After the perceived failure of the Littoral Combat ship programme, the US Navy has shifted its focus back to building traditional frigates. In this piece, we examine the turbulent beginnings of the Constellation-class (FFG-62) project and look at the wider lessons for those involved in warship design and acquisition.
Background
In the early 21st Century, a faction in the US Navy believed that conflict with another peer state was becoming a remote possibility and the main concern was terrorism and a few rogue states. In this new world, ‘old-fashioned’ frigates were seen as obsolete and should be replaced by something more agile and exciting. With the highly successful Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates in need of replacement, instead of developing a new frigate, the radical Littoral Combat Ship was chosen.
The LCS was intended to be light, fast and modular, able to adapt to different roles and optimised for asymmetric warfare in coastal waters. Without getting into the conceptual flaws, design issues and procurement mistakes, the programme has mostly proved to be a disaster. Having spent $billions, the USN is stuck with more than 30 ships with a mix of reliability issues, poor survivability and missing capabilities. While some have already been decommissioned, the USN is working hard to overcome their shortcomings and optimise them for their main utility in the surface strike role. Perhaps most significantly, the intended ASW mission package for the LCS has been cancelled.
The USN has continued to buy more of the excellent Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (a total of 117 likely to be built, now up on the Flight III variant). Based on a 1980s design, these ships have continually evolved but are now at the developmental limit of what can be done within the existing hull. Burkes form the backbone of the fleet and are exceptionally capable air defence assets but they are not the best ASW platforms.
FFG(X)
Finally recognising the need for conventional frigates, the FFG(X) program became public in 2017. To (theoretically) control costs and expedite delivery, the USN looked for a proven frigate design as a starting point. Breaking with two centuries of tradition, a foreign capital ship design was selected as the basis of FFG(X) – the Italian ASW variant of the Franco-Italian FREMM (Fregata Europee Multi-Missione). In 2020 Fincantieri was awarded an $800M contract for detailed design and the construction of the first ship at its Marinette shipyard in Wisconsin. The lead ship of the class will be named USS Constellation (FFG-62) and a further 5 ships are now on order, with the intention to eventually acquire at least 20 vessels.
The Constellation will be very different to the FREMM. The principal features of the class are the AEGIS Baseline 10 Combat System, the AN/SPY-6 AESA 3D primary radar and a 32-cell Mk41 VLS. No less than 16 Naval Strike Missiles will be carried in canister launchers amidships. In common with the RN Type 31 frigate, the main gun will be the lightweight Mk 110 57mm. Point defence will be provided by the MK 49 RAM Block III system. There will be no hull or bow-mounted sonars but instead, the USN will fit the highly effective Thales CAPTAS-4 towed array sonar that is also the basis for the RN’s type S2087 system. The hangar and flight deck will support a single MH-60R Seahawk ASW helicopter and/or future RWUAS.
Constellation will use a heavily modified version of the Combined Diesel-Electric and Gas (CODLAG) propulsion of the FREMM. The single LM2500+G4 Gas Turbine is common to both but the US will use more powerful diesel generator sets and electric motors, design a new gearbox, shaft lines, propellers and machinery control system. To maintain the low acoustic signature needed for ASW, the design and manufacture of these components needs to be especially rigorous. The USN is committed to building a Land Based Engineering and Test Site (LBES) to de-risk the propulsion and combat system before fitting into the ship.
Customisation costs
Initially, the project seemed like the USN would be getting a series of fine ASW frigates with good all-round performance at less than £1bn per ship. Unfortunately, this optimism soon disappeared as Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and its subcontractors, Gibbs & Cox began to make major changes to the FREMM parent design. The hull has been lengthened by 23.6 feet to accommodate larger diesel generators to support future equipment fit and give an increase in speed to allow the ships to keep up with carrier battle groups steaming at 30+ knots. The bow design was substantially modified to make space for 32 Mk41 VLS cells and the bow sonar was removed to improve speed and seakeeping. The value of hull-mounted sonars are the subject of debate but feature on most ASW frigates. It is not always possible to stream the towed array and HMS are useful for short-medium-range detection and can provide warnings of torpedoes and mines.
With the exception of LCS, the USN has markedly higher survivability standards than most European navies. This includes ballistic protection, water-tight subdivision, firefighting systems, redundancy and revisionary modes for weapons and critical systems. Internal modifications to meet a completely different set of standards requires a significant amount of new design work and has added at least 300 tons of weight to the ship.
Superstructure mass has been reduced and the topside arrangement substantially changed to accommodate US combat systems. The selection of systems already in service should reduce engineering risk but there is still some novel integration work to be done including CAPTAS-4 which is new to the USN. However well-proven, all of this equipment has to be integrated into the design and has little in common with that fitted to the original FREMM.
Initially, the Constellation design shared about 85% commonality with the parent design but the modifications have now reduced this figure to below 15%, almost an entirely new ship. During a design review, it was found the revisions meant the hull was not now stiff enough longitudinally, requiring additional reinforcement. Total displacement has increased by around 500 tons but by October 2023 the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported further unplanned weight growth of over 10% above the shipbuilder’s initial weight estimate. Costs have also spiralled with the latest price for each ship around $1.6bn, a 40% increase on the original estimate.
Unlike many European navies that are more used to compromises and de-scoping projects to keep within tight budgets, the US Navy has historically been able to dictate most of its requirements and frequently accept major cost overruns. The USN issued 511 functional design documents referred to as the contract data requirements list (CDRL) for the FFG-62 and these rigid specifications have driven complexity, delay and cost into the programme. In February 2024 it was reported 343 CDRL items had not yet been approved.
To complicate matters further construction work on the lead ship has already begun before the detailed design work has been completed for many aspects of the vessels. This practice of ‘concurrency’, which gives the impression of progress, usually leads to complications and delays (infamously a policy implemented for the F-35 programme) as re-work, late modifications or back-fitting is required.
The Fincantieri Marinette Marine Shipyard is also struggling with labour and supply chain issues. Particularly since the pandemic, the US shipbuilding and repair sector has suffered from recruitment and retention problems, together with raw material costs rising sharply. FMM also has a significant backlog of work on the tail end of the LCS program and LCS on order for Saudi Arabia. Consideration is now being given to involving a second shipyard for the Constellation programme.
All these issues have culminated in the USN recently admitting that delivery of USS Constellation will now be delayed by 3 years.
Perfect is the enemy of good
There is a good argument that the USN’s uncompromising approach to the Constellation class is to maximise capability and ensure the safety of its sailors. The alternative view is that just when the USN needs more affordable lower-end combatants in good numbers as quickly as possible its decisions to ‘gold-plate’ will cause delays and reduce fleet size. There is a balance to be struck and it is a matter of fine judgement. The RN’s Type 31 programme is controversial but is an example of making a compromise on capability in order to get ships within a given budget and timeframe.
There are those in the US pushing to see the Constellations further up-armed. Unhappy with just 32 VLS cells they would like to see the ship enlarged to carry 48. Besides adding further cost and delay, this kind of mission creep slightly overlooks the frigate’s primary ASW mission (while having good all-around capabilities that allows it to operate independently or as part of the carrier group). The USN needs to increase overall firepower but there are other routes to achieving this. Besides, without the best tools to achieve mastery over the underwater domain, the whole fleet is at risk.
Warship procurement – never easy
From a European perspective, the difficulties the USN has experienced in procuring new surface combatants are all too familiar and of very serious concern. Declining USN hull numbers has major implications for the strength of NATO. Despite years of warnings and small steps toward European rearmament, NATO would still be heavily reliant on the USN to do much of the heavy lifting in the case of direct conflict with Russia.
The challenge from China also intensifies the consequences of US industrial and procurement failures. Total US and European combatant construction combined is comfortably being outpaced by the Chinese. The PLAN fleet is expanding rapidly and in 2023 alone commissioned 8 Type 054A frigates and launched two much-improved Type 054B variants, never mind many other warship and submarine types.
There were advocates in the US for selecting the RN’s Type 26 as the basis for FFG(X) but it was outside the parameters of the competition that specified a platform proven in service. The selection of a design already at sea was, quite reasonably, seen as a way of reducing engineering risk. However, given how extensively the USN has subsequently modified FREMM, this risk has effectively been added back into the programme. With hindsight, the Type 26 might have proved easier to adapt, given its larger hull capacity (c1,000 tonnes) and higher survivability standards closer to US practice. It would also have given the USN commonality with its two AUKUS partners.
The Australian Navy has encountered difficulty adding significant extra air defence capability for its Hunter class to the ASW-focussed Type 26 platform. In contrast, the latest iteration of the Type 26-based Canadian River-class looks well-balanced and will be predominantly equipped with US-made combat system, making for an interesting value-for-money comparison with the Constellation. The propulsion system of neither the Hunter nor River class has been significantly modified and the platform comes with additional power generation margins to support future equipment fit.
The early signs for the Constellation programme are not encouraging but naval procurement is never easy and few nations outside of East Asia seem able to consistently deliver effective warships on-time and on-budget. Delay and cost increases are now unavoidable but let us hope that once the design and shipyard issues are resolved, production will settle down into a steady drumbeat of deliveries. The success of Constellations will play a key part in determining if the USN can reach its goal of a 500-ship force while the need for more hulls and improved ASW capability has never been more pressing.
What the USN set out to do with the constellation class, was all very reasonable. Until you ask the USN and its usual contractors to actually build it. The idea the USN would accept an off the shelf design, built around another navies procurement system, which only limited changes, meaning high European content, was never going to fly. It was predictable that the system would push back and it clearly has in this case.
It was always going to end up a brand new design, sharing almost nothing with the original design. That was always going push out the delivery date. It was never going to be the quick procurement the navy urgently needs. To many want it to be a disaster, so this never happens again.
So we have seen trench warfare over requirements that has caused delay after delay after delay. The vested interests have won, this program will ultimately be canceled after only a handful get built. A new US sourced program will eventually replace it. Another generation of USN procurement personal have learned that buying European is not good for your career.
I would be careful drawing parallels with other programs in over countries.
The British Army have pretty much done the same with the ASCOD chosen as the new Ajax family of armoured vehicles – keep moving the goalposts and redesigning until it’s years late and well over budget. Very typical of ‘Senior Management’ (uniform and civilian) and they then get promoted further for all the f**k-ups.
It’s a fixed price contract so can’t go over budget.
Not true, there is always a way.
There will be upgrades and ongoing maintenance. These costs are not agree to yet, let alone fixed.
It’s not over budget, the budget was fixed at the outset. Tabloids don’t seem to be able to get their heads around this! LM will make a loss, unlike US procurement, the price and numbers are fixed.
Budget fixed so the numbers will decline. Thats already established
‘The BBC has seen extracts of the leaked report. It states that compelling evidence was found that the programme will not deliver the planned number of Ajax family armoured fighting vehicles to the British Army..”
Yes. It was very clear to me way back when they had the design competition from an existing in production type the Americanisation of the supply chain of a non US type would be complicated , but I didnt think they would be as bad as this
This should have been the start of the design and even then seems the superstructure shares features of the now updated Constellation class
USCG National security cutter or Legends . The USCG has a later smaller cutter design under construction – still 4500 tons
There are also 2 other patrol frigates designs from Ingalls of lower capability based on the Legend hull and superstructure
https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/patrol-frigate-concepts-from-huntington-ingalls-industries-gain-traction-internationally/
Yes would thought a frigate based in the Coast guard’s Natural security cutter would have made more traction then it did with the USN. Another missed opportunity for the USN.
Not a missed opportunity at all. The Legend Class derived Patrol Frigate couldn’t do any of the tasks the USN needed on the displacement they could be built for. As soon as you tacked on Aegis, ASW fit, helo etc etc there was no way it could have been done.
The USN needed something to fill the role the LCS program was intended to do. LCS has no Aegis, most don’t have a ASW capability and very limited AAW capability
Since a Burke light would threaten the Burke program, you will never see such an ship in the USN.
LCS combat system is based on Aegis software.
What you mean is the SPY radar system
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/littoral-combat-ship-lcs.html
I stand corrected.
It would have been ‘a development’ just like the Freem needed to changed.
I never said they ‘fit it all onto’ the Legend class
Strangely there doesnt seem to be any model or realistic graphic of Ignalls offering
Ingalls have never so much as released a poor CGI of it….
Which indicates it was either at a very basic ‘back of a fag packet’ stage…or…..was that poor in reality they couldn’t see the point in even generating one of those…
Makes no sense whatsoever. Where is the SPY radar in that?
Thats the USCG class underway. There would be changes required just as Freem was
See no SPY radar in this Italian baseline ship
Bergamini
He USN did not “really” want a budget patrol frigate, they wanted large surface combatants that were slightly cheaper and more focused on ASW than the burkes…but could still do the wider role of the Burke.
If they had really wanted a budget ASW based escort they could have knocked out in large numbers they could have gone for something like the French defence and intervention frigate…4500tons and about half a billion per ship.
FDI is not half a billion. The 2019 price for the French ones cost 780M Euros each, the 3 Greek ones were sold at 1M Euros each with some support.
There was an argument running in French discussion that the price was not an worthwhile advantage over more FREMM’s.and FREMM had a silent propulsion.
That makes T26 look like a bargain.
What is the price of T26?
£850m for T26BII
And that is for a whole full fat warship.
Aren’t the radars, TAS and mushrooms brought from T23?
Yes they are, but all will go through some updates before going on.
The Mushrooms might change though….
Yet these ships are even less focused on ASW than the Burkes are. At least the Burkes have two helos, hull mounted sonar in addition to the towed array, torpedo launchers for Mk. 50 torpedoes etc. The constellation will have one helo, no hull mounted sonar, and no onboard torpedoes. The old Knox Class, and Perry Class frigates (at least until they lost heir ability to launch ASROCs) were better ASW platforms than the Constellation class will be.
Choosing a foreign design and then making radical mods is madness! Can’t see why US industry is incapable of designing a pretty straightforward and conventional frigate, especially when (as the article notes) all the major systems are already proven in service.
Becasusee they have been failing at designing surface combat ships
Yes they are, first the USN has figure out why that is. Simply starting another program is not the solution if they have not figured out what is going wrong first.
They have problems, really deep problems, they need to put some serious effort unto fixing its processes if wants the next program to be a success.
Using a European design would only work if the USN is allowed by buy it completely unmodified. Since this will never happen, this outcome was totally predictable.
They haven’t designed a new frigate or destroyer since the mid-80’s with the design of the Arleigh Burke. That’s 40 years, and there have been precious few design tips from the Zumwalt or LCS designs that could be ported over.
Its the combat systems that are important , not the hull shape or superstructure – and those were upgraded for the FIII
RR USA also provided more powerful GT gen sets
The current generation of SM missiles are vastly different to that in 1990. Even the Sea Sparrow latest generation bears little in common with 30 yrs back
Hull shape and structure are important, or no one would be making new ships.
AB have an obsolescent propulsion system that is highly inefficient at normal cruise speed. AB can’t go from west coast much more than Hawaii with safety margin.
Whats obsolete about GE marine gas turbines.
Thats how warships operate these days, and AB have 4 of them plus RR gas turbine gen sets.
The GT have been improved over the decades , like RR does for its standard naval GT
The Italian navy used LM2500 series in their Freem frigates too and so are Germany and Japan.
The Integrated electrical power and propulsion system brings complexity- ask the RN and T45
A propulsion only of GT to shafts is the thing that is obsolete. It is a ship that is not economical to operate unless the GT is at 90% power.
From wiki
From USNI January 2024
This ia a modern propulsion system for Singapore Navy 8000t new combatant.
From Naval News
This is a modern propulsion system for Singapore Navy 8000t new combatant.
From Naval News
Misleading .
The ABs are more efficient on LM2500 GT when running at 13 kts or above
Thats most of the time…
The LM2500 has been improved over the years like any other aircraft based GT
The tested a hybrid drive system with direct electrical propulsion in one ship USS Truxton . But it wasnt satisfactory and would only be useful at 12 kts or less. The fuel savings were less than expected.
But your glossy brochures might claim different but reality at sea can be very different and you are welcome to your noisy combustion diesels thundering away at low speed
I think noise is one of the issues. To hunt a modern sub requires electric motors and a hull where diesels and turbines are isolated from the hull and therefore the water.
If only the USN had a base on Hawaii………
:))))
Or a fleet of 15 AOR tankers with a new class of 50,000 t still building
Because the last time they designed a surface combatant that was not an abject failure was in the 1980s. At present the US seems incapable of designing and building a viable 21c large surface combatant.
A classic example of how you create a problem. The biggest lesson is probably ‘do not start construction until the design is complete’.
The other observation is the US government/Congress has not got a clue what US industry can and cannot do (not alone in that).
The impact is that they are budgeting money that cannot be spent.
That do not work. The dose is the issue.
The Navy has told fibs to Congress about how ‘complete’ was the design process, after the concurrency disaster of the LCS was already known
You need to do concurrent design/building but there is a certain dose that is good and a dose that can bea disaster.
Everyone is having a difficult time procuring and manning ships. Everyone but communist China.
That we know of. There’s no independent political oversight of Chinese porcurement. Remember how Russian systems like the S400 were viewed before Feb 2022 with how they’re viewed today in the light of experience.
Also remember where China we and have bought their military tech from up until a few years ago.
And then remember the struggles the Chinese were having reverse engineering the Russian jet engines.
Bringing multiple areas of cutting edge tech together is serious hard. And they were struggling with what would, to UK/France/Italy be 1980’s jet engine tech.
Then look at the ships and see the number of independent systems from the sensors on top. That gives a good insight into the lack of integration into a fully central CMS.
Russian CMS is still, pretty much, a chinagraph pencil on some glass. The Chinese look to be in advance of that.
The Chinese are not stupid and neither are they lacking in money or bright people. So they will, in time, catch up. But they are not there yet.
The question really is, ‘are we prepared to spend enough *right now* to stay ahead?’
Agreed. Plus the elephant in the room is the institutional corruption inside the CCP and the PLA. Like Russia pre 2022 we knew it was there but didn’t know how corrosive it was. Everyone at every stage of procurement is skimming a %. The people with the inside knowledge of how bad things are are the PLA leadership. That they are the people least enthusiastic for war over Taiwan could tell us a lot about how bad things really are.
We know almost nothing about Chinese ships, we don’t know how well they’re built, manned or maintained, we don’t know how good their weapons are or how good their survivability and damage control is, we just have to assume that they’re built and operated to a high standard and then prepare accordingly.
Indeed..making assumptions your better and they are inferior is a bad move. All you have to do is look at the high seas fleet and the German imperial navy…it did not exist in 1870 and by 1914 was able to fight the more numerous high seas fleet to a draw…the fact a draw for Germany was a losing position should not distract from the fact a nation with no navy or traditional could move to challenging the greatest navel force the world has ever know in just 40 years…..the PLAN has been growing as a navy since 1980.
It wasnt a ‘draw’ – the HSF ran away into the night.
And the grand fleet after taking a number of significant losses decided not to press. It was a classic cases of a draw as both admirals decided the most critical outcome was to maintain a fleet in being.
But the grand fleet was almost in its entirety ready to sail and fight the next day, something it took the German fleet months to be capable of. The German fleet was in a really bad way and although they had less sinkings, Many more ships had serious damage rendering them incapable of fighting.
AA
All
One of the key reasons the RN beat the Imperial German Navy in WW1 was the key issue of geography = namely that the UK itself acted as a stone huge barrier to prevent Kaiser Bills Navy roaming the wide oceans…………
and so the Navy acted to prevent a enemy nation invading a small and heavily populated island nation lying just off the coast of Europe…
and thus the severe threat of Mr K Bill using his very new navy to transport an already very efficient army across a short sea crossing was averted ( i.e. a huge army that had IFF (using pointed hats) and was already trained on eating high octane combat rations (frankfurters))
Overall Jutland was, at best, what the FA Pools Panel used to call a “score draw” = namely the RN lost more ships and crews: however the German Navy was very very severely battered
The New York Times probably summed it up best = “the German Navy has assaulted its jailor: however it remains in Jail”
——————-
IN WW2, the tables were completely turned by Germany Invading France: which gave it complete control of a very long long coastline
————————————–
Thus, when it comes to the key geo-political question of the 21st century = whether Taiwan will, or will not be, invaded by mainland China- it is always worth nothing that the geography could favour either side
Thus, overall, with both the technology and the geography, a possible WW3 over Taiwan – or Formosa as it used to be called by the commies – is a not dissimilar strategic situation to that the UK itself once faced in in WW2 during 1940/41
regards Peter (irate Taxpayer)
“decided not to Press…LOL
It was a literal U turn as the Grand Fleet was about to Cross their T
‘As darkness fell the High Seas Fleet, despite having sunk an impressive number of British ships, was in a desperate situation. By aggressively pursuing Beatty’s Battle Cruiser Fleet to the northwest it had allowed Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet – unseen until quite late in the day – to interpose itself between the High Seas Fleet and its home ports. The stage was set for a decisive British victory that would wipe out the disappointments of the daylight action on May 31st. ‘
In terms of losses, the Germans could claim a tactical victory. Fourteen British ships had been sunk and twenty six damaged, as opposed to German losses of eleven sunk and thirty damaged. British casualties (including prisoners) came to 6,945 compared to 3,058 German. Balanced against this the Germans had retreated, effectively conceding the field to the British.
we can all find whichever sources and quotes we want this one was from the imperial war museum.
essentially a draw…but all Britain’s needed was a draw..but in material terms the high seas fleet came out on top..but strategically Germany needed the highs seas fleet to destroy the grand fleet which it could not do due in the main to numbers…
but the point I was making that your ignoring, is that in 70 years a nation without a meaningful navy was able to take a tactical victory from the greatest navy on the planet that had hundreds of years of tradition behind it…that’s the lesson, do not dismiss the PLAN because it’s new…arguing as historians have done around the marginal victory or loss at at Jutland is not really the point and actually jellicoe did not press, he did not want to run the risk of running his capital ships into torpedoes with little visibility. That was the right thing to do..many at the admiralty at the time did not think it was.
Precisely Jonathan, it was a German defeat for all practical proposes.
They could not breach the status squo.
Does the picture have any factual meaning or just your hallucination?
Its from the link. Thats what happened a U turn
And refutes the claim of the HSF deciding ‘not to press’
Do this chart view make it simpler for you ?
From a source
As everyone knows the RN was going to cross the T on the German fleet and destroy them, explains it all for our burrowing friend
“There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today” – Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.
How much do you get paid for the daily misleading information?
I have no idea about Jutland…. I rely on experts .
The chart shows the German fleet doing an abrupt U turn to avoid annihilation as the RN battleships cross their T
How sock puppets have you got on the go, is that your game of armchair admiral
I believe Admiral Beaty said that.
I said the grand fleet decided not to press..Every source ever agrees the grand fleet decided not to press, the bloody reason. Jeleco lost his command was because he did not press and refused a night action for fear of torpedoes…it’s in every historic account.
RN certainly did take after the fleeing Germans with their 16 battleships + 6 pre dreadnoughts
The Battleships were fine, all 28 of them , it was the battle cruisers of which there was 9 – a scouting force badly affected.
How can you say with a straight face that the 28 British battleships present were holding off for some blather ‘about fleet in being’ when they came very close to annihilating the HSF- who fled instead with the RN in pursuit
Scouting battlecruisers , having lost 3 of the 9 were still equal to the 6 BC of the Germans present
Scheers only tactical options were to make sure his flight back to base wasnt blocked by RN
Sorry but you’re wrong the ongoing controversy is that jellicoe refused to push forward for a night action. As described below, the reason jellicoe lost command after that battle was:
“Jellicoe was much criticised – and continues to be so – for his apparent exaggeration of the importance of the new weapons of the day: mines and torpedoes.”
“The torpedoes in use at Jutland had ranges effective between 10,000 and 15,000 yards, and carried a 300-pound high-explosive charge. The course of the battle was heavily influenced by fear of this unknown weapon:”
“Jellicoe had declined a night action largely through the fear of a torpedo attack on his fleet at night, though confident that he would still meet the enemy in daylight on 1 June. Scheer, on the other hand, had braved torpedo attack through fear of having to meet Jellicoe’s guns in daylight.”
Night action …LOL
I have no idea about Jutland but even a few minutes checking would show that
..”the germans were practiced at night fighting, the British werent”
By following in the general direction of the fleeing germans Jellicoe planed to bring his 28 battleships into action at dawn which was 3-4am
“Admiral Jellicoe knew that the German fleet, somewhere in the murky twilight to the west of his own fleet, had three possible routes to its home base in the Jade estuary. One was the long way around Denmark into the Baltic, and thence via the Kiel Canal to the Jade Estuary. The second route lay to the south, in a minefield-protected corridor near the Frisian Islands. The third was to the southeast – the Horns Reef route, where another mine-protected passageway ran along the lower Danish coast into German waters. Jellicoe did not wish to fight a night engagement, and planned to intercept the High Seas Fleet at dawn. He was uncertain which of the three routes his enemy would steer for, but initially concluded that the southern passageway, via the Frisian Islands, was most likely, and therefore continued steaming to the south. “
https://wavellroom.com/2019/11/28/reflections-battle-jutland-broad-questions-from-a-narrow-selection-of-the-secondary-literature/
Hindsight now tells us the Germans went via Horns Reef
Your claims so wide of any reasonable analysis and devoid of even hindsight thinking , so the only answer is you have made it all up
Yes right I made up the quotes….go read some navel historians.
We do have an idea from reported overseas sales and the problems/issues with radar, engines and missiles unable to hit targets. Only problem is that when these issues are reported they don’t gain traction with the main media, for whatever reason. It is in the interest of defence contractors and politicians to exaggerate Chinese capabilities, based on numbers (almost nobody reports on PLAN recruiting problems).
So it appears, but then again, they do have a very large population!
Corvette/Light Frigate
https://www.twz.com/sea/our-best-look-at-chinas-stealthy-experimental-corvette
My best guess is that the USN will plough ahead with the Constellations rather than switch. All US defence procurement is tied into political interests. Cancelling a failing programme is much more difficult than elsewhere because of political pressure from congressmen from the sreas affected. See LCS. If they do the most likely alternative would be the USCG NSC. The Type 26/CSC is possible and likely the best fit with what the USN wants but having been embarrassed by one foreign design there would almost certainly be considerable resistance to adopting another.
Let’s hope the T26 lives up to expectations. It has a chance as it is not so cutpriced as the T45 which apart from size and the radar missile system is not so good.
T45 had one major fault which is being fixed in PiP. Fundamentally, they work as advertised.
They are good big hulls that have excellent sea keeping. Crews like them as the accommodation standards are better than T23.
There are lots of problems with the type 45… The multinational missile system is fantastic. And the hull is big. The rest of it not so much. Basically a one-trick pony with a not very big magazine
Pray elucidate?
48 slots of very high end AWW missile.
Soon to be augmented with another load of CAMM slots (24+ as it hasn’t been confirmed how they are to be housed and launched).
Maybe to be augmented with 8 x NSM but possibly could take 16 in the space.
That sound like quite a good load out to me.
You will complain about the lack of ASW and that it is a bit noisy. PiP will have improved that as the DGU’s will be less noisy than the GT’s as all modern Marine DGU’s come with some form of noise insulation around them anyway as the idea of having a really noisy workspace isn’t flavour of the month anymore.
You will also, doubtless, complain about the lack of a hull sonar. This is an issue that can be fixed for relatively small amounts of money and RN does have spare hull sets from the T23’s that are being decommissioned. The issue is rather more people than kit here.
“Hasnt been confirmed where CAMM will be housed”. ?
NL seems to have a good idea and its a location that was reserved for future missile VL
https://www.navylookout.com/royal-navys-type-45-destroyers-reaching-their-full-potential-with-addition-of-sea-ceptor-missiles/
Well it is actually an AAW destroyer so it it’s sort of designed as a one trick pony…and in that job it is very good..as for the magazine 48 slots is not low…many European AAW ships have 32…and you cannot compare it to the burkes as Aster is a one target one missile system, standard is a 2 missile per target system. So the burkes need more standard missiles..
Indeed, comparing Burke and Type 45 AAW capabilities is fraught with inconsistencies. All of the Flight I and Flight II Burkes (28 ships) have BMD at SM-3 exo-atmospheric range, and SM-6 endo-atmospheric range. About 20 Flight IIAs have BMD now and about 2 per year get upgraded with it. Even the 20 or so Flight IIAs that don’t have BMD capability yet can use SM-6 for AAW, which has a serious range advantage over Aster 30.
As to the 2 missile per target issue, that is doctrinal, not a technical necessity.
Burkes, Type 45s, and French FREMMS have all done very well recently in the Red Sea though, so it’s all good.
I was not comparing capabilities I was comparing missile silo size in regards to the core AAW function and pointing out that the 48 asters is not as insignificant as the poster stated..as for doctrine…the reason the USN navy has a 2 missile doctrine is because the kill probability is slightly lower and they use 2 missiles as doctrine to cover that small but vital difference…RN doctrine is one missile..that means the USN needs its larger siloes for the same number of targets.
Again, go back and watch that video and count the amount of missiles being fired by hms diamond. Hint…it wasn’t just one.
I think you are confusing it with the CAMM from the T23 which were fired in pairs.
“one target one missile system” that you are claiming is a calculated risk and you have read too much advertisement, no system is perfect and 100%
shooting a 60 MPH drone with one missile might be enough for high PK while a Mach 5 hypersonic missile might need two missiles for high PK.
your comparison is simplistic and idiotic, is Mars bar better than M&M’s?
Precisely, it is something often repeated here that do not make sense.
“Aster is a one target one missile system, standard is a 2 missile per target system. So the burkes need more standard missiles..”
Please please please for the love of God stop repeating this. It’s simply not true. The only place you will see this claim made is on internet boards like this. Not from the vendor or the military. Even the intercept videos from the red sea earlier this year proves that this is not the case.
I read it in what I considered to be a respectable article, that included the reasoning behind the two different approaches…re the video do you know how many targets Dimond was targeting at the time….
It was reported that it intercepted one missile. You can read about the engagement on quite a few sites including this one we’re on now.
So if there is no difference between semi-active and active seekers why is the USN “upgrading” to active seekers in their ship born missile systems?
Active seekers are more modern and capable, but that wasn’t the point I was making. Whether its a US, UK, Rus, Chi, there are no systems with a 100% interception rate. I don’t believe there is a SAM battery commander anywhere, having ballistic missiles inbound would fire one interceptor per missile and call it a day. They would soon find themselves out of a job and possibly a very short time to live.
It is not the slot size mate but the missile load; the Dutch frigate with 40 VLS has 64 missiles, and the German F124 frigate with 32 VLS has 56 missiles.
It’s VLS magazine is perfectly adequate for the job it is designed for, anti-air warfare. Compared to many European AAW vessels it’s on the larger end of magazines, whereas the Arleigh Burkes magazine comparatively needs to be so large to carry her complement of ASROCs, Tomahawks, and ABMs.
I believe the Type 45 typically carries more Asters than the Arleigh Burke typically carries SM-2s. Aster otherwise is simply a superior anti-aircraft missile, independent from the need of target illumination, and with a higher Pk.
It’s VLS magazine is perfectly adequate for the job it is designed for –
against whom?
A 100 drones of $30k each is about the same price as 2 Aster missiles, what do you shoot after 48 missiles?
You don’t fire 2-3 million pound very high end missiles at £30 drones..you ensure you have a new solution for the evolving threat, such as guided rounds for your medium cal gun and plenty of smaller cal weapons to put up a wall of blast frag.
And pigs can fly too.
What new solution for T45? Why are drones still getting through in Ukraine? even £30 one!
What did HMS Diamond was shooting with against drones at the Red Sea? BB gun?
Install a 57mm gun in T45 instead of 4.5″, replace the Phalanxes with longer range also radar guided guns.
From the kill marks it appears most drones could have been destroyed by a 6×500$ round (Italians fired 2 salvoes of 3 rounds with 76mm) instead of 1M$ Aster
Its cheaper to just upgrade the 4.5 in gun- combat system software to restore the simple AA capability for these slowest targets
A cardboard box under a railway arch is better accom than a T23…
Well not quite but you’re right T23 accom is not great.😁
Very likely part of the retention problem.
Be good to move towards to the standards on T26/31.
I do believe the USN is not so much into standards of accommodation, infact I understand it’s more RN standards circa 1984.
Sorry but the USN hasn’t been embarrassed by a European design, They’ve been embarrassed by thier own meddling and revisions as they’ve forgotten what the point was to begin with..
The chance of the USN buying T26 is as great as the UK buying a Chinese tank, go and daydream.
France (Naval Group) seems to build frigates in a timely and cost-effective way. France is a western country.
Can we learn anything from them ?
I was always surprised that the Japanese Asahi ASW class wasn’t considered. Although just commissioned they were based on the proven Akizuki AAW class. Might have been easier adaptation given the amount of American weapons and technology the Japanese use?…
It feels like the USN wanted something cheaper than an AB (ie budget frigate like T31) to replace the LCS, but with top-end ASW (ie like T26), but have simply ended up recreating the AB but with better ASW.
Feels like a ‘Frankenfrigate’…
I had the same thought, but I think the Asahi and Akizuki classes were built for tactical length MK-41 cells and not strike length MK-41 cells. While the initial weapon requirements for the Constellation class didn’t specify strike length cells, they are definitely getting them.
The Asahi class are certainly beautiful, I think they have perfect proportions.
You are about right.
A bit like AUS trying to turn a T26 into an AAW whatever. It was a bit silly really.
That is where a small group of people who know and understand things can move very fast by determine what is possible or impossible within parameters – it is called high level decision making!
Supportive Bloke
I would like to add that – especially when one compares the Constellation with the weapons and sensors that were once fitted to the USN’s last “true” ASW optimised frigate – that these most-modern of USN ships seems to me to have very little additional ASW warfare capability
.
That ASW frigate was the fifty-year-old design of the USN Oliver Hazard Perry class.
It is now worth pointing out that, of all of the many modern western-designed escort-sized warships that have been built anywhere over the past five decades, the USN’s OHP class “probably” had the best battle surviveability charcteristics.
The OHP’s surviveability, both above and below the waterline, was superb. Tha was well-proven, twice in combat, during the later 1980’s: when tw ships stayed afloat after receiving massive battle damage (thus saving most of their crews)
Therefore – and this next comment is being made despite the comments that have just been made by the NL editor in the main article above – I personally “rather doubt” that the much-larger overall size of these brand-new USN Constellation warships is being driven ever upwards towards the obesity crisis (ie, “Would Sir Like to spend more Money and Go Large“) by the USN’s current warship survivability standards.
regards Peter (Irate Taxpayer)
Funnily enough I have been doing some work on a former USN OHP.
Survivability is OK and the fact that they are still sailing around is a testament to a sound design.
OHP survivability is not at the level that is designed into RN vessels post Falklands but its comparable to that seen on most ABs which are comparable main space machinery wise to B3 T42s.
Biggest issue with the OHP is a single shaft. Lose the propulsion train for any reason and its time to lower the pod and trundle around at a few knots.
But that is the difference.
DC in machinery spaces is the key. One of the big advantages of IEP. The downside is that if some bits get wet…see QEC saltwater main failure for more information…the ship survives but…
I always heard that azimuth thrusters has s**te all shock resistance, so if you’ve lost the propulsion train through shock damage, I would imagine that the pods would be knackered as well ?
USN has very large, by RN standards, crews which need accom of increasing standards.
A very wide range of weapons also drives crew size as well as taking up space.
Top weight of the radar system drives metacentric weight and therefore hull size.
So you have three major factors that say larger.
Then as you say you have survivability. An area where RN excels.
Yes Australia seem to be repeating the problem with the T26 AAW transmogrification…
The RN’s approach seems to be to have specialist classes, T45 for AAW and T26 for ASW, because a ship that is top-end at everything is both too expensive to build in numbers, and consequently too expensive to risk due to low numbers. Then to bulk up the fleet numbers have the cheap general-purpose T31.
(Though for this strategy they really need more T31s…)
I wouldn’t call T26 specialist.
Yes, it is very good at its primary role of ASW but with mk41 and CAMM it is also a capable platform for both ASuW and local air defence.
I’d say it’s a ASW specialist as that’s its primary role.
As for the Mk41 VLS and CAMM they are there to stop it being a one-trick pony. Both the Mk41 and CAMM are going on the T31 and CAMM is going on the T45.
Every ship needs air-defence these days which is why they’ll all have CAMM. The MK41 is useful for land/surface-attack. I’m sure if there was space and money then the T45 might get these too.
As I always observe it is easier to buy some Mk41 compatible missiles than it is to fit a VLS and order the missiles. If you wait to lump both together into a budget line the line become too big and gets cut.
So having the VLS fitted enables the follow on conversation(s) to be tackled at piecemeal.
Isn’t the AAW variant of the hunter class just a BAE concept?
He’s just saying that the Aussies turned the Hunter class into a proper multirole cruiser with full AAW rather than leaving it as the base ASW oriented design.
Exactly.
Got ya.
No the Hunter class is T26 ASW which the Aussies are trying to shoe-horn into the AAW role too. Trying to do both ASW and AAW is making it wider, longer, heavier, and more expensive.
Last-year BAE did float a guided-missile variant of the Hunter, with between 96 and 128 VLS by stripping out the towed-array, mission-bays, Mark45 gun, etc. The Australian’s don’t seem to have been tempted.
As I understand it, you get to keep the towed array & ASW optimised propulsion if you go for 64 mk41 VLS (still loose the current mission bay). You loose it all if you go 96 VLS. 128 VLS meant no main gun so not a realistic option.
At the end of the Hunter build, a new AAW Destroyer build is to immediately follow. According to Minister statements, the drop in Hunter numbers from 9 to 6 has not changed this. Hunter is already destroyer sized, destroyer CMS, destroyer class radar. They may still be tempted, but not necessarily for the current Hunter build.
I would also not be surprised if Canada looked at the idea for some of their build. They currently have no destroyers, so rather light on for AAW.
Canadians are doing the same with their own version. It will have Standard missiles and a SPY radar And it is what everyone is doing with ships of this size, having a proper AAW capability.
Only RN thinks different so a drone can be 50km from T26 RN lobbing missiles and T26 RN cannot hit the archer.
Instead T26 CAN/RAN can hit the archer.
Read Janes for info on the actual range of CAMM missiles.
A 99kg missile that goes several Mach numbers don’t have 50km range with current engine tech launched from land.
one would hope they will buy into the longer range CAMM options being developed.
If you’re talking about the Canadian River class, it looks like they have dropped CAMM for point defense and are now going with a 21 cell RAM launcher. The Hunters seem to be sticking with Phalanx for point defense, I don’t think the Australians considered CAMM.
Just the RN version.
The RAN and RCN Type 26’s are also 3 times the cost of the RN version. A lot of that is related to domestic build but not all.
Domestic build is shipyard only and often 1/3 of the cost.
Its the propulsion and plethora of ship systems that take it up to about 50% . The rest is combat system, major sensors and armament to cost the final 50% and thats mostly ‘never local’
Yes it’s quite possible to increase the AAW capabilities of a T26 without massive top weight issues…the reason AUS hit top weight issues is they went for the very heaviest radar set they could find…
Yes, I always wondered about the size of the radar tower on the Hunters. Seems ridiculous and I wonder if a lot of their problems would go away with a lower profile, like on the Arleigh Burkes. At some point you are just better off going for AEW.
It is not the size of radar from what i have read, it is that the cooling is also made there.
RAN also increased range so more fuel in tanks down low as well.
Thats most of the weight increase.
Radars are relatively light but affect stability when up high so that needs extra beam
The critical condition is when they have some sort of flooded compartments as they are warships and expect that from battle damage
The Hunter class have L , S and X band multiple face radars all on the same superstructure block
It’s a seriously amphibious radar set up for any ship not over 10,000 tons
Most ships have those 3 bands already, usually only one is multi face flat plate and they may have the others on separate parts of the ship.
Ambitious is having a local outfit making all 3 types and knitting all the multi faces together …before 2035
Could you try posting in English and not gibberish?
You don’t seem to understand the different types of AAW or the concept of having specialist vessels.
The Archer is a 155mm artillery gun system, if you mean the ship that is firing the missiles then you are wrong yet again. The RN T26 will have NSM and ultimately FC/ASW to sink opposing surface ships. But the RN ciuld also add a few maritime Tomahawks into its Mark41 VLS.
“archer” is the whatever vector it is that fires missiles in the air in context of AAW . You seems to understand what AAW means.
The thread is about the 3 naval radar bands L, S and X and the effort to put them all on the ships main superstructure tower , all made by a local radar manufacturer.
None of us have any idea how you diverted off into army high calibre artillery, no doubt its an internal conversation you are having
The biggest issue AUS is having, is not so much turning a T26 into a AAW ship..it’s the fact they decided to stick the heaviest radar anyone could possibly find on the top of it..I suspect any hull less than 10,000tons would have struggled with a CEAFAR 2 set with the maximum size and number of panels. They could have dropped the weight of the CEAFAR as it’s a scalable system…but they wanted the very best radar in the world on their ASW frigate…….
But they don’t want just an ASW frigate.
It seems some countries are going for the very best nec plus ultra ship – maybe because buying warships is political difficult so that chance has to be seized – good enough is not good enough…
Trouble is it’s then a catch 22…the super HMS Massive appoach leads to smaller and smaller numbers of ships ordered and designed that flows into a cycle of ever increasing costs per ship…thank goodness the RN has broken itself out of that cycle..and followed the far more pragmatic La Royal approach in which just enough is enough capability..with hull numbers being a quality all of its own.
Which ever way you look at it though, T26 is an expensive design. Hence RN forced to get 5 x T31 to make up the numbers with potential for more. RAN is supposedly getting 11 x GP frigates in the 3,500 – 5,500 tonne range (decision on design in 2025), with Spain, Germany, S.Korea & Japan on the short list.
Hence I doubt RCN will get 15 T26 River class as they are currently configured. Perhaps 9 River B1 ASW & 6 River B2 AAW (with 48-96 mk41). Otherwise they are somewhat short on area defence as they no longer have any destroyers at all (unlike RN & RAN). They could even follow RN & RAN in dropping T26 based numbers for more of an alternative smaller cheaper frigate (say reduce 15 to 12 & add 6 T31/whatever RAN goes for). Something like 6 ASW, 6 AAW & 6 GP. They are also looking at increasing submarine numbers. Remember, Canada has a Pacific coast.
Expensive compared to what?
Consternation Class?
Latest French offerings?
CAN T26?
AUS T26?
Compared to all of those it is a bargain.
Did you ever think of comparing it to the UK defense budget and the £22bn black hole? Is the law of physics mate.
Well T26 RN it is inferior to all of those. But what is the cost of HMS Glasgow being build for 7-8 years and commissioned probably in 10?
I would suspect the T26 will be a better ASW asset than a constellation..but the constellation will be a better strike asset.
Strike and specially AAW, Constellation will have ABM capabilities to,
The hangar of Constellation is also bigger than T26 so more assets there too.
Problem is the Constellation is supposed to be a high-end ASW to make up for the AB’s deficiencies in that area. Instead it’s going to be second-rate compared to T26.
Cost of first 3 £1.2bn each, cost of last 5 £900m each.
Wrong.
It’s not really that expensive for a large high end surface combatant that is exquisite in one area..the first batch are 1.3 billion each..the second batch are around .85 billion each..that’s profoundly cheap..really the first in class constellation is expected to come in at 1.6 billion dollars and each there after just over 1 billion each and that’s for 20. A new flight AB costs 2.2 billion and that’s after they have churned out 73..
at .85 billion they should nail a few more on as a batch 3.
the big advantage of the T31 is that it is stupid cheap ( that does not make the T26 expensive) ..half the price of the new 4500ton french second class combatant or the entire first batch of five for the price of one USN AB. And that it doubles the industrial capacity for escorts..which we need because HMG accidentally forget to order any escorts for a decade and if we go to war with china we will have a navy to rebuild.
Did you say better ASW than the AB? Its single towed array sensor and signal processing may be a step up, but overall, this ship will have less ASW capabilities than the ABs. It is entirely relent on a towed array, leaving it with zero onboard sonar sensors if the towed array is unavailable for any reason. Also, it has no onboard torpedo launchers for close in targets/anti-torpedo uses. It seems to be a lousy ASW ship, particularly in shallow water environments
Type 26 has Sonar 2150 as a bow mounted sonar….
USN procurement of surface ships makes the UK look competent. To take a proven design then change it so much that it is no longer proven is idiotic.
Far better to uparm the Legend coastguard cutter.
I suspect that fleet numbers matter more than exquisite ASW capability with much greater reliance on SSNs for ASW. But with unit costs rising above T26, the USN may achieve neither.
Really?! Compare Constellation with HMS Glasgow looks like 10 years build to service time. For now Constellation still looks better and it is a more complex ship being multirole.
It looks likely that Constellation will also take @Владимир Темников 10 years from order to acceptance. It isn’t really much more multi role than T26. But it is going to be much more expensive which may threaten the plan to build 20.
Where is 200km range anti aircraft missiles and anti ballistic missiles in T26?
In the strike length mk41, though the RN T26 may need a radar upgrade. So SM2, SM3 & SM6 will all fit. Aster 30 versions have been fit tested, but actual mk41 integration still needs to be done, but the whole basis of mk41 is ability to add new missiles. We are still several years away from any T26 firing anything.
Ah, the radar upgrade. It is is more like radar replacement. One of my perennial criticisms of RN T26
Don’t US supercarriers have a habit of being sunk in training exercises by conventional powered small subs from countries like Sweden. If these exercises are anything to go by, the absence of a dedicated ASW warships in the fleet makes most of the US carrier fleet little more than Davy Jones Locker fodder. Does a carrier have to be sunk before the USN stops believing it’s own propaganda about being invulnerable.
Constellation is an ASW frigate, was the only in competition with electrical power.
No they don’t, a single instance does not constitute a “habit”.
You need to check your onions matey
Great article. Sub Brief did a video on the mismanagement (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgXuBWw9X8U&t=1s) I hope it’s ok to link this video to Navy Lookout). What a pointless endeavour.
Just watched the video. These guys in the USN leadership team couldn’t get jobs at Monty Python! They make The RN procurement teams look like GODS! I suggest that anytime a NavyLookout poster critiques the RN Shipbuilding schedules they are made to watch this!
I’m afraid I’ve been saying this for years. The US has forgotten how to design ships – as have most of the western nations. Exceptions being Italy, possibly France and maybe Holland.
There’s a deficit of institutional knowledge, which is illustrated by the current trend to demand ever more detailed design as well as process-led documentation – as exemplified by the CDRL mentioned. By the time you’ve developed your detailed product model and followed the snake oil of MBSE your ship design is outdated or you’ve spent all the money.
If you don’t do the early stage designs often enough, you lose the people who understand why ships are as they are – and just as importantly – whether they should remain that way Arleigh Burke has actually caused untold damage to the USN.
T31 / Hunter/ CSC are all in flight and none are going well. Buying “proven” designs is an illusory attempt to reduce risk
Buying a proven design only works if you actually proceed and buy said proven design.
What we tend to see is, is a navy will buy a proven design to use as a base for a unique in country program. The end result is a design with only a limited association with the original reference design.
It seems the people who make the choice have little understanding of what it takes to turn their dreams into reality.
I suspect we are now at point were were at forty years ago in the fighter industry, where building a fighter around a unique country specific set of requirements is so expensive only a handful of countries can afford to do it.
I believe we will see more joint programs as navies accept reality.
Britain has a number of very good domestic designs, Germany as well to a lesser extent. The design of the Baden-Wurttemburg, F126, and F127 frigates I think represent the future of fixed-array major surface combatants lacking T26-style flexible mission spaces.
They’re seemingly more space-efficient, damage-redundant, and better balanced than the Burkes/F100s – I believe.
The F125s are not a good warship design, even putting aside the poor execution that led the first in class to list and requiring considerable one-sided ballast to correct an already overheavy ship. It’s a peacetime design (whose weaponry includes water cannon) that came to fruition after the peace was over. The CODLAG propulsion, used on the T23s and FREMMs for quietness, is used on the sonarless Baden-Wurtemburgs to reduce maintenance! Really? It was to reduce maintenance issues that the T26 avoided CODLAG for the simpler CODLOG.
The Germans wanted reduced maintenance on the F125 so that it could be forward deployed for up to two years, then gave it a range of 4000 nmi, only marginally better than a corvette. Frankly, with its lack of VLS, although it should be just about capable of defending itself with gunnery, I wonder if it’s really fit to send alone into today’s world.
One thing missed is the VLS weapon fit.
Connies will not have the illuminators associated with Aegis fits on ABs and Ticos that allow the use of semi active homers.
Flight 3 ABs have retained the illuminators even though they receive the Spy 6 AESA radar.
The connies will be limited to having the still in-development Standard 2 111C active homers or ESSM active homers for regular air defence. The Standard 2 111C is not due to become operational until 2027 and as yet hasn’t even done any operational test shots to prove its capabilities. It’s also going to be a quite expensive missile. 1.2 mill for a regular SM2 plus 2.3 mil for the conversion kit to make it a 111C version.
You could of course fit out the VLS with SM6 but that’s at around 4.5 mil a shot.
ESSM can be quad packed and is 1.3 mil a shot, has a lot shorter max range than SM2 but has a long minimum engagement range. That means you also need RAM missiles or a Phalanx to cover short range engagements
I don’t think the VLS weapon fit is a problem at all. According to USN budget documents, SM-2IIIC started delivering to the fleet in Dec of 2023. It’s a major acquisition program, EOC, IOC, and FOC dates are good reference points, but the program is well under way already. Furthermore, as of 2026 SM-2 IIICs will get the same guidance section as the SM-6 IA and will be redesignated SM-2 Block IIICU. ESSM Block 2 production is already under way, it is already in use by the USN and the RCN.
The SM-2 Block IIIC and ESSM Block 2 will also feature heavily in the Hunter and River classes.
Flight III Burkes might still need illuminators for the SM-3, which the Connies won’t use. Both the Connies and Flight III Burkes have SPY-6, though of course the (V)1 array on the Flight IIIs is giant in comparison to the smaller (V)3 that the Connies and the remaining Ford class carriers will get.
A large reason for the delays in the Constellation program is that the USN is adding to the requirements of the combat system. People here don’t seem to acknowledge that the spec getting better is probably a good thing over time, the ships will have more capabilities than originally envisaged. time delays are embarrassing, but these will be very capable ships. I think it highly likely that terminal BMD capability will be added to the frigate version of the Aegis Baseline 10. It should be possible given the SM-6IIIC (very likely SM-6 as well) and the SPY-6(V)3 radar.
A 21 cell RAM launcher for point defense is already part of the Constellation class spec.
Who thinks in semi active radar guided missiles these days? that is legacy tech.
——————-
The RAM launcher in Constellation is over the hangar covering the sides and stern.
Incidentally the stern defence of Type 26 seems to be lacking. Do not matter for targets that can be detected and shot at some distance, but Type 26 is lacking in that quadrant for short range.
Sea Ceptor has a very short minimum range. It can cover 360deg.
Sea Ceptor is the Type 26s point defence missile. Cold-launch with a high rate of fire and short minimum engagement distance, vertically launched with a 360 degree engagement arc.
Incredibly manoeuvrable, accurate, and fast… active homing and can be guided onto target even by navigation radars.
I understand that the reason ESSM B2 has a semi active (as well as active) mode is due to the insistence of at least one consortium member (Raytheon has the lead, but it’s not strictly a Raytheon product – some members supplied money, others supplied IP &/or produce parts – it’s an international effort).
It’s harder to jamb or confuse a semi-active when driven by a high power quality fixed ASEA system with loads of computing power behind it. Two targets close together is one scenario I can think of.
I thought it was the other way round. semi active was susceptible to jamming and confusion
The RAM system is used because there is a gap in the minimum range of ESSM. Plus RAM works as an additional layer but has only a directional aspect which isnt 360, unless theres another one forward.
ESSM B2 on most vessels only acts as a B1 unless the Aegis upgrades have been done (says DOTE)
Plus it reduces illuminator support not eliminates it
Simply wrong.
I think the Connies are running into range and endurance issues which will not sit well with Pacific operations and the carrier escort duties. Correct me if I’m wrong.
I don’t think there will be a problem to be better than AB’s maybe except at top speed.
I’ve heard that the extra weight margins built into the Constellation class design have been encroached upon by additions in capabilities, not that margins have been breached, or that they are slow, or that range has suffered. I think any range and endurance issues due to growth and weight were identified by the USN in the wave tank at Carderock a couple of years ago and compensated for, hence at least part of the changes and delays. When they hit the fleet (probably starting in 2029) they will be the ship the USN wants/needs.
It seems odd to me that some people here want USN requirements to mirror RN requirements, different navies just have different needs. The USN likes multi-mission ships with good AAW capabilities and radars, weapons, and high speed datalinks to contribute to the overall USN kill web. The Constellation class will do that with SPY-6, SM-2 IIIC, and Cooperative Engagement Capability, while adding ASW capability to the fleet.
They will be the ship the US ‘gets’, warts and all.
Could go one of two ways, like the LCS or might turn out to be like the burkes which though decades old are still the most capable surface combatants in the world.
The U.S. really doesn’t build pretty ships, even when they get a half decent looking ship they have to hit it with a mallet.
This is unfortunately an unreliable article.
The author do not make legitimate comparisons And worse not even make a comparison with RN Type 26..
Constellation looks also a well balanced and predominantly equipped with US made combat system. That is not the point.
The point is what time and costs to change the Type 26 to the Type 26 with US equipment like with Constellation.
We don’t know the time of Canadian project to compare because it did not reach same development level so the comparison is not possible . What we know is that the costs already more than duplicated. This did not happened with Constellation.
News on Canadian from Ottawa Citizen January 2024
Bad mouthing the Australian Type 26 and do not even make reference to the significant increased in costs of Canadian Type 26 looks particularly bad when the Canadians are not even at same development level
Finally the RN Type 26 HMS Glasgow was laid down in 2017. Only now is at sea and will enter in service probably 10 years after being laid down.
Fact is, RN T26 is closer to entering service than any of the types you mention above.
RN T26 also has Mk41 VLS and could take more of the shorter version of Mk41 in place of CAMM to allow multi packed missiles.
More the issue is the instance on high mounted flat panel/plate radars that are very heavy and skew the metacentric weights. That is the real issue with AUS/CAN redesigns.
The other part of the problem with the CAN/AUS efforts it is that it is very hard to change a ship that has been designed from keel up for very high DC standards. You cannot just make it bigger; or longer; or heavier….these have massive effects.
Fact without relevance. Type 26 RN started to be build in 2017 – already 7 years – Type 26 CAN and Type 26 RAN, Constellation started this year. If they take 10 years, they are at same level with a much more complex and capable ships.
But will they be ready for WW3 and at what cost? You are looking at Commissioning in 2036 is my guess. By then the RN has 8 in commission.
US law and those who can change it don’t care if WW3 is around the corner.
USN could have bought FREMM with Aster they take 4 years do build. Since the competition was won in 2020 and with shipyards of Fincantieri all over the world they could probably have commissioned a couple frigates – maybe 4 or more by next year.
If Australians want Australian systems, if Canadians want US systems and much more capability than RN T26 and if US want US systems in the FREMM then time is one the biggest costs to pay.
T26 RN will be in service by 2027 or 2028 and it started in 2017. By that time USN was still saving the unsalvageable LCS.
Not sure why people continue to quote ridiculous whole of life costs for ships. Whilst these numbers make good political and comedic points they have little basis in reality. What we do know is that the delivery costs of the second trench of T-26 is cheaper than the first and that the ships are on schedule (with a wobble for COVID). The schedule is based upon a sustainable ship building drum beat, not on how quickly ships can be put in the water.
To suggest that the Constellation clusterfuck, which follows on from the Ford clusterfuck, which follows on from the Zumwalt clusterfuck, which follows on from the LCS clusterfuck, is good practice and going to plan requires a major departure into an alt reality! Which the article doesn’t subscribe to, and rightly so.
I’d rather be in HMS Shannon though.
HMS Shannon. Laid down in May, commissioned in August of the same year. Four months to build a frigate! Using fir rather than oak was new technology and meant she lasted only 8 years: lived fast died young. Everything went faster in the 18th century.
The 1750s were a period of considerable experimentation in ship design, and Sir Thomas Slade, Surveyor of the Navy, authorized individual builders to make “such alterations withinboard as may be judged necessary” in final construction.
Maybe we should do the same.
You do realise that 80% of the C$80bn & 60bn is future maintenance and running costs over the service life of the vessel right.
It is irrelevant what is the propose if the rules to make the accounting did not changed . The price more than duplicated in relation to the price that won the competition.
There is not way around it unless you can say that first price included support for 20 years and now it is support for 40 years.
I appreciate that your native language is not English and you have limited understanding of accounting standards. However, projections into the future, longer than a couple of years, from an actuarial or quantitative analysis perspective are pretty meaningless, from a risk management perspective. So a projection of 30 or 50 years into the future, is as I have said only relied upon by comedians or politicians. Take your pick. What you can rely upon is the purchase price.
A good example would be the Ford aircraft carrier, it is often quoted as having a $13bn purchase price (nobody quotes the service price incase their head explodes), but if you actually read the relevant Congressional reports, $13bn was when they stopped “counting”, the inservice delivery cost has yet to be determined. So add maybe another $3bn to that and you get a more accurate picture of delivery costs.
Having worked with actuaries/quants in the project management field for 30/40 years, trust me when I say these projections into the future are for the simple minded who believe them.
Accounting differs between countries, some countries subsidise weapon exports – so even an international buy don’t always show the real cost – and price many times includes support, services and training that increase the price significantly for some weapons . So comparisons are always difficult.
I also know that predicting the future is impossible. Life long prices are all fiction. But they still show the difficulties that a project is having when they increase 2 fold.
What will be the real price of RN T26 after being build for more than 7 years ?
The contract price is the contract price. The delivery time is irrelevant, unless it activates “penalty” clauses. So yes, we do know the “price” of the first batch and second batch of the T-26. And as I said before, the second batch is cheaper than the first batch.
The contract price changed.
a link for that ? or is it a maintenance cost
2015 contract £0.85 bill for ‘development’
2017 £3.7 bill manufacturing contract for 1st 3
2022 £4.5 bill for 5 more
A new class has expensive development and entry into service cost and time
So the first 3 cost £1.2bn each and the next 5 cost £900m each.
Are we talking about UK or Canadian T26?
I have come to believe our Admirals are actively working to make us weaker. Why does an ASW platform have to have Aegis? Through network links an accompanying Aegis platform (we’ll have over 100 Burkes) could direct AAW assets from the FFG. When you see what Turkey has done with acquired FFG-7s it makes me furious. We are not preparing for nation state battle, but moving deck chairs on the Titanic. We need hulls in the water, not ship that has slightly less AAW capability but more ASW than a Burke for the same price. 1 billion USD for an FFG?! Insane
Because it makes sense. The AB’s are a 1980’s design with 4 GT’s and accommodation levels are not current anymore and will have to be retired, many will be retired before the next DDX will appear. And also it makes sense to have AAW capability in any ship. Italy and now France have Aster 30 in their frigates.
Burke do no cost 1B$ , it costs 2.3B$
The ABs were redesigned hulls and superstructures for the Flight III. As the previous variant was at the limit for future growth that was eaten up by the heavier new very advanced radars – 2 bands in one flat plate- the hull below the waterline was recontoured to increase overall buoyancy – thus restoring the growth margin over the life of the ship.
Some of the previous variant are getting most of the sensor upgrades
There isnt much left as far as the systems goes for the late 1980s design – in service 1991- and theres no miracles in ship design over the last 30 years
Aegis is the combat system, it’s becoming the fleet standard. Aegis and the combat management system US amphibious ships have (Ship Self Defense System) are merging in a couple of years. Both variants of LCS will end up with COMBATSS-21, which is an Aegis derived combat system.
If you are asking why the Constellation class has SPY-6 radar, it is fast becoming the fleet standard. Aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, destroyers and the Constellation class will have versions of SPY-6 in the USN, it’s just the future.
Its the future for US navy only. Its not available for allies , they can ‘chose’ Spy-7 only
Aegis is a generic name for software libraries which then build a specific combat system
The LCS used Aegis libraries too
The Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate was a very successful design with 71 ships built over 30 years. With a displacement of 4100 tons, it packed an all-round weaponry of SAM1, Harpoon, CIWS, 76mm gun, torpedoes onboard, and ASW helicopter.
It was by no mean a Gold plated design but in battle, quantity has a quality of its own,
The PLAN Type 054A frigate has a plan of 50 ships with 35 already active and its successor the Type 05B frigate, 2 are being built,
On the other hand, RN has a mere 9 old frigates in commission.
It did not had the fuel economy that Europeans wanted and with 1 shaft only was at more risk than those designs. The single missile system had more range than Euro ones in AAW , but had only one fire channel. The missile launcher was also for everything. including Harpoon SSM making it a point of vulnerability.
Best thing things it had : The hangars for 2 SH-60 and it could be build fast.
And how many 2 shafts Type 21 frigate of the same era was built? 8?
I have an OHP anytime for the Falklands War instead of Type 21 with the crappy SeaCat.
Range to where from European countries? 8 (Turkey) 6 (Spain)
This OHP couldnt defend itself either
The Sea Cat version in the T21 was an automated blindfire system
Tactics win battles not brochures ,its even risky relying on brochures to go on holiday !
As usual, your comment is fake.
The USS Stark was shot at not in a war situation while HMS Sheffield was sunk in war condition.
Even if the T21 SeaCat missile was automated with a Blindfire system, it was still obsolete by then. How many T21 was sunk? HMS Antelope, HMS Ardent? Could you try to keep up?
No worse than the OHP missile defences then. All missile systems of that era didnt perform as the brochures you quack on about claim.
This GWS24 Sea Cat brochure on T21
However the Falklands T21 operated in narrow sounds of the Falklands with mountainous background.
Unlike the vast wide Gulf ( 120 miles wide ) and flat surrounding desert where Stark was – yes it was right in the middle
It was a war like situation, the Iraqi Mirage fired 2 anti ship missiles, which both hit. Dont recall war being declared between Britain and Argentina either.
So 1982 Falklands was not a war situation and the RN was just sleeping?
All the crappy Seacat missile with the fantastic radar that could not work properly was retired after the Falklands War
That fantastic radar that you claimed was also not Blindfire. Has any Type 21 got CIWS then which the Pakistan Navy installed later?
The Seacat brochure disputes you claim.
of course the Falklands was hostilities , just like the hit on the Stark
The USS Stark was shot at not in a war situation while HMS Sheffield was sunk in war condition.
Yes it was.
…
Which one was in narrow waters surrounded by mountains where its radar wasnt optimised.
The other was literally in the middle of the 120 mile wide Gulf
Would the crappy Seacat have been capable of shooting down an Exocet in the middle of 120 mile wide Gulf then?
Neither could the inadequate SM-1 ….but love the launching system
Khazi, that is what the Phalanx CIWS for? and why RN bought them? Neither could Seadart stop any Exocet.
The original comparison was the ‘so much better weapons systems on OHP’ in that era.
The reality when an OHP was in a war zone much like the Falklands where hostiles are firing their missiles , the brochure/fanboi claims show OHP wasnt so good.
Monty you were one of them.
Sea wolf was in service by 1982 , so the GWS-24 was out of date in an era when systems aged quickly
GWS-24 radar used this radar from Italy
It was blindfire in the sense it would do both target search and target illumination. The earlier systems had a man in the loop for targeting
However the missile launder was at the rear and the radar at the front so not 360 deg coverage , fixed with the Sea wolf and launchers front and rear ( in the era before vertical launch)
OHP in 1982 had the benefit of having the 76mm instead of lousy for AA 4.5″, but the Phalanx was only arriving to service.
IMO, the USN messed up royally. They should have never tampered with the FREMM design in the first place. They should have left the design as is and simply installed the weapons and systems.The US Navy messed up with the LCS and now they messed up with the Constellation class as well. Congress needs to fire NAVSEA and either buy the FREMM outright with NO design changes or buy the USCG’s Legend class cutters and Upgun them to Frigate standard.
The “we had to remove the bow sonar due to sea-keeping concerns” official USN reason given in their Congressional report, seems like a reasonable, if very odd choice for a ASW focused frigate to hunt submarines. Ship stability is a serious issue, especially with the US specific changes.
However, the real reason for no bow mounted sonar is, due to very strong political pressure to select the winning Fincanteri shipyard located in Wisconsin: the shipyard is on the Menominee river, part of the Great Lakes System.
If the bow sonar from the original FREMM design was kept, the ship would NOT be able to clear the St. Lawrence Seaway to make it to the ocean, and thus be permanently land-locked. That’s not an exaggeration. The Constellation design certainly can handle a sonar dome, but the actual shipyard building it, & the incredibly shallow sea-ways allowing ships to reach the ocean from the rivers, can’t.
It’s surprising they didn’t look for an alternate way to get a hull-mounted sonar. Something conformal, perhaps.
They could put the sonar in any place.
I sincerely hope your wrong about this. If true, we should simply cancel to the contracts for any ship hose keel has not been laid, and just start over suing a shipyard that is actually on the coast.
Begs the question, why not pick the T26 as the basis, if they planned to make so many upgrades, as it sounds like the T26 is a closer fit to what they wanted.
In what way? The T26 does not even have a top weight radar like the FREMM
Had to be in production and service . T26 at the time hadnt.
And yes the T26 UK has a rotating radar on the highest superstructure like Freem
It’s not a very good rotating radar.
I don’t think we should be too critical of Constellation project. The RN’s own T31 project seems to be dragging its heels. The picture below turned on X late August. If it represents recent progress things don’t look good:
How is that even a comparison. Babcock had a greenfield site . Fincantiere didnt, theirs was a ‘hot’ warship building yard with the LCS still coming through, a derivative being built for Saudi Arabia as well.
Keel block for Venturer was laid in April 22, so that was only 2 yrs 5 months back
Its clear the designers have been stuck on the FFG detail design at 80% for a few years so the builders started the hull bottom modules before it was all complete. The detail design of the T31 from its parent type seems to have gone reasonably well.
It is a matter of what they promised and what they haven’t delivered.
There was a competition here and they won the contract on what they promised.
The impact of the delays will flow through the whole project. The effect of the delays will be impacting on the second and third ships and the delays are unlikely to be much recovered by ship 5.
There are 2 issues here, industry issuing unlikely promises and governments believing them.
The delays suggest that the project budget is blown and the taxpayer is going to have to bale them out if you want 5 ships.
Have you just found that out… warship building never delivers what they promise.
BAE have been doing that ever since they took over at Barrow , 20 yrs back
I don’t think you quite grasp what an utter c0-ck up Constellation has become. It’s a mess. A real mess. Really the only thing it has in common with T31 is that supposedly they are building a warship.
OOPS
No Phalanx? Urrggghhhh.
Something better. Sea Ceptor
The development process and reconfiguration of this ship is alarming. it is as if the Navy is conceding its inability to contest China in the South China Sea by taking the ASW variant of the FREEM, and redesigning it into a terrible ASW platform. In one fouls swoop, the Navy has 1) lost any benefit from using an existing design as its base, requiring a longer hull, different superstructure, different engine plant, different sensors, thereby essentially designing an entirely new ship; and 2) In that redesign process, the Navy has failed to create a ship that could fill the glaring hole the Navy has in surface ASW operations, particularly in shallow water environments that are within range of an adversary’s diesel-electric boats, like the South China Sea. The LCS was supposed to play that role, and now it cant. The DDG’s are not well suited to the role either. Now, with the redesign of the FREEM, the Navy has managed to do nothing more than design a mini Arleigh Burke DDG with a focus on air defense. As designed, the new FFG will have only one helicopter and it will have no hull mounted sonar or torpedo countermeasure sensors. They even lost the ship launched torpedoes, which, in a pinch, can be used in an into torpedo role. While they at least kept a nixie decoy, those trail behind the ship and any torpedo that hits the nixie stands a fair chance of severing the towed array cable, leaving the ship with only its helo. and its limited number of sonar buoys. Also, hull mounted sonars are typically better at detecting close in threats, and some areas of the SEA or Persian Gulf are just too shallow for towed array sonars anyways.
I understand the concept that a good ship now is better than a perfect ship later. But in determining where to make compromises, we should have favored the areas where we are currently weak rather than just adding more anti-air capabilities to a force that is already pretty strong in that regard. We have already lost a generation of ship building with the ill conceived LCS and Zumwalts. Now is the time to look at the force and ask where are we weak, and fill that gap, rather than adding another ship that that repeats already existing capabilities.
Italian FREMM maximum speed is about 31+ kn. The 27+ declared is the speed with only the gas turbine active, but is also the declared maximum speed of French FREEM.
Italian FREEM has a CODLAG propulsion system with variable pitch propellers, while the french onesa CODLOG configuration with fix pitch propellers.
The bow retractable azimuth thruster is already part of FREEM units design.
I can’t believe they eliminated the hull mounted sonar. I also can’t believe they started cutting steel without a finalized design – well yes I can. Gone are the days when we had leadership that knew what they were doing.
“…the USN will fit the highly effective Thales CAPTAS-4 towed array sonar that is also the basis for the RN’s type S2087 system.”
The Thales CAPTAS-4 is a Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) not a towed array.
The towed array is the (TB)-37A Multi-Function TowedArrays (MFTAs) is a different piece of equipment streamed from the fantail that is towed behind the ship that provides sonar support, but requires less ships performance restrictions, and can be recovered more rapidly. CAPTAS-4 depicted
TB-37 Towed Array is a significantly different construct.
CAPTAS-4 is on the right, and TB-37 is on the left.