In part 1 of this article we argued that HMS Ocean (LPH) should be retained and then replaced. If this does not happen the official plan is for the RN to operate the Queen Elizabeth class (QEC) aircraft carriers (CVF) in the LPH role. Here we look at how this might work in practice and why this solution is flawed.
The RN is currently developing its concept of operations for the QEC with a broad definition of their purpose called Carrier-Enabled Power Projection (CEPP). CEPP offers four main capabilities – Carrier Strike, Littoral Manoeuvre, Humanitarian Assistance and Defence Diplomacy. The carrier strike role is what the QEC were originally designed for but the requirement to perform the littoral manoeuvre/LPH role has been added and then expanded during their construction. HMS Queen Elizabeth will go to sea without the full modifications for the role and will be occupied working up and operating as a strike carrier with the F-35, at least for most of her first commission. She could be expected to enter major refit around 2025 when she will be modified. HMS Prince of Wales is being constructed with these modifications from the outset, essentially internal changes to accommodation, equipment storage and access for the embarked military force. F-35 trials will be conducted with HMS PoW in 2020/21 but she may then be configured and tested in the LPH role soon after.
Tactical headaches
Assuming that the RN was conducting an amphibious assault with any sort of opposition the primary role of the aircraft carrier (CVF) is to provide local air superiority and air-ground support. Both of these are prerequisites before contemplating a serious amphibious operation. In the next decade at least it is unlikely the RN will be able to have both aircraft carriers operational simultaneously. Even if the necessary manpower can be generated and sustained, there is no guarantee in the time of need that one will not be in refit or under training. Without HMS Ocean (or her replacement) we are either reliant on another nation to provide a CVF or LPH, or our available QEC must attempt both roles at once.
It is unclear if the RN would embark any F-35s when the QEC is in the LPH role. When configured for the carrier strike role, the QEC Tailored Air Group (TAG) is planned to typically consist of 24 F-35Bs and 9 Merlins for ASW and ASaC. The littoral manoeuvre TAG would see most, or all of the F-35Bs replaced by Chinooks, Merlins, Apache and Wildcat helicopters. In all but the most benign environment, air cover must therefore come from somewhere else.
In their designed Carrier Strike role, the QEC would need freedom of movement to operate her fixed wing aircraft with plenty of sea room. Less critical with VSTOL aircraft operations, but at times it is advantageous to turn the ship to head into wind at speed. Most importantly, large high-value ships try to keep as far away as practically possible from the threat of land-based aircraft and missiles and even small boat swarms or mines. It is also far easier to defend a ship against submarines in the deep ocean than in the more acoustically challenging littoral environment where small conventional submarines have a great advantage.
Acting in the LPH role ideally requires the ship to be reasonably close to the beachhead so the helicopters can quickly shuttle back and forward with troops and equipment, at least in the initial phase of the assault. The range of the Merlin would allow the ship to sit considerably offshore but speed and timing are critical in the initial phases and this would slow everything down. There is a fundamental conflict between the carrier’s need to maintain its speed and distance from the land and the requirement to close the shore and reduce to slow speed during amphibious operations.
Using the 65,000 ton fleet flagship, the sole available carrier as an LPH would expose her to increased risk. The loss or even damage to the ship would probably end the operation, be highly symbolic and politically unacceptable. The loss of a smaller LPH like HMS Ocean would still be a disaster but a political risk that could be contemplated. Historically the RN accepted it must sometimes lose ships to win wars.
Although effectively forced on the RN by underfunding, this is a case of too many eggs in one basket, operationally challenging and tactically unsound.
The QE carriers have been designed from the outset with fairly generous accommodation for up to 1,600 people. With her very lean complement of 733 there is a lot of space left for aircrew and an embarked military force (EMF) of least 250 which can live aboard for long periods in relative comfort. It is interesting that as the disposal of HMS Ocean gets closer, government is now saying up to 900 troops could be carried in extremis. We can assume that the modified HMS PoW will have space for about two Marine companies (500 personnel) to live aboard in tolerable comfort for an extended period. The hangar is spacious but, unlike HMS Ocean, there is no separate vehicle deck. Storing and maintaining aircraft and vehicles in close proximity at sea is potentially hazardous. There is also no means to unload vehicles at sea, except perhaps the odd one underslung beneath a Chinook helicopter for very short trips.
There are no plans for the QEC to be fitted with davits for LCVPs like HMS Ocean (small landing craft capable of carrying up to 35 troops). Landing craft have some advantages over helicopters, not least being a quieter way to approach a defended beach. Apart from the cost of adapting the ships, it could be argued the powerful airlift capability of the ship makes LCVPs slightly redundant, especially if the ship is forced to operate a long way from the beachhead. Fundamentally the QEC contribution is about troops on foot with whatever weapons they can carry, delivered by helicopter.
On the upside…
HMS Ocean can launch up to 6 Merlin helicopters almost simultaneously. The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) is currently evaluating how many helicopter spots the QEC could safely support. It seems likely that up to 10 Merlins could be launched together, allowing a full company of around 250 Marines to be transported in a single lift. This raw capacity would be the biggest single advantage the QEC has over a more normal-sized LPH. Operating in the humanitarian (HADR) role the QEC also has the clear advantage over HMS Ocean. The sheer amount of space, additional manpower, cavernous store rooms, good medical and command facilities would all be beneficial.
Deck comparison. Apart from QE’s obviously more spacious deck, the deck-edge lifts can cope with larger aircraft including the Chinook and V-22 Osprey.
CGI showing Chinook helicopters aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth. The Chinook can lift a lot more than a Merlin but is slower, has shorter range and less protected. They are not properly marinized and don’t have folding rotors like the Merlin. Embarking a lot of Chinooks for an extended deployment would be possible but problematic.
Companionways down to a waterline boarding platform at the stern of the QE class offer the possibility of troops boarding landing craft or mexflote directly in very benign weather. However this is a very unlikely scenario and more for use when accessing the ship at anchor in peacetime.
The aviation assault ship USS America. It will be instructive for the RN to observe how the US Marine Corps develops its concept of operations for this ship and the F-35B.
American cousins
In the US there has been controversy surrounding the recently commissioned USS America (In US parlance designated as LHA – Landing Helicopter Assault). Designed as an assault ship but without the traditional well-dock they are something of a parallel to the QEC when configured for the LPH role. Smaller than the QEC but very large for an assault ship, at 44,000 tons they can carry 1,700 marines, have an enlarged hangar and expanded aviation support facilities. The V-22 Osprey and the F-35 aircraft have been the drivers of the America design. The Osprey can transport troops further and faster than any helicopter allowing the ships to stay a greater distance offshore or deliver greater numbers of troops to the beachhead in a given amount of time. US Ospreys may well occasionally embark on the QEC but there is no funding available for the UK to obtain these versatile but expensive aircraft. (For the cost of around 6 Ospreys the UK could probably build a replacement for HMS Ocean.)
It is planned that the LHA will typically operate six F35-Bs (together with its Ospreys and helicopters) that would provide close-support for the troops. They also have the capacity to operate as emergency aircraft carriers embarking up to 20 F-35Bs. It may lack the ski-ramp to help launch F-35Bs but the LHA may well moonlight as CVF better than QEC can moonlight as an LPH.
Equipped with the Osprey and operating under air cover from their main aircraft carriers, the America class perhaps makes more sense for the USN than the QEC LPH does for the threadbare RN. However is interesting to note that only two LHAs will be built, it has been decided that over-reliance on aircraft by the US Marines is undesirable, the remaining ships of the class will be LHDs with well docks.
Are historical precedents still relevant?
Since the 1950s the RN has operated ships originally designed as aircraft carriers as helicopter assault ships, formerly referred to as commando carriers. The main difference was that these ships were all originally light carriers, much smaller (approx 20-25,000 tons) than the QEC and were part of a larger fleet that included at least one other fleet carrier or strike carrier (CVF) to provide air cover. Even in the 1980s and 90s when there were just 3 small Invincible class carriers, this allowed for one in refit, one CVF and one LPH. The limitations of the Invincible class in the assault role were recognised even then, but the RN was always a master of improvisation with inadequate equipment. During the Falklands War the RN had no LPH in service at all, the main amphibious landing was conducted from 2 LPDs and a converted cruise liner, aided by good luck and Argentine incompetence.
In contrast to the fleets of the past we have just two large carriers/fat targets, with only one fully operational. There will probably be no second deck available to provide air cover for the LPH and to compound the problem we lack mass in the fleet, too few escorts to protect the QEC at a time when threats to surface ships are on the increase. Risk upon risk.
In summary, the QEC assault ship will either have to be placed at extreme risk or operate along way from the beachhead reducing its effectiveness. Without its own air cover, the RN is therefore reliant on foreign support to mount a significant amphibious operation against even moderate opposition. The case for procuring a new LPH is overwhelming, this would complement the QEC, allowing them to operate primarily in their intended carrier strike role.
Related articles
- The campaign to retain, and eventually replace HMS Ocean starts here (Save the Royal Navy)
- RN conducts study to plan amphibious capability integration in Queen Elizabeth carriers (IHS Janes)
- New carriers to host more assault troops than HMS Ocean (UK Defence Journal)
- Q&A on USS America (San Diego Tribune)
Good comment and perfectly correct. If the RN wished to have two major assault carriers then they could have redesigned some of the American LPH class to take 30 F35 B aircraft. However I keep insisting that they give HMS Ocean to an international disaster organization paid with international aid monies and use this to offset the cost of a new 30,000ton LPH. With that then done the the Albion and Bulwark can go through the same process. The two carriers are strike platforms not makeshift LPH,s.
And the added problem http://www.defensenews.com/articles/british-naval-commander-wants-us-marine-aviation-on-aircraft-carrier
I’m sorry but the author/s of this article are misguided. In a period of constrained defence spending and ever increasing competition from the other services we must ‘sell’ the concept of CEPP to the public and political class ‘including’ the fact that both carriers can and will be used in the LPH/A role. Whilst in an ideal world with plenty of money for procurement projects we would like to see Ocean retained and ultimately replaced like-for-like the fact is any deviation from the party line (that we need both carriers) will likely result in the mothballing or disposal of one. I for one would rather time and treasure were devoted to sorting out the shocking lack of escort vessels than arguing for an additional capital ship that we will struggle to protect without sufficient FF/DDs. If we need to bolster our Amphibious Capability then we should aim to have both Albion and Bulwark operational in conjunction with QE and PoW (so far as routine maintenance schedules allow). Overall an interesting article but authors here failing to grasp the the political and economic reality and simply playing Armchair Admiral. We should be spending time fighting the fights we might actually have a chance of winning.
Thanks for your comments. This goes to heart of the SRN dilemma – “tow the party line” accepting fudges within constrained budgets or highlight serious problems and argue for a better equipped and funded RN.
It may look good in the brochure to say QEC can be “all things to all men” but this still does not hide the fact it is a potentially dangerous compromise. As we said in previous piece, we are only suggesting Ocean goes into reserve with that hope that a very cheap replacement can be funded in SDSR 2020 (£300M – less than the cost of a single proposed Type 31 frigate). This is realistic – a fight the RN has a chance of winning.
Thank you for addressing my points. Nice to see that two sides can debate firmly and I really do appreciate your argument and the fact that you have taken the time to reply. I am in agreement that this is clearly a compromise we would rather not have to make. However, I stand by my argument / assessment of the political situation; that the inclusion of a newly commissioned and dedicated LPH in our limited inventory will ultimately result in the sacrifice (mothballed or sold) of 1 X CVF. Given the difficulties we had getting the government to commit to operating both platforms in the 2010-15 debating period, I cannot see politicians (or the chiefs of other the services) supporting our desire for 3 “flat tops”. Whilst it may be argued that a CVF will make a less than ideal LPH/A, it is without question that a dedicated LPH/A will make a very poor strike carrier. Unfortunely that is the reality. By 2025 we either have 2 X QE Class CVF either of which can moonlight as an LPA or we have 1 X QE CVF/LPA and 1 X Ocean-like LPH (which will not be able to project carrier strike when QE is in a maintenance period). I sincerely hope I am wrong but an additional £300 Million in 2020 will likely not be forthcoming and if it was it should probably be spent on additional FF/DDs. As for holding in reserve….nice concept but comes with many problems. Manpower would have to be found to reactivate it (and they will likely have very limited experience with the platform type). It would need maintenance and a prolonged work up (to re-train ships company) before deployment. Certainly an argument for keeping it until PoW is afloat but after that point I can see no real advantage – costs again outweighing any likely benefit. Let’s get both Albion and Bulwark operational and maybe argue for a LPH capable replacement for them when the time comes for retirement. On another note just want to say the website is exellent and the articles are always thought provoking. Appreciate what you guys at savetheroyalnavy do.
Sorry clearly meant LHA not LPA
during the falkland war both blake and bulwark were considered for reactivation, blake was fine but needed a 450 crew and used f.f.o for propulsion the navy had insufficient tanker facilities to keep them going at sea their seacat system was a liability, her 6 inch gun for n.g.s would have been a bonus, as would her 4 seakings, after the loss of the convayer, bulwark was badly damaged from a boiler explosion which’s damage had never been touched,tiger in pompey harbour had been so cannablised for blake, that blake would have been in danger of breaking down.mothballing ocean would be a risk, it would need to be maintained in a degree of readiness, which the m.o.d couldn’t afford or want to do.
It should be noted that the only reason Blake was not reactivated for the Falkands was that the MOD had disposed of all the 6 inch ammo some months before. In the case of Bulwark, a proposed reactivation was considered and abandoned because her communications fit was completely obsolete.
buying a mistral would need a crew of 400 finding them wouldn’t be easy.retiring albion and bulwark makes sense the mistrals are in the way in france, they really do want them off their hand.s a flightdeck comparable to ocean and a bigger cargo deck. could allow them to easily cover the expeditionary role, ba real asset for the marines building a ship as big as an albion class and not arming it was stupid what would be the outcry be if a fully loaded bulwark was lost because it couldn’t defend itself! there are so many possible answers to naval issues. i for one cannot get my head around how the problems came to happen in the first place.there is more common sense on here it seems than the M.O.D how do those buffoons get the jobs?
a carrie is a carrier, end of. if you spend so much and use it for something else why build them in the first place? we’ve enough waste in the r.n budget already
Spot on as usual. Have the Falklands lessons been completely ignored. The Fixed Wing Carriers were kept at sea to the East of the Islands to maintain distance and manoeuvrability from the Argentine threat from aircraft, submarines (albeit a slight risk) and surface attack. Operating in the littoral arena simply wasn’t an option for these vital, valuable and irreplaceable assets and so it will be in future. Time for a letter to my MP…..again.
When are we going to have to fight the argiies again? Naval history and experience didn’t start and end in 1982. Two new white elephants specs to retake the Falklands are of dubious value when the primary threat is is in kayaks.
the santissima trinadad won’t be a worry, it s still on her side where she toppled over and partially sank
The Falklands was a war no one imagined we’d ever have to fight, but it happened and badly needed lessons learned about the lack of effective air defence weapons and the direction need for an LPH. Ocean was built as a result, the QEC will never actually in the role of LPH/A simply because the MOD are not going to place a 3.5 Billion ship in a position off shore where she can be sunk with Ease! Wakey wakey.
i was in the falklands on antrim,
, and no, the lessons have not been learned,inadequate self defence systems some without anything, opv’s of no military use built at the expence of cancelled type 26’s and type 45’s.carrier, so late coming into service, so late they’re already being derided. cancelling 2 f5b’s would enable the u.k to have the cash to buyback the 72 harriers sold to the u.s. for a paltry 180 million.
i have sent numerous letters to my m.p who passed them to the MOD, who sent me a copy of the conservative party manifesto! my m.p now calls me admiral!!
where did this littoral word come f i’d not heard of it until recently, now its everywherere
If the QEC are going anywhere near trouble, especially inshore, they are going to need integral anti air and anti submarine defence. I see neither in any meaningful sense. Until more escorts are built they are dangerously vulnerable wherever they venture.( Iconic RN ships have been lost before for want of a few additional inches of armour). The USN is developing and adding just such defences.
On the premise that steel is cheap, we can work with ‘open architecture plug-and-play’ technology and that commonality saves resources, what we need is a generic flat top well-dock support ship.
Need an amphibious command vessel? Put containerised command modules in the hangar.
Need a casualty receiving ship? Put containerised hospital/surgical units in the hangar.
Need a support ship? Put stores in the hangar.
Need a commando carrier? Put aircraft in the hangar.
Need to minesweep? Put specialist satellite manned or unmanned boats in the well dock.
Combine the manpower and support organisations of LPD, LPH, PCRS, LSD(A), MCMV and it’s eminently efficient. Cadre-ised specialist teams such as MASF, ASRM for the specific functions.
It isn’t difficult. But too many political special interests within fleet HQ to see common sense.
Time for the skimmers to realise its not about the hull, it’s about the capability.
on the subject of casualties, equiping the argus with operating theater and 100 beds already, why still the need for another ship? keep the argus and paint her white, its not rocket science
the obvious answer is to recomission ilustrious as a LPH OR BETTER STILL LOOK TO PURCHASE ONE OF THE MISTRALS FROM FRANCE THAT THY’RE HOLDING ONTO, BECAUSE DEALS WITH EGYPT AND OTHERS FELL THROUGH.
sadly it is said that illustrious has deteriorated so badly a nd so,fast that she would be barely seaworthy.so, a like for like mistral for ocean makes more sense.and the frenchies want rid of the two built for the ruskies.
IF YOU SPEND BILLIONS ON HAVING 2 CARRIERS, YOU SHOULD ONLY USE THEM IN THE ROLE THEY’VE BEEN DESIGNED FOR, OTHERWISE GET YOUR HEAD OUT OF THE SAND, AND INTO THE REAL WORLD AND MAKE THE r.n.worth while.
buy the two mistral the russians didn’t get from france and use as direct replacement for ocean
Surely the real answer is just to build another QEC? And operate two at a time, one in reserve, one in each mode. You still have the same manpower issue in each situation. The designs are already there and processes for building are still fresh.
Excellent article and enlightening. There certainly is a need to retain HMS Ocean, be it mothballed, rather than send her to the breakers.
I went onboard whilst she was moored at Greenwich during the Olympics. She was in first rate order. An excellent vessel.
The simple answer is to create a few more queen elizabeth class aircraft carriers. The cost of production is about £1.5bn, as all the costs were in tooling up the plants and design.