After more than 7 months away, the carrier strike group has returned to the UK. While official channels rightly trumpet the many achievements of the deployment, here we provide a balanced assessment of the trip which has not been entirely plain sailing.
By numbers…
Away for around 244 days, the group traveled about 50,000 nautical miles, made visits to 42 nations and 3 territories, representing 47% of the world’s population and 53% of the UK’s trading partners. 18 set-piece naval and flying exercises were conducted involving 17 other nations. There was media coverage of the group’s activities in 99 countries and in 252 languages. The group hosted 66 government ministers, 106 ambassadors and around 500 senior officers of foreign militaries.
Crucially the MoD says the 3,700 personnel deployed consumed 25.5 tonnes of sausages, 190,000 potatoes and 2.01 million eggs. (HMS Defender alone got through 55,000 sausages, while HMS Kent consumed just 13,000). Such details may seem frivolous but do give an insight into the considerable logistical challenges of sustaining naval forces at distance.
The tailored air group embarked on the carrier flew a combined total of 4,723 hours of which 3,433 were by day & 1,290 by night covering a total of around 100,000 miles. The 18 F-35 jets of VMFA-211 and 617 Squadron flew 1,278 sorties, totaling more than 2,200 hours in the air. Exercises were conducted with over 60 other types of aircraft and 44 combat missions were flown in support of Operation Shader/Inherent Resolve over Iraq.
The deployment saw three pre-ICO Crowsnest-equipped Merlin MK2 deployed and their first opportunity to fly together in formation, an opportunity to practice airborne surveillance picture handovers, a key skill for the Observers to master. Although still not formally having achieved IOC, Crowsnest aircraft flew 362 hours in 179 sorties between 1st May and 22nd November. An assessment of the system’s progress to date is obviously not in the public domain but these figures would suggest a gradual ramp-up in capability but not yet offering complete round-the-clock coverage during periods of operational activity.
HMS Kent’s Wildcat helicopter, one of four 815 Naval Air Squadron cabs that deployed with the group, flew 239 hours and 15 minutes of sorties (the equivalent of almost ten whole days airborne). Notably, the first operational firing of the Marltet missile was conducted by a Wildcat from HMS Defender in the Bay of Bengal.
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Despite the limited opportunities, more than £1.9 Million was issued by HMS Queen Elizabeth’s ships office for the crew to spend ashore. Around 5,000 meals were prepared every day on the carrier totalling about 1.4 million meals for the deployment. -
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Cdr Vince Owen, CO HMS Defender, proudly brings his ship and crew safely home (Photo: Navy Lookout) -
Cdr Matthew Marriot, CO HMS Diamond, oversees the last 2 feet of a 50,000 nm voyage. The weight of responsibility carried by commanders during a long deployment should not be underestimated. (Photo: Navy Lookout) -
HMS Defender sailed in three oceans and 13 seas, passing through 8 of the world’s major maritime chokepoints including the Bosphorus, Suez Canal and Malacca Strait. Besides HMS queen Elizabeth, she escorted 5 aircraft carriers, worked with the military of 18 nations, hosting 17 events to promote Britain’s global ambitions. (Photo: Navy Lookout) -
The deployment took HMS Diamond further east and further south (including her first crossing of the Equator) than ever before in her ten years of service. (Photo: Navy Lookout) -
HMS Richmond, the only Devonport-based participant comes home. During the deployment, she visited Montenegro, Israel, Guam, Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Crete, Malta and Gibraltar. She is the first of the Type 23s to undergo the Power Generation Machinery Upgrade (PGMU) and the deployment was the first major test of the new diesel generators. -
During her time away, HMS Kent sailed 48,525 nautical miles in 15 different seas or oceans, visited 10 ports on 4 continents and worked with 17 other navies. -
Five Commando Helicopter Force Merlin Mk4s of 845 NAS (and accompanying Wildcat) returning to RNAS Yeovilton at the end of the deployment.
The view from the bridge
As would be expected, the comment from the officers leading the group has been positive and upbeat, Commodore Steve Moorhouse described the trip as “challenging but a hugely successful and rewarding deployment”. It is not spin or hyperbole to say those serving have made big sacrifices and generally come through tough times with good humour. Navy Lookout spoke to the COs of the two Type 45 destroyers on their arrival in Portsmouth. When asked about their experience in the Black Sea, Cdr Vince Owen, CO HMS Defender said their ethos of “train hard – fight easy had paid off”. When Russian forces hounded the ship on 23 June it was “Just another Day in the Royal Navy”, although he described Russian actions as “unprofessional”.
Despite the well-documented propulsion problems of the Type 45s, HMS Defender sailed the furthest of any ship on the deployment, traveling over 51,000nm. Asked what was the secret, Cdr Owen attributed the performance to the engineering excellence of his ship’s company and stated that they had not missed a single day of planned availability. Although Defender has proved to generally be the most reliable of the destroyers, she did suffer at least one total electrical (and propulsion) failure on the trip, demonstrating the urgent need to get these ships through the Power Improvement Package. (The first PIP for HMS Dauntless had encountered serious difficulty and has yet to leave the Cammell Laird yard on Merseyside.)
Cdr Matthew Marriott, CO HMS Diamond was extremely proud of the achievements of his crew. Diamond’s most notable challenge was a major propulsion defect suffered in the Mediterranean that resulted in 6 weeks alongside in Taranto having a Gas Turbine engine replaced. Marriot took a very positive view of the situation, pointing out the RN was only one of two navies that could change a GT while deployed and his MEs, assisted by BAES engineers had completed the job faster than it has ever been done in the UK. While the issue necessitated a major change to Diamond’s programme, Marriot said the ship had still fulfilled her main strategic objectives. She made it to Singapore for a key exercise but was unavailable to escort the carrier in the South China Sea on the outward leg, although the CSG benefited from having 3 other powerful air defence ships. Diamond also suffered a further minor breakdown which necessitated time alongside in Singapore dockyard, missing the Five Power Power Defence Agreement 50th anniversary fleet review.
Partnerships enhanced
Most of HMS Diamond’s battle honours from centuries past were won fighting the Dutch while HNLMS Everstsen’s were for battles with the English fleet. Having put historical rivalries aside, Cdr Marriot said he enjoyed a fantastic working relationship with Evertsen’s captain and similarly close ties and mutual trust was developed with USS The Sullivans. During exercise Bersama Gold in the South China Sea, Diamond met up with the Australian, New Zealand and Singaporean ships. Marriot explained: “We met in the night about 0300, by 0700 we had refuelled, exchanged helicopters and were in the midst of a complex in a multi-threat exercise with no integration time whatsoever. We are partners in the FPDA who are capable of entering a theatre and being combat-ready in minutes”. Similarly Diamond was impressed by the speed with which the Italian Destroyer ITS Andrea Doria was seamlessly integrated into the air defence of the carrier group during the final exercise in the Mediterranean.
This interoperability with other navies is key to the RN having a credible military effect, especially in the Pacific. While it exercises frequently with NATO partners, the CSG21 deployment helped build and improve the ability to integrate with forces of other nations beyond the European theatre. The visible presence, even if relatively transitory, demonstrates to allies and adversaries that the RN is able to turn up and contribute to combat power. Although hard to quantify exactly, the strategic effect of enhanced partnerships, together with the deepening integration with the USN, is perhaps one of the most important achievements of the deployment.
Gash trip?
The effects of COVID around the globe impacted the deployment in many ways but most significantly it severely curtailed the opportunities to get ashore. It was galling to be alongside in exotic places, most notably Japan, but not be allowed ashore to explore or meet other people. The advertised “trip of a lifetime” did not come to fruition and on many occasions, the ships’ companies had to make their own entertainment on board. For example, HMS Diamond was kept entertained by the ship’s in-house band and held a memorable crossing the line ceremony. Improvised leisure opportunities were the order of the day – in a few places the crews were able to go ashore to secluded beaches or places where they would not interact with the local population.
Two visits to the Pacific Island of Guam provided the highlight of the deployment for many and included adventurous training opportunities. On the final leg, HMS Defender visited Jordan and Barcelona while Diamond went to Crete, Alicante and A Coruña and were able to have almost ‘normal’ runs ashore. Overall the trip will not be remembered especially fondly by the majority of sailors because of the extended time confined on board, although there have been some definite highlights.
Painful lessons
For many casual observers, the deployment will be seen as a ‘failure’ due to the loss of the F-35 jet. (Eg. no-context hatchet job by City AM) Early indications are that the accident was caused by human error. The MoD announced this week that the wreckage of the aircraft has been recovered from the seabed by a joint UK, US and Italian salvage effort. Whoever leaked the footage of the accident onto social media has been arrested. There is no doubt this is an embarrassing episode and a costly error but one that will be learned from. It is a reminder of the complications and risks of naval aviation. The Fleet Air Arm lost many aircraft through accidents over the years but these airframes were generally much cheaper (even in real terms), simpler and more numerous. The problem with modern combat aircraft is that all your eggs are in a few very expensive baskets while the risk of loss through accidents remains.
Despite the dangers and risks of life at sea, the professionalism of the sailors and airmen saw everyone return safely except one sailor that did not make it home. A young rating committed suicide on board HMS Kent on 10th July. This was a very traumatic event for the ship’s company and the medics who tried to treat him. The issues around mental health are a challenge that goes well beyond the navy, suicide being the biggest killer of men under 45.
Delivering effect
Overall the deployment has been a success. In hard power terms, the group delivered a powerful presence in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the Russians reacted strongly in these regions they would like to dominate. Carrier-based F-35s conducted combat operations over Iraq. Operations in the South China Sea demonstrated a small UK contribution to upholding international law. Despite strong rhetoric in Chinese state media, prior to the deployment, the response to the group’s presence appears to have been very limited and low-key. HMS Richmond conducted patrols off Korea in enforcing UN sanctions against the North Korean regime and was the only ship of the group to make a very public transit of the Taiwan Strait.
The diplomatic and economic impacts of the deployment are another major prize. Making a great first impression and promoting Britain’s political, trade and military interests is a core Royal Navy function and this trip was no different, although the impact may have been blunted slightly by COVID restrictions. Critics may complain at the cost to the taxpayer of sending the navy overseas but in the grand scheme of things is small change compared to the value of trade deals and the promotion of ‘brand Britain’ the CSG will help to deliver.
Global deployments of an RN task group is nothing new but CSG21 has been called “the largest in a generation”, marking the end of the RN’s convalescence from the effects of the disastrous 2010 SDSR. Although the RN cannot mount deployments on this scale every year, it can now be described as a carrier-centric navy and has proved it can operate anywhere although some obvious caveats, notably the fragility of its destroyers and heavy reliance on allies. Future CSG deployments will see much-needed growth in capabilities, particularly as the UK F-35 fleet grows and the jets have the full range of weapons integrations.
The majority of those who served on the deployment will go straight on leave for Christmas with friends and family and up to 5 weeks of well-earned rest. HMS Queen Elizabeth and her escorts will need significant maintenance and will go into Fleet Time Support Periods but will technically remain at ‘high readiness’ to deploy for most of 2022.
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Six weeks to change a GT and require BAE assistance, shocking.
The article claimed this was done quicker than if done in the UK.
Didnt Invincible do one ‘while under way’ in South Atlantic. Sure it was a carrier with a spare but still
There was a 10-14 day delay due to a viral stowaway being delivered to the ship along with the spare parts.
Do all the ships offloaded their munitions underway to the RFAs once they are close to home?
No. They will afload some but not all. It will be stuff approaching lifex dates. Complex weapons will remain onboard
No, munitions will stay in the deep stowage’s until going to the ammo bouys if the require to de-ammo ship
Wot Gunbuster said! She may not even be working much ammunition but Fort Victoria (and the late and much lamented Fort Austin/Rosalie) are limited in what alongside berths they can use in the UK whilst carrying ammunition. Basically all options involve acquiring a taste for Irn Bru and Haggis.
None in a England like?
A very good article on this superb deployment, thank you.
The T23’s seen to be absolute bricks, so reliable. I think Richmond has had PGMU and Kent has not. PGMU seems to have passed the audition.
Hope that PIP does the same for T45. The reliability of the carrier suggests good lessons learned from the T45 program. Great effort by Defender even without PIP.
I wonder if the carrier has had to forego some of the propulsion efficiency of the T45 in order to get the reliability or if they have got the efficiency by other means?
The propulsion efficiency on T45 has been proven to be a bit of a myth – largely because the original concept (essentially do away with diesel generators and run GTs on a flat fuel curve) was “somewhat” flawed.
It’s all dependent on load cases across the speed power curve and service loads across environments. QEC has a different philosophy (planned to run DGs as base load with GTA for high power cases) – so comparisons are of limited use.
Isn’t that what PIP is trying to do to reverse the load balance to base MTU’s and sprint GT’s?
Yes. Opposite to the original design intent. But constrained by the fact the ship is already built.
The T45 Propulsion Improvement Program (PIP) has been in the works for so long how on earth can the implementation on Dauntless be suffering ‘serious implementation problems?’
What you see on a CAD screen rarely reflects what you actually get onboard.
I see that Gunbuster is still making excuses for another sad episode of Type 45 propulsion debacle. Now the episode is called the PiP.
CAD is always a bit of an issue, particularly if the ships in the class are built over an extended period and evolve away from the screen version (officially or otherwise). However, that is why you survey the vessel as you strip it out the effected compartments.
Too much Defence planning is done on the basis that everything will go smoothly when it rarely does. The impact is that too many Defence contracts are started on false assumptions, with false costings and false schedules.
Its not the only place. Building industry works like too. From design on computer to how to build it on computer and then the schedule of work on computer and the final commissioning ….on computer. Often they are different people using different software at each stage, on short term contracts.
Echoing Gunbuster – a CAD screen shows you what the design is supposed to look like. Numerical models tell you how it’s supposed to perform. In order for reality to match the prediction, the installation has to be as per the design and the assumptions in the numerical models have to be correct – NB they often aren’t, at least to start with.
The other crucial thing is that when the “system” has been “installed” you still have to have skilled people to inspect it (confirm it’s as per the design), commission it (conduct the functional tests for all items – it isn’t just switch it all on, you need pressure tests, connectivity checks, instrumentation checks, reversionary tests) and then you need to set the system to work which involves bringing individual components online and checking they are performing, gradually opening up the whole system to ensure all components behave and interact as predicted. Availability of the right competent people to do that in CL is AIUI a major driver of the delay.
What we could have had….
Lucky escape.
T45 isn’t a looker, but that thing is fugly.
More importantly, I doubt that it’ll be capable of any relevant upgrades on the exotic ASMD side if required.
While I don’t agree with X’s point beyond perhaps the propulsion system – this is a bit of a silly assertion given the Orizzonte-class already have an MLU program laid out, which will start in 2025. Notably, they’ll be replacing their multifunction radar (their main weakness versus the Type 45’s), and integrate the Aster 30 Block 1NT to allow for ATBM and ASBM work, something still not yet on the cards for the Type 45’s.
Exotic isn’t radar and/or missiles …
Would you be able to elaborate on what you mean by ‘exotic’, then?
It’s the propulsion system I am on about. Though I think the 76mm’s are something we should have kept too.
The propulsion system includes an MV distribution ring at 4160kV, fed by a goodly chunk of of electrical grunt if need be. That can make certain things easier in future.
Plus a pair of 25mm each side just behind the bridge
“More importantly, I doubt that it’ll be capable of any relevant upgrades on the exotic ASMD side if required.”
Why?
Aster are French Italian development. Big radars are either Thales or Leonardo.
Again French(or Dutch Thales side) or Italian
BAE ended up with SAMPSON in their hands but they don’t have a “radar industry” and it is been said that SAMPSON is not being updated.
Thales and Leonardo have R&D in UK.
See above
Which is the whole probably with Sea Viper. AEGIS will be still in service decades from now.
Let’s wait and see who pops up and says the guns will do a better job 1-2-3 than Ceptor!
Sea Ceptor is glorious. But I think the threat is greater now.
T45, apart from Mk8 which destroys a sense of scale, looks pretty. I am not sure many modern ships look pretty.
I am not sure about your ASMD point. But you are the expert. 🙂
The triple 16 inch mount seems to be missing.
There is always somebody who points that out! ALWAYS!!!! 🙂
Apparently the problems are Daunting
Altogether excellent and we await the TV series with interest.
Separately, two recent controversies have come to light on internet defence sites that could impinge on UK MoD operating costs, which I’d personally appreciate any knowledgeble context upon, if possible.
The first is the ruckus emerging from a number of countries, including Australia, that are fed up with the unreliability & expense of running their NH90 helicopters, to the extent of ditching them for Blackhawk. The subject seems potentially a little too close to home for our AW101?
The second is similar but with regard to the USA and their LCS vessels, but adds to unreliability with commercial maintenance contracts that even the USN cannot afford, extending to private company and OEM veto over enlisted engineer access whilst on operations. Overall, both extortionate and impractical in a war situation. Are the RN subject to the same constraints, say with Rolls Royce and even much less technical contractors where previously our sailors would have done the work?
Regards
I think you may be confusing unreliability and expense with poor contracting.
It is a sad fact that people tend to be more concerned with headline numbers in service than with the support arrangements that enable them to be operationally available. Given the choice, acquisition organisations (which are NOT a bunch of civil servants, but a mix of CS, service personnel and occasionally defence contractors) will invariably choose to skimp on ILS when confronted with hard budget choices.
You can trace the T45 availability issues directly to the failure to agree a Contractorised LS contract – with associated sparing provision until the last minute prior to service entry. Those contracts define who does what to what and with what caveats – so for example if the ships MEO chooses to operate a piece of equipment in a certain way, or conduct a certain repair procedure, that may or may not be within the warranty provisions and invalidate any support/repair agreement.
It’s a delicate trade-off – some kit is so specialised that you really don’t want Jack fiddling with it – however competent (or not) they may be. In other cases you’ll probably find that no-one agreed a sufficiently short lead time for spares provision, compounded by inadequate provision of in-stock spares.
Just in time logistics works for many mass-production operations, precisely because volume can be predicted reasonably well for them. For small-volume one-offs with “random” demands, it is potentially less applicable. Lessons always being learned.
For context, these are the links I based my query upon:-
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43472/australia-has-had-enough-of-its-dysfunctional-mrh90-helicopters
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uo_dohzWEIw
Regards
Not sure I’d give too much credence to either.
NH90 definitely appears to have issues. Whether that is because they didn’t contract for the required level of support, or because the bird is too fragile isnot clear.
The LCS one appears to be a former enlisted asking why they didn’t keep doing it like they did back in the day, while using a GAO report as backdrop. Much like our own HCDC and NAO, it is entirely possible for the GAO to write critical reports without actually understanding the issues. I would be astonished if the actual causes did not come down to failure to plan and specify ILS contracts in sufficient detail – and with sufficient flex. In those circumstances where the contractor tends to be pushed to justify each line item of cost assumption and cut provision out of their cost base, “extras” always tend to attract a higher premium.
Certainly in the Sub Brief case the blogger is a former enlisted, but latterly contractor in his own right, with background in how service agreements are structured, US at least. The GAO is in the background but quoted prodigiously. Main concern being focused on bureaucracy over routine maintenance, at least. But I’ll let folk decide on the presented links.
My hope is that similar concerns cannot be laid at our MoD door (you can see my crossed fingers as we speak, I’m sure), since funding is too tight to start with. Certainly there are too many instances of ‘disasters’ on the MoD procurement front, arguably impinging on our military survival now, without that extending to ‘inefficiencies’ in more routine maintenance contracts.
Rgs
The Aussies have smartly decided that a fleet of Seahawks and Blackhawks is much easier to maintain, especially when you’re going to be integrated with US forces for years to come. They always loved the Seahawks, and the Blackhawks, while their capacity is less than the NH90s, they are more reliable with abundant worldwide spares access.
The Australia NH90 situation seems to be the builder, Airbus was the support contractor and just didnt deliver the hours or reliability promised.
I dont know any more details but when you go from having to do your own maintenance and then total outsourcing the expectations change and quite rightly near perfect support is demanded.
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/maintenance-and-safety-issues-leading-to-extended-grounding-of-australias-mrh-90-helo-fleet
AS far as I’m aware, we do not have issues with our Merlin- similar to the Aussies’ NH90 or otherwise. The Australians are replacing them because they haven’t managed to meet their contractual availability targets for numerous reasons, and other operators have had a bit of a nightmare with them too- similar issues and more. In contrast, the AW101 seems to be doing just fine, and Norway seem to like it too. There is the possibility that has been discussed about replacing the RAF’s Puma fleet with Blackhawk, but that’s because the fleet is old and Blackhawk is favourable on a cost-basis.
I’m not familiar with the issue that the Americans are having with the LCS, so not sure I can comment.
Ta
What I’d prefer to know is, what Brand of Sausages, Variety of Potato’s and were the eggs organic ? Nothing else really matters.
The important thing is that this deployment helped made many problems appear that now can be fixed.
It is better doing it now than at war.
I agree this is at least one of the most important things. How may other navies could do this, not many.
Cheers
John
Type 45 more breakdowns than RAC and AA.
Loved the only reference to logistic side of csg21 was pic of Fort Vic . No other rfa platforms involved ? Clues in the title . Strike group …. Pretty sure there were some valuable lessons learned about the complexities of moving back in to task group deployments and how much RFA bring to that particular table ….
This recalls great memories from visiting the fleet led by HMS Eagle in Wellington,
I got a feeling we might need a bigger navy ! Said everyone on here and everywhere else for the past few decades. looks like the penny might just have dropped.
Altogether, I would say that the maiden deployment of QE and her CSG was a great success, barring the prospect of being part of an around the world cruise and spending almost the entire bloody time confined aboard.
As far as the crew member that posted the footage of the F-35 going into the drink, granted that there was a a bit of temerity. But to arrest him? Within 24 hours of the incident, the whole world knew of what happened prior to the released footage. A bit of overreaction I would say.
Its the principle of the thing. You don’t take or use PEDs in certain spaces on a ship. You’d have to be mind-bogglingly daft to think that doing so and then posting the footage on an unclass network would have any other result.
That’s the thing about security – the individual doesn’t get to decide what they can and can’t do.
Some will dismiss this but I believe the RN should purchase four Arleigh Burkes and permanently stopgap the anemia in offensive capacity at sea. Not nice to hear but absolutely necessary. The “special relationship” gives them access and they should take it. Type 45 is a terrific AAW platform (though not carrying sufficient reloads). However, the engine problems are incredible and the platform has negligible offensive capacity. That has to change.
Not a bad idea in the short term if the govt is wiling to increase defense budget to a more realistic level.
Unfortunately no sign of that as far as I can see but there is always hope.
Too crazy to even consider even if they were available on their busy production line.
The RN would struggle to crew them, at nearly 400 crew each! All the early AB’s are currently in service with the USN.
The RN could always hire some US sailors and pay them with tea and crumpets. 🙂
50,000 Nm or 4939 London buses to use the MODs standard unit of measure.
According to a ship tracker, CSG21 actually frightened off a Chinese survey vessel in the North Natuna Sea. Apparently ran off in the opposite direction. Came back later to check out the on going Indonesian gas exploration operation though. Probably harassed the Chinese more than the Russians.
We should base a couple submarines an£ frigates in Gibraltar.
25 tons of sausage.., Jesus
very interesting to see this article. I have a similar article and its on http://www.mianairforce.com in blogs.
Good article. The role of the contractors needs mentioning, BAE Systems alone had 100 engineers supporting the deployment, 30 flew to Taranto in Italy to help fix Diamond, whilst 40 flew to Guam to give Lizzy some much needed TLC. Add on those from Rolls-Royce, Babcock, Thales … and there was probably several hundred civilian personel keeping the show on the road.
The UK CSG clearly has a key ship dependency on Fort Victoria, the disposal of the still quite youthful Fort George in 2011 is argubably one of the biggest mistakes (of many) made in SDRS 2010.
I get the impression that Crowsnest is already considered a failure, it was never really a low-risk low-cost solution. Trying to refresh and update a system based on 1970’s technology was penny-wise but pound foolish – the type of mistake that anyone who has been trying to cheaply upgrade their old Windows 7 PC to run Windows 11 can attest to! But the really big downside is that the system uses scarce HM2 Merlin airframes, effectively forcing the CAG Commander to choose between configuring his Merlin squadron (6 to 8 helicopters) as primarily a ASW or AEW force. I believe that re-role’ing a helo supposedly takes the mechanics about 72 hours, and of course you then need suitably trained air crew.