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N-a-B

OMG. They disinterred TRAM.

That is pretty much exactly the same system Navsea were trialling at Port Hueneme at the turn of the century. There was a video floating round of a shore-based trial where as the “crane” reached about 60 degrees, the canister gave a visible slip of about a foot or so (which would indicate they’d forgotten to tension the suspension point).

None of this solves the very significant questions of what you do with the empty canisters, where you store the TRAM gubbins aboard the T-AKE, nor indeed how quickly you can move strike length canisters from their stowage (they won’t fit on the lifts to the mags) to the RAS pockets. There’s very limited stowage volume on those ships for an 8m length canister.

And sea state 4? Judging by that picture, not a chance. More like a low SS3.

Still – fair play, they’ve done the easy bit.

I wouldn’t get too excited about T26/T31 either. There’s very little free deckspace in way of the silo position to be faffing around with something like TRAM. That’s before you start looking at impact on local deck strength or stability.

Last edited 4 months ago by N-a-B
ATH

I can see how the big Mk41 payloads are a problem. But do you think things would be more practical for the much smaller Sea Ceptor containers? From a British point of view even just being able to reload Sea Ceptor would be a useful win.

N-a-B

Theoretically, of course. However, having seen the contortions people went through to try and make a go of RASing GWS 26 / VLSW, I’m not sanguine.

The Australians had a system for trying to reload ESSM alongside their east coast ammunitioning facilities. It was called MCLE and produced by a company called LOPAC. Didn’t get anywhere either, not least because the silo position on the ANZACs was very high (just like T31……..)

ATH

Thanks

Duker

The ’emptys’ go back the same way they arrived

The purpose of trials ….is what ?

And no its not the same as 20 years back, other wise they wouldnt have changed completely the method

85455741
N-a-B

Genius. Missed the point completely.

Duker

What ? That something you said couldnt be done has been done – with pictures to prove it . You even dispute the sea state- because you can tell better from a few pictures.
Transferring was the critical part of the exercise solving the storage and movement on the AKE is trivial

N-a-B

Says the internet warrior who has never set foot on a warship – or auxiliary – in his life. Incidentally that is precisely the set up Navsea were using twenty years ago.

Never said it couldn’t be done, merely that the complication and expense were unlikely to be worth it.

I note your “English” is slipping again.

Lloyd

Moderators we have a breach of guidelines

  1. “Please try to stick to the subject matter of the article you are commenting on and above all, avoid personal attacks, however much you disagree.
A Robinson

The empty cannisters will go back on the same RAS, just like we used to do with Seadart!

N-a-B

Dart was a toy in comparison. The issue with the empties is that – unlike Dart – you have to remove the empty canister from the silo first, either store it somewhere clear or recover it to the store, BEFORE you can start shifting the loaded canister and loading it. Its not the removal itself, its the sheer volume of containers needed to be removed and stored in addition to the live ones.

Supportive Bloke

I suspect *the concept* is that you withdraw the empties before the RAS and stack them.

The empties are then cleared first or vertrep’d as they are no longer sensitive munitions.

However, in time of war the empties may go to Davey Jones for long term storage.

I agree that this still has the air of a co production by Messrs Heath & Robinson.

N-a-B

It’s all do-able, ultimately, but what it costs is either significant additional space on both ships – but more importantly, time spent connected. These serials will be slow and quite hazardous. VERTREPing the empties would be a spectator sport in itself.

Supportive Bloke

I must admit was I being mischevious with the VERTREP comment.

Random Commentator

Better off converting some old super-tankers to arsenal ships controlled by the destroyers.

ATH

One of the problems with most commercial hulls is that they can’t keep up with naval escorts. If minimally crewed/uncrewed companion ships turn out to be a good idea they’ll probably need to be custom built to make the 25 plus knots needed.

Supportive Bloke

Riiiiiight

So when you take an existing ship and substantially modify it, it has to conform to current class rules.

So if you turn a civilian vessel into one that carries things which go bang you need a lot of modifications.

Essentially you have proposed The Deathtrap Class – arsenal ship!

N-a-B

Not necessarily. Depends on the type of ship and notation applied. As it is, Class doesn’t deal with magazines – they tend to run away muttering. That sort of thing would be a safety case with the Naval Authority.

Not that i’d use supertankers mind. Too big, wrong speed.

Biggest issue with arsenal ships is the one they’ve always had. Striking the right balance between the number of missiles carried vs stockpile and number of ships is a very tricky thing to sort.

Jon

Surely the biggest question to sort on the number of arsenal ships is zero or not zero. The rest is fine-tuning.

I only hope someone doesn’t decide these trials mean we can cut back on VLS numbers for the new frigates, because we’ll somehow figure out how to restock at sea. That’s the kind of initiative that we could spend the next twenty years trying out different things, always almost succeeding, before deciding it’s still too difficult.

Supportive Bloke

Pleeeeeease don’t give that idea to The Good Ideas Club…

Malky

Rather than supertankers, container vessels are just about fast enough to keep up. Plenty of open topped space for conversion to VLS silo space.

ATH

Unless you’re talking the very small ~200 TEU container ships then they are just too big. I doubt anyone is planning more than say 200 missiles per ship and probably less than that. To accommodate that number of missiles and not much more you don’t need a huge hull, even if it has the power to do say 28kt.

Challenger

Interesting stuff, but with our more limited resources I’d be looking to improve everything on the table already……quad packing Sea Ceptor, getting more 57mm/40mm gun systems into the fleet, better decoy systems (know this is already in hand), further exploring whether it’s worthwhile getting LMM/StarStreak onto vessels themselves rather than just Wildcat.

Make sure we’ve got a well provisioned and layered short/medium range capability so as many Aster 30 and FC-ASW in MK.41 as possible are saved for longer range/offensive actions, as once they are gone they’re gone.

ATH

With the fleet moving to 127/57 mm main guns, both of which I believe have guided shell options is there a need for LMM/Star Streak on the ship?

Hugo

Seeing as were abandoning 4.5 which had better AAW characteristics are we really gonna pick up that capability again with the 5 inch?

Duker

The knowledgeable people here said the 4.5in lost its AAW capability as the radar/ combat systems were upgraded

Supportive Bloke

It was to do with when the gun control / actuator system changed from electro/hydraulic to fully electric stepper motors etc.

That required different interface software and as the lead customer for the legacy 4.5” gun system RN decided not to develop the AAW software module as Sea Ceptor was the coming thing and that was, sensibly, where air defence money went.

Russ

We stopped using 4.5″ guns in AAW mode when I was on the Edinburgh back in 89 – 92 – or rather we stopped training it at FOST when we went through COST Feb/Mar 92.

Supportive Bloke

Honestly we’d be better off fitting 40mm across the fleet – spend the money on giving another good quality layer that keeps drones and missiles at arms length from the ship.

Spending big on making medium calibre guns usable for AAW doesn’t make a load of sense as it will never be as good as the specialist mounts with really do excel at that kind of thing.

Hugo

Sure, except both are probably expensive proposals, fact we don’t have enough phalanx or 30mm for our tiny fleet at this point makes a 40mm replacement program extremely unlikely

Supportive Bloke

There are loads of 30mm mounts coming off all T23, Albions and the new ones bough for QEC.

What makes you think there is a shortage of the physical parts?

Whether they are all serviced to spec is another question!

Whether there is anyone to operate them is quite another question!

Last edited 4 months ago by Supportive Bloke
Hugo

Either way if we can’t deploy a weapon system we’ve had for years consistently how are we going to deploy a new one across the fleet

Also aren’t the latest ones remotely operated.

Last edited 4 months ago by Hugo
AlexS

It is sad how enclosed into themselves are the so called Anglo Saxon world. France already made it with an Aster and Charles de Gaulle carrier.

While the RN currently has no solid stores support ships available,

French did it with Jacques Chevalier which is a replenisher but also «solid stores. I don’t understand why RN do not have a multi propose ship like that. Instead seems parts of it still live in the time of the large navy it once had.

Last edited 4 months ago by AlexS
AlexS

The title is incorrect. Please search French news.

Le bâtiment de ravitaillement des forces « Jacques Chevallier » a réalisé pour la première fois un transfert de missiles surface-air à bord du porte-avions « Charles de Gaulle », qui l’a ensuite placé dans son lanceur vertical.

Duker

Title is around wrong way but transfer did happen – to a carrier where they used a crane on deck to then load the VL, an easier operation

AlexS

So? filling a VLS with a missile from a supply ship at sea is what everyone wants and was achieved.

Supportive Bloke

Vessels like the Tides have very long legs, high speeds and massive tanks.

Also there is negligible difference in crew size and costs for making them that big.

Making Swiss Army Knife vessels is very, very expensive and all of your eggs are in one basket.

AlexS

Au contraire! Having replenishment separated from stores forces RN to have too few vessels of each.

SailorBoy

Even just completing one of the FSS as a dual role auxiliary would be a good idea.
When, apart from a CSG, are we going to need 7000m3 of solid stores? Two would be enough to rotate along with the carriers and provide a ship for each deployment.
Then we have the third available for 2nd tier deployments like LRGs, acting as the catch-all replenishment ship.
Lots of European navies do it (the ones without carriers to escort) so the CONOPS is there.

Jon

Yes. We do it too. The Forts are mixed. Even the Waves have a small solid stores capacity. It’s only the latest iteration of supply ships, Tides and FSSS, that are so completely separated out.

The question is, how much is Fort Vic laid up because of the lack of sailors and how much is because it’s going to cost too much to bring it up to code? Even if we solve the RFA pay dispute, I believe that Ft Vic still won’t sail again short of a war. According the this site last week, “the cost of bringing Fort Victoria’s firefighting and munitions handling safety equipment up to more stringent modern standards to meet Lloyds certification is believed to be prohibitively expensive.”

Perhaps we should review the need for Lloyds certification to current standards, for ships scheduled for replacement. Presumably Ft Vic was within code for CSG 21. However, given the ridiculous length of time before the first FSS will be operational, even allowing an extra 5 years of use under an older code wouldn’t stop gapping in this case.

I made an argument (in another place) for the conversion of one of the Tides to mixed use. It would still be very expensive, but it should take less time than a new build in the UK.

N-a-B

The stuff about Class societies is a red herring. DMR can – where valid – concess, or indeed limit the scope of Classification, although MCA get a say as well. Munitions are outside the scope of Class Societies. Have a good go through LR Naval Rules and CLAME and you’ll find only minimal reference to lifting equipment – and certainly nothing that would require massive investment.

The real driver is the manpower crisis in the RFA, coupled with the underlying poor material state of FTVIC. She was always the more fragile of the two.

There is no way that a Tide can be sensibly converted to cover off meaningful amounts of solid stores.

Jon

Why couldn’t a Tide be refitted to include solid stores? It would obviously be a major task to gut and refit. I know it would cost an arm and a leg and probably take years, but surely not the 7 years it’s going to take us to get a new FSSS. The class was designed by BMT to have variants that include solid store, such as HNoMS Maud, so I assumed that would give designers and project managers a leg up. Why and what does “sensibly” preclude? Would the same be true of increasing the solid store capacity of a Wave, perhaps ripping out its tanks and fuel delivery systems all together?

However, if the real driver is manpower and Ft Vic could be brought back into action, I agree it wouldn’t be worth it to convert another class.

N-a-B

Lets start with physical arrangement. The Tides have 17 cargo oil tanks arranged along the ship forward of the deckhouse. Those tanks are quite deep >12m but also constrained by the ships longitudinal structure. So straight away you’re into adding decks, adding access (lifts and stairs) but more importantly interfering with the primary structure – which is rarely a good thing.

Then you’ve got to start thinking about separation from contamination sources so now you’re adding cofferdams, which complicates access. Also load bearing for local FLT loads on stores routes, which may exceed the design strength of the existing deck (which wasn’t designed for those loads).

Then you’re into adding the things that aren’t there in a cargo oil tank. Like electrical power, lighting, HVAC, mechanical venting, firefighting systems, refrigeration plants, internal comms systems, plus all the cable and pipe routes for them to run on. Then you’re into the local electrical distribution centres, fuse panels etc and you still haven’t got to the bit where you figure out if your main switchboards have both enough enclosures for the circuits required and the available current from your generators to power all the things you want to power.

The only thing common between Maud and Tide is the 3D shape of the form and the main engines. Pretty much everything else will be different.

Tricky sh1t this ship design….

Jon

Thank you. I had hoped that the ship’s primary structure could remain unaffected, although extra floors, access, general and electrical systems I had thought about. Also armoured enclosures for ammunition. However, I had hoped that as well as the hull form and propulsion, much of the superstructure, accommodation, navigation, flight coordination, hangars etc, could remain.

I can see that alteration of load bearing structures would indeed be problematic. I hadn’t come across the idea of cofferdams inside ships before. Always good to learn new things.

SailorBoy

Is what we need a modern Fort Vic design? Maybe 15,000 tons, with CAMM for air defence and dual replenishment.
Give it a twin hangar and cranes for moving containers around and it can help LRGs with aviation and logistics.
It would never happen but if two replaced the third FSS probably result in a more balanced fleet.

ATH

Going to cost a lot more to go with 4 ships of two different classes. As it looks like progress towards an annual MoD budget of 2.5% of GDP will be slow to very slow what would you give up to get this outcome?

Irate Taxpayer (Peter)

Jon and Sailorboy

I will add a few extra points to what N-a-B has, quite rightly, said in his several posts directly above.

The Fort Vic class was orginally designed and built, way back in the 1980’s, for one key purpose: and that never “just” to be a supply ship.

In modern parlence, they were primarily intended to be a “mothership” for a group of eight ASW T23’s operating out in the North Atlantic and up into Far North.

Thus they were conceived, designed and built concurrently with both the then-new T23 and Merlin programmes – all of which were intended to hunt down, and sink, lots and lots of Soviet flagged Red Octobers.

Thus the orginal ship’s plans included not only for the very large volume of fuel and stores needed for maintaining a large RN flottila for months out at sea: but also included the large spaces needed for supporting a big airgoup of engineers – those necessary for maintaing a full squadron of large naval helicoptors for months out a sea.

Provision was also made inside the ship for a big ASW passive sonar tail; ops room etc and, at one time, fitting Seawolf was being very seriously considered.

Overall the ship’s sheer complexitity – four key functions of fuel; solid stores; helicoptor maintainance and on-board ASW – made it very complex to design and build – and thus very expensive.

However that key role as an ASW mothership simply disappered when the Berlin Wall fell: which was the year before the first ship in class got its rudder wet.

Thus, of the “orginally planned” class of six ships: only two were ever started and completed. Those two never had the seawolf and towed sonars fitted…..

Thus the whole RN ASW programme of the 1980’s – Fort Vic + Merlin + T23 – was a classic case of the world has moved on by the time they started their service careers… …..

….and so neither Fort Vic, nor its sister ship, ever did a single voyage of the type which the designers had been ordered to plan for….

—————-

Furthermore, as N-a-B quite rightly implies, building a “modern Fort Vic” today would not be a like-for-like replacement

One cannot just unroll the old parchment plans – and then nip out and photocopy them

Ship codes have changed massively over the past forty years: including, let us not forget, MARPOL for pollution control. For starters, that requires a full double hull.

So, even IF one wanted to build a modern Fort Vic – one with the same stores and fuel capabilities as the orginal class – any new ship would be bigger again…..and that extra size would mean that the new ship could not fit into many useful ports and most UK drydocks…..

….. in modern parlence, its often called an obesity crisis…..

————

So I am wih N-a-B on this one: the age-old engineering adage of KISS should apply – Keep It Simple Stupid.

The other often-forgottem advantage of KISS is that inheremtly simple ships spend far more time out a sea: and less time in the dickyards.

The Point class – which is as simple as it can possibly get – has repeatedly proved that key principle, time and time again, over the past two decades of its service.

——————————

Modern helicoptors today are far better, and far longer legged, than those little Sea Kngs were back forty years ago.

So let us not forget that transferring small pallets of solid stores to frigates and destroyers can often most-easily be done by VERTREP: not necessarily by a RAS (S)

———-

What I would say in reply to one of Jon’s points is that I do think that it was a “bit of a shame” that the superstructure of the RN Tide tankers were not build with the following three extra space incorporated:

  • a small amount of useable solid stores space (possibly say half of the 900cm that orginally went into the wave class?)
  • a permenantly fitted Role 2/3 medical surgical facility, one that would be staffed “only as and when needed“.
  • a bit more extra accomodation for arguementees:- be that a few bootnecks on a cruise, or aviation maintainers, or civilian evacuees etc etc

That is because it has been proved – time and tine again – that having extra “flex” spaces onboard these big RFA ships offers very useful extra extra military capability – especially in grey zone or “limited ops” when very small forces need a base at short notice

….so lets not forget that the special forces rescue mission in Sierra Leone – the one when the Britishh Armys’ crack infantry unit surrendered to a unit of crack addicts – was launched from an RFA ship lying just offshore. Often forgotten is that the RAF Chinnoks used in that rescue mission flew in the Hereford Hooligans very quickly, and from a very very long way away

————-

Overall, when it comes to this key topic of fleet solid stores support the RN is now very deep down inside a very deep hole – one wholly (pun intended) of its very own making.

Therefore, the best bet for the RN right now is to hurry up and get Navantia to hurry up and build those three new FSS: to the fully-approved and now-contracted design

(Big Hint: without changing your ********* minds halfway through !!!!!!)

and, whilst those three much-needed FSS ships are being built on the slipways, concurrently the RN eldership also now needs to sort out the RFA crew’s T+C’s; rates of pay and whether (or not) fish and chips (or paella) is to be on the menu board in the FSS on Frydays etc etc

Regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)

Supportive Bloke

“ So let us not forget that transferring small pallets of solid stores to frigates and destroyers can often most-easily be done by VERTREP: not necessarily by a RAS (S)”

OK so the private joke NaB and I were sharing at the top of the page is what happens to an 8m long slung load under a helicopter?

The down wash will make the container rotate nicely…

Trying to carry it vertically would be really interesting unless it could be stowed vertically by magic that could deal with pendulum action and downwash…

4m canisters are a bit different as they can sling lengthways under the helo’s body. Subject to safety clearances….

N-a-B

I think the point Peter is making re VERTREP is less to do with munitions and more to do with how solid stores for RN DD/FF have been supplied over the last 20 years or so.

The FSS is entirely specified and designed around supporting a carrier – and a proper carrier at that, rather than a CVS – where the sheer volume of vittles, spares and munitions requires connected (ie jackstay) resupply,

The unfortunate truth is that during the HERRICK/TELIC years and the interval between Lusty/Ocean retiring and CSG 21, the RN have conducted vanishingly small number of sustained deployments where that large scale resupply has been required. Which has allowed the use of small VERTREP serials pretty much exclusively. Which is why the RN/RFA have conducted literally a handful of real (as opposed to training) RAS(S) serials during that period.

Jon

The separation of solid and fuel replenishment ships would probably have been theoretically cheaper had both been designed and built at the same time or even back to back in the 2010s. KISS in ship design has many advantages. It also has risks and costs, not least of which is that two supply ships will be needed for a sovereign CSG, the destruction of either being capable of signficantly disrupting a mission. It’s the opposite of resillience and introduces operational complexity.

One of those risks has manifest — we didn’t build the solid supply ships in time — and rather than treat that as a military priority, politicians prioritised social value and added even further risk and complexity to the shipbuilding process. One of those risks has also just manifest in the shape of H&W’s bankruptcy.

Not having sovereign operational capability is risky and reduces the deterrent value of building carriers. I can’t prove that alliance capability won’t suffice to fill the gap over the next 7 years or more. It just feels like a risk too far to me, leaving me casting around for interim capability.

And nobody can argue that the current mess is keeping it simple.

Irate Taxpayer (Peter)

N-a-B, Supportive Bloke and Jon

USN Experimetal VLS Reloading at Sea

  • I had not commented in my post (at all), on the USN’s latest efforts for practicing the at-sea replenishment of “long and live and loaded” VLS canisters
  • Frankly, this USN “rig” looks to me like it has been designed by that legendary inventor, and also cartoonist, our very own Mr Heath Robinson:
  • Heath Robinson comes home – Professional Cartoonists Organisation (procartoonists.org)
  • Frankly, I really cannot ever see any solution involving “wire rope and hooks” ever having the remotest possibiliy of ever working sucessfully out on a moving platform in a rough sea. This is inherently the wrong solution.
  • A helicoptor would be even worse: not least because of the downdraft and also the very poor airflow around the ship’s shipstructure.
  • and, also, especially when the load of live explosives is being lowered by Mr Biggles from one of those inherently dangerous flying machines – when it first touches down onto a ship’s metal deck…..let us not forget the big static electricity discharge that always occurs… not what explosives like best….

However, having just emitted all of those very-negative vibes ….

  • …it is currently being reported (in some circles) that the USN alone has expended over $1 biilion dollars worth of US taxpayer funded munitions in the Red Sea region alone over the past twelve months – during a period of peace
  • i.e. in peacetime = when we have “not been fighting” Iran.
  • I personally have no idea whatsoever if that recently-reported financial figure is correct…or not…..
  • However, if it is anything like correct, then the safe and fast RAS’ing (i.e. transferring live explosive munitions) suddenly needs to become a much-higher NATO R&D priority… …
  • it needs to become a higher priority even than our top cyber-warfare experts sending a VRE directly into the heart of the Kremlin’s key computer systems !
  • So, if I was desiging something to “do the VLS reloading business out at sea” then I would be looking at either:
  1. A large manipulator “arm” – one able to positively grip and hold the long canister steady – so possibly one quite-similar to the biggest types of industrial materials handling robots?
  2. or movng the silos themselves futher apart – and then putting in a jacking and/or lifting system positioned vertically deep down inside the ship’s hull
  • However, all in all, as N-a-B quite correctly points out = any RN or USN ship would need a complete redesign – from scratch – to be fitted with a VLS system which is capable of usefully reloading (using that new capability) whilst out in the rough stuff
  • so, whichever way one does it, it noew definitely a case of “back to the drawing board”
  • EITHER
  1. Develop an efficent and safe VLS / RAS system: and so the rN and USN can fire lots and lots of very expesive missles at lots of very cheap “incoming” drones and missles
  2. OR fit more silos: and fill them all up before a “war patrol”
  3. OR just bomb Iran’s drone and missile production factories… i.e. what an overpaid management consultant might call “dealing with the root cause of the problem”.

Learning the Right Lessons from the Fort Vic Class

The key point of my orginal post was that the Fort Vic class was always, right from the word “go”, frankly always a too complicated concept.

The conceptual design of these very-complex multiple-function ships should not be – in my very humbe opinion – repeated anytime soon.

Thus, whilst those two big ships have since given us three decades of good service; it has now gone far past the point where they both should have been given an OAP bus pass: and then sent off on a one-way trip down to the local knackers yard.

——

To pick up on one of Jon’s point – what might once have made some sense – so maybe some twenty years ago – would have been for the RN to have designed and then procured concurrently both of its two planned types of its proposed RN / RFA supplies vessel – tanker and solid stores – so both “procured in parallel”

We could then have designed and built two quite-similar classes, both to a “roughly common” overall size and, whereever possible, also technically standardised internally.

  • That quite-innovative approach could have allowed for the commonality of many key components – such as main engines and auxillary plant, generators, gearboxes, ship controls systems etc:
  • Those two “quite similar” classes of supply ship could then have been built with two different hull structures: i.e each one of the two hull types thus being optimised for either fuel stowage OR solid stores.
  • It is, after all, always the moving parts of a ship that cost much of the initial capital expenditure and also, in use, then use up most of the maintainance budget i.e. the pounds shillings and pence expendd when the ship itself is spending its time-out in the dockyard(s).

It is however now far too late now for that type of innovative thinking

Therefore I totally agree with Jon’s key point – that the procurement of the solid stores ships as key replacements for the two big Fort Vic vessels is now long- overdue!

Sovereign Logistics Capaility

  • N-a-B has only hinted at the main reason why the importance of long range and, cruciially, also very-high-capacity UK defence logistics has been all but been forgotten about over the past three decades…..:
  • ……that is because the UK has only been fighting very small scale wars ever since the end of Gulf War 1 (back in early 1991)
  • I have just been reading, in the Daily Torygraph, today that General Mike Jackson has died: i.e. the former head of the British army and its long-serving chief of staff etc etc
  • His obituary points out that he – and indeed his entire generation of fellow officers – have never been involved in a conventional nation-state war whilst serving in our army.
  • The hard truth of the matter is that we now have a complete generation – of ALL of the most-senior UK officers (naval, army and crabs) – not one of whom has ever fought in a “proper sized” peer-on-peer war: not even serving their time as a junior teaboy.
  • and so they have never learnt the most-basic lesson = that big wars eat up supplies – of all types – very, very rapidly!
  • Often forgotten today was that during Operation Corporate in 1982 was that the vast majority of the supplies went south of the equator by sealift
  • However – THE BIG BUT was that – just to keep the supply of ONLY the most urgently needed “stuff” getting out to the front-line = that the airflift from the UK out to Ascension Island required that very small island’s one and only single runway to become, overnight, the world’s busiest airport: with the number of daily flights in and out easily exceeding those at either London Heathrow or even Cicargo’s O:Hare (which both had a lot more space – and more runways!)
  • So I reckon that the first big thing that the UK will get completely wrong at the start of our next big war is that Oxfordshire constabulary will have to be tasked to sorting out the traffic gridlock on the ten miles of country lanes surrounding RAF Carterton”.

Conclusion

  • So I totally agree with Jon – that we now need proper sovereign logistics capability – not least for supporting a CSG…
  • That type of big CSG deployment does – as Jon and N-a-b have both quite-correctly pointed out – require the delivery of hell of a lot of fish-and-chips and baked beans and mars bars and bog-roll etc
  • Thus, as we stand here today, I really can’t see any way out of the “current pickle” that the Navy has got itself into – other than the only possble way forward now being get those three new FSSS ships down the shipways ASAFP
  • And also investing a little bit more in the shore-side facilities at our three existing key UK sovereign “forward” logistics bases overseas – at Gibraltar, Cyprus and Oman – would also significantly help to smooth the efficent flow of logistcs
  • thus to give any future UK CSG “improved high-endurance global reach“.
  • and that key capability is really needed before we start “not really fighting Iran..….”

Regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)

  1. So, as the well-known Frenchman Neopolitian Boney-Parts once famously said: “amateurs talk about stratagy: whereas us professionals always talk about logistics…”
  2. Mind you, having just said that….. Boney himself did loose a very big war against the Russian’s = mainly because his own long-range logistics were simply not up to the task….

Note 1

  • In modern state-of-the-art cyber warfare: sending the enemy a VRE is a war-winning tactic = a “Very Rude Emoji
AlexS

The Jacques Chevalier class , 4 ships were ordered for 1.7 B Euros, so 425 M euro each.

194m 31000t displacement full load. Capacity 13000m3 fuel, 1500t stores.

Last edited 4 months ago by AlexS
Barry from Barrow.

Can’t get my head around why this is so difficult, or why this is so Limiting to Global Operations. Surely some solution can be found that enables replenishment at sea rather than having to return to port ? Space X can send a Rocket to outer space and safely grab it a few feet off the ground on it’s return, Why is this so difficult ?

N-a-B

Space X have done that – very expensive and complicated thing – because it will save them money on their space business. Very difficult to construct a similar case for RAS-ing VLS missiles.

It’s difficult because it involves transferring big explosive, energetic items between independently moving platforms which are also subject to wind.

Supportive Bloke

In the Space X recovery system there are no humans nearby so if it does go wrong 10% of the time they still gain 90% of the rockets to recycle. With maybe some bent bits of metal.

With RASing missiles there are humans and delicate systems on both ships. The missiles are intended to destroy ships, aircraft etc so the risk case is orders of magnitude worse.

Mozu

Given that sea state and general weather conditions are very limiting for RAS already, I wonder if this will cause a design shift for VLS positioning.

If you were to move the cells amidships it would provide a far more stable and sheltered position which would make a system like this far more viable and perhaps feasible in higher sea states.
It would be reminiscent of the debate on positioning of aviation facilities in WW2 and the Cold War, amidships or aft.

If done on Type 83, with the cells amidships you could use the space for a more conventional A, B turret arrangement, a 5″ general purpose with superfiring 57mm for anti-drone work.

Hugo

Not enough space on high vls count combatants for them all to be amidships. Plus it means there’s very little survivability for your weapons if they’re all in one place or an accident happens in one of the silos.