As part of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee enquiry into armed forces readiness, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Ben Key gave some insight into the current availability levels of the RN fleet. Here we consider the discussion and some of the nuances and context that were overlooked.
Fight tonight
It was asked of the First Sea Lord how many frigates and destroyers could put to sea if called on to “fight tonight”. He was understandably reluctant to be pinned down on exact numbers but stated that “we maintain about 50 per cent of the fleet at high readiness and above” and when pushed, said that there were typically about “eight and a half or nine” escorts at readiness or at sea. It is important to see availability as a constant cycle as ships move through maintenance, training and deployment phases. This cycle is dependent on a long tail of force generation planning to get the vessel to the right material state, provide SQEP (people) along with the spares, stores and equipment needed to make an effective fighting unit. In an emergency greater numbers could be deployed but only with significant consequences in terms of availability in the future. The smaller the fleet becomes, the more acute the effects of any interruption to this cycle.
At the time of this committee hearing, surface combatant availability as a proportion is looking unusually healthy with 9 or 10 of the 17 in commission either at sea or at a high state of readiness. Of course, this peak number can be expected to dip as ships cycle back from deployment. For example, both HMS Dauntless and Duncan have been away for some time and will inevitably need maintenance periods before any of the 3 Type 45s in deep refit are ready to replace them.
Self-congratulation should be avoided as almost everyone agrees that 17 escorts (16 in reality) is woefully inadequate and it was not long ago that Boris Johnson’s government was talking about increasing numbers to 24. While the RN always insists it can meet its mandated tasking under the (classified) Defence Planning Assumptions, there is clearly little depth or resilience to cope with the unexpected or combat losses.
The frigate gap
Asked what the First Sea Lord would like to have in an ideal world, the Admiral replied, “What I’d really like is to accelerate the pace of transformation from the ships and submarines we have in build to the new navy…” He compared this new generation of ‘digital ships’ that replace existing ‘analogue vessels’ as being similar to when the RN changed from sail to steam propulsion. This may be rather over-selling the difference between a Type 23 and Type 26/31 but the more important point is that the new ships will have much better availability and greater flexibility for different roles.
Mark Francois MP pointed out that the first Type 26 frigate, HMS Glasgow will have taken 11 years from keel laying to becoming operational in late 2028 which compares very poorly with other navies such as the Japanese. It was implied this delay was all the fault of industry but in fact, the story is rather more complex. The Navy spent almost 30 years deciding what would replace the Type 23 in a convoluted process of changing requirements and a few blind alleys. Years of austerity, the costs of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and aircraft carrier construction, helped push the project further to the right. By the time the Type 26 design was mature enough to begin construction, its price had ballooned and the MoD then spent at least two years in a standoff negotiating on price. The eventual compromise was a slow build schedule agreed by all parties which would spread the cost, keeping in-year payments down, although increasing the total bill. Unfortunately, COVID and production problems added another 18 months of delay.
Putting aside the issues with the first-of-class prototype, HMS Glasgow, 1SL pointed out that of more importance is that the rest of the Type 26s are delivered quicker and in a steady drumbeat, on time and without significant teething troubles. It should be noted that the 5 Batch II vessels will be delivered faster than the first 3 ships. Other than HMS Glasgow the expected In-Service Dates for the Type 26 frigates are not public. (Assuming Babcock can deliver on their promises, the Type 31 in-service schedule is more definite). Dates for the retirement of the Type 23 frigates are also fluid and will depend on their material state. It is doubtful the RN itself can even be sure what its frigate fleet will look like between about 2028-35. The ‘frigate gap’ in this period where the ageing Type 23s have to be kept going awaiting replacement by new ships is undoubtedly the RN’s most pressing medium-term worry.
Following our article published in May highlighting the state of HMS Westminster, the committee pressed 1SL and Rear Admiral Moorhouse on her future. They continue to insist she has not been axed and that a refit might still happen, subject to “ongoing work to understand what would be involved”. The refit would cost at least £100M and might take 3-4 years. It starts to look like wasted money if she can only serve for a few more years from around 2027-32. Transferring her S2087 Towed Array Sonar system to HMS Iron Duke or Argyll (not a simple operation) in the interim might have to be considered. HMS Westminster is highly unlikely to return to the fleet, even if it will entail a further dip in frigate numbers into the early 2030s. A cynic might suggest the RN has been told to stall on the announcement until after the election, by which time it will land on another minister’s in-tray.
Think the unthinkable
Based on our recent article highlighting the concerns about increasingly long deterrent submarine patrols, Sarah Atherton MP asked what can be done to improve matters, especially for submariners. 1SL admitted, “What keeps me awake at night is the pressure on our deployed personnel”. A ‘Tiger Team’ is currently tasked to “think the unthinkable” and look at completely new ways about how submarines are deployed and operated in order to relieve pressure on people.
Mr Francois also quoted our article from late August that noted not a single RN attack submarine was at sea on a particular day, something he described rather unfairly as “operational failure”. 1SL rightly pointed out that this was the best situation for the boats at the time, given their schedules and that maybe they did not actually need to be at sea on that particular day. This is a nuanced argument and 1SL is right to say that submarines are not put to sea for the sake of it and it would be pointlessly disruptive to the operating cycle to do so. (Within a few days, two boats did sail from Faslane as we predicted). When pressed, he suggested that half the force (3 boats) could be put to sea in extremis. He also reminded the committee more broadly that “days at sea” numbers are not a good measurement of fleet effectiveness or actual availability.
However, the episode highlights how a 6-boat force is far too small and 2 of those precious submarines are effectively stuck alongside for an extended period due to maintenance and support infrastructure issues. To say they were “not needed at sea on that day” may be true in a narrow tactical sense but certainly not in the wider strategic sense. It will always be desirable to have one or more boats on operations as they are arguably our most potent naval assets and create great uncertainty in the minds of adversaries. They are also needed to gather intelligence, respond to events, and would be very useful in the Pacific and other theatres if only we had sufficient numbers.
Rounding off
Mr Francois also cited another of our pieces on recruitment issues but the discussion focussed purely on the long term and the pros and cons of the tri-service privatised Armed Forces Recruitment Programme (AFRP). An important opportunity was missed to press the Admiral on the low numbers of candidates making it into basic training right now and what is being done to address this very real crisis. Everyone recognises that in the long term militaries around the world will struggle to find recruits for a variety of demographic and societal factors, however, the RN does not have an attraction problem at present. According to the MoD’s own figures, at least 80 people apply to join the RN every single day but failures in the processing pipeline mean many suitable candidates don’t make it to HMS Raleigh.
On the sustainment of the fleet in theatre, the witnesses pointed out that the RN can be positive about the progress with the Type 45 PIP programme and the success of forward-deploying a frigate, MCMVs in the Gulf and the Batch II OPVs overseas. The RN was one of the few navies that was able to send a carrier strike group across the globe during COVID with very little host nation support.
Finally, it should be noted that Ben Key and Steve Moorhouse are generally well-liked and respected in the service and are grappling hard with an array of legacy problems, few of which are of their making. They are obviously constrained by what they can say in the committee but mostly endeavoured to be honest and avoid the spin and obscurification that is sometimes the refuge of other uniformed and MoD witnesses.
It was curious that none of the committee asked about the defence of the RN’s main naval bases. Having seen the success of Ukraine at hitting Russian ships in port, how would the UK defend against similar threats? It’s much easier to hit a stationary vessel tied up alongside, or in drydock, than one moving around at sea. Airborne and surface drones, and cruise missiles. have all recently been successful at degrading Russian naval assets in harbour.
This appears to be a gap in UK defences, not just restricted to maritime assets, but as this is a naval website I’ll just ask about RN bases for now.
Good point. However I suppose that, in extremis, there remains the options of using the facilities in Rosyth and Gibraltar and possibly Falmouth too.
Yeah but how much capability for serious dry dicking and refits do those bases have? Probly nowadays next to nothing.
Sky Sabre might need a few extra units.
Sky Sabre is Sea Ceptor……with a different radar……?
Yes, it uses SAAB Giraffe. It also has a different CMS, essentially the one from Iron Dome.
Our geography helps as the three major UK naval bases are south/west facing and threats are expected to come from the North/ Northeast. So attacking them with surface vessels would be extremely difficult. (especially with the towed array sonar frigate patroling) For missiles we rely on th RAF QRA if a threat is launched against the UK. Our best defence is to make sure these threats aren’t launched in the first place by escorting vessels near the UK and maintaining a good knowledge of everything near the UK.
The submarine base at Faslane would be easily knocked out with a minimal attack using long range cruise missiles regardless of where they are launched from, it is so exposed with no apparent defence systems. The only saving grace is that nobody has had an interest in doing it.
The RN base in Qatar near the Persian Gulf is certainly vulnerable to drone/missile attack. Iran and their proxies have used drones and missiles repeatedly to hit targets in the region both on land and at sea. Bases at Cyprus, and Diego Garcia are also quite vulnerable I would think.
Excellent point Peter, remember at the outbreak of WWII the RN suddenly demanded thousands of AA guns to defend their bases. Just another reminder that Defense agencies of the govt tend to plan for the last war but one, as per C Northcote Parkinson.
Cheers
John
No mention that we do not have an operational LPD at the moment and no date for its recommissioning.
The issues with old ships, a lack of submarines and personnel is just the bit we see. The real concern is the run down in the supporting infrastructure. Devonport is a prime example and whilst money is now being spent on 10 dock this is impacting on submarine availability including the V Bombers.
Given this is our ultimate deterrent it doesn’t bode well for other parts of naval support infrastructure that might not be such a high priority.
I wouldn’t be too pleased about having Navy Lookout pieces cited by Penfold. A man whose schtick largely consists of grandstanding and whose “reports” show a somewhat disturbing inability to distinguish opinions from facts.
Penfold?
Separated at birth?
And penfold
Thx, must admit Penford never crossed my horizon.
So says the skipper of HMS Conservative Party
I always thought an opinion repeatedly endlessly without evidence became fact after 100 repetitions in The Strangers Bar after 10 pints?
All 5 Type 31s target is to be all in service by 2030, so the question is can the existing GP Type 23s last until then.
The bigger concern is the ASW Type 23s, as at best we’ll have 3 Type 26s in service by that date. Depending on the ships conditions, and how heavily they are worked over their remaining years, it may be necessary, as speculated in the article in to transfer a S2087 towed sonar to a GP Type 23 frigate.
This is not an outlandish proposal, all the Type 23s were originally designed as ASW frigates with towed arrays. The current ‘GP Types’ are simply those that didn’t get the S2087 as part of the mid-life refit of 2004 to 2012.
It would be a prudent move to avoid any ASW frigate gap.
The GP T23s are the oldest ships. Lancaster will decommission when she comes back from the Gulf. Another T23 will replace her.
This leaves 1 that could be reverted back to ASW. The ASW T23 are also getting new hull mounted sonars although Westminster’s will now be spare.
Trouble is, how long will the GPs last? Not much longer I suspect. Maybe it would be better to adapt the first T31 coming into service. I suspect they will get the new S2150 off the T23s as 16 sets were ordered for both T23 and T26. I don’t know if T31 could be adapted for a towed array.
By 2030 only 2 T26 will likely be in service so there will be a dip in numbers.
At the same time Fort Vic will probably have to leave service before FSSS enters service.
All this points to CSG taking a hit in the late 2020s and early 2030s. The RNs has to have a ship on TAPS which will be the priority.
You’re making a basic error by assuming that the oldest ships are the most knackered. In real life it will depend on lots of factors, such as the build quality from that yard, the number, duration and environment of its taskings over the years, any incidents such as accidents or rushed refits, etc, etc.
The T31s are not getting the S2150, they are getting S2170. This gives the T31 basic defence should it accidentally encounter a submarine, but it doesn’t equip it to actively hunt submarines.
I think “Navy Lookout”, who came up with the idea in the article of updating a GP Type 23 to ASW, probably has better knowledge on this that either of us. I assume you bothered to read the article…
As the article states, the most expensive LIFEX was Iron Duke, the youngest of the GPs.
Argyll is in her third major refit of her life and is only expected to stay in service until 2027-28.
Lancaster will decommission when she come back from the Gulf.
16 S2150 sets were bought for T23 and T26. The RN aren’t going to waste nearly new sonars, so I suspect they will move onto T31s or T32s if they transpire.
They won’t be going on T31, for the simple reason that the bows have been fabricated without the ability to fit them……
Can T31 not be adapted to have a sonar fit?
It seems strange that the RN would order so many S2150s if there was no use for them. You’d have thought the b2s would get old T23 sonars then.
Could be a under hull dome fit ? But not sure
You do know that 2170 is a torpedo warning set – and nothing else?
Yes, as I pointed out in another post when I discredited the idea of using T31 for active sub-hunting.
The RN can’t afford to modify the T31 contract, so any refit of the first T31 would have to take place after delivery, with a knock on effect on operational dates. As you point out, Lancaster can’t be extended much beyond the end of 2025. Iron Duke will probably go by end of 2027, so not getting Venturer operational in 2027 will cause yet more problems if we want a GP frigate covering the Gulf in 2028.
It might be better to modify the last but one T31, Bulldog, rather than the first, so we could be as certain as possible of 3 GP frigates without extra delay. Or better still, we could fast-build another T31 batch, this time second-tier ASW by design, coming operational from 2030/31. (We could even call them Type 32s, but I wouldn’t.) That would require someone to make decisions before the next election, even before the first T31 has been delivered, so the risk profile will be high. A early gate contract to pay for design and planning could be the best option with the costly build decision left for the next government. It would signal intent to Babcock and help forestall questions about the future of Rosyth in the election run up.
I don’t think that means we shouldn’t look at making Argyll ASW as well. They alleviate the problem over different time periods.
I agree the first T31s should be left alone, without Mk41 etc. The RN is managing with just 3 GPs in service so the 3rd or 4th T31 could still be upgraded with a sonar without causing too much disruption.
To me it just doesn’t make sense to upgrade a T23 when it will decommission a few years later anyway. With only one that could be upgraded anyway it doesn’t make sense. The RN has many deployments a GP T23 can cover, e.g. FRE, or any NATO deployment, or trials for new weapons systems like Dragonfire, or new aircraft, saving ASW T23s for tasks that require an ASW ship.
As noted above, you’re essentially talking about IRDK and then only because she’s finally available after a long refit.
Fitting 2087 to that ship is not a straightforward task, not least because you’d have to get into the winch well to fit the passive tail and winch and then do a bunch of structural work under the quarterdeck and on the transom to fit the active towed body and winch.
That’s before you get to recommissioning the after Sonar Instrument space, which will also require a bunch of modifications to the local power and CS interfaces.
Probably another 6-12 months in hand to do all that and that also assumes that the ships certification will allow the additional weight.
Best solution is probably to refit F237, but attempt to do it in a shorter timescale. There will be a trade-off between overall cost and time in hand and it won’t be linear.
Moral of the story. Don’t design and build ships for an 18 year life and then try and run them for double that – or at least not in a Navy that requires a safety certification regime as well as time available for sea.
Yes a lot of work… but if not, we’re down a ASW frigate for years. But all that work has been done previously when the ASW T23 frigates were upgraded so the risks should be reduced. Given the Chilean Navy have managed to retro-fit the S2087 to the Type 23s we sold them it would be embarrassing if the RN can’t manage it.
There’s many morals to the story;
• don’t let short-term funding issues affect investment in long-term project, which leads to delays, greater overall cost, and capability gaps
• don’t have long gaps between ordering warships that results in a loss of skill-base and having to order OPVs just to retain what’s left
• design the frigates to have lots of flexibility in what they can accommodate so that they can cope with new requirements that emerge during the design process
If it only takes 6-12 months to convert Argyll or Iron Duke to ASW, that sounds vastly better that the current four-plus year estimate to sort out Westminster. Probably vastly cheaper too.
Don’t forget that the four year estimate is based on a workforce planning assumption for Devonport. Westminster herself was built from keel up in under three years.
You should be able to do the ship in well under three years by applying more bodies.
The other thing to remember is the certification issue. The ships have diverged in weight and stability since the mid-noughties.
Might be cost effective to consider leasing 3 of the recently decommissioned LCS Freedom class variants from the US as a stop-gap. Could work well in the North Sea and UK waters, ideal to demonstrate PODS modular capabilities and other innovations for future operations.
Nooooooooooh
More cost effective to use the gigs
It must be quite embarrassing for the 1SL to give satisfactory answers when he has basically BUGGER ALL to work with in the first place. Who’s fault is it? It’s certainly NOT the Royal Navy’s.
Did watch the video, 50% at 30 days is a good number.
But 50% of F/D 16or17 is only 8.
But looking at the Russian fleet not including the ships in the Pacific. F/D is 15 if they have a 33% at 30days it’s only 5 ships. And 5 F are bottled up in the Black Sea.
It was interesting that when asked what he would want more of ( than currently planned ) he said OPV’s and MRSS particularly in relation to the RM. This is an interesting insight into what the RN may be proposing and prioritising to a new govt after the next election.
Thats just a political answer because it please the Navys real masters – The Treasury
Changed from coal to steam propulsion? ???? What does he think the coal was burnt to make then? Egg Banjos?
Err except he didn’t say that, if you watch the video. He says from “sail and coal to oil”.
“ It was implied this delay was all the fault of industry but in fact, the story is rather more complex. The Navy spent almost 30 years deciding what would replace the Type 23 in a convoluted process of changing requirements and a few blind alleys. Years of austerity”
I’m not so sure about that.
The unloved 1SL West got G Brown to accelerate GCS in return for giving up T45 7 & 8.
Cameron, Clegg, Osborne thought it was too expensive and kicked the can. That bit of money ‘saving’ has cost billions. Along with delaying replacing the V boats.
Thats right . The too expensive angle was was a smokescreen to put spending off, until it could be announced – still largely the previous design-as a pre election ‘bribe’ for the voters. Created havoc for the poor old T23s
I agree and the long term fault lies with the govt in wanting to reduce defense spending rather than increase it, in these times of expanding threats, they think we got through the Cold War so now it is all honky dory.
Cheers
John
I’m afraid not. The requirements for what was the FSC submission in 1999 are essentially the same as those for T26 as approved in 2010. The only requirement change was a brief flirtation with go-faster when the USN were enthralled with LCS, which luckily got squashed quickly.
The simple reason that the three attempts to move FSC/GCS/T26 forward during the period 1999-2007 foundered was that Browns Treasury didn’t want to spend the money.
The subsequent 2010 delay was fairly short and far more to do with a redesign for a specific feature than anything else – followed by a far more prolonged game of chicken over who was going to pay for it.
The last two T45s on option were cancelled in 2009 to provide funding for the new frigate design
this was when the T45 construction costs for 4 and 5 were in the region of £650 mill each.
Your partisan view as usual fails to see the new government in 2010 cut everything- which is well known to everyone else .
Even when the pre election go ahead was given in 2015 , the development of the final design and industrialisation was at a snails pace as by then the project had collided with the start of the new nuclear deterrent Dreadnoughts spending – as of this year the MoD had spent overall, £12 BILL on design, long lead orders ( mostly reactors) etc
Great article as usual. Does highlight why doesn’t UK agree to SPEND MORE ON DEFENSE, Afterall itis desperately needed, 3 or 4% like the US. Global Britain wil depend on it and it costs a lot less than the NHS which suffers from the problem that if you make something free there will be infinite demand. ould not sink to the levels of its other partners like
The UK is a vital part of the Western Alliance and would still be a force to be reckoned with if it would cease choosing economy-stifling socialism over private enterprise and defense.
Cheers
John
All
I am with “Supportive Bloke” on this one.
It is far to easy to just glibly blame the politico’s (both parties) and HM Treasury for the mess today – i.e. too many tasks and not nearly enough warships to go around – when the real root cause issue has to be laid at the door of some very muddled thinking inside the procurement teams of the RN and MOD.
With the Type 23 frigate design of the mid 1980’s the RN had produced a very-competent all-round warship (however admittedly one optimised for North Atlantic ASW). Furthermore the UK shipyards were able to, from about 1988 onwards, produce this warship at the rate of (very roughly) one per year. This was what we now call a regular drumbeat of work.
Furthermore, by the late 1990’s, Merlin’s were coming into operational service. The Merlin is versatile platform which massive increases the effective range and reach of any single frigate.
Hence by 2000, so fully ten years after the end of the original Cold War and also despite the change in government in 1997, the RN had a very competent and quite-modern frigate fleet. It was also getting more modern helicopters.
During these ten years (1990-2000) the UK government was still spending plenty of money on conventional defence forces (Note: All of the big savings in the overall defence budget during that period were coming from reducing size of the British Army of the Rhine and RAF Germany and also the fact that the Trident programme was completed and in-service).
Thus by 2000, by far and away the most-obvious thing for the RN to have done would have been to continue to produce the Type 23. I believe an improved “Batch 2” design would have fitted what the RN needed quite nicely. Several suggestions for improvements and variants of the T23 had been on-the-table since the late 1980’s and the favourite always looked to be a slightly-stretched version.
Accordingly, from 2000 onwards, the RN should have been making hay whilst the sun was still shining = and just continued to produce its popular frigate warships on regular “production line” basis. These could have been ordered from the shipyards that knew how to build them properly, both on time and on budget, at the rate of one per year.
At that time, the total frigate force was planned to number about 30 to 35 (i.e. 1998 SDR). Thus, if frigates have lifespan of about thirty years then the calculation is quite simple. The the RN needed to build one new frigate per year so as to keep its frigate fleet up to strength. (and also take one per year out of service)
However – throughout all of the 1990’s and 2000’s – all that was ever produced by the RN and MOD was concept studies and ever-more-glossy colour brochures. Who on NL remembers:
Before 2010 – when RN finally decided it really wanted the Type 26 – there had been two full two decades of just 3D modelling (3D=Dithering, Dawdling and Doodling) and nowt else..= so nothing at all in the frigate-sized warship department was coming down the slipways ………..
and so most of the UK’s commercial shipyards had gone bust (i.e. mainly because of a lack of regular RN orders!)
Thus by 2010 – so once the penny had finally dropped and the RN leadership finally realised that all of their remaining Type 23 were all-too-rapidly approaching the end of their natural lives – the world had changed:
Thus by 2010, after two decades of dithering, once the Navy had finally made up its own mind as to what it wanted, the UK government had no money left….
And we all know only too well that leaving old ships in service for too long racks up massive dockyard bills!
All in all, the RN’s procurement policy for the workhorse of the fleet – its frigates has over the past three decades has been classic case of:
“at first we were indecisive; however then we were not so sure what we wanted”…
Peter The Irate Taxpayer.
Hmm.
NATO Frigate replacement dates from the late 80s, became Horizon which ended up as Type 45. In no way shape or form could the requirement for that have been met by a T23 however modified.
Future Escort became Future Surface Combatant and went for its first initial gate in 1999, which it failed, ostensibly because the requirement for ASW ships could not be justified at that point, but actually because the treasury said no. They tried again in 2003 with the same result – and again in 2006/7 with the S2C2 (sustained surface combatant capability), still HMT weren’t having it. In all cases, the requirement was essentially the same, although the solutions (total clean sheet design (including Trimaran), modification of T45 design or modified foreign design) differed. Every single time, HMT said no.
Cerberus Stealth was a private venture idea (VT IIRC), not an RN idea. Fast Flexible Frigates (possibly BMT NGA?), Global Corvettes, Motherships etc were never formal RN programmes, more stuff put forward by think tanks and as conference papers.
Could the RN have continued building T23? Theoretically, yes. Practically, not so much.
Firstly – what were you building them to replace? Leanders? Already gone. Type 42? No T23 would be area AD capable to the extent required, whatever BAES glossies may have said. T22? Still had plenty of life left and were actually designed for a longer life than T23. So making the case to HMT – and their scrutineers – would have been tricky.
There’s also the minor issue that the design did not (and does not without concessions) meet the various safety and accommodation policies that were by then in place. Everything from damaged stability requirements, through-life margins, accommodation allowance to fire-fighting systems and refrigeration / chiller gases and MARPOL requirements.
Then you’ve got the thorny problem of actually building them. By 2000 there were two surface ship yards left in the country – Yarrow and VT. Arguably you could include Barrow, but the Wave and LPD builds were ongoing – and not ongoing well……Of those, only Yarrow had built frigates since the late 80s. Swan Hunter – the only other T23 builder – died in 1993/4.
Yarrow and VT ended up building T45s collaboratively. One could – again theoretically – have had one yard build T45 (which was why VT moved to Portsmouth) and one build T23, but that would have had two issues. Firstly where’s the money for the extra ship per year coming from? Secondly, by keeping building T23, you atrophy the design teams, which is what happened in any case. Batch modifications don’t exercise the right sets of skills (which is one of the reasons the T26 has been a bit of a palaver). Yarrow were also busy building the Brunei corvettes in the early noughties, although with hindsight, all parties probably wish they hadn’t.
The RN – and DE&S – were well aware that the T23 wouldn’t last forever, it wasn’t a case of waking up and finding a surprise. They had two problems. Firstly, the designs were consistently much larger than they were expecting and there were some who “knew” with absolute certainty that a frigate “should only be 5000-6000te” otherwise it was “unaffordable” (without necessarily seeing a price!). These people took a great deal of convincing and/or outflanking, which is why what is a 9000te plus ship is still described in places as 7000-ish.
Their second problem was that making a compelling case to HMT always came up against the question – “Can you run them on for a bit and defer the decision?” – to which the answer was always a qualified “yes”. It was only at the fourth attempt that the question could be answered – with supporting evidence – “yes – but the cost of doing so will approach the cost of a new build and the time to implement these life extensions will seriously reduce the number available”. At that point – HMT concurred and the programme went forward, only to bump into a change of government and SDSR 2010.
That resulted in a relatively small slip while the need and cost was re-examined. While that was ongoing, a significant change in configuration – not capability – was made which forced a significant redesign, which both ate up time and money and actually induced some compromises in the ships certification, all of which led to a prolonged game of chicken (2-3 years) before any agreement was reached to proceed with the programme, complete basic design and move to detailed design. All complicated by the ToBA dating from 2008 (particularly the bits about right-sizing the Clyde workforce) which meant that the build time was distinctly sub-optimal.
The history is not enjoyable reading. However, it is definitively not a case of the RN not knowing what it wanted. I could read virtually all the line items from the 1999 requirement and they’d be broadly the same for the 2003, 2006/7 and 2010 attemts to get the programme through Initial Gate. It is more a case of a number of transient circumstances obstructing progress, but at the heart of it is lack of control of a long-term capital programme for shipbuilding. Which is the best part of Sir John Parkers National Shipbuilding Strategy – and the one part that remains unfulfilled……..
“Well, Chairman, had we not spent 75 plus billion on HS2 …”
If “one T23ASW” will be missing until the 8th T26 come (starting from HMS Westminster), how about improving ASW capability by other means? Adding an “ASW frigate” looks difficult and time/cost consuming.
ASW tasks:
Meanwhile, for tasks “other than ASW”
Patrol and shadowing Russian and Chinese warships:
Anti-Surface:
Just my thoughts.
Francois ans former loser Ellwood want the ships to stay at sea despite famuky issues and lack of manpower. Neither offer any solution just stay at sea damn sailors
The British military in general, and the Royal Navy in particular, are much, much too small. It is absolutely irresponsible for an island nation like the UK, and one that has ambitions much further afield from the home isles, to have let its navy dwindle down to its current emaciated state. This is a terrible indictment of the entire UK political system.
It was clear from its beginning that using a civilian contractor to recruit RN, RAF and Army staff could only offer a second rate, clerical process and a poor outcome. If members of the forces are not involved in recruitment, the connection between the citizens of the UK, especially the young ones who will form our armed forces, and the forces themselves is severely weakened. If put back into the hands of serving officers and experienced soldiers, sailors and airmen/women, serving or recently retired, we can turn the process round. It’s not difficult.