Undersea data cables are critical to the internet upon which the modern world has come to depend. This hidden network forms the backbone of global communications but is surprisingly vulnerable to interference by hostile actors. Protecting this infrastructure may become an increasingly important remit for the Royal Navy.
Background
The first undersea cables were telegraph cables laid by Britain to maintain communication across its empire in the second half of the 19th Century. Telegraph cables were gradually replaced by telephone cables and in the 1980s fibre optic technology revolutionised the volume of data that could be carried by a single cable. As the internet revolution began, this fibre optic cable network expanded and new cables continue to be laid across the globe. At least 97% of all internet and voice data now passes through this network.
A data cable is typically about the same circumference as a garden hose for most of its length, although sections closer to shore have thicker sheathing, are buried in trenches cut below the seabed or even have mating laid over them for protection. Specialist cable laying ships are employed and keep to carefully planned and surveyed routes, avoiding natural obstacles such as reefs, wrecks, sharp drops and inclines and areas of known seismic activity. Besides intentional damage, cables have been accidentally cut by ship’s anchors, fishing activities and have even been attacked by sharks. Laying submarine cables is expensive and time-consuming, demanding the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars before a return is made. To date, more than 1.2 million km of submarine cables have been laid in the oceans of the world, the longest single cable is the Asia-America Gateway (AAG) cable system which runs for over 20,000 km. A typical modern subsea cable is made up of up to 200 fibres, each able to transmit 400Gb of data per second in both directions.
Interference with submarine cables for strategic ends began in earnest during the First World War when Britain cut Germany’s undersea telegraph cables in the English Channel. The single remaining German cable was tapped by Britain allowing it to read messages. In response, the Germans attempted to destroy allied cables and signal stations in the Pacific and Indian Ocean with limited success. Most of this sabotage did not require sophisticated equipment and was usually done in relatively shallow waters by surface vessel using grappling hooks. However German U-boat, U-151 was fitted with a cutting device and in 1918 managed to sever links between New York and Nova Scotia and New York and Panama. The practice of cable cutting continued in all theatres during the Second World War.
The Cold War inspired a new level of submarine cable interference. The most well-known example is operation ‘Ivy Bells’. The US Navy used SSNs adapted with diver lockout chambers to lay cable tapping devices on Soviet cables that linked the Russian naval base at Petropavlovsk to its mainland headquarters in Vladivostok. The devices recorded conversations on magnetic tapes that were recovered and replaced by regular submarine operations. Between 1971-81, when the tap was revealed to the Russians by a US mole, the recordings provided valuable intelligence and insight into Soviet naval planning. This may have been the tip of the iceberg as the USN likely conducted other tapping operations. In the modern era, Edward Snowden (Heroic privacy rights campaigner/Putin’s useful idiot) revealed to the media that the American NSA and British GCHQ are able to harvest vast amounts of internet data from taps placed both legally or covertly on fibre optic cables all over the world.
Unprotected
Most of the explosion in wealth derived from globalisation relies on high-speed communications, quite small disruptions to connectivity can have consequences disproportionate to an apparently minor event. Even very undeveloped nations can be impacted. Off the coast of Somalia in 2017 a single cable was accidentally cut by a ship’s anchor. The outage lasted 3 weeks and cost the country $10 million each day. Some nations are reliant on just one or two cables while some routes have multiple cables. There are at least 19 TransAtlantic cables that connect Europe to the US, offering a measure of redundancy if one or two cables are cut but traffic levels continue to climb.
Deliberate interference with cables does not necessarily require particularly sophisticated technology because they are clearly marked on charts for mariners and inevitably have to traverse shallow waters. There have been instances where cables have been cut by amateur divers and vandals breaking into terminals on land. Just like shipping routes, the constraints of geography have created many ‘chokepoints’ where cables are forced to pass through narrow straits where they are easier to locate and interrupt.
The cable network is owned and managed by a wide variety of international commercial entities (Google, Facebook and Microsoft are now in the cable-laying business). There is some global management of key software elements of the internet such as that exercised by ICANN, an organisation that manages domain name allocation, but there is no international or even much government oversight of the physical infrastructure. Despite being strategic national assets we are reliant on commercial interest to maintain and repair cables.
When cables fail, initially locating the break is the hardest part. Once found, either an ROV is despatched by the cable layer or grapnel hooks are used to retrieve the ends and bring them to the surface where they must be spliced together by hand. The whole process may take anything from a few days to a few weeks and may depend on weather conditions and the depth of the water. In an open conflict, slow or stationary cable laying vessels following predictable routes to attempt repairs would be very easy targets.
Cut off
The internet was originally conceived by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the 1960s as a military communications network that could survive nuclear strikes. If part of the network was destroyed, signals would automatically be re-routed via other parts of the system. Although the underlying structure of the internet still works this way, there is very limited spare bandwidth to cope, especially if multiple cables are severed. The sheer volume of data could not always be re-routed and would likely slow down or cripple activity across large parts of the web. Some communication by satellite would be possible but is vastly more expensive and the available bandwidth is relatively small. Using every communications satellite available in the Earth’s orbit could carry just 7% of the communications currently sent via cable from the United States alone.
While ‘local parts’ of the internet might continue to be accessible if international cables were cut, many critical services rely on data centres that are overseas, particularly the big tech companies based in the US that dominate the web. The seamless and distributed nature of the internet is both its strength and vulnerability. A company’s data may be housed in a data centre located just down the road but the application that processes it may be running on a server on another continent.
In many people’s minds, the internet is associated with entertainment and social media and the possibility of the web going dark for a few weeks might seem like just a potential inconvenience. Behind the scenes, the internet does far more than deliver Netflix or allow pictures of cats to be uploaded to Facebook. Financial transactions worth over $10 trillion each day are done online and any disruption would have an immediate effect on the economy, potentially crippling the banking system and halting commerce.
Not only are consumers increasingly shopping online, but most companies are now entirely reliant on the web to store and access vast amounts of data, handle administration, distribution, intellectual property, send and receive payments and much more. Few organisations have parallel offline processes in place that could quickly be activated to replace online systems and life in most western societies would be turned upside down without the internet. One of the legacies of the pandemic is going to be an even greater reliance upon online connectivity. Many organisations are considering abandoning or downsizing their offices as employees demand to work remotely at least part-time or with only occasional in-person meetings.
Wake up call
In 2017 the think tank, Policy Exchange published a landmark document written by Rishi Sunak outlining the threat to undersea cables in a UK context. We will not repeat the full content of this excellent work but the piece names Russia as the primary actor developing the capabilities and having the potential motivation to interfere with submarine cables.
Sunak has subsequently experienced a meteoric political rise and now wields enormous influence as Chancellor of the Exchequer. If not the instigator himself, he would certainly have been in favour of investing in “Multi-Role Research Vessels” announced by the Prime Minister in November. In his Christmas address to the fleet, First Sea Lord mentioned the vessels, labelling them slightly differently as “two new ocean surveillance ships”. He said their purpose would be “to help with data gathering but also help us protect critical national infrastructure and undersea cables.”
The Russian threat
Cutting submarine cables is a deniable activity that would suit a power like Russia that my try to achieve its ends operating in the ‘grey zone’ below the threshold for full-scale war. This kind of asymmetric attack is attractive for a ‘weaker power’, the activity is low risk and for a relatively modest investment and could potentially achieve enormous impact. Russia is dependent on the internet but the Western economies would be much more exposed to loss of connectivity. The UK has been particularly successful in developing its digital economy, even amongst other developed nations and would be especially harmed by a loss of internet access.
Russia is investing in sophisticated naval assets that could be employed to cut specific cables in a targeted and covert way. Submersible with arms that can manipulate objects on the sea bed can place taps, cut cables or leave devices that could cut cables upon command in the future. The research ship Yantar is officially classed as Auxiliary General Oceanographic Research (AGOR), with underwater rescue capability. She is tasked by the shadowy GUGI (Main Directorate Deep-Sea Research) which is an arm of the Russian Defence Ministry but separate from the Navy. Yantar has been seen operating close to seabed cables on several occasions by open-source intelligence analysts and is doubtless tracked much more closely by professional naval intelligence. There is no evidence of nefarious activities yet but Yantar has likely been primarily engaged in information gathering, charting the location and vulnerabilities of cables and other undersea energy infrastructure should they wish to interfere with them in the future.
The US maintains a secretive underwater network of sensors (Formerly SOSUS, now known as the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS)) used to track submarine activity. IUSS is increasingly mobile and less reliant on fixed infrastructure but it does still exist and adversaries remain interested in the location of the sensor arrays and supporting cables. As part of its attempts to dominate the Arctic, Russia is known to be laying its own network of arrays under the ice called HARMONY. Incredibly, the system is believed to be powered by a series of small submarine-portable nuclear reactors laid on the seabed.
The construction of such a complicated system is only possible because GUGI operates the largest fleet of covert manned submersibles in the world. This fleet includes six nuclear-powered mini-submarines; 2 x Paltus (730 tons) 3, x Kashalot (1,580 tons) and Losharik (2,100 tons). Supporting them are two large ‘mother’ submarines that can covertly convey their deep-diving babies over long ranges. Although the construction of HARMONY may be the initial task, this transporter submarine capability means the Russians can potentially interfere with submarine cables unseen anywhere in the world’s oceans.
Securing the lines
Protecting cables that stretch for thousands of miles across the deep ocean floor is extremely challenging and potentially expensive but there are three main ways in which security could be improved.
Legal and regulatory. There is limited protection for submarine cables in international law and this could be addressed with a new International treaty with punitive sanctions against any nation proven to have interfered with cables. This would at least help raise the threshold of risk for actors contemplating such action. Cable Protection Zones could also be implemented in areas of shallower waters where vital cables at risk. Areas covered by these regulations would not allow, surface ships conducting ‘research activity’, fishing, ships anchoring or diving. Even assuming all nations would be willing to accept a new treaty, like all regulation of the marine environment, the primary difficulty is to ensure round the clock enforcement.
Capacity and redundancy. Key data traffic routes could be backed up by redundant extra ‘dark’ cables, ideally not marked on charts and buried as much as possible. There is already some redundancy in the system as accidental cable breaks occur frequently but there is limited financial incentive to invest large numbers of new cables, capable of providing the level of resilience required if a concerted attack cut multiple connections. Building this additional resilience would likely require government funding in partnership with cable companies.
Surveillance and deterrence. It is possible that cables could be fitted with sensors that can detect the sonar frequencies used by submersibles intent on interference and alert authorities ashore. It may also be possible to use fibre optic cables themselves as sensors. Small or unusual movements in the cable caused by interference may be detectable by analysing the transmission of light through the cable. There are already research programmes underway to investigate using undersea cables to measure distant seismic activity.
New developments make the deployment of a fleet of UUVs to patrol up and down sections of cable practical and affordable. Persistent Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (PAUV) that use very little power and are can operate independently for several months are maturing and could be a solution. The deployment of patrol UUVs and the inspection and rapid repair of submarine cables could be a task for the new Ocean Surveillance/Research Vessels. This activity cannot be undertaken by the UK alone and would require co-operation with other nations willing to invest significantly in cable security.
The RAF recently stood up a new ‘Space Command’ with its mission to “protect the UK’s interests in space”. Loss of satellite links would severely hamper military command and control systems, communications and ISR in particular, but cutting a few seabed cables has the potential to cause damage measured in hundreds of £Billions and affect every aspect of society. The ability to disrupt satellites is limited to a few powerful nations but the bar to disruption of seabed infrastructure is much lower and more easily achieved. Part of the tasking for the newly established NATO North Atlantic Command (based in Norfolk, Virginia) is to monitor threats against undersea infrastructure – the nearest organisation (or ‘Inner Space Command’) currently in existence to address an arguably greater threat.
Unlike the nuclear or cruise missile threat, specific deterrence against data cable interference cannot be maintained with the option to respond in kind. All that can be done is to make it riskier for adversaries to contemplate by improved regulation and surveillance. In broader terms, further improvements in anti-submarine and underwater warfare capability for the RN and across NATO is needed. Small steps such as the new RVs and the procurement of the Manta XLUUV technology demonstrator are moves in the right direction but there is much more to be done to secure the backbone of global communications.
Russia sure does have the gear that could ruin our week! I wonder if we have any spy ships that we don’t know about. And we should definitely build half a dozen Non nuclear submarines for around our shallow waters and protecting subsea hardware. A submarine maybe 3 to 4 thousand tonnes would be ideal wouldn’t it, German or Swedish? Or develop our own again maybe from the New barrow design Facility and start exporting?. Also 7 nuclear submarines isn’t enough to do half the jobs the UK need them to do! 12 is about enough the RN needs in reality. But I’m surprised We actually got boat 7!.
on another note I was arguing with someone the other day, he seems to think our Astute class carry nuclear weapons!! Cruise missiles bought from USA, and just like tomahawk launch I suppose, he was adamant a RN admiral let slip we do carry some in the Astutes but obviously I disagreed…. but is this true guys?
No. Our SSN’s don’t carry TLAM-N. For a variety of reasons.
All I will say is that it was a shame that Astute wasn’t designed with VPL’s. And yes we need 12.
TLAM-N was withdrawn even from US inventory.
It is just possible that we have nuclear depth charges or torpedoes still: but not cruise. I doubt we have nuclear depth charges but we could easily make them as we have a massive national stockpile of plutonium.
There certainly used to be small nuclear depth charges as it is well known they were transferred to the carriers’ magazines in ‘82 for better safety.
We have no nuclear naval ordnance now. Not even sneaky-beaky………
You should reply to Cam not me.
Was this the 1994 Defence Review that started the withdrawal of UK tactical nuclear weapons ?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Front_Line_First
About 1998 yes.
No buckets of sunshine in the fleet. They are long gone. Even the legacy handling and stowage fittings and fixtures have been removed from legacy magazines.
Good riddance …it was a pain in the arse to look after!
There are no 3000-4000 tonnes submarines in the Swedish or German navy inventory. In Europe only the Dutch have 3000 tonnes Walrus-class subs.
That’s true. But TKMS has a Type 216 submarine design with around 4000 t. They tried so sell it to Australia as the future Attack-class.
As for SSK’s there are a number of options.
The Type 216 from Germany which was a design put forward for the RAN’s Collins replacement.
The A26 from SAAB which comes in three sizes, um, lengths. We could have the smallest for training and eight for real work. After trouble with the Collins class the RAN didn’t speak with the Swedes.
And the JMSDF Soryu class which was also offered to the RAN.
It would be nice to build these at home but I don’t think there is the capacity. The Australians saw their new SSK project as a national investment in education and infrastructure. But that has cost them a lot, lot more than intended. The Germans could have built them boats in Germany for a fraction of the cost. The French Short Fin was a poor choice too. The RAN were over ambitious in the specs.
As always you are right.
Bless. I like to be approximately right in a fuzzy sort of way.
Fuel cells and AIP’s aren’t a panacea. They offer other problems but the benefits do outweigh them.
We used to send O-boats oop north to hang about to listen for Soviet submarines coming our way. And modern SSK’s are several classes beyond them.
I do like the look of the A26’s. I wonder if the extended range Oceanic models could have its range extended in lieu of say missiles or SF fit out so it could submerge just outside Faslane and not pop up again until it returned?
All three of them are great designs. I think the RAN made a poor choice. Saying that the SSN Barracuda would have been a better choice than either our A-boats or the USN’s current designs for the RAN.
I think the Japanese offered the Australians a late version Soryu class which did away with AIP, replacing it with a larger Lithium ion battery outfit, as in fitted to their last 2 Soryus and it’s replacement. I think they believe Lithium ion battery technology is the way ahead for various reasons.
Readers are probably aware of the concerns of the Irish government last year when Russian operatives were caught conducting surveillance on cable ingress and egress locations on the western coast of Ireland.
Taiwan constantly reminds the world that ocean going Chinese dredgers are always positioned off its coasts, outside territorial waters, but over locations were international cable are laid.
They really are sand dredgers and they are intruding on Taiwans islands close to the mainland
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-security-idUSKBN2A51EJ
“The sand-dredging is one weapon China is using against Taiwan in a campaign of so-called gray-zone warfare, which entails using irregular tactics to exhaust a foe without actually resorting to open combat. Since June last year, Chinese dredgers have been swarming around the Matsu Islands, dropping anchor and scooping up vast amounts of sand from the ocean bed for construction projects in China.”
There is worldwide shortage of sand apparently. As odd as it may sound.
we do have plenty of sand but not every sand is the right kind for building
Yes. And from the sea means its often cleaner and lower transport costs via sea or rivers for a heavy free flowing material
What would be the actions if we had a sub catch another in the act of cutting or tampering with a cable?
In theory a cable disturbance can be detected from the landing stations before it’s even cut. Undersea fibre optic cables are monitored for performance 24/7 and most routes have sensitive OTDR equipment installed to instantly detect bends or cuts down to a fairly close location. So deliberately cutting or even just tampering with these cables carries a very high risk of getting caught in the act. If multiple cables were cut in different places, getting caught somewhere along the line would be almost a certainty. I’m sure the likes of Russia and China know this and would not be so stupid. A more likely scenario would be a smaller rogue state or terrorist group, but then these are unlikely to have sufficient technical resources i.e. submarines. So while the threat is real and very serious perhaps the actual risk of it happening can be somewhat overstated. IMO the bigger issue, as stated in the article, is the globalised, commercialy managed, operation of the infrastructure. Having worked in the industry I’m aware of a number ways this could introduce additional vulnerabilities but obviously that’s not the kind of thing to put on a public internet forum!
The Russians have been at the very least ‘monitoring’ Western undersea Comms cables for decades. Unfortunately we don’t really know what they were doing on the seabed, as our SMs can’t go to the same depths as the Paltus or Losharik. Have they cut cables/interfered with them, no idea, but, they weren’t collecting sand samples I would imagine.
DaveyB, I don’t think there is a lot we could do if we know they cut a cable, other then replace it. It’s a They know we know sort of thing, much the same if the reverse were true.
They can survey the routes but the information on cable locations is in the public domain anyway so it doesn’t really gain them much. I don’t believe they can interfere much less tap these cables without at least being detected – and I used to design these things for a living.
Undersea systems are long and very very expensive, hence they are pushing the limits of what’s possible/economic. Consequently they are baselined and very closely monitored, with actual people and software watching 24/7. These systems are very sensitive and continuously automatically logged with trend analysis etc. so any disturbances will most definitely be noticed.
So I would put the Russian activity in the same category as buzzing the edges of our airspace with bombers. It’s annoying, it needs a response and there is always a risk of some small escalation or accident. But outside of WW3 the likelihood of actual attack is practically non existent.
IMO what would be very useful and quite easy/cheap/quick to implement would be increased cooperation and direct lines of communication between telecoms industry, RN and USN.
e.g. if a Telco sees a suspicious event(s) on a cable they have a way to report the location to the Navy straight away so they can be on the lookout. Likewise the Navy call the Telco if they see a vessel acting suspiciously near a known cable route. Just like civil ATC works with RAF/QRA. For all I know such system may already exist. Also there are plenty ex RN in the Telco world – I have worked with a few – so they should be able to work together just fine.
I would imagine the Navy (thus Telco) knows well in advance if something like the Paltus is enroute to the Comms cables. While SSBNs and SSNs are inherently quiet, the mother ship with attached vessel are not. It wouldn’t take much to discover their presence/location if they were at sea.
As I’ve said, they have been deploying for years, if the location of said cables are in the public domain, then they probably aren’t conducting route surveys! Just a different perspective.
Yes I’m sure the various NATO navies will keep a very close eye on these activities!
I don’t know so much about cooperation with the Telcos, whatever system exists I’m sure its something that could usefully be expanded because in my eyes it’s an easy low cost win to improve security. For example there have even been cases on terrestrial (land) cables where close coordination between Telco monitoring and Police has been able to catch cable theives in the act, and those guys do not hang about! Even a submarine should be easy to catch if you already know roughly where to look, especially with P8, sonorbouys etc.
However it may be difficult for Navy to coordinate with submarine cable Telcos because the industry is very complex in its ownership. Due to eye watering costs most trans-oceanic cables are built in partnership between several companies and countries, individual fibres/pairs will then be sub-leased to various others still, and the assets themselves often change hands due to mergers and acquisitions. So you can easily have 20+ commercial entities with an interest in a single cable!
What I do know for sure, is that the undersea cables are very closely monitored. In simple terms, due to the very high build costs they are generally designed to a minimum spec to only ‘just’ work, with very tight operating margins. There is also a certain amount of ‘drift’ due to changes in temperature, cables shifting on the seabed due to currents etc. So the operators have to keep a very close eye on things to make sure the cable keeps working reliability.
Another factor is that the fibre cores in submarine cables are normally surrounded by a 15Kv DC conductor to power amplifiers along the route, which makes it nigh impossible, and extremely dangerous, to access the actual fibres underwater, at least not without tripping the power which would alert the operator to the disturbance
I guess it may be the case that the Russians are building intelligence picture by testing the limits of what they can get away with before they are noticed/challenged, while retaining some level of plausible deniability e.g. by simply moving a cable a bit on the seabed, which they can claim was unintentional e.g. due to getting snagged. But if you can catch them in the act a few times it gets more difficult to maintain deniability.
I wouldn’t question ur knowledge of said systems and the way companies monitor them for any potential abnomilies in their operation. It is very easy to associate a stationary ship in the vacinity of any cables if disruptions occur at the same time, however, the same cannot be said of submarines conducting the same sort of work-what the eye doesn’t see=deniability.
All of the Russian specialist submarines are based in the Northern fleet, two types require mother ships to transport them, both are deep diving and are seabed operations vessels……
Good points and it certainly helps detection that the Russian deep diving systems require mother ships.
Deniability is by definition a nebulous concept, but IMO repetition over time can still make it problematic to sustain, even when the actual act itself is unseen. I guess that falls into the ‘we know, they know’ category like you said!
I think the main point that I was trying to make, with my somewhat long winded explanation, is that a ‘submarine cable QRA’ could offer some additional deterrent effect. Such system has certainly reduced cable theft on land, but obviously policing vast oceans is much more challenging.
I guess it all helps one way or another.
I think the security of said systems across the globe is becoming more important, as you say, much vital information is sent along these cables, with any disruption able to cause untold economic damage. How it can be policed is another question entirely, but, I suspect that a countries military probably needs to step in and help.
Cheers for it comments, I have learnt much on this subject.
That should be ‘your’ comments.
You’re welcome – I too have learned a great deal from the comments from others on numerous STRN articles so it’s nice to have a subject that I know a bit about and can make a contribution! Cheers.
Going back to your original question:
“What would be the actions if we had a sub catch another in the act of cutting or tampering with a cable?”
(which I failed to answer with my ramblings below lol)
Since the likely antagonist would be Russia or China, I doubt that a direct military response would be sensible.
A better approach IMO would be to collect as much evidence as possible to support a protest via diplomatic channels, no doubt to be followed by vociferous denials and a major international diplomatic incident.
It would be interesting to know if RN has examined this scenario and have a protocol in place, perhaps something to consider if not?
As I said previously, I suspect the Russians at least are well aware of the technological characteristics of submarine cables that present a high risk of them getting caught, as well as the potential fall out.
So IMO they would be unlikely to actually do something so risky, but you never know.
Isnt the depth of the oceans such that the vast majority of the undersea cables are way out of the reach of all submarines with the Russians having the specialist deep diver Losharik ( with a series of circular titanium eggs) able to to go a bit deeper than the rest.
If it was up to me I would have a sort of SOSUS network in the vulnerable shallower seas to detect any ‘loitering’ sub
An image from Forbes on this issue
Depth of oceans varies obviously.
With respect to interfering with submarine cables I don’t think Russia’s deep diving capabilities are much of an advantage TBH.
Any underwater activity gets exponentially more challenging the deeper you go, and tampering with submarine cables underwater without being noticed is difficult enough already for the various reasons I described above.
So I guess you are right, in terms of protecting cables it’s really the shallow areas we probably need to focus on most. Being CASD countries I would imagine UK & France already have some sort of coastal SOSAS, conveniently these are also the two countries where most all of the transatlantic cables land into Europe.
Also the resolution of OTDR equipment is directly proportional to distance, so on the cable itself it’s much easier to get a more accurate ‘fix’ on any disturbance in the shallow areas close to the landing stations.
As usual, interesting top stuff from Navylookout, but a bit naugthy too?
“The internet was originally conceived by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the 1960s as a military communications network that could survive nuclear strikes”.
I know some will say Tim Berners-Lee, but that was the WWW. Was not packet switching created by Davies which led to the ARPANET? Both the UK and US were working on systems in the 1950s and I think both Davies along with Baran are both credited (in US) at being at the start of what became the internet. Our opposition in the UK came from the Post Office and opposition to new tech has since the war held the UK back when it should be leading in many innovations. Fibre Optics, Broadband, the UK was the base for the start of all of this.
What is ‘the Internet’? As you alude it’s debatable. To me as an engineer it is the network within the public IP address space as defined by ICANN, of which the WWW is just one part. But when most laypeople people talk about ‘the Internet’ they are referring to the WWW.
Also if we are being pedantic, the vast majority of network traffic actually runs outside ‘the Internet’. Besides the numerous international private networks owned by Telcos, Banks and other large companies, even the likes of Google, Facebook, Amazon etc. run very substantial content distribution outside the public IP address space, and therefore technically not really ‘the lnternet’ as such.
Regarding the development of broadband, Charles Kao, regarded as the father of fibre optics, was born in China and grew up in Hong Kong, albeit he did do most of his pioneering development work in the UK. He was working at STC, a UK company which ultimately fell into Nortel, a Canadian company which itself went bankrupt later.
I don’t disagree about the Post Office strangling developments. The UK has long had a strange relationship with new tech. We seem to produce and nurture many of the most brilliant innovations, then completely fail to capitalise on them. Deregulation has helped a little, but has also often resulted in our best companies and technology becoming owned offshore.
So IMO plenty nit-pics can be leveled at the article, but the gist is correct in layman’s terms. Since the basis of the article is around security of connectivity and economic impacts, I don’t suppose those technical specifics matter so much anyway.
Funny this came. A couple days ago i was reading about the new big “most advanced” cable layer ship being build.
https://seatec-services.com/biggest-new-build-contract-in-seatecs-history/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dsc1DB0he2g
Undersea cable security is something I have been concerned about for ages but the issue isn’t restricted to telecoms. Offshore wind, wave etc farms each have, I gather, a single very expensive interconnector which is not small and is, to be fair, buried quite deeply. As we (rightly) move to fossil fuel free energy, defence of the interconnectors needs to be addressed. They are not a few kilometers of 2.5mm cable strung out but substantial pieces of engineering that are difficult to install and repair. The best wind, wave etc sources are many kilometers out to sea and the UK is particularly rich in this resource but the interconnectors are vulnerable not only to geological events but also to those promoted by a hostile actors. The sudden loss of many GW of energy is a substantial threat to civil society. In my view it would be better to generate hydrogen onsite, yielding not only H2 but O2 and the many other components of sea water, tankering the H2/O2 to where it is needed, even by remotely controlled tankers but in the mean time, it should be a job that the RN is considering. I think we need a bigger navy!