring that he was
fine. The FDO aided the pilot to their feet and walked with him back to the
FDO’s office in the aft island.
In several instances of document it is not understandable.
Same old same old not enough engineers for flight ops and maintenance and too many short term tourists running the show.
Also the loss of one of these golden aircraft is a big hit to the fleet as there are not many perhaps getting shot of the Harrier was a mistake?
Oh and not all of us thought 617 were all that brilliant either back in the day.
Depends if you want to endanger pilots by having them fly a hopelessly obsolete aircraft? It’s was a great plane in its day, 40 years ago.
Not the same plane as 40 years ago .
Look around at the planes in newer versions which are older
B-52, F-15 , C-130, CH-47
Of the 4 you mention, only the F15 is a fighter. And that is only still in service with the USAF because the F22 order was slashed.
Have you bothered reading this yet? Or do you ignore scientific facts that contradict your political opinions?
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/physics/2021/popular-information/
What fighter aircraft is relevant to a Nobel prize , but clearly you are a lot smarter than me so Ill leave it there
Dont forget the F16
The Nobel Prize article highlights that you conveniently ignore facts you don’t agree with. You originally raised the Nobel Prize for Physics in another post as being the standard for scientific authenticity in your denial of man-made climate-change. Yet you ignore every time I post the details of the 2021 award that confirms man-made climate-change.
Not an honest approach on your part.
As for the F16, that was to be replaced by the F35A in USAF service – something the Norwegian Air Force has already done. Given the failure of Russia/China to produce quality 5th generation fighters at volume, the USAF has slowed its replacement. Doesn’t alter the fact, sending a F16 against a 5th fighter will be as one-sided as sending as Spitfire against a Harrier.
I heard the navy banned all RAF personnell from the flight deck the day before
Too much daylight and fresh is bad for them. 🙂
I am reminded of a discussion during Harrier days about RAF going to sea. Some pointing out exceptions that most RAF personnel aren’t bothered about a one off ‘sea draft’ being an argument for RAF personnel going to sea as a matter of course.
It seems to me like the chicken and the egg.
The carriers don’t spend enough time at sea operating F35 because of a shortage of personnel.
The reason being a lack of training at sea and experience of crews because they never go to sea.
It also seemed to me a high number of people being flown home for personal and health reasons and not being replaced, this needs to be looked at, A ship the size of QE has great medical facilities and amenities.
I believe we are in a dangerous time in our history and one of our QE class should be at sea most of the time. Problems with propellers ,training and morale our carriers are not fit for purpose at the moment.
With the way things are at the moment the MOD should be demanding more funding from the government.
After all these carriers are the UKs main conventional strike force.
Technology should be able to remove most of the human errors, if each part had a security tag that automatically counted them in and out of storage, with a display in flight control human error would be reduced.
Some of the comments from people who should know better on this site are piss poor. Firstly, accidents will happen. This is not the end of the world. Have we done any worse than other F35 operators? No we have not, both in absolute terms and air miles denominated, we have a good record. Can lessons be learned, yes they can. Are losses inevitable, yes they are. This is a relatively new platform which involves risk, but having read the report, it would seem that relatively simple risk management practices, like those performed before medical procedures, would solve the problems. Let’s dial down the pro forma hysteria.
Good point about the inevitable losses, they have to be expected.
The article does seem to reinforce the case for re-separation of the Fleet Air Arm, and operate like the US Navy. After all the RN is the Senior Service, the RAF has seldom served it well. Each service should be allowed to use whatever weapons it thinks best to achieve its mission.
Happy to hear rebittals of this, I agree that inter-service cooperation is extremely desirable, but only seems to go so far in practice, in any country.
Cheers
John
Another example that comes to mind is the USAF efforts to abolish the Grunmman A-10 Warthog that is an infantry support plane that the army really wants. Why not let the arimy have them?
USAF will never let the army fly fixed wing.
Every US armed uniform service has its own airforce, even the USAF!
For a long time now the main USAF ‘force’ has sat in silos in the US Mid-West and not in its fleet of aircraft.
Either the FAA needs to takeover the RAF. Or the RAF needs to look after fast air on its own.
The counter arguments are cost and minimum mass. It was discussed earlier in the comments that it’s difficult to have a sustained organic force without reaching a certain critical mass that allows for training replacements as well as operations. It’s easier and faster to reach that critical mass with two services rather than one. Similarly economies of scale come into play. These are more important factors for us than for the US because their services individually are bigger than ours as a combined whole.
There’s a final counter argument that pushes us away from the “to each their own” mentality. To get the best possible bang for the buck, our services have to learn to fight as one. The Americans call it multi-domain operations (MDO) and CJADC2 is the current active expression. We go wider and talk about multi-domain integration (MDI), which also includes the integration of industry and other government departments on security issues. This isn’t just cooperation or some nice to have tack on, but combining our forces is seen as crucial to our ability to fight well. When you are also integrating with allied forces, your choices become even more constrained. You can’t take this approach if you allow each separate service to do what it wants.
I think it’s worth adding something else. The Levene Reforms are often credited with (blamed for) the decentralisation of decisions towards the individual services, effectively echoing what you were asking for. I think they were more subtle than that, but that was certainly part of them.
Levene Reforms 2011, recomendation 6b
Gray’s Report on Acquisition, 2009, had seem to lean the other way recommending that DE&S should become an arms length body, taking procurement out of the hands of the MOD much less the individual services.
The government at the time said they decided not to follow that Gray recommendation, However Gray was appointed to head DE&S between 2010 and 2015, and what we’ve ended up with seems to be a combination of the two acquisition philosophies, Gray’s and Levene’s. DE&S is too arms length IMO, and the divorce of requirements gathering from procurement has done us no favours. I can’t blame Levene for that.
I think it’s fair to say that the delegation of powers aspect of procurement hasn’t been seen as successful as it might be, and I hear it’s currently under review as to whether it’s fit for purpose. I’m expecting yet another report at some point.
All
At the start of this post I would like to make it 110% clear that I fully support the Royal Navy. More specifically, I also support the need for both modern QE class carriers to be operational (ideally one at a time) and also the (obvious) need for the UK to have modern aircraft that are operationally fly off them.
At a time when the Salisbury Poisoner (Mr V Putin Esq) is running amok around the world, frankly we need our armed forces to be “fighting fit” ….
HOWEVER….
Lets be honest, accidents do occasionally happen. What is most concerning to me about this particular incident is not the fact that “we” had an accident (although paying £81M for an F-35 to have membership of the goldfish club really ought to be called a Fiscal Disaster). What is really worrying me is that it has taken senior UK military leadership over two years to produced this excuse note (aka full accident report). Despite that rather-lengthy timeline, the contents of this full report are on a par with “Sorry Sir, the canine ingested my homework”.
So, lets be clear, I have read this so-called “full” report from cover to cover. Lets start with the basics…
The risk of any aircraft suffering from FOD damage is very basic stuff. FOD management applies on every airfield in the world, large or small, civilian and military; on land or at sea. Think back to why another very expensive supersonic jet, Concorde, was taken out of UK service two decades ago…..
Nowhere in this 147 page reports does it point out that this incident is really was a quite-remarkable one-of-a-kind. Ever since Frank Whittle received his knighthood from KGV1 back in 1948 (anybody reading Navy Lookout remember that?) I cannot ever recall another occasion when a piece SaS (Soft and Squidgy) FOD was NOT ingested through the jet engine itself. Thus FOD is (normally) therefore instantly macerated, just milliseconds before being comprehensively incinerated. For this Red Gear cover to stay, undamaged, on the intake side of a military jet engine when it was running at full power during its take-off run makes this truly remarkable “accident”.
That key fact – the uniqueness of this accident – rather implies to me that this Squidgy Red Gear was extremely well wedged into the intake (and thus explains why it became low observable during the pre-flight checks).
Accordingly, the “almost-new” condition of that surviving key piece of evidence rather supports what I wrote in my original post on Navy Lookout: that the design of this Red Gear was/is fundamentally flawed.
This report does however spell out that their had been numerous earlier FOD incidents with this particular type of Red Gear. This report does clearly state that F-35’s like to ingests this Red Gear. There are numerous, regular and repeated official reports of this particular type of Red Gear causing many FOD incidents on F35’s in the three years before this one F-35 did its (unwanted) impression of a Astute-class submarine.
These numerous incidents had happened both onboard the QE carrier itself; also at the RAF station at Marham (apparently a very serious incident) and elsewhere in the world (i.e. throughout the global F35 programme). Of course, the relevant paperwork was filled out and lengthy computer entries typed in via Qwerty What this excuse note (aka full report) fails to comment upon – again it is nowhere to be found in its 147 pages – is what then happened to all of these numerous DASAR reports. There should have been numerous recommendations, flying about within the chain of command on the multi-billion F35 programme, to do something about Red Gear FOD.
Apparently, this official report expects us taxpayers to believe there were no recommendations made, no reports issued, no meetings held about F-35 FOD in those three years. Really? I now believe that Black Holes do exist on Planet Earth..
Then we come onto the “quality” of the orders that were being given on board this warship. As I am sure every reader of Navy Lookout knows, the first job of a warship is to be ready for war (Thus, as German Admiral Bismarck once said: “Your first duty is to stay afloat”).
The full report states these covers were only fitted to prevent the threat of espionage during the transit of the Suez Canal: to prevent photography of the top-secret aircraft intakes. Furthermore there was also the terrorist threat, from a second cousin of Mr T. Aliban, using his family heirloom, an RPG.
Therefore, two sets of orders were given.
On the one hand, we are told that the terrorist threat level to the ship’s crew was so severe that the flight deck was strictly out-of-bounds to all of the ship’s crew. Therefore the QE’s crew did not get the opportunity to top-up on their very-severe Vitamin D deficiency. However, and in very marked contrast, we are expected to believe that the threat level from the aforementioned RPG was so low that it was “very good idea” to park no less 11 low observable F35’s up on the deck through Suez transit (Note. In total, all of the F35′ parked up on the deck were worth, in total, £891M)
Can I please ask why – obviously for reasons of preventing both espionage and terrorism – why these low observable aircraft were not all stowed down inside the hanger during that 120 mile long transit through Suez? I might being being a bit cynical here ………….however is that not what the spacious aircraft hanger aboard an £5 billion pound aircraft carrier that carries (big hint) low observable aircraft is supposed to be used for????
Then of course, there is the finale. These Red Gear covers were only fitted to these aircraft to prevent photography of the F 35’s top secret intakes (Special Access Required) . However I am sure that Mr Putin’s mates, the aircraft designers at Sukhoi, have already downloaded this full report from the gov.uk website in the week after the 22nd August 2023.
Quite unbelievably, this full report, which missed out all of the basic stuff, has inside its 147 pages far better photos of these top-secret jet intakes than anything which Mr Putin’s paparazzi could have taken with a long-lens camera during the ship’s transit of Suez.
I believe premier league footballers call this an own goal…..
TO CONCLUDE
Before he leaves office, a certain Mr B Wallace ought to be having this piece of surviving Red Gear framed. I suggest that it be hung, for a month at time, in the senior leaderships office: one month at RAF High Wycombe, followed by one month in Portsmouth’s
As somebody who has just paid to the HMRC a proportion this month’s salary to help pay for the much-needed defence this country, can I politely ask that more time is spent getting the basics right. There needs to be less waffle about policy, strategy and inter-service rivalry: and rather more attention to detail.
Peter ((irate UK taxpayer)
I very much doubt there was a security risk to the F35 being on deck. You can’t see much that can’t be seen in a million pictures on the web. And the Egyptians take security of the Canal very, very seriously as it is a source of revenue for the state.
Whale Island Zookeeper
On both of the two counts you mentioned, the twin threats of espionage and also terrorism during the transit through Suez, I do not doubt for one minute you are 100% correct about the “reality on the ground”. Ever since Egypt fought a war against us, France and Israel back in 1956 they have always know how vital it is: both to their own economy and also for world maritime trade (i.e. to retain national control of the Suez Canal),.
However in my (admittedly rather long) post of yesterday I was not commenting on the “reality on the ground”. I was only commenting on the details reported in that long-awaited official report (which was, as other posts have recently pointed out, often very-inconsistent and frequently semi-illiterate). Frankly, one key issue is that this long-awaited official report was/is entirely inconsistent with the “reality on the ground”.
Let me clear here, the official report clearly says that RN clearly though that there was severe threat of either terrorism and/or espionage during this particular Suez transit (i.e. on this occasion in 2021). Whether, as you imply, that was or was not an over-reaction, I simply do not know. However your two key points should have been some of the issues which the official report should have considered :
On this occasion, given the perceived threat levels, two sets of orders were issued. To quote verbatim from the report:
“1.3.50 No flying occurred and the flight deck was out of bounds to all personnel except those engaged in force protection of the Ship”.
“1.3.51 The GSSO sent an email on 10 Nov 21 directing that the Red Gear should be fitted for the Suez transit.”
Therefore, as I pointed out yesterday, the “thinking” which went into these orders was completely muddled-headed. On the one hand, the threat was so severe that the QE crew were not allowed up on the flight deck for a very-well-earned break. However, at the same time, many very rare and very expensive aviation assets were parked up on the flight deck. These F35’s were only “protected” by a total unsuitable set of Red Gear.
Furthermore, that Red Gear had already been proved – by being implicated in numerous previous FOD incidents – to be totally unfit for only two purpose of which it was supposed to be used for: FOD and counter-espionage (and I will add, regardless of how it was stored, issued, accounted for etc etc).
Any half-competent official report into this entirely-avoidable crash should have been stating:
Given this long history of previous FOD incidents, this Red Gear should have been replaced years before this accident.On this particular transit through Suez, because of the perceived threat from terrorism and espionage, all F35 aircraft should have been stowed down in the hanger.Last and by no means least, if the F-35 is a Special Access Programme, then I am staggered that any of the QE crew are allowed anywhere near these planes: let alone with a personal mobile phone (with camera). That is what the words “Special Access” mean!
Regards Peter
The letters saying ‘remove before flying’ fell off.
The RAF engineers thought they couldn’t use white lights at night because it might blind the crew on the bridge (on the 2.5 acre flight deck).
They were ‘tired’.
Purlease! Did the dog eat their manuals, too?
The only explanation in the above that washes is that they were *woefully* lax. And, to be frank, having watched the the QE’s woke pleasure cruise on BBC, it was blatantly obvious that the US Marines had a wholly more committed, professional approach – and that’s why they didn’t miss giant red pillows in engine intakes.
Bob
You mention yet another key point that was completely “accidentally on purpose forgotten about” throughout the official report.
The whole incident, including a media interview with the pilot very soon afterwards, was broadcast primetime on BBC1. That omission is yet another example of the very low, and frankly very unprofessional, standards that this official report managed to achieve.
Can I suggest that – instead of the low-observable red colour – that the next batch of F35 FOD gear (i.e. the many attrition replacements) are procured by the RAF/RN from the multi-national consortium in a six-colour rainbow flag design.
That quite-obvious redesign of these essential FOD covers will make them:
more expensive to buy.More visible during preflight checks to colour-blind pilots and engineers.More visible under red lighting conditions at nightShow our armed forces continued commitment to being politically correct.Only then will the UK be able to fly our F-35’s with Pride!
Peter (irate taxpayer)
The US has always been manpower heavy per aircraft, because they all specialise in various systems etc, such as: hydraulics, landing gear, airframe, engine, etc, etc…..the FAA separate trades are: Airframes & Engines (grubber) Electrical (greenie) Radio/radar (pinky) etc…….I was a grubber on the Hermes, operating wessex 5s, seakings & at times harriers……we embarked some USMC, with the same sized aircraft that we had……our manpower per aircraft numbered around 8 bodies, the USMC head count per aircraft numbered around 20 bodies…….they each specialised in their little part (such as hydraulics) & had very little idea about the aircraft, outside of their own specialisation!!!!
The FAA operating small ships flights, mean small teams of very skilled trades, operating together, helping each other, not just staying in your own trade/skill…….if there wasn’t this crossover within the trades, we couldn’t operate aviation at sea!!
The reason the blank was left in the engine intake was lack of due diligence…….check, check & check again!!!!!
After the FAA I went on to be a licensed aircraft engineer, in civilian life!
I thought remove before flight covers had little streamers on them ,also red in colour, to draw the eye and aid in their removal before flight.
Nothing quite as simple as with ALL blanks held together by a LONG RED SECTION OF RED WEBBING, S per EJECTION SEAT PINS ON the Pilatus PC7’S
KSA Riyadh Saudi Arabia
I find it astonishing that there were apparently no cockpit indications of impaired functioning of the engine, owing to the blocked airflow.